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Foreword
World Report 2015 is Human Rights Watch’s 25th annual review of human rights
practices around the globe. It summarizes key human rights issues in more than
90 countries and territories worldwide, drawing on events from the end of 2013
through November 2014.
The book is divided into two main parts: an essay section, and country-specific
chapters.
In his introductory essay, “Tyranny’s False Comfort: Why Rights Aren’t Wrong in
Tough Times,” Human Rights Watch Executive Director Kenneth Roth reflects on a
year so tumultuous, “it can seem as if the world is unraveling.” The rise of Islamic
extremists, the retreat of hoped-for gains after the Arab uprisings, and the creep-
ing frost of Cold War-style tensions, he writes, have prompted many governments
to view human rights as a “luxury for less trying periods.” But, he says, retreating
from such ideals and falling back on established relationships with strongmen, as
many influential governments and important international actors have done, is
both myopic and counterproductive. Surveying several of the year’s most daunting
security challenges—including the rise of the extremist group Islamic State (also
known as ISIS), China’s crackdown on Uighurs in Xinjiang, and Mexico’s abuse-rid-
dle war on drugs—Roth stresses the important role that human rights violations
played in fomenting and aggravating those crises. He argues that ending and re-
dressing those violations is essential if sustainable solutions are to be found and
affected societies put on a firmer foundation.
Until the summer of Snowden in 2013—when former National Security Agency con-
tractor Edward Snowden exposed details of the agency’s previously secret spying
programs—international momentum and commitment to global Internet freedom
had been building. That movement has since been derailed by revelations that the
United States and United Kingdom have been engaging in mass surveillance—a
practice widely condemned, but also increasingly emulated by other countries. The
result, warns Cynthia Wong in “Internet at a Crossroads: How Government Surveil-
lance Threatens How We Communicate,” could be a “truly Orwellian” scenario in
which “every online search, electronic contact, email, or transaction is stored
away” in government databases, vulnerable to misuse. With fundamental human
rights—including freedom of expression, association, and information—on the
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line, Wong insists that privacy and surveillance remain on the human rights
agenda of the global community, and that various United Nations institutions, as
well as Germany, Brazil, and other countries that are taking up the mantle of Inter-
net freedom, continue to pressure the US and UK to implement meaningful re-
forms. 
Most civilians killed or wounded in warfare today are the victims of explosive
weapons—a lethal range of munitions that include aircraft bombs, mortars, ar-
tillery, rockets, barrel bombs, and ballistic missiles— detonated in populated
areas. In “Deadly Cargo: Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas,” Steve Goose and
Ole Solvang provide a stark picture of the devastating human and physical damage
caused by these weapons in such environments, where flying shrapnel finds easy
targets. In the past two years alone, explosive weapons have maimed and killed
tens of thousands of people—mostly civilians—in attacks that often violate inter-
national law. Noting building international momentum to address the issue, Goose
and Solvang call on countries to—among other steps—cease using such weapons,
especially those with wide area effects, in populated areas, as well as review na-
tional policies that outline how and when they are deployed. “Curbing their use,”
they write, “would have a bigger impact on the protection of civilians during armed
conflict than anything else we could do.”
Finally, in “Raising the Bar: Mega-Sporting Events and Human Rights,” Minky Wor-
den highlights the contradiction between the lofty ideals surrounding the
Olympics and other large-scale sporting events, and the often-grim rights-abusing
reality on the ground. Russia’s 2014 Sochi Olympics, for example, resulted in
forced evictions, violations of workers’ rights, a crackdown on civil society and
journalists, and anti-LGBT discrimination; construction in Qatar related to the 2022
World Cup has resulted in the death of hundreds of South Asians working in a
highly abusive construction sector. With just two countries in the running to host
the 2022 Winter Olympics—Kazakhstan and China, both flagrant human rights
abusers—the International Olympic Committee, Worden says, faces a “crisis of
choice” that provides the impetus for the IOC and other international sporting bod-
ies to finally reform a system “that for too-long has rewarded human rights abusers
while often creating misery for local populations.”
The rest of the volume consists of individual country entries, each of which identi-
fies significant human rights issues, examines the freedom of local human rights
IX
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defenders to conduct their work, and surveys the response of key international ac-
tors, such as the UN, the European Union, the US, and various regional and inter-
national organizations and institutions.
The report reflects extensive investigative work that Human Rights Watch staff un-
dertook in 2014, usually in close partnership with human rights activists in the
country in question. It also reflects the work of our advocacy team, which monitors
policy developments and strives to persuade governments and international insti-
tutions to curb abuses and promote human rights. Human Rights Watch publica-
tions, issued throughout the year, contain more detailed accounts of many of the
issues addressed in the brief summaries in this volume. They can be found on the
Human Rights Watch website, www.hrw.org.
As in past years, this report does not include a chapter on every country where
Human Rights Watch works, nor does it discuss every issue of importance. The ab-
sence of a particular country or issue often simply reflects staffing limitations and
should not be taken as commentary on the significance of the problem. There are
many serious human rights violations that Human Rights Watch simply lacks the
capacity to address.
The factors we considered in determining the focus of our work in 2014 (and hence
the content of this volume) include the number of people affected and the severity
of abuse, access to the country and the availability of information about it, the
susceptibility of abusive forces to influence, and the importance of addressing cer-
tain thematic concerns and of reinforcing the work of local rights organizations.
The World Report does not have separate chapters addressing our thematic work
but instead incorporates such material directly into the country entries. Please
consult the Human Rights Watch website for more detailed treatment of our work
on children’s rights, women’s rights, arms and military issues, business and
human rights, health and human rights, disability rights, international justice, ter-
rorism and counterterrorism, refugees and displaced people, and lesbian, gay, bi-
sexual, and transgender people’s rights, and for information about our




Why Rights Aren’t Wrong in Tough Times
By Kenneth Roth
The world has not seen this much tumult for a generation. The once-heralded Arab
Spring has given way almost everywhere to conflict and repression. Islamist ex-
tremists commit mass atrocities and threaten civilians throughout the Middle East
and parts of Asia and Africa. Cold War-type tensions have revived over Ukraine,
with even a civilian jetliner shot out of the sky. Sometimes it can seem as if the
world is unraveling.
Many governments have responded to the turmoil by downplaying or abandoning
human rights. Governments directly affected by the ferment are often eager for an
excuse to suppress popular pressure for democratic change. Other influential gov-
ernments are frequently more comfortable falling back on familiar relationships
with autocrats than contending with the uncertainty of popular rule. Some of these
governments continue to raise human rights concerns, but many appear to have
concluded that today’s serious security threats must take precedence over human
rights. In this difficult moment, they seem to argue, human rights must be put on
the back burner, a luxury for less trying times.
That subordination of human rights is not only wrong, but also shortsighted and
counterproductive. Human rights violations played a major role in spawning or ag-
gravating most of today’s crises. Protecting human rights and enabling people to
have a say in how their governments address the crises will be key to their resolu-
tion. Particularly in periods of challenges and difficult choices, human rights are
an essential compass for political action.
The Rise of ISIS
No challenge in the past year has exploded more dramatically than the emergence
of the self-proclaimed Islamic State, the extremist group also known as ISIS. One
can only be appalled at ISIS’s mass execution of captured combatants and disfa-
vored civilians. This Sunni armed group has singled out Yazidis, Turkmen, Kurds,
Shia, and even other Sunnis who contest its extreme interpretation of Islamic law.
Its militants have enslaved, forcibly married, and raped Yazidi women and girls,
1
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and beheaded journalists and aid workers in gruesome videotaped spectacles.
Rarely has an armed force engendered such widespread revulsion and opposition.  
Yet ISIS did not emerge in a vacuum. In part it is a product of the United States-led
war and military occupation of Iraq that began in 2003, which produced, among
other things, a security vacuum and the abuses of detainees in Abu Ghraib prison
and other US-run detention centers.  Funding of extremist groups by Gulf states
and their citizens also played a role. More recently, the sectarian policies of the
Iraqi and Syrian governments, and international indifference to those govern-
ments’ serious rights abuses, have been important factors. If the conditions that
led to ISIS are left to fester, the group could deepen its hold on the two countries
and expand into Lebanon, Jordan, Libya, and beyond. 
Iraq
In Iraq, ISIS owes much of its emergence to the abusive sectarian rule of former
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the resulting radicalization of the Sunni commu-
nity. With Iranian backing, Maliki took personal control of Iraqi security forces and
supported the formation of Shia militia, many of which brutally persecuted the mi-
nority Sunni population. Sunnis were excluded from select government jobs,
rounded up and arbitrarily detained under new overbroad laws, summarily exe-
cuted, and indiscriminately bombed.  
The severity of the persecution can be measured by its effects. ISIS’s predecessor,
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), was defeated with the help of a military coalition of Sunni
tribes in western Iraq known as the Awakening Councils. But many of the tribes
that nearly single-handedly defeated AQI became so fearful of slaughter and per-
secution by pro-government security forces that when conflict broke out in 2014,
they felt safer fighting those forces than ISIS. 
Human rights groups persistently called attention to Maliki’s abusive rule, but the
US, the United Kingdom, and other countries, eager to put their own military in-
volvement in Iraq behind them, largely shut their eyes to this sectarian reign—and
even plied it with arms.
Today, there is wider recognition that this indifference to atrocities under Maliki
was a mistake.  Eventually he was forced from office and replaced by Haider al-
Abadi, who has pledged a more inclusive form of governance. But as Western mili-
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tary aid still flows into Iraq, abusive sectarianism has not ended. Maliki continues
to serve as one of Iraq’s three vice presidents, and the weak government has vastly
increased its reliance on Shia militia, allowing the mobilization of almost one mil-
lion Shia fighters without government oversight or regulation. Indeed, because of
the Iraqi army’s disarray, the militias are the lead ground forces fighting ISIS, de-
spite their ongoing killing and cleansing of Sunnis as ostensible ISIS sympathizers.
Until these atrocities end, the Shia militias are likely to do more to aid ISIS recruit-
ment than to defeat ISIS on the battlefield.  
Meanwhile, the Iraqi government has not ended indiscriminate military attacks in
civilian areas or released a significant number of detainees held without a warrant
or after completion of their sentences. The corrupt and abusive judiciary remains
unreformed, and Abadi’s calls for an end to abusive, exclusionary rule remain
unimplemented. Over the long term, completing these reforms will be at least as
important as military action to protect civilians from ISIS atrocities.
Syria
In Syria, ISIS owes its rise to various factors, including porous borders with Turkey
that have enabled fighters armed and funded by foreign governments to flow in.
Many then joined the extremist group. ISIS has also generated funds through exor-
bitant ransom demands and “taxes” on people in territory it controls, as well as
selling Syrian oil and antiquities.  
With these building blocks, ISIS came to portray itself as the force most capable of
standing up to the extraordinary brutality of President Bashar al-Assad and his
troops. In vicious fashion, Assad’s forces have been deliberately attacking civilians
who happen to live in opposition-held areas, aiming to depopulate these areas
and punish presumed rebel sympathizers.  
Since the Syrian government turned over its chemical weapons, its most notorious
tool has been the barrel bomb, an oil drum or similar container filled with high ex-
plosives and metal fragments. Also used by the Iraqi air force, it has gained notori-
ety in Syria, where the air force typically drops it from a helicopter hovering at high
altitudes to avoid anti-aircraft fire. From that height, the barrel bomb is impossible
to target with any precision. It simply tumbles to earth, making its dreaded swish-
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ing sound as its contents shift back and forth, until it hits the ground and deto-
nates.  
Barrel bombs are so inaccurate that the Syrian military does not dare use them
near the front lines for fear of hitting its own troops. Rather, it drops them well into
territory held by rebel groups, knowing that they will destroy apartment buildings,
hospitals, schools, and other institutions of civilian life. These indiscriminate
weapons have made life so miserable for many civilians that some who do not flee
the country choose to move their families near the front line, preferring to brave
snipers and artillery rather than the horror of the barrel bombs.
When the Syrian government attacked civilians with chemical weapons, the United
Nations Security Council pressured Assad to stop and to surrender his weapons.
But as the Syrian government killed countless more civilians by indiscriminate at-
tacks with conventional weapons such as barrel bombs, as well as cluster muni-
tions, incendiary weapons, and unguided rockets, the Security Council has largely
stood on the sidelines. A number of states have condemned the slaughter, but
they have done little more to generate pressure to end it.  
Russia has used its Security Council veto power to stop unified efforts to end the
carnage. Russia, as well as Iran, has also refused to use their enormous influence
in Damascus to press for an end to the indiscriminate attacks, despite demands
from the Security Council, including Russia, for such attacks to cease. Referring
Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to address serious international
crimes by all sides, a step endorsed by more than 65 countries, remains anathema
to Moscow.
The US-led coalition has taken on ISIS, but no nation—whether adversaries like the
US, or backers like Russia and Iran—have increased pressure on Assad to stop the
slaughter of civilians. The two cannot, and should not, be so easily separated
This selective concern has been a gift to ISIS recruiters, who portray themselves as
the only ones willing and able to stand up to Assad’s atrocities. Simply attacking
ISIS is clearly not going to end its appeal. A broader concern with protecting Syrian
civilians is required. 
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Intensified Repression in Egypt
In Egypt, the brutal reign of the general-turned-president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, has
sought to crush the democratic aspirations of Tahrir Square. The uprising that over-
threw President Hosni Mubarak’s authoritarian government gave Egypt its first free
and fair presidential election, which was won by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mo-
hamed Morsy. The Morsy government ruled in a way that left many Egyptians fear-
ing (whether legitimately or not) the gradual emergence of a strict Islamic regime,
but its abuses never came close to those now being visited upon the Egyptian peo-
ple by the military-dominated government that overthrew Morsy on June 30, 2013.  
The military coup led by Sisi devastated the Brotherhood and its supporters. In just
12 hours on August 14, 2013, security forces overseen by Sisi and Interior Minister
Mohamed Ibrahim systematically shot dead at least 817 mostly peaceful protesters
in Cairo’s Rab’a Square, where they had conducted a weeks-long mass sit-in to
protest Morsy’s removal.  
The security forces claimed self-defense, but their handful of casualties paled in
comparison to the number of protesters shot by snipers and other gunmen, many
as they sought medical aid. Egyptian authorities had planned the violent dispersal
of the sit-in weeks in advance, and fully anticipated a massive death toll. It was the
largest massacre of protesters in recent history—the most deadly since at least
China’s repression of the Tiananmen Square democracy movement in 1989.  
Since the coup, Sisi’s security forces have imprisoned tens of thousands of sus-
pected Muslim Brotherhood members, often without charge or trial, as well as
many secular activists. Egyptian courts have handed down death sentences by the
hundreds after mass trials that make no pretense of individualizing proof or pro-
viding a meaningful opportunity for a defense.  
The international community’s response to this unprecedented repression has
been shamefully inadequate. At the UN Human Rights Council, 27 countries
pressed Egypt to investigate the Rab’a Square massacre but did not achieve a ma-
jority within the council. There is little appetite among the US, the UK, and other
key European governments to look into the military government’s abuses. Indeed,
while Washington will apply selective sanctions on Venezuelan officials (a move
we support) for their security forces’ brutal response to protests—which took the
lives of no more than a few dozen protesters (though victimized many more)—it
5
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has fought sanctions for Egypt, despite the government’s murder of close to 1,000
protesters at Rab’a Square. 
Congress cut off some military aid even though the Obama administration resisted
calling the takeover a “coup” for fear of further ramifications under US law. Secre-
tary of State John Kerry repeatedly spoke of a transition to democracy that was sup-
posedly under way in Egypt despite the lack of supporting evidence. Now that
Congress has added a new national security exception to the military aid condi-
tions in place, the US government seems likely to restore most, if not all, of its mili-
tary support for Cairo without any letup in its repression. This rush to turn the aid
spigot back on is driven by a prioritization of enlisting the Egyptian military to cur-
tail an insurgency in the Sinai, back Israel’s fight against Hamas in Gaza, and sup-
port the anti-ISIS war in Syria and Iraq over supporting the rights of the Egyptian
people. The UK, France, and other European governments have also done little to
reverse Sisi’s unprecedented crackdown.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have eagerly helped Egypt to
crush the Muslim Brotherhood. As monarchies that invoke Islam for their own legit-
imacy, they appear terrified of a religious movement that rules in the name of Islam
yet embraces democratic elections. They have thrown billions of dollars at Sisi’s
project of suppression and have labeled the Brotherhood a terrorist organization.
The UAE has hunted down those at home deemed to represent Brotherhood views.
International support for the repressive Sisi government is not only a disaster for
Egyptian hopes of a democratic future; it sends an appalling message to the re-
gion. ISIS can now credibly argue that violence is the only path to power for Is-
lamists because when they sought power through fair elections and won, they
were ousted with little international protest. Again, the short-term convenience of
some influential powers—suppressing the Muslim Brotherhood—threatens a long-
term debacle for the region’s political future.
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
The past year saw more settlement construction by Israel, more tit-for-tat violence
in the West Bank, and another round of bloody armed conflict in Gaza. Hamas and
other Palestinian armed groups in Gaza fired thousands of indiscriminate rockets
and mortars toward Israeli population centers. In some cases, Hamas and its allies
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unnecessarily endangered Palestinian civilians by fighting from populated areas,
and summarily executed alleged Palestinian traitors.  
Tens of thousands of Israeli rockets, bombs, and artillery attacks, as well as an ex-
pansive definition of legitimate military targets, attacks without any evident mili-
tary target, and lax concern for civilian casualties, left an estimated 1,500 civilians
dead in Gaza and wreaked unprecedented destruction on civilian homes and infra-
structure. In the occupied West Bank, beyond the settlement expansion, Israel con-
tinued its discriminatory and punitive demolitions of Palestinian homes, and
unnecessary use of lethal force against Palestinians, killing dozens, including
 children.
Israel has a poor record of holding its own forces to account for serious laws-of-war
violations; Hamas has not even claimed to investigate violations by Palestinian
fighters. The involvement of the ICC could help to deter both sides from committing
war crimes, while potentially offering victims a modicum of justice. With its UN ob-
server-state status, Palestine is eligible to join the ICC, and it marked the New Year
by finally doing so. The ICC will have jurisdiction over war crimes committed in or
from Palestinian territory; that is, its mandate will apply to both sides in the
 conflict. 
However, the US and leading EU countries tried to prevent this development by
placing misguided pressure on Palestine not to join the Hague-based court.. But
they take the opposite position in virtually every other situation of large-scale war
crimes, where they recognize that curbing these crimes is often a prerequisite to
building the trust needed for productive peace talks. No one has credibly ex-
plained why the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be an exception to this rule.  
The real motive of Western governments is to protect Israelis from possible prose-
cution. That kind of selective embrace undermines the power and legitimacy of in-
ternational justice around the world. It emboldens critics who argue that




Boko Haram Atrocities in Nigeria
The problem of turmoil trumping rights is not confined to the Middle East. Human
rights concerns are central to the conflict in Nigeria, where the militant Islamist
group Boko Haram attacks civilians as well as Nigeria’s security forces. The armed
group has become notorious for cruelly planting bombs in markets, mosques, and
schools, killing thousands of civilians. This past year, Boko Haram abducted hun-
dreds of schoolgirls and young women in the northeast. Some were forced to marry
militants and were subjected to sexual violence. One mass abduction in April pro-
voked a worldwide social media campaign, “#BringBackOurGirls,” but those vic-
tims and many others remain in captivity. 
Oil-rich Nigeria should be able to field a professional, rights-respecting army capa-
ble of protecting Nigerians from this abusive group. However, the country’s leader-
ship has left its military ill-equipped and poorly motivated to defend against Boko
Haram attacks. 
When the army has acted it has often done so in an abusive manner, rounding up
hundreds of men and boys suspected of supporting Boko Haram, detaining them
in inhuman conditions, and physically abusing or even killing them. Many other
community members have been forcibly disappeared, allegedly by security forces.
When Boko Haram suspects escaped in March from a famously abusive detention
center, Giwa Barracks, Nigerian security forces reportedly recaptured and summar-
ily executed hundreds of them.  
The persistent lack of accountability for these atrocities has made it difficult for
Nigeria’s allies to provide security assistance for fear of themselves becoming
complicit in abuses. The failure of Nigeria’s leadership to rein in security forces has
also alienated local communities that might otherwise have willingly provided in-
telligence to the authorities. Winning the “hearts and minds” of the civilian popu-
lation will require that the government transparently investigate alleged army
abuses and punish offenders.  
Kenya’s Abusive Response to Al-Shabaab
Like Nigeria, Kenya has experienced a major increase in extremist attacks on civil-
ians at least partly fueled by an abusive security force response. Al-Shabaab, the
Somali Islamist insurgent group, carried out its highest-profile attacks at a Nairobi
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shopping mall, in Mpeketoni and nearby villages along Kenya’s coast, and in
northeastern Mandera. 
Kenya’s response has been riddled with abuses. Instead of building public confi-
dence in the ability of the security forces to combat such attacks, the security-force
operations have generated public anger and mistrust. In April, after a spate of
bombing and grenade attacks in Nairobi, the military and police carried out Opera-
tion Usalama Watch in the city’s Eastleigh neighborhood—a sweeping campaign
that entailed rights violations of registered asylum seekers and refugees, undocu-
mented Somalis and other foreign nationals, and ethnic Somali Kenyans. As in pre-
vious similar operations, Kenyan police arbitrarily detained several thousand
people and used excessive force, raiding homes, extorting residents, and physi-
cally abusing ethnic Somalis. 
Meanwhile, evidence mounted that Kenyan anti-terrorism units were forcibly dis-
appearing and extrajudicially executing terrorism suspects rather than bringing
them to court.  Rather than respond to the public outcry, the government has tried
to gag the messenger by further empowering security forces and strengthening leg-
islative controls over media, civil society, and other sources of independent criti-
cism. Donor countries, particularly the US and UK, that provide significant
counter-terrorism support to the Kenyan security services have been slow to re-
spond to the growing body of evidence of this abusive behavior.    
Russia and the Crisis in Ukraine
Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea and its military assistance to rebels in
eastern Ukraine have been major political and security challenges for Western gov-
ernments. The core of the dispute involves issues of sovereignty on which Human
Rights Watch takes no position. However, the relatively narrow Western reaction to
intensifying human rights violations that had been brewing in Russia during the
two preceding years may well have aggravated the Ukrainian crisis.  
Western governments imposed intense political pressure on Russia, including tar-
geted sanctions, to encourage it to withdraw from Crimea and stop supporting the
rebels. However, these governments for the most part either underestimated grow-
ing authoritarian rule in Russia since Putin’s return to the Kremlin, or struggled to
respond to it.  
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Fearing a possible “color revolution,” the Kremlin in 2012 began what has become
the most intense crackdown on dissent since the Soviet era. By targeting human
rights groups, dissidents, independent journalists, peaceful protesters, and Inter-
net critics, the Russian government radically reduced the possibility that critical
voices would reach large numbers of people. The resulting closed information sys-
tem enabled the Kremlin to suppress most public criticism of its actions in
Ukraine. The health of political rights in Russia should be a central part of any ef-
fort to resolve the Ukrainian conflict, but has not been.
By the same token, caught in what at times seems like a new Cold War with Russia
over Ukraine, the West also has tended to fall back on a good-versus-bad mental-
ity. The desire to present Ukraine as the innocent victim of Russian aggression has
made the West reluctant to challenge troubling aspects of Ukraine’s behavior,
whether the use of “voluntary battalions” that routinely abuse detainees, or the in-
discriminate firing of weapons into populated areas. Meanwhile, pro-Russian
forces in eastern Ukraine themselves have seriously abused detainees and have
endangered the civilian population by launching rockets from their midst.  The
Western reluctance to address Ukrainian abuses has politicized what should be a
principled appeal to both sides to respect international humanitarian law—an ap-
peal that, if successful, would lower temperatures and increase the possibility of a
broader political solution.  
China’s Crackdown on Uighurs in Xinjiang  
The Chinese government’s approach to Xinjiang, the northwestern province that is
home to the Muslim Uighur minority, is to respond to complaints about human
rights abuses with more human rights abuses and restrictions. Beijing claims that
its crackdown is necessary to fight separatism and terrorism, but its tactic is to im-
pose some of the most draconian and discriminatory policies against Uighurs, in-
cluding prohibitions on wearing beards and veils, restrictions on fasting, and overt
discrimination with respect to religious education.  
The escalating deadly attacks against civilians and security forces in Xinjiang are a
grave concern for the government. But the haste with which the government attrib-
utes violence to “Uighur terrorists”—while rarely producing evidence and routinely
denying suspects the right to a fair trial—creates a vicious cycle in which already-
repressed Uighurs feel under constant siege from the state. From the little informa-
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tion made publicly available, it is impossible to assess with any confidence
whether those convicted and often sentenced to death are responsible for violence
and whether the government’s severe counterterrorism measures are aimed at the
right people. 
As illustrated by the extraordinarily harsh life sentence handed down in September
to Ilham Tohti, a moderate Uighur economist, the state remains unwilling to distin-
guish between peaceful criticism and those who engage in violence. Viciously
prosecuting peaceful criticism, leaving virtually no room for religious or cultural
freedom, and expanding an economic strategy in which Uighurs cannot compete
equally with Han Chinese migrants is a recipe for increased violence.
Mexico’s Abuse-Riddled War on Drugs 
Beginning in 2007, the government of then-President Felipe Calderón opened a
“war on drugs” in Mexico, deploying security forces en masse to fight the country’s
violent drug cartels. The result was an epidemic of summary executions, enforced
disappearances, and torture by the military and police, spiraling violence among
competing criminal organizations, and a public security catastrophe that has taken
the lives of more than 90,000 Mexicans. In his two years in office, Mexico’s current
president, Enrique Peña Nieto, has dialed down the rhetoric but has not made sig-
nificant inroads in curtailing the corruption and impunity that allow these atroci-
ties to flourish.
Washington has supported Mexico’s “drug war” policies, providing assistance to
the country’s security forces, while repeatedly praising their efforts to confront the
cartels. What it has not done is speak out about the terrible abuses that these
forces commit, or enforce the human rights conditions that the US Congress placed
on a portion of the assistance it gives them. Rather than embarrass an important
ally and risk bilateral cooperation on counter-narcotics and other policy priorities,
the Obama administration has preferred to remain silent, facilitating Mexico’s ef-
forts to downplay its serious human rights problems. 
Some US states have done more by legalizing marijuana, undermining the illicit
market for this drug. The Obama administration has acquiesced in these initiatives
but has hardly embraced them. It should. They are not only the right thing to do
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from the perspective of the right to privacy, but also an important step for under-
cutting the profits on which drug traffickers thrive.
United States: CIA Torture with Impunity
The year concluded with the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence publish-
ing a redacted summary of its report on the Central Intelligence Agency’s use of
torture against terrorist suspects under the administration of former President
George W. Bush. 
President Obama has taken a firm stand against torture during his tenure, using
his second day in office to ban the Bush administration’s “enhanced interrogation
techniques”—a euphemism for torture—and to close the secret CIA detention facil-
ities where much of the torture was carried out. Nonetheless, Obama has stead-
fastly refused to investigate, let alone prosecute, the Bush CIA’s torture, even
though that is required by the Convention against Torture, which the US ratified in
1994.  
There are various possible reasons for Obama’s refusal to allow prosecutions. He
may have feared that they would be politically divisive, undermining the support of
Bush backers in the US Congress for his legislative agenda, even though there has
been little such cooperation. He may have felt it unfair to prosecute after the Jus-
tice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel had ruled that the “enhanced interroga-
tion techniques” were legal, even though the Senate report shows that the CIA
knew these amounted to torture and went shopping for politicized government
counsel who would justify the unjustifiable. He may have felt that the serious secu-
rity threat faced after the September 11, 2001 attacks made resorting to extreme
forms of interrogation understandable, even though the Senate report shows that
they produced little if any actionable intelligence while undermining America’s
standing in the world and impeding counterterrorism efforts.
Obama’s refusal to allow prosecutions means the basic criminal prohibition of tor-
ture remains unenforced in the United States. That enables future US presidents,
who inevitably will face serious security threats, to treat torture as a policy option.
It also greatly weakens the US government’s ability to press other countries to
prosecute their own torturers, weakening an important voice for human rights at a
moment when principled support is urgently needed.
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The revelations in the Senate report also require action in Europe, particularly in
countries that hosted CIA detention sites or were complicit in renditions and result-
ing torture. To date, Italy is the only European country that has prosecuted people
for involvement in CIA abuses. Poland has finally admitted it hosted a black site
but a criminal investigation is stalled. Romania and Lithuania are both in denial. 
Criminal investigations are ongoing in the UK, but its government has reneged on
its promise to conduct a genuinely independent judicial inquiry into Britain’s in-
volvement in rendition and torture. Meaningful accountability for Europe’s role in
these abuses is vital to hold those responsible to account and to prevent them
from being repeated in the future.
Conclusion: The Central Role of Human Rights
In all of these cases, policymakers inevitably can cite seemingly good reasons for
downplaying human rights. Human rights require restraint that can feel antithetical
to a “do what it takes” attitude that often prevails in the face of serious security
challenges. But the last year shows how short-sighted that reflex can be. Violations
of human rights often sparked these security challenges, and their continued vio-
lation frequently aggravates them.  
Human rights are not just arbitrary restraints on governments. They reflect funda-
mental values, widely shared and deeply held, imposing limits on the power of
governments and essential safeguards for human dignity and autonomy. Betraying
those values rarely turns out well. Meeting security challenges demands not only
containing certain dangerous individuals but also rebuilding a moral fabric that
underpins the social and political order. 
The short-term gains of undermining those core values and the fundamental wis-
dom that they reflect are rarely worth the long-term price that must inevitably be
paid. Rather than treating human rights as a chafing restraint on their latitude for
action, policymakers would do better to recognize them as moral guides as well as
legal obligations. The results are likely to be both the right, and the most effective,
thing to do.
Kenneth Roth is the executive director of Human Rights Watch.
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Internet at a Crossroads: 
How Government Surveillance Threatens 
How We Communicate
By Cynthia M. Wong
We have reached an inflection point for the future of the Internet. To preserve the
Internet as an open, global platform for rights, development, and commerce, we
need principled rules to govern digital surveillance and protect privacy that apply
to every government. 
Until the summer of 2013, the global movement for Internet freedom had been
gaining momentum. A diverse range of governments had formed the Freedom On-
line Coalition and publicly committed to promoting a free, open, and global Inter-
net through coordinated diplomatic efforts, led by the United States, United
Kingdom, and their allies. There was broad recognition at the United Nations
Human Rights Council that the same rights we enjoy offline must also apply online. 
However, global trust in US and UK leadership on Internet freedom has evaporated
ever since former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden
began releasing evidence of mass surveillance by the NSA and its British counter-
part, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). In a blistering cri-
tique at the UN in September 2013, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff condemned
these practices: “In the absence of the right to privacy, there can be no true free-
dom of expression and opinion, and therefore no effective democracy,” Rouseff
declared. “The right to safety of citizens of one country can never be guaranteed by
violating the rights of citizens of another country.” 
Snowden’s revelations laid bare the rift between the stated values of the US and
UK and their behavior. Even while championing an open and free Internet, these
governments were collecting data on hundreds of million people worldwide every
day, including, in the case of the US, Dilma Rousseff herself. To make it easier to
spy on people online and identify security threats, they have also surreptitiously
weakened Internet security, paradoxically making all Internet users less safe and
more vulnerable to hackers and identity thieves. 
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While many governments expressed outrage over snooping by the NSA and GCHQ,
many may have also responded privately with envy. Though few can match the re-
sources of the NSA or GCHQ, governments everywhere are expanding their own
mass surveillance capacity, and are likely emulating the US and UK. 
Left unchecked, this dynamic could soon produce a world in which every online
search, electronic contact, email, or transaction is stored away in one or more gov-
ernment databases. With no government able to ensure the privacy of its own citi-
zens from foreign snooping and intelligence agencies teaming up to share data
about the citizens of other countries, a truly Orwellian scenario could unfold. While
the US asserts it will not use intelligence gathering to quash dissent or discrimi-
nate, governments have repeatedly used surveillance to these ends. 
President Obama has welcomed a debate about modern surveillance, but talk of
safeguards and reform in the US has led to little or no discernible change for global
Internet users. The Obama administration has committed to additional protections
for personal information it has collected but has done little to rein in the sheer
scale of surveillance the NSA conducts, especially abroad. The UK, for its part, has
refused to answer even the most basic questions about its intelligence gathering
practices and, in an astounding act of hubris and blatant disregard for rights,
rushed through a law in July 2014 that extends its surveillance powers. In defend-
ing its program, neither government has been fully willing to recognize the privacy
interests of people outside its borders. 
The picture is not entirely bleak, however. In 2014, several important actors
stepped into the leadership void left by the US and UK. Major UN human rights in-
stitutions have begun to articulate what it means to protect privacy when technol-
ogy makes surveillance potentially ubiquitous. And a new coalition of states, led
by Germany and Brazil, has taken up the mantle of Internet freedom to press these
efforts, while the Freedom Online Coalition strives to restore its credibility. 
It is critical to continue pushing the US and UK for real reform, but the rest of the
world should not wait for them to act. Fears of terrorism, and the comparative ad-
vantage that the US and UK have in surveillance are blinding them to the harms
their practices pose, not only to their alliances but also to their own democratic in-
stitutions. Those harms include chilling basic freedoms of expression and associa-
tion, weakening the press and freedom of information, and degrading access to
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legal advice and defense. Indeed, these countries might not change course until
their own citizens face comparable levels of surveillance by foreign powers. 
In the meantime, other countries should keep surveillance and privacy on the
human rights agenda at the UN and elsewhere. These issues should be consis-
tently raised in bilateral meetings as well so the US and the UK are not let off the
hook. Experience has shown that the US and UK, though often unwilling to be at
the vanguard in developing international norms, eventually conform their practices
to principled rules to which other countries agree to be bound. 
“Collect it All”
We now live in an age of “big data,” when our communications and activities rou-
tinely leave rich digital traces that can be collected, analyzed, and stored at low
cost. In parallel, commercial imperatives drive a range of companies to amass vast
stores of information about our social networks, health, finances, and shopping
habits. The plummeting cost of storage and computing means that such data can
be retained for longer and mined for future, unforeseen purposes. 
These digital dossiers appeal to governments for a range of purposes, both legiti-
mate and illegitimate. By accessing data held by the private sector, governments
can easily uncover patterns of behavior and associations, both offline and online—
whether to thwart security threats or to identify a particularly vocal online critic of
government policy. 
Security agencies in the US and UK have responded by building enormous storage
facilities and voraciously collecting as much data as they can. In a 2008 visit to the
United Kingdom, US General Keith Alexander, then-director of the NSA, asked,
“Why can’t we collect all the signals, all the time?” The UK set out to meet that
challenge with its Tempora program, which involves mass interception of data
flowing over 200 undersea cables connecting Europe to the Americas, Africa, and
beyond. Media reports from the past year also indicate that the GCHQ may be se-
cretly capturing and storing webcam images of millions of Internet users. 
In the US, the NSA has wholeheartedly embraced bulk collection of metadata from
private telecom operators (and perhaps other unknown entities), as well as mass
fiber optic cable tapping. In 2014, reports based on the Snowden documents
showed that the US may be collecting millions of text messages worldwide each
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day, gathering all mobile phone metadata in five countries, and intercepting all
phone calls in two of these countries. 
In the name of security, the US and UK have thrown away any notion of proportion-
ality, where surveillance is targeted only at individuals they have reason to believe
present a genuine threat. Only a tiny fraction of Internet or mobile phone users
being surveilled today will ever be suspected of wrongdoing, let alone ties to ter-
rorist activity. 
Most of this has happened largely in secret, punctuated with brief windows of in-
sight provided by national security whistleblowers over the years and the much
larger window opened by Snowden’s disclosures.
Failure of Leadership 
What have the US and UK done to rein in mass surveillance in response to public
outrage? For the billions of global Internet users outside these countries, the an-
swer is: almost nothing.
On January 17, 2014, President Obama announced measures to restrict the use, re-
tention, and dissemination of personal data gathered by intelligence agencies in
Presidential Policy Directive 28. These new measures purport to bring rules for
data collected on non-US persons (foreigners abroad) closer to those governing
data collected on US persons. While the directive represents a greater level of dis-
closure (especially compared to most governments), the rules themselves are
vague, do not go far enough to prevent abuse, and do not create rights that non-US
persons can assert in court. They are also not entrenched, given that they are not
embodied in legislation and can therefore be changed by any subsequent US ad-
ministration. Most critically, the new measures do not prevent large-scale gather-
ing of data and communications of individuals not linked to any wrongdoing,
leaving the vast databanks of intercepted information growing larger for future ad-
ministrations to exploit. 
The USA Freedom Act, the main legislative vehicle for reform in the US, intended to
end bulk collection of metadata and other records in the US. The bill failed to move
forward in Congress in November 2014. However, even if the USA Freedom Act had
passed, important as its passage would have been, it would have addressed only
one of the programs revealed by the Snowden documents and would have done al-
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most nothing to address the privacy concerns of billions of global Internet users
outside the US whose personal information may be sitting in NSA databases. At
time of writing, it appears that a Republican-led Congress may be even less recep-
tive to efforts to rein in bulk collection. 
In the UK, authorities continue to “neither confirm nor deny” that GCHQ intercepts
the communications of millions of individuals. The government has refused to an-
swer the most basic questions about its practices, so it is exceedingly difficult to
assess its claims that these programs are lawful and necessary for protecting secu-
rity. However, in a response to a court challenge, the UK government acknowl-
edged that it interprets the law to allow agencies to gather potentially millions of
communications via popular services like Twitter, Gmail, and Facebook without a
warrant, merely because the servers of these companies are often located abroad.
This disclosure raises serious questions about the GCHQ’s claims that these pow-
ers are necessary to protect public safety. 
Most troubling, the US and UK continue to argue that they have no legal obligation
to safeguard the privacy of anyone outside their respective territories. In other
areas of human rights law, the US has argued that it has no obligations to individu-
als outside its territory and has only admitted this year that it may have some du-
ties under the Convention against Torture towards foreigners it physically captures,
but only in territories where it exercises “governmental authority.” In contrast to its
resistance to assuming extraterritorial obligations with respect to surveillance, the
US asserts authority to compel US-based companies to hand over information
about any user around the world, regardless of where that data is stored, with al-
most no protections for the privacy of non-Americans abroad. The UK has also con-
ceded extraterritorial human rights obligations in circumstances such as detention
of foreigners abroad. But in the area of privacy and surveillance, the UK labels
communications that travel outside the British Isles as “external,” and UK law pro-
vides scant safeguards for the privacy of “external” communications. 
The shortsighted approaches of the US and UK will almost certainly come back to
harm their own citizens as other governments follow their lead. As Internet net-
works continue to globalize, an increasing amount of data about American and
British residents will travel outside US and UK territory, and other countries will feel
free to gather and store that data without limit. 
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The US and UK have provided a roadmap for governments of all political persua-
sions to build their own systems of mass surveillance. Though few can match the
NSA’s and GCHQ’s resources or capabilities today, many other governments take
an equally opaque and rapacious approach to digital data gathering. 
Vilifying Encryption 
The Snowden documents reveal that the NSA has also weakened encryption stan-
dards and withheld information about security holes in commercial products so
that it can exploit them before companies can fix them. In addition, media reports
suggest the GCHQ is developing ways to defeat encryption, especially for Internet
traffic that it intercepts. These tactics can facilitate surreptitious monitoring and
data collection from devices and networks, not just by the US and UK but poten-
tially by other actors as well. While code breaking has always been at the heart of
the NSA’s mission, any techniques that undermine the broader security of Internet
applications and networks put all Internet users at risk. 
In 2014, major US technology companies redoubled efforts to harden the security
of their devices and services against spying. These measures have become a com-
mercial imperative as loss of trust drives users to non-American companies. In
September 2014, Google and Apple announced that data stored on their mobile
devices would be encrypted by default, and neither company would be able to de-
crypt stored data in response to government requests. Google, Microsoft, Yahoo,
Facebook, and other services have taken additional steps to secure emails and
messages as they transit the Internet changes that security experts and rights ac-
tivists have pushed for years. As journalists and rights groups increasingly rely on
global online tools for their work, many view these security improvements as a cru-
cial post-Snowden outcome. For vulnerable groups or those living under authoritar-
ian regimes, shielding communications and associations from abusive spying can
be a matter of life and death. 
Yet government officials in the US and UK have responded to these new security
measures by accusing technology firms of facilitating murder, terrorism, and child
abuse. In his first week in office in November 2014, Robert Hannigan, head of
GCHQ, penned an op-ed calling US technology companies the “command-and-con-
trol network of choice for terrorists and criminals,” citing increased encryption as
especially useful for the extremist group Islamic State, also known as ISIS, and
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other terrorist organizations. Similarly, in a September 2014 speech, James Comey,
head of the FBI, argued that “encryption threatens to lead all of us to a very dark
place” and puts criminals beyond the law. Officials seek even greater cooperation
from major technology firms, including through “back doors” built into devices
and services that will allow them greater access to user communication. 
Law enforcement and security officials argue that encryption back doors are neces-
sary to protect public security. Yet these actions ironically leave Internet and mo-
bile phone users—all of us—less secure. Security experts affirm that such back
doors, once in place, create new vulnerabilities since they can be misused by hack-
ers, identity thieves, and other malicious actors. From a technical standpoint, it is
almost impossible to create a back door that can only be exploited by designated
“good” actors.
Opponents of encryption in the US and UK governments also forget that they are
not the only ones who will demand access to back doors. If Google, Apple, and
other firms capitulate to their demands, it will be difficult to refuse the same ac-
cess by other governments. Baking privacy and security into technology by design
is the most effective way to protect the security of users from a range of bad actors.
If GCHQ cannot force Apple to unlock an iPhone because Apple does not hold the
key, then neither can intelligence agencies in China or Russia. 
True Costs of Surveillance
As a global community, we have not even begun to grapple with the true costs of
surveillance, not only to privacy but also to other rights and closely held values. 
A joint report published by Human Rights Watch and the American Civil Liberties
Union in July 2014 documented the insidious effects of large-scale surveillance on
the practice of journalism and law in the US. Interviews with dozens of journalists
showed that increased surveillance, combined with tightened measures to prevent
leaks and government contact with media, are intimidating sources, keeping them
from talking to journalists (even about unclassified topics of public concern) out of
fear that they could face retaliation, lose their security clearances or jobs, or even
face prosecution. Ultimately, this is having a detrimental impact on the amount
and quality of news coverage, particularly on matters related to national security,
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intelligence, and law enforcement. This effect undermines the role of the fourth es-
tate in holding government to account. 
Steve Coll, staff writer for the New Yorker and dean of the Graduate School of Jour-
nalism at Columbia University, explained: “Every national security reporter I know
would say that the atmosphere in which professional reporters seek insight into
policy failures [and] bad military decisions is just much tougher and much chillier.”
Public understanding of national security policies that are carried out in our name
is essential to the functioning of healthy democracies and open societies. 
Another national security reporter described the impact of the Snowden revela-
tions on the ability of journalists to protect their sources: “I used to think that the
most careful people were not at risk, [that they] could protect sources and kept
them from being known. Now we know that isn’t the case. That’s what Snowden
meant for me. There’s a record of everywhere I’ve walked, everywhere I’ve been.” 
Many journalists are taking extraordinary measures to protect their sources and
shield them from retribution, including by using disposable burner phones or
strong encryption, or avoiding phones and the Internet altogether. As one journal-
ist put it, they are being forced to adopt the tactics of drug dealers and criminals
just to do their job. Lawyers—and particularly defense attorneys—who spoke to
Human Rights Watch described adopting similar tactics to protect the confidential-
ity of their communications with clients, which is essential to the right to counsel. 
In the UK, documents released in November 2014 as a result of a legal challenge
show that UK security and intelligence services have policies permitting the inter-
ception of privileged lawyer-client communications on national security grounds,
including potentially in cases in which the agencies were defendants. The human
rights group Reprieve brought the case on behalf of Libyan families who allege that
they were subjected to extraordinary rendition and torture. Reprieve’s legal direc-
tor, Cori Crider, stated that these policies raise “troubling implications for the
whole British justice system” and questioned how often the government has
“rigged the game in their favor in the ongoing court case over torture.”
This initial research only scratches the surface. For example, an April 2014 poll of
2,000 Americans on the impact of NSA revelations found that almost half—47 per-
cent—had changed their approach to online activity in response to reports of NSA
surveillance. Survey participants reported thinking more carefully about where
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they go, what they say, and what they do online, and about a quarter are less in-
clined to use email. Other studies have documented the real and projected eco-
nomic costs of NSA surveillance to the US Internet industry (as high as US$180
million in lost sales for the cloud computing industry) as loss of trust in US-origin
technologies and services drives business overseas. A report from Open Technol-
ogy Institute released in July 2014 begins to catalogue some of these costs, as well
as harm to Internet openness, US foreign policy interests, and cyber security. 
Perhaps one of the biggest casualties of the Snowden revelations has been the US
and UK’s moral authority to criticize the surveillance abuses of other governments
and lead by example. 
A March 2014 Human Rights Watch report documented how the Ethiopian govern-
ment uses surveillance to monitor opposition groups and journalists and silence
dissenting voices. With unfettered access to mobile networks, security agencies
regularly intercept calls and access phone records, which are then played during
abusive interrogations, without any process or oversight. 
A former Ethiopian opposition party member told Human Rights Watch: “One day
they arrested me and they showed me everything. They showed me a list of all my
phone calls and they played a conversation I had with my brother. They arrested
me because we talked about politics on the phone. It was the first phone I ever
owned, and I thought I could finally talk freely.” 
Earlier in 2014, the Ethiopian government arrested a group of bloggers who wrote
on current events under a collective known as Zone 9. The Zone 9 bloggers now
face politically motivated charges under Ethiopia’s deeply flawed anti-terrorism
law. The charges cite as evidence the fact that the bloggers traveled out of the
country to receive training in encrypting their communications. 
The Ethiopian state is not the US or the UK, but the US and UK statements and ac-
tions set a troubling precedent that undermine their credibility on rights and will
be cited by many other governments. If the US, the UK, and their allies continue to
argue, for example, that metadata deserves little privacy protection, then how can
they effectively challenge Ethiopia when the government adopts the same legal ar-
gument? And if US and UK authorities continue to vilify and weaken broad use of
encryption to protect ordinary Internet users, how can their governments credibly
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condemn other governments that outlaw and punish use of encryption in the name
of security?
International Standards for the Digital Age
The Snowden revelations have launched a global debate about modern surveil-
lance, national security, and human rights. Privacy is now on the agenda of a range
of states and international institutions for the first time. 
Several major UN human rights institutions have begun to examine modern sur-
veillance practices. In March 2014, the Human Rights Committee, an international
expert body and authoritative interpreter of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR)—a global treaty to which the US is party—called on the US
to ensure all surveillance is necessary and proportionate to achieving legitimate
objectives regardless of the nationality or location of individuals who are affected. 
In July 2014, the UN’s top human rights official, then-High Commissioner for
Human Rights Navi Pillay, issued a groundbreaking report on privacy in the digital
age that directly challenges US and UK arguments for secret mass surveillance. 
Pillay notably concluded that mass surveillance was “emerging as a dangerous
habit rather than an exceptional measure.” She said unchecked snooping could
harm a range of human rights, including freedom of expression and association.
The onus was on governments, she said, to demonstrate that their practices were
necessary and proportionate to their security aims. In other words, spying on
everyone because you can does not mean you should.
The high commissioner’s report followed sustained action from privacy advocates
and a group of countries, led by Germany and Brazil, to press the US and UK to
stop mass surveillance and safeguard the privacy of people around the world.
Stepping into the leadership vacuum, Germany and Brazil, along with Austria,
Liechtenstein, Mexico, Norway, and Switzerland, led the passage of the December
2013 UN General Assembly resolution calling for the high commissioner’s report.
In the face of inaction by the US, the UK, and their closest allies, these UN institu-
tions have begun to lay out a principled approach to surveillance and human rights




Several critical themes emerging from this work directly challenge the defenses of
mass surveillance:
• Surveillance harms a range of rights beyond privacy, including freedom of
expression, association, and movement, as well as the right to counsel. If in-
dividuals cannot go online without fear of undue monitoring, the power of
digital technologies to enable rights will be deeply undermined. Journalists
cannot protect their sources, lawyers cannot ensure the confidentiality of
their communications with clients, and human rights defenders cannot do
their work safely. 
• States have obligations to safeguard the privacy rights of users outside their
borders. In our globally networked age, it is untenable to argue that the right
to privacy stops at the border while surveillance is borderless.
• Mass surveillance is by nature indiscriminate and it is presumptively illegal.
Article 17 of the ICCPR requires that any interference with privacy be propor-
tionate and narrowly tailored. Just because mass surveillance and bulk data
collection might yield some information that may one day be useful, it cannot
justify the invasion of everyone’s privacy. 
• States should recognize that privacy and other rights are harmed when they
collect private data, regardless of whether that data is used. Knowing that
the government can acquire data about your communications and online ac-
tivities can chill freedom of expression and association, even if the data col-
lected is never misused. States should impose meaningful limits on when
data can be collected, as well as on how data may be used and how long it is
retained. 
• States should increase transparency and oversight over surveillance and in-
telligence gathering powers. There are legitimate reasons for secrecy when
addressing national security threats. But such powers must be subject to
oversight to prevent overreach and abuse, including through judicial and par-
liamentary bodies. 
• The private sector has a responsibility to respect rights when asked to facili-
tate surveillance or data collection. Where Internet or telecommunications
companies turn over user data or assist with surveillance without adequate




While the Snowden controversy has focused on the US and UK, as noted above,
there is no reason to assume that other governments’ laws or practices are better.
Most privacy regimes were put in place during the Internet’s infancy, before social
media or smart phones existed, and they are now falling short in providing mean-
ingful protection for rights. And, of course, there are those governments like
Ethiopia, China, and Russia who routinely engage in abusive surveillance as a mat-
ter of policy and design. 
Thanks to Brazil and Germany, there is international momentum to develop norms
and guidance and establish institutions to ensure that privacy still has meaning in
the digital age. As part of this effort in the coming months, Human Rights Watch
will support the creation of a new special rapporteur on the right to privacy at the
UN Human Rights Council—an independent expert tasked with scrutinizing state
surveillance practices in a sustained and systematic way. 
At time of writing, however, there is still a desire to secure buy-in from the US and
UK as mass surveillance debates play out at these international venues. The in-
stinct to treat the US and UK with diplomatic kid gloves is not surprising, given
their technological capacity and political power. But ultimately, this approach may
be counterproductive. In the short term, they are more likely to play the role of
spoilers rather than promoters of principled standards. This was certainly true dur-
ing the debate that led to the December 2013 UN General Assembly resolution on
privacy in the digital age, when the US and UK pushed, somewhat successfully, to
water down the text behind the scenes, and again in November 2014, with respect
to the follow-on resolution on the same topic. 
Of course, we must continue to press for reforms in the US and UK and urge these
governments to extend privacy protections to those outside their borders. But we
should not allow political paralysis in the US and UK to hamper development of in-
ternational privacy norms. A process of broad international engagement, including
with strategic allies, can facilitate the US and UK’s eventual acceptance and inter-
nalization of strong international standards over time. When other nations and in-
ternational institutions lead by example and establish strong human rights
standards, they will bring the US and UK along. 
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Global norm development is just a first step, however. The Snowden revelations
have shown how far security agencies are liable to go when they are allowed to op-
erate with inadequate oversight and accountability. As new surveillance capabili-
ties develop and states grapple with renewed security threats—whether terrorism
and violent extremism or cyber attacks—sustained public scrutiny and national im-
plementation of global norms are needed. The Pillay report has provided much-
needed guidance. The onus is now on parliaments and legislatures around the
world to examine surveillance practices and assess their costs and tangible bene-
fits more closely and publicly within a human rights frame. 
Surveillance must remain on the human rights agenda, nationally and globally.
Otherwise, we risk transforming the Internet into every government’s all-seeing
panopticon.
Cynthia Wong is senior researcher on the Internet and human rights 




Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas
By Steve Goose and Ole Solvang
Late in the evening of September 1, 2014, an Iraqi air force plane dropped a bomb
on a school in Al-Alam near Tikrit in northern Iraq, which had recently fallen under
the control of the extremist group Islamic State (also known as ISIS). Dozens of dis-
placed families were sheltering in the building at the time. The immense explosion
and flying shrapnel killed at least 31 civilians, including 24 children, and wounded
41 others. One survivor who spoke to Human Rights Watch lost his wife, two sons,
a daughter, a sister, and a nephew in the blast. Five members of his family were
also wounded, including his son Yazin, just six months old. 
Modern and not-so-modern armies rely on explosive weapons—including aircraft
bombs, mortars, artillery, rockets, and even ballistic missiles—to conduct military
operations, not ubiquitous assault rifles and machine guns. As a result, when civil-
ians are killed or wounded in fighting in populated areas, it is usually these
weapons that inflict the harm. 
In 2014 alone, Human Rights Watch documented the use of explosive weapons in
populated areas in violation of international humanitarian law (the laws of war) in
at least 12 countries, including Syria, Iraq, Israel/Gaza, Ukraine, Libya, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Sudan, Nigeria, Somalia, Thailand, and Colombia. Such unlawful at-
tacks were typically indiscriminate because they did not distinguish between the
military target and civilians, or were disproportionate because the anticipated
civilian loss from the attack exceeded the expected military gain. 
Ranging from cheap and easy to produce to complex and expensive, explosive
weapons are often deadly to anyone nearby. According to Action on Armed Vio-
lence, a United Kingdom-based nongovernmental organization, explosive weapons
maimed and killed almost 38,000 people in 2013—82 percent of them civilians.
Not surprisingly, when more civilians are present, the percentage of civilian casual-
ties jumps; explosive weapon use in populated areas resulted in civilian dead and
injured reaching 93 percent in the same period. In Syria, explosive weapons have
been responsible for more than 50 percent of the civilian deaths (about 40,000 of
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more than 75,000) documented by the Violations Documentation Center, a Syrian-
based monitoring group, since conflict erupted there in 2011. 
Not all uses of explosive weapons in populated areas violate international humani-
tarian law. But the increase in urban warfare and rapidly mounting civilian casual-
ties around the world scream for urgent action. For several years, international
momentum has been building to curtail the use of explosive weapons in populated
areas, including halting the use of those with wide area effects. Doing so would
help save lives, alleviate civilian suffering, and reduce destruction of civilian infra-
structure, which would facilitate post-conflict recovery. It could be the single most
crucial step that nations take to protect civilians from the horrors of war.
***
When explosive weapons detonate, they send a powerful and destructive blast
wave that travels faster than the speed of sound. Often, however, the most lethal
effects are caused by flying fragments of casing—shrapnel—which can have a long
reach. The Syrian government’s OFAB 250-270 aircraft bomb, for example, can in-
flict damage and injuries within a 155-meter radius from where it strikes. The cas-
ing can also be designed to shatter into sharp pieces of metal that can penetrate
the body and rip internal organs, causing life-threatening injuries. 
The wide area effect of some explosive weapons is a key reason why they kill and
injure so many civilians. A weapon that can injure people within a radius of dozens
or hundreds of meters of its strike will almost certainly kill or wound civilians when
used in populated areas. Many explosive weapons are also unguided or are used
without spotters, which means that they cannot be targeted precisely, posing addi-
tional risk to civilians. A doctor at a morgue in eastern Ukraine told Human Rights
Watch that 99 percent of the civilian war victims it had received had died of frag-
mentation injuries caused by explosive weapons. 
In Syria, where the use of explosive weapons in populated areas has been particu-
larly extensive, the government has used a broad range of such weapons since
2011, including mortars, artillery, rockets, fuel-air explosives, and ballistic mis-
siles. Since late 2013, the government has also increasingly used “barrel bombs.”
Built locally from oil drums, gas cylinders, and water tanks, they are packed with a
deadly cargo of high explosives, oil, chemicals, and scrap metal to enhance frag-
mentation on impact. 
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In 2014, Human Rights Watch documented hundreds of irregularly shaped blast
craters in Aleppo caused by such bombs, and recorded dozens of injuries and fa-
talities, including that of Noura al-Abdu, 13, who was decapitated in Hraytan,
northwest of Aleppo, in a December 2013 barrel bomb attack that also severed the
leg of a 9-year-old girl as she sought shelter from a helicopter overhead. 
Armed groups opposed to the Syrian government have also fired mortar and ar-
tillery shells and launched rockets into populated government-controlled areas,
and their powerful car bombs have killed hundreds of civilians. A twin bomb attack
targeting a school in Homs, Syria on October 1 reportedly killed dozens of children
and several adults. On April 29, two mortar shells also struck the Badr el-Din Hus-
saini educational complex in the al-Shaghour neighborhood of Damascus, a pro-
government area, killing 17 children and at least two parents and injuring 50
others.
In Iraq, ISIS has earned a reputation for limitless cruelty by shooting and behead-
ing hundreds of non-combatants in cold blood. But they have also fired mortar
shells into populated areas, killing and maiming civilians, and used car bomb at-
tacks across the country that have killed hundreds of people and likely amount to
crimes against humanity. The government’s response to ISIS has included the use
of barrel bombs and a string of indiscriminate attacks. 
In Gaza, Israeli forces fired tens of thousands of explosive weapons into populated
areas where Hamas was deployed during a seven-week-long war in July and Au-
gust. Hamas itself fired thousands of rockets and mortars toward Israeli popula-
tion centers. Israeli attacks killed more than 2,100 Palestinians, including at least
1,486 civilians, according to the United Nations. Daily casualty reports from local
human rights organizations in Gaza show that nearly all the deaths were due to ex-
plosive weapons.
In Ukraine, government forces have fired artillery, multiple-launch Grad rockets,
and other explosive weapons into populated areas where pro-Russia rebel forces
were deployed, killing dozens and injuring many more. The pro-Russia forces have
used the same kind of explosive weapons against government forces, also killing
and injuring civilians. 
In Sudan, persistent government bombing of populated areas in the Nuba Moun-
tains (Southern Kordofan) and Blue Nile has killed and maimed hundreds of civil-
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ians and damaged humanitarian aid structures since the conflict started in 2011. A
surge in bombing in May and June of 2014 damaged humanitarian aid facilities and
forced the humanitarian organization Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without
Borders) to withdraw.
Using explosive weapons in populated areas not only causes civilian casualties,
but also destroys civilian infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, water pipes,
and electrical power grids, prolonging the impact of armed conflict for civilians.
For example, when government and rebel forces were firing unguided rockets, ar-
tillery and other explosive weapons at each other in Luhansk, eastern Ukraine,
tens of thousands of people trapped in the city were left without running water and
electricity for weeks. When a Human Rights Watch researcher visited in late Au-
gust, hundreds of people were braving regular bombardment to line up for hours at
dawn for water and food at distribution points across the city, carrying empty bot-
tles and containers. 
Israeli explosive weapons destroyed or damaged more than 15,000 buildings in
Gaza during the summer’s conflict, according to satellite imagery analysis con-
ducted by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research. Schools were par-
ticularly affected; 228 were damaged, according to a UN special rapporteur,
severely impacting children’s education. When the school year began in Septem-
ber, around 90 percent of Gaza’s schools were running on a double shift, with stu-
dents attending for just four hours each day.
In northern Syria, government air strikes, some seemingly deliberate, have dam-
aged and destroyed hospitals, leaving the medical system in shambles. Physicians
for Human Rights, a group that documents the plight of medical personnel, has
recorded nearly 200 attacks on hospitals in Syria since the start of the conflict. The
few medical resources that are available are insufficient to cope with war-related
injuries; maternal health, vaccinations, burns, and chronic diseases are neglected.
In northern and eastern Syria, the collapse of the medical system contributed to
the outbreak of polio, a disease not seen in the country since 1999. 
The use of explosive weapons in populated areas is also one of the main reasons
for displacement of civilians. Most people we interviewed in refugee camps in
Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon said they had fled Syria because of the government’s
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constant bombardment of areas held by non-state armed groups. People fleeing
Luhansk in Ukraine said the same. 
International law prohibits the use of certain explosive weapons, most notably an-
tipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions. But for the most part, the legality of
explosive weapon use is decided on a case-by-case basis by general provisions in
international humanitarian law—such as the obligation to conduct attacks using
weapons in a matter that can distinguish between civilians and combatants or
other military objectives.
This piecemeal analysis does not lend itself to a categorical finding regarding a
broad category of weapons (e.g. explosive weapons) in a general type of setting
(e.g. populated areas). As a result, it cannot set a clear boundary on this issue. 
So what can be done? 
A legally binding ban on the use of all explosive weapons in populated areas
would not be politically feasible, but it is possible to set standards that would sig-
nificantly raise the bar. Human Rights Watch is a founding member of the Interna-
tional Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW), a global coalition of NGOs
established in 2011 to work to prevent harm from the use of explosive weapons in
populated areas. INEW calls on governments to “develop stronger international
standards, including certain prohibitions and restrictions on the use of explosive
weapons in populated areas.” 
Building these standards takes time. But states and other actors should now ac-
knowledge the problem in international discussions and review national policies
that outline what weapons are appropriate for use in populated areas and under
what circumstances. They should seek to develop a common position that aims to
further limit the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. In particular, they
should agree to halt altogether the use of explosive weapons with wide area ef-
fects in populated areas. As a matter of policy, military commanders should not
order the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas due
to the foreseeable harm to civilians. 
Emphasizing explosive weapons with wide area effects is crucial because they
have caused the most civilian harm. The concept of wide area effect will need to be
more precisely defined, but it should include heavy weapons that produce a wide
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blast and/or fragmentation radius (like large aircraft bombs); weapons with multi-
ple munitions or explosive warheads that cover a large area (like Grads and other
multiple launch rocket systems); and weapons that are so inaccurate that they
cannot be effectively targeted (like barrel bombs). 
Other measures could be considered that could go beyond the minimum require-
ments of international humanitarian law, apart from halting the use of explosive
weapons with wide area effects in populated areas. Possibilities that have been
discussed include restricting the use of indirect fire weapons or unguided
weapons in populated areas and committing to using the least destructive force to
achieve a military advantage. States could articulate best practices related to doc-
trine, operational policies, planning directives, rules of engagement, and other
such guidance. 
Despite the increasing use of explosive weapons in populated areas in 2014, the
year also saw significant international efforts to address this issue—and momen-
tum is likely to grow. The UN secretary-general, several UN agencies (notably the
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, or OCHA), and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have all called on states to refrain from using
explosive weapons with wide area effect in populated areas. In March, the ICRC
held a meeting to consider how to strengthen the protection of civilians from ex-
plosive weapons used in populated areas. In June, Norway hosted an informal ex-
perts meeting with OCHA with the same purpose. Austria has announced that it
will host a follow-up meeting in 2015.
A sustained international process to address the use of explosive weapons in pop-
ulated areas is getting underway. Views appear to be coalescing around two no-
tions: that the most feasible outcome of international discussions is likely to be a
politically binding commitment—such as a joint declaration of guidelines—rather
than a new legal instrument; and that there should be a focus on explosive
weapons with wide area effects. 
Some government and military experts have expressed concern about the growing
effort to curb explosive weapon use in populated areas based on two arguments:
first, that many governments already significantly do this through domestic poli-
cies and regulations, and second, that the most serious violators will not comply
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with international guidelines on the issue since they already violate other laws
with impunity. 
It is true that non-binding guidelines might not have an immediate effect on the
Assads of the world. But the power of international norm setting should not be un-
derestimated. Today, few countries, even those that have not signed the relevant
treaties, are comfortable admitting that they use landmines or cluster bombs. And
the fact that many countries already restrict the use of explosive weapons in popu-
lated areas is actually an argument for, not against, developing international
guidelines, which would help to spread the practice to other countries. 
Other critics have speculated that limiting the use of explosive weapons in popu-
lated areas would encourage opposition forces to move into cities and towns and
prevent civilians from leaving—all to deter belligerent forces from attacking with
explosive weapons. But such actions, which would amount to using human
shields or otherwise deliberately putting civilians at risk, are already prohibited
under international humanitarian law and could alienate the civilian population. 
A future political declaration regarding the use of explosive weapons in populated
areas should affirm the obligation to avoid co-location of military objectives and
civilians. But it should not be aimed at preventing the use of appropriate means
and methods of warfare to address such a situation, and could help to better elab-
orate what those means and methods might be. 
Explosive weapons kill and injure thousands of civilians every year and seriously
damage civilian infrastructure. Clear international guidelines on the use of explo-
sive weapons in populated areas could have prevented the 31 deaths of civilians at
the Tikrit school, as well as countless deaths, injuries, and suffering in other
places. Curbing their use would have a bigger impact on the protection of civilians
during armed conflict than anything else we could do. 
Steve Goose is director of the Arms Division at Human Rights Watch. 




Mega-Sporting Events and Human Rights
By Minky Worden
As fireworks cascaded over Sochi’s February 2014 Winter Olympics opening cere-
mony, Anastasia Smirnova sat miles away in St. Petersburg police custody. A top
Russian advocate for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights,
Smirnova had recently met with International Olympic Committee (IOC) President
Thomas Bach to explain how the country’s anti-gay laws were creating a climate of
violence and discrimination ahead of the Sochi Olympics. Russian authorities,
keen to ensure that the Games’ luster not be sullied by exposure of human rights
abuses, detained Smirnova as she held aloft a banner emblazoned with Principle 6
of the Olympic Charter: “Discrimination is incompatible with belonging to the
Olympic Movement.” 
Human rights were broadly trampled upon before and during the Sochi Olympics,
amid forced evictions, violations of workers’ rights, a worsening crackdown on civil
society and journalists, and anti-LGBT discrimination that caused worldwide revul-
sion. Looking ahead to future games, the human rights situation does not look
much better. 
Since South Korea and Tokyo have established domestic human rights monitors,
their selection as hosts for the 2018 Winter Games and the 2020 Summer Games is
not cause for alarm. But the outlook for the 2022 Winter Olympics—with Kaza-
khstan and China as the only contenders—should be keeping the IOC up at night. 
Both countries have abysmal press freedom records and journalists languishing in
jail. Beijing has launched its harshest crackdown since the 1989 protests in
Tiananmen Square that ended in bloodshed, is jailing journalists, and is breaking
an international agreement to allow free elections in Hong Kong. In Almaty, where
peaceful dissenters are routinely imprisoned and labor rights often flouted, the
IOC could experience a disastrous déjà vu of the Sochi clampdown and abuses. 
This crisis of choice for 2022 should, finally, provide the impetus for the IOC and
other international sporting bodies to reform a system that for too long has re-
warded human rights abusers while often creating misery for local populations.
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In October 2014, Norway—which had made respect for human rights part of its
Olympic bid—pulled out of the contest to host the 2022 Winter Games, leaving
Kazakhstan and China as the only contenders. 
Oil-rich Kazakhstan craves the global prestige that hosting the Games would bring,
while China is seeking to burnish its reputation on the world stage, as it did during
the 2008 Beijing Games. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is set to host the first European
Games in 2015—launched and administered by the European Olympic Commit-
tees—against the backdrop of an escalating crackdown on critics in the country. 
For too long, governments have said whatever it took to win the right to host the
Olympics, only to be unreliable partners later on who flouted key promises as the
IOC declared itself powerless to act. With Nobel Peace Prize-hosting Norway out,
the IOC is well and truly stuck with the choice of two competitors for the 2022
Games with terrible human rights records.
In both China and Kazakhstan, peaceful critics languish in jail; each country has a
recent history of censoring the Internet and crushing press freedom. Migrant work-
ers in China who would build new stadiums face exploitation and dangerous con-
ditions, while Kazakhstan’s abusive handling in 2011 of extended labor strikes and
its recent adoption of a law on trade unions have serious curtailed freedom of as-
sociation. Lawsuits against an advertising agency for a poster showing a same-sex
kiss and renewed calls for a ban on “homosexual propaganda” in September ex-
pose Kazakhstan’s problematic record on LGBT rights. 
To host the Olympics, governments pledge not only to build sparkling new stadi-
ums but also to uphold the “Fundamental Principles of Olympism”—human dig-
nity, press freedom, and a complete rejection of “any form of discrimination.”
These principles are enshrined in the Olympic Charter, a lofty document that sup-
posedly guides the Games’ preparation and advances “human dignity.” 
Human rights crises around so-called “mega-sporting events” are not limited to
the Olympics. The scale of abuse in Qatar as it builds a dozen 2022 World Cup sta-
diums and US$200 billion worth of infrastructure is immense: already, hundreds of
South Asian migrant workers who toiled in the heat and dust of a highly abusive
construction sector have been sent home in body bags, with authorities ignoring
calls for investigations into their deaths. Russia has a grim record of failing migrant
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workers who were exploited and cheated as they built infrastructure for the $53 bil-
lion Sochi Olympics, and is set to host the 2018 World Cup. 
The prospects for change now are greater than before: sports fans, corporate spon-
sors, and the general public are increasingly turned off by reports of human rights
violations when sporting extravaganzas are staged. 
With this perfect storm of abuses tied to, and often caused by preparation for,
mega-sporting events, it is time for practical reform to encourage governments to
clean up their human rights acts before hosting. International sporting bodies
need to accept that awarding contracts for massive infrastructure to governments
that violate human rights will only compound existing violations; while governing
bodies for global sports need to reform from within, with the mantra that there is
no successful sporting event where there are major human rights violations. 
Mega-Sporting Events: Five Main Abuses
When athletes break the rules in Olympic competitions, they are harshly sanc-
tioned. When host countries flout the rules, they have largely got away with it. For-
mer IOC President Jacques Rogge often insisted that the Olympics are a “force for
good” but refused to criticize blatant violations of the Olympic Charter by Olympic
hosts. 
Human Rights Watch has extensively documented how mega-sporting events can
bring mega-violations when Games are awarded to governments who fail to re-
spect human rights. No country has a perfect human rights record, but increasingly
it is the more abusive states that most want to burnish their international reputa-
tion and need the patriotic boost gained by hosting world media and leaders for a
global sport extravaganza. 
Over a decade of research, Human Rights Watch has documented five signature
types of serious human rights violations that are typically tied to mega-sporting
events. 
The first is forced evictions without due process or compensation due to massive
new infrastructure construction. Before 2008, thousands of citizens in Beijing were
forcibly evicted from their homes with little due process in terms of consultation or
adequate compensation. Residents who protested the demolition of their homes
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were arrested. Fair compensation and due process were serious problems in Sochi
as well. 
As massive stadiums are constructed for opening ceremonies, soccer games, or
swimming and other events, the bulk of the work is often done by abused and ex-
ploited migrant workers, who face hazardous working conditions, long hours, and
being cheated of pay. 
Major infrastructure construction often also leads to environmental and other com-
plaints. The silencing of civil society and rights activists has been a signature
abuse ahead of both the Beijing and Russian Olympics. Instead of the promised
human rights improvements, the period leading up to the Beijing Games was
marred by jailings and house arrests of activists who criticized the Olympics (in-
cluding Sakharov Prize winner Hu Jia), and a three-year jail sentence for an envi-
ronmental activist in Russia. In Beijing, citizens like 59-year-old Ji Sizun—who
attempted to use the “Olympic protest zones” officially set up by the Chinese gov-
ernment to supposedly allow peaceful protest—were arrested. In Sochi, members
of the feminist punk group Pussy Riot who staged a small protest during the Winter
Games in February 2014 were visibly tackled and beaten by Cossacks while the po-
lice did nothing.
The Olympic Charter expressly guarantees press freedom—the sale of media rights
is a major source of revenue for the International Olympic Committee. But both the
Beijing and Sochi Olympics were marred by threats, intimidation, and arrests of
journalists. When 25,000 journalists arrived in China to cover the Beijing
Olympics, they were surprised to find Internet news blocked—until the IOC forced
China to cease web censorship for the duration of the Games. News that China’s
milk supply was poisoned nationwide with melamine was censored until after the
Games closed, and at least six babies died as a result of this tragic poisoning (and
the media blackout about it). In the lead-up to the Sochi Games, Russian police
harassed, detained, and threatened to imprison two journalists from a Norwegian
television station, before sarcastically saying, “Welcome to Sochi” when the jour-
nalists’ ordeal was over. So egregious was their treatment that Russian authorities
issued a rare apology.
Mega-sporting events are supposed to be moments to celebrate diversity and
human achievement. But too often they are settings that expose ugly discrimina-
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tion. Until just days before the launch of the London 2012 Olympics, Saudi Arabia
was still planning to send a male-only national team, as in all past Olympics, and
also to the 2014 Asian Games. Extreme pressure—brought about in part by Human
Rights Watch’s “Let Them Play” campaign—finally led to two Saudi women being
allowed to compete in 2012. But back in Saudi Arabia, as documented by Human
Rights Watch’s 2012 report “Steps of the Devil,” the country still bans sport for all
girls in state schools and has no women’s sports federations, a clear violation of
the Olympic Charter’s non-discrimination clause. 
In June 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed into law an anti-LGBT “pro-
paganda” bill. The law uses the pretext of protecting children to ban spreading in-
formation about equality, tolerance, and other issues affecting the LGBT
community and demonized LGBT people and activists in the public eye. This has
helped spark a surge in harassment and violent attacks against LGBT people, and
the IOC raised no concerns about how this could be compatible with a commitment
to non-discrimination.
In some parts of the world, women cannot even attend a sporting event as a spec-
tator. Equal access to sporting events for women has become a serious concern,
with the Fédération Internationale de Football Association, the international gov-
erning body for soccer known as FIFA, allowing a ban on women spectators for
football matches since the 1980s in Iran. In 2012, Iranian officials extended the
ban to volleyball matches. 
Law student Ghoncheh Ghavami was arrested in June 2014 and jailed for months in
Iran’s notorious Evin prison after she and others protested a ban on women enter-
ing a stadium to watch a World League match. In November, the International Fed-
eration for Volleyball (known as FIVB) called on the Iranian government to release
Ghavami, and affirmed its commitment to “inclusivity and the right of women to
participate in sport on an equal basis” at the organization’s World Congress. The
FIVB flagged that Iran’s policy could limit its ability to host international tourna-
ments in the future. Ghavami was released on bail in late November, but not before
a revolutionary court convicted her of “propaganda against the state” and sen-
tenced her to one year in prison. She was appealing the decision at time of writing. 
In November 2014, the Asian Volleyball Confederation announced that it had se-
lected Iran to co-host the 2015 Asian Men’s Volleyball Championships. Ghavami’s
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conviction and Iran’s continuing ban on women spectators attending men’s sport-
ing events should prompt international sporting groups to pull all major tourna-
ments from offending countries until women are guaranteed the right to attend
matches as spectators without the prospect of arrest and jailing. 
Taking a Stand, Making Reforms
It has often taken getting a major black eye in the press for the IOC to finally react
to egregious abuses extensively documented by Human Rights Watch and other or-
ganizations. The IOC has responded to earlier scandals including doping, environ-
mental degradation, illegal betting, and corruption with concrete reforms that
included setting up an anti-doping agency, environmental impact statements, and
term limits for the IOC leadership. 
In the last century, the IOC helped combat discrimination in sport by banning
Apartheid-era South Africa for sending whites-only teams, and Taliban-run
Afghanistan for discrimination against women and girls. Facing public demonstra-
tions that could have ended in a bloodbath, the IOC told South Korea’s military dic-
tatorship to hold elections or it would jeopardize Seoul’s hosting of the 1988
Olympics (South Korea has since been a durable democracy and is due to host the
2018 Winter Olympics. 
The International Olympic Committee and FIFA are the two largest players on the
field of mega-sporting events. They need to use this crisis to act on reforms before
the next Olympics and the next World Cup. 
In autumn 2014, IOC President Thomas Bach put in place a series of reforms that
Human Rights Watch has long sought that could curb abuses—a sign the body may
no longer want to play ball with rights-violating host countries. Starting with the
2022 Olympics, the International Olympic Committee Host City contracts will in-
clude human rights and labor rights protections, including non-discrimination.
Olympic Host City contracts have generally been secret and have never before ex-
pressly included rights protections.
The success of contract reforms will depend on how serious the IOC is about imple-
mentation. By picking up the reform baton dropped by his predecessors, the IOC
and Thomas Bach could launch a new era of zero tolerance for serious abuses
around mega-sporting events. 
39
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Russia’s Olympics, marred by entirely predictable rights abuses, may have been a
turning point. As Human Rights Watch documented in a book-length 2013 report,
Race to the Bottom, many migrant workers who built the Games’ infrastructure
were abused and cheated of their wages. In some cases, those who complained
were beaten and deported. The IOC ultimately took up those cases with Russia,
which admitted that workers were still owed $8 million in unpaid wages and
pledged to ensure that employers make these payments. Russia’s anti-LGBT law
led to global protests by leading athletes and extensive negative press coverage.
In September 2014, the IOC belatedly rebuked Russia by adding an anti-discrimi-
nation clause in future host city contracts and in December, in a unanimous vote,
the IOC added “sexual orientation” as an explicit protected ground against dis-
crimination in Principle 6 of the Olympic Charter.
Future Risky Hosts
FIFA has deservedly faced a firestorm of criticism for awarding the 2022 World Cup
to Qatar without making labor reforms a prerequisite for them hosting the tourna-
ment. The result is that the migrant workers building football stadiums and billions
of dollars of new infrastructure are highly vulnerable to trafficking and forced labor. 
The “Supreme Committee for Qatar 2022”—the tournament’s quasi-governmental
delivery committee—has pledged to improve conditions for workers on projects di-
rectly related to the World Cup. 
But Qatar is not pledging to seriously reform exploitative laws such as the kafala
system that ties workers to employers; it has refused to abolish a pointless and en-
tirely illegitimate exit visa system that traps workers in the country; and it has not
outlined how it plans to stop the systematic confiscation of passports and the im-
position of illegal recruitment fees on workers. 
Oil-rich Azerbaijan, where the government has recently jailed the country’s top
human rights defenders, will host the inaugural European Games, which will take
place in Baku in 2015 (the Organizing Committee is chaired by the first lady,
Mehriban Aliyeva). 
The European Games are organized by the European National Olympic Commit-
tees, which means that Olympic Charter human rights principles should apply. De-
spite the stated goal of “spreading throughout Europe of the Olympic ideals as
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defined by the IOC Charter,” the Azerbaijan authorities have instead been crushing
critics, cutting foreign funding, and freezing bank accounts of independent groups,
and threatening or jailing journalists and social media activists. 
The European Games organizers should urgently study the ugly history of the 2012
Eurovision Song Contest hosted by Azerbaijan: the atmosphere for political ac-
tivists and independent and pro-opposition journalists grew acutely hostile; critics
were jailed, demonstrations dispersed, and activists were arrested.The December
2014 arrest of Khadija Ismayilova, Azerbaijan’s leading investigative journalist and
ardent government critic, is a devastating blow to critical voices in Azerbaijan, and
a clear violation of the Olympic Charter’s press freedom protections. 
Bridging Words and Reality
The Olympic Charter states that “sport is a human right.” It elevates the principle
of human dignity and proclaims, “The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the
service of the harmonious development of humankind, with a view to promoting a
peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.” Similarly, the
FIFA statutes stress the importance of “humanitarian values” and state: “Discrimi-
nation of any kind against a country, private person or group of people on account
of ethnic origin, gender, language, religion, politics or any other reason is strictly
prohibited …”
For now, the IOC and FIFA have a serious problem: how to bridge the gap between
these lofty words and the ugly reality on the ground. 
One answer to this is to build human rights monitoring into the hosting process—
assessing progress towards press freedom and international human rights stan-
dards, just as they now do to build ski jumps, swimming pools, and equestrian
facilities on time. Similar changes are needed in the FIFA Statutes to ensure that
dazzling soccer stadiums are not built on the backs of migrant workers toiling for
low wages in hazardous conditions. 
The IOC has a massive structure in place to evaluate host cities, and that same fly-
specking care should be brought to bear on publicly available information on
human rights abuses, in particular as they relate to the hosting of the Olympics.
Spectators do not want to cheer in a stadium that costs not just millions of dol-
lars—but dozens of human lives—to build. Social media can send news of a gold
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medal around the world in seconds, but it can also send images of water cannons
and bloodied peaceful protesters.
Selecting future host countries should involve a complete and meaningful evalua-
tion of governments’ commitment to respect human rights in compliance with in-
ternational human rights norms, as well as the “Fundamental Principles” of the
Olympic Charter. These standards can easily be included in the IOC Model Candi-
dature for Olympic host countries, and compliance should be facilitated by making
host city contracts public in the interest of greater transparency. 
For all future mega-sporting events, evaluations of candidates should include
human rights benchmarks, including those related to media and Internet freedom;
fair compensation for forced evictions; labor rights for workers building venues;
protections for activists and peaceful protests; and protection against discrimina-
tion, including based on race, religion, politics, gender, nationality, disability, or
sexual orientation and gender identity. 
Sports associations should not bring events to countries where women will not be
welcome as spectators, or where they could get attacked or arrested for cheering a
team. Sporting federations can and should play a positive role in quashing dis-
crimination by insisting women have equal access to mega-sporting events and
tournaments, which should not go forward with a male-only spectator policy, as in
Iran. Sports leaders need to state in public that they will not back mega-sporting
event hosts who violate the foundations of sport. 
It is time to level the playing field and put an end to the high human cost of award-
ing mega-sporting events to repressive governments. In launching “Agenda 2020”
reforms that include human rights protections for the first time, IOC President Bach
has begun to take overdue steps in this direction. Now is the moment for FIFA and
other international sports bodies to reform as well. There cannot be a truly suc-
cessful global sporting event in countries where there are major human rights
abuses. 
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Afghanistan entered a new period of instability in 2014, with important implica-
tions for human rights. The June 2014 final round of the presidential election re-
sulted in political impasse as both candidates, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah
Abdullah, claimed victory after accusing each other’s teams of engaging in fraud.
On September 21, the two candidates signed a deal making Ghani the president,
and Abdullah the chief executive. The bitterly fought campaign and months-long
standoff raised fears of continuing instability, and lingering disagreements over
the terms of the deal delayed the formation of a cabinet.
Uncertainty surrounding the political transition, along with growing pressure
from Taliban insurgents, contributed to a decline in respect for human rights
throughout the country, including impunity for abuses by security forces, threats
to women’s rights and freedom of expression, and indiscriminate attacks that
killed civilians. 
Preparations for the withdrawal of international combat troops by the end of
2014 continued, with foreign troops largely departed or sequestered in their
bases. As insurgent forces launched sustained attacks on a number of vital dis-
tricts, Afghan security forces suffered increasingly higher casualties on the bat-
tlefield. However, civilians still bore the brunt of the violence. The United
Nations recorded a 24 percent rise in civilian casualties in the first six months of
2014 compared to 2013, most due to insurgent attacks.
Election Violence and Attacks on Civilians
Early in the year, the Taliban stepped up attacks on officials and workers associ-
ated with the presidential elections, and targeted other civilians and foreigners.
On January 17, a suicide attack on a Kabul restaurant, La Taverna, resulted in the
deaths of 20 people, including 13 foreign nationals and 7 Afghans. The Taliban
claimed responsibility, apparently targeting the restaurant because of its popu-
larity with foreigners. On March 21, gunmen attacked the dining room of the
high-security Serena Hotel in central Kabul, killing nine people, including Agence
France Presse journalist Sardar Ahmad, his wife, and two of their children. A
third child was wounded. 
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In a March 11 statement, the Taliban vowed to “use all force” to disrupt the vote,
and to “target all workers, activists, callers, security apparatus, and offices.” Vi-
olent incidents in the period included kidnappings of election workers, and tar-
geted attacks on campaign rallies, and candidates’ staff and offices. Taliban
forces killed some 40 civilians in attacks during the election, injured at least
100, and severed fingers of 11 men in Herat who voted in the run-off poll on June 14.
Torture, Extrajudicial Executions, and Enforced
Disappearances
Impunity for abuses by government security forces remained the norm. The po-
lice in Kandahar, in particular, were cited by the United Nations, human rights
groups, and journalists in numerous reports of torture, summary executions, and
forcible disappearances through 2014. The torture and death in custody of
Hazrat Ali, a 23-year-old plumber, as reported in the New York Times, prompted
Minister of Interior Umer Daudzai to promise an inquiry, but no results had been
made public at time of writing. 
Despite a 2013 government investigation into allegations of ill-treatment and tor-
ture, not a single member of the Afghan security forces was prosecuted during
the year for such abuses. Kandahar police reportedly maintained at least four se-
cret detention centers, to which the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
(UNAMA) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), had no ac-
cess. 
A number of high-level police and army officials made statements that appeared
to endorse a “take no prisoners” policy toward captured Taliban fighters, blam-
ing government policy and corruption for the fact that released detainees were
returning to the fight. In June, Kandahar police chief, Brigadier General Raziq,
stated that his police had orders to kill all Taliban on the battlefield. Raziq later
retracted that statement. Just before leaving office, President Karzai promoted
Raziq to a three-star rank. Kunduz Police Chief Mustafa Mohseni echoed Raziq’s
sentiment, stating that police had no option but to kill captured insurgents be-
cause they could not be effectively prosecuted in a corrupt judicial system. On
August 23, Gen. Murad Ali Murad, commander of the Afghanistan National
Army’s infantry also called for “giving no quarter” to captured insurgents in clear
violation of international humanitarian law.
47
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Since 2013, Afghan authorities released hundreds of detainees from the Bagram
Detention Facility, including 65 who were freed in February over the objections of
the United States military, which argued that the men continued to pose a
threat. In August and September, the US released and repatriated 2 Yemenis and
14 Pakistanis from Bagram. 
Police impunity in 2014 extended to other crimes against civilians: in April,
Meena Intizar, a poet, claimed that she had fled Kandahar city after one of
Raziq’s deputies, Abdul Wadood Sarhadi Jajo, threatened to rape and kill her
and family members after she filed a complaint that Jajo’s forces raided her
home and stole electronics, jewelry, and money. Jajo had been accused previ-
ously of sexual assault, but was never prosecuted. In May, he was killed in a sui-
cide attack. 
The Afghan Local Police (ALP)—a network of local defense forces established
largely by the US military in cooperation with the Afghan government—continued
to be responsible for serious human rights violations, including extrajudicial ex-
ecutions. During an offensive against the Taliban in August in Zhare district, Kan-
dahar, an ALP unit under Brigadier General Raziq’s command reportedly
captured and executed six Kuchi nomads it accused of working with the Taliban.
In June, ALP members under Commander Abdullah summarily executed three vil-
lagers in Andar district following a clash with Taliban forces in the area. Accord-
ing to UNAMA, at time of writing there had been no accountability for the
killings. 
Women’s Rights
Women’s rights remained under threat in 2014. In January, a provision in
Afghanistan’s draft criminal procedure code became the latest in a series of at-
tempts to roll back the already fragile legal protections for women and girls. As
passed by parliament, article 26 of the draft code included “relatives of the ac-
cused,” among a list of people who “cannot be questioned as witnesses” in
criminal proceedings, thereby making successful prosecutions of those commit-
ting domestic violence extremely unlikely. In late February, President Hamid
Karzai signed the law but amended article 26 by decree to state that relatives of
the accused are permitted to testify voluntarily. It also allows compelled testi-
mony from any “complainant or informant regarding the crime” and slightly nar-
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rows the definition of “relatives.” However, the amended article still exempts
many family members from being called as witnesses. 
In June, the government rejected recommendations from UN member countries
to abolish prosecution of women for so-called moral crimes. Other setbacks for
women’s rights in 2014 included a continuing series of attacks on, threats to-
ward, and assassinations of, high-profile women, including police women and
activists, to which the government failed to respond with meaningful measures
to protect women at risk. The implementation by law enforcement officials of
Afghanistan’s landmark 2009 Law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women
remained poor, with many cases of violence against women ignored or resolved
through “mediation” that denied victims their day in court.
More positively, women’s rights activists through hard work and constant advo-
cacy were able to inject some discussion of women’s rights into the election
process. This included a successful effort by the Afghan Women’s Network (AWN)
to obtain signatures from Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, after both sur-
vived the first election round, to commit to following 30 recommendations that
support women’s rights. AWN and its member organizations planned to follow
up with the new president to ensure his compliance.
Transitional Justice
Early in the year, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission pre-
sented President Karzai with a copy of its 800-page report mapping war crimes
and crimes against humanity in Afghanistan since the Communist era. Com-
pleted in December 2011, the report would provide a foundation for future steps
to prosecute those implicated in past abuses. President Karzai had rejected calls
to release the report publicly. Although Ashraf Ghani had vowed before the elec-
tion to release the report, at time of writing there was no planned release date. 
Freedom of Expression and Association
The rights to freedom of expression and association of media and political par-
ties, hailed as one of Afghanistan’s clear human rights successes since 2001, in-
creasingly came under threat in 2014.
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Two credible Afghan media organizations, Nai Supporting Open Media, and the
Afghanistan Journalists’ Safety Committee, documented some 68 attacks on
journalists in the first six months of 2014, compared to around 41 attacks in the
same period in 2013. The groups attributed 63 percent of the attacks and threats
to government officials and Afghan security forces, almost 12 percent to insur-
gent forces, and the remainder to other powerful figures or unidentified sources.
The attacks included the killing of New York Times reporter Noor Ahmad Noori on
January 23, 2014, by unidentified assailants in Helmand province. Foreign jour-
nalists were also victims of violence; on March 11, an unidentified guman shot
dead Swedish journalist Nils Horner in Kabul, and on April 4, a policeman in
Khost shot dead photojournalist Anja Niedringhaus and wounded Associated
Press reporter Kathy Gannon while they were covering preparations for the coun-
try’s April 5 presidential election. 
On May 23, WikiLeaks revealed that the US National Security Agency (NSA) con-
ducted mass phone surveillance in Afghanistan on a scale far greater than the
NSA’s controversial metadata collection program in the United States. According
to WikiLeaks, since 2013, the NSA has been recording and storing almost all
phone calls, including those made by Afghan journalists. 
Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees
The intensified fighting displaced thousands of people throughout Afghanistan,
particularly in Helmand and Kunduz provinces. The UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) documented an increase of over 38,340 in the number of in-
ternally displaced people from January through September 2014, bringing the
total to over 755,011. The main causes of displacement were armed conflict and
diminished security.
Deteriorating security and growing fears for the future contributed to an increas-
ing number of Afghans fleeing their homes for other countries, or choosing not
to return home from overseas. The number of Afghans seeking safety outside the
country also grew, with some making dangerous journeys from Afghanistan
through the mountains into Iran toward Europe or by boat to Australia. The num-
ber of refugees returning to Afghanistan from neighboring countries has fallen in
recent years, according to UNHCR.
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Afghans arriving in other countries faced increasing hostility, including dracon-
ian policies in Australia diverting asylum seekers to third countries, and govern-
mental proposals in European countries, including the United Kingdom and
Norway, to deport unaccompanied Afghan children back to Afghanistan. The sev-
eral million Afghans in Iran continued to face discrimination and abuses. 
Key International Actors
International fatigue with Afghanistan among countries that have contributed
troops or significant amounts of aid post-2001—particularly the US, which has
had the largest military and aid involvement—reduced political pressure on the
Afghan government to respect human rights, particularly in the areas of security
force abuses and women’s rights.
While many countries pledged to continue aid to Afghanistan, political engage-
ment waned and donors scaled back most forms of assistance. In October, Presi-
dent Ghani signed the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US, a key step
in determining the scope of NATO’s military presence in Afghanistan post-2014. 
The International Criminal Court, which since 2007 has been looking into allega-
tions of serious international crimes in Afghanistan, expanded its preliminary
analysis to include admissibility issues, including the efficacy of relevant na-






2014 saw no overall improvement in human rights conditions in Algeria despite
promises tha the government has made since 2011 to introduce reforms. Au-
thorities curtailed free speech and the rights to freedom of association, assem-
bly, and peaceful protest, and arrested and prosecuted political and trade union
activists. 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, president since 1999, was re-elected for the fourth time on
April 17, 2014, despite his reported ill-health. Several opposition parties boy-
cotted the election and called instead for democratic reforms and genuinely plu-
ralistic elections. 
The government authorized Human Rights Watch to make an official visit, in Oc-
tober 2014, to the country for the first time since 2005 and to hold a press con-
ference on the human rights situation in the Tindouf Refugee camps. However, it
continued to block the legal registration of Algerian human rights nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs) and maintained its non-cooperation with United
Nations human rights experts and mechanisms. 
Freedom of Assembly
Authorities continued their policy of pre-emptively suppressing peaceful
protests by rounding up and arresting protest organizers in advance and then
using the police to block access to demonstration venues. Those arrested and
prosecuted on charges of gathering illegally included human rights activists and
trade union leaders. 
In April, authorities forcibly dispersed protesters opposed to President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika’s re-election, and arrested and detained hundreds, including many
supporters of the Barakat (“Enough”) movement. Police held those they arrested
for hours in police stations before releasing some and prosecuting others. Those
charged included Mohand Kadi, a youth activist, and Moez Bennecir, a Tunisian
resident in Algeria. On May 18, a court convicted both men of participating in an
“unlawful non-armed gathering harming public order,” under articles 97 and 98
of the penal code, and handed down suspended six month prison sentences. 
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In another case, on June 18, the First Instance Court in Laghouat imposed prison
sentences ranging from six months to two years on 26 defendants after convict-
ing them on charges that included “armed gathering” and violence against the
police based on police testimonies that did not incriminate the defendants indi-
vidually. The 26 included 17 local human rights activists whom the court con-
victed in absentia. They surrendered to the authorities and received a new trial,
at which they were acquitted. 
Freedom of Association
Authorities continued to frustrate efforts by human rights and other organiza-
tions to obtain official registration in compliance with Law 12-06 of 2012. This re-
quires all associations, including those previously registered, to obtain a
registration receipt from the Ministry of Interior before they can operate legally.
The law also empowers the ministry to refuse to register an association whose
activities it deems are contrary to Algeria’s “fundamental principles (constantes
nationales) and values, public order, public morals and the applicable laws and
regulations.” 
These vague criteria give the authorities broad leeway to deny registration, with-
out which organizations cannot lawfully hold public meetings or accept funds
from abroad. Authorities also curtailed activities of some organizations that had
obtained registration prior to the 2012 law by administrative means, such as by
withholding official receipts for which they had applied and declining to make
public venues available for them to hold annual general meetings that they are
required by law to hold. 
Law 12-06 also empowers the Interior Ministry to suspend or dissolve any organ-
ization it considers “interferes with the internal affairs of the state or violates na-
tional sovereignty,” and makes any “cooperation agreement” between an
Algerian and an international organization conditional on prior government ap-
proval. This latter requirement tightened the previous restriction whereby Alger-
ian organizations had to obtain prior government approval for their
“membership” in an international organization. 
The 2012 law maintains the previous requirement that Algerian organizations ob-
tain government approval before they can receive foreign funding but added the
additional requirement that they must first have a “cooperation agreement.”
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These requirements afford the government excessive powers over the legal es-
tablishment and functioning of independent organizations, rendering their mem-
bers liable to prosecution on illegal gathering charges, and makes such
organizations vulnerable to excessive government interference. The rules gov-
erning foreign funding, a lifeline for some independent human rights organiza-
tions, are particularly problematic. 
Labor Rights
The government continued to prevent or disrupt efforts by workers to form inde-
pendent unions, and to clamp down on peaceful protests and strikes. Authori-
ties used administrative chicanery to withhold legal status from independent
unions that seek to operate outside the General Union of Algerian Workers
(Union générale des travailleurs algériens, UGTA), the national trade union feder-
ation that many consider too close to the government. 
Under the law, workers are entitled to form trade unions simply by providing au-
thorities with written notification, after which the Ministry of Interior should
issue them with a receipt confirming the union’s registration. In many cases,
however, the ministry either failed to issue a receipt, leaving the union unable to
prove its registration, or requested additional information from applicants or in-
structed unions to modify their statutes before it would issue them a registration
receipt. In some cases, the ministry failed to issue a receipt even after unions
complied with its instructions. Without a receipt, a union cannot legally repre-
sent workers.
Organizers and workers in autonomous unions face arbitrary arrest and prosecu-
tion and other forms of harassment, such as dismissal from public service em-
ployment, for peacefully pursuing their trade union activities and demonstrating
in support of better labor rights. On April 16, 2014, for example, the Appeals
Court of Ouargla, imposed a suspended prison sentence of one year on union ac-
tivist Houari Djelouli and fined him for distributing “leaflets likely to undermine
the national interest.” Police arrested Djelouli on April 8, 2013, in Ouargla city
center as he prepared to distribute leaflets for the CNDDC union calling for a
peaceful sit-in protest outside the wilaya (provincial headquarters) of Ouargla in




Despite the adoption in 2012 of a new law on information that removed impris-
onment as a penalty for speech offences, such as defaming or showing “con-
tempt” to the president, state institutions, or the courts, authorities continued
to prosecute and imprison peaceful critics using provisions of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedures. 
On September 1, the Court of Appeal of Ghardaïa in southern Algeria confirmed a
two-year prison sentence and fine that a First Instance Tribunal had imposed in
June on Youssef Ouled Dada after convicting him on charges of “insulting state
institutions” and “publishing material that threatens public interest,” under arti-
cles 146 and 96 of the criminal code. The charges arose after Dada posted a
video on his Facebook page that allegedly showed police officers robbing a store
in El Guerrara, 115 kilometers northeast of Ghardaïa, during violent unrest in the
town in November 2013. 
Accountability for Past Crimes
The Law on Peace and National Reconciliation, adopted in 2006, continued to af-
ford legal immunity to perpetrators of torture, enforced disappearances, unlaw-
ful killings, and other serious rights abuses during the internal armed conflict of
the 1990s. The law also criminalizes any expression that authorities believe den-
igrates state institutions or security forces for their conduct during that conflict.
However, to Human Rights Watch’s knowledge, there have been no prosecutions
based on this law to date. Despite this and continued official harassment, asso-
ciations representing the rights of the disappeared continued to call for truth
and justice.
Counterterrorism
Algeria increased its security cooperation and joint military operations with
Tunisia, following several attacks by armed militants on the Tunisian army and
National Guard along the border with Algeria. Several high level representatives
of western countries who visited Algeria, such as the French defense minister
and US secretary of state, said their governments wished to strengthen security
cooperation with Algeria to fight terrorism in the region.
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On September 24, fighters who, according to news reports, claimed allegiance to
the extremist group Islamic State, also known as ISIS, beheaded a French citizen
in Algeria and released a video showing the killing. They kidnapped him after
ISIS called on its supporters around the world to retaliate against the participa-
tion of French armed forces in military airstrikes in Iraq. 
Polisario-Run Sahrawi Refugee Camps
The Polisario Front has governed camps in southwest Algeria since the late
1970s for refugees who fled Western Sahara after Morocco invaded it. Critics of
the Polisario were able to hold small, sporadic public demonstrations in 2014.
None were imprisoned for their political views, to Human Rights Watch’s knowl-
edge, but at least a few faced harassment for openly criticizing the Polisario. 
Refugees were largely free to leave the camps for Mauritania or to return perma-
nently or temporarily to Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara. A Sahrawi woman,
Mahdjouba Mohamed Hamdidaf, who had emigrated to Spain and was visiting
her family in the refugee camps was forcibly confined by her family for more than
two months after she sought to depart as planned in August. The Polisario Front
did little to end herconfinement and protect her freedom of movement until it
came under strong international pressure. At time of writing, there were report-
edly other cases of Sahrawi women with legal residency in Europe whose fami-
lies have forcibly confined them while visiting the camps.
The government of Algeria did not, to Human Rights Watch’s knowledge, explic-
itly recognize its responsibility for safeguarding the human rights of Sahrawis liv-
ing in Polisario-run camps on Algerian soil.
Key International Actors
In the framework of its European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the European
Union engaged in negotiations with Algeria on an action plan. ENP action plans
are supposed to demonstrate partner countries’ commitment to, among other
things, democracy, human rights, rule of law, and good governance.
The government of Algeria has not granted access to United Nations human
rights mechanisms since 2011. Pending requests for access include the special
rapporteurs on torture and on freedom of peaceful assembly and of association,





President José Eduardo dos Santos, in power for 35 years, has faced increasing
criticism in Angola for rampant corruption, bad governance, and government re-
pression. Although the 2012 elections ended in another victory for his ruling
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the authorities intensi-
fied repressive measures, restricting freedom of expression, association, and as-
sembly. In 2014, the government once again delayed long-overdue local
elections. 
The government continues targeting outspoken journalists and activists with
criminal defamation lawsuits, arbitrary arrests, unfair trials, intimidation, ha-
rassment, and surveillance. The police use excessive force and engage in arbi-
trary arrests to stop peaceful anti-government protests and other gatherings. In
2014, authorities conducted the first post-colonial population and housing cen-
sus, and in late 2013 launched a civil registration campaign that promotes free
access to birth certificates and identity documents. However, the government
also stepped up mass forced evictions in Luanda, the capital, and continued
there and in other cities to violently remove street traders, including pregnant
women and women with children. Outspoken human rights activists, journalists,
human rights lawyers, and youth protest activists reported repeated harassment,
intimidation, and pervasive surveillance by police and intelligence agents.
Freedom of Expression 
Freedom of expression is severely restricted in Angola due to censorship and
self-censorship in state media and ruling party-controlled private media and
other forms of government repression. In such a climate, Internet blogs and so-
cial media have become the main channels for open debate. 
The government has regularly used criminal defamation laws and other abusive
legal provisions to silence journalists. 
In July, the prominent investigative journalist Rafael Marques was formally noti-
fied of criminal libel charges filed by seven high-ranking Angolan army generals
and the diamond mining company Sociedade Mineira do Cuango. The plaintiffs
are jointly demanding US$1.2 million in damages from Marques. The lawsuits
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have been pending since 2013, and the legal time limit to present the formal
charges expired in June. At time of writing he was awaiting trial. A further crimi-
nal lawsuit filed by another diamond company, ITM Mining, is pending. Marques
had accused the plaintiffs of involvement in torture, rape, and killings in a book
he published in Portugal in 2011. Angola’s Attorney General’s Office shelved a
complaint filed by Marques against the generals and business associates in
2012, and has failed to investigate the allegations.
The same generals are also demanding $376,000 in damages in a civil lawsuit
against Marques and his editor in Portugal on the same matter. In February, An-
gola security agents harassed and threatened two Angolan defense witnesses,
brought to a court hearing in Portugal by Marques, before their travel to Portugal
and upon their return to Angola. A previous criminal lawsuit against Marques by
the same plaintiffs in Portugal had been dismissed by the Portuguese prosecu-
tor.
On February 2, police in the police headquarters of Cacuaco, Luanda, arrested
Queirós Anastácio Chilúvia, editor of Rádio Despertar, which is owned by the op-
position party, National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA). He was
there to seek an official explanation from the police after trasmitting, live on
Rádio Despertar, cries for help from jailed detainees. Chilúvia was held in cus-
tody for five days without charge. On February 7, a court sentenced him to 180
days in prison, suspended for two years, and a fine of $600 on the charges of
defamation and slander, disobedience against a corporate public authority, and
“abuse of press freedom”—a vaguely defined crime under the 2006 Press Law. 
On May 28, police briefly arrested Rádio Despertar journalist Adérito Pascual at a
police station in Viana when he asked for an official statement for a live broad-
cast on a violent operation to remove street traders. Police seized his phone,
recorder, and identification, and government agents forced him to delete videos
he had taken. He was released after two hours and his equipment returned. In a
similar incident on September 24, police briefly arrested Álvaro Victoria, a jour-
nalist with the privately owned weekly newspaper Novo Jornal, at the S. Paulo
market in Luanda, where he was taking videos of police beating street traders.
Police roughed him up, threatened him, and held him for two hours. He was then
released without charge. 
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Right to Peaceful Assembly
Since 2011, the government has responded to any kind of peaceful anti-govern-
ment protest with excessive force, arbitrary arrests, unfair trials, harassment and
intimidation of protest activists, and attacks against reporters and passers-by. In
2014, violent crackdowns against youth and other peaceful protesters continued. 
In incidents on May 27, July 26, August 16 and 21, September 5 and 7, and Octo-
ber 3 and 11, police used excessive force to disperse youth demonstrations in Lu-
anda, and arbitrarily arrested dozens of people. Many of the demonstrators were
protesting silently and only displaying handwritten messages. 
On November 23, a group of police commanders and state security agents cuffed
and brutally beat the 26-year-old youth activist Laurinda Gouveia during two
hours in a school, and filmed the beatings. Police arrested her when she took
pictures of police mistreating two youth demonstrators at Independence Square
in Luanda. The incident followed an intense campaign of intimidation by the au-
thorities against the youth movement, which since October had been planning a
peaceful anti-dos Santos rally on November 22 and 23.
On October 11, police arrested at least 12 youth protesters in Luanda and injured
several with metal bars and batons. Most protesters were released that day with-
out charge. One protester received a 30-day sentence for allegedly having torn
the uniform of a police agent, and five more were held for nearly two weeks be-
fore being released, pending their trial on disobedience charges. They were de-
nied medical care and access to lawyers until five days after their arrest. 
On June 21, in Lubango, Huila province, police used teargas to disperse a peace-
ful rally of the teacher’s union; teachers were then on strike. Police arrested 20
teachers and held them for four days without charges.
On May 27, rapid intervention police beat and arrested 17 protesters at Luanda’s
Independence Square, and threw teargas into the police vans where they were
held. Police also arrested two opposition politicians who happened to be sitting
in a nearby coffee shop. They were brutally beaten, photographed, and later re-
leased. The youth protest had called for justice for Isaías Cassule and António
Alves Kamulingue, both protest actvists who were abducted and executed by se-
curity agents in May 2012, and Manuel de Carvalho Ganga, an opposition activist
who was killed by a presidential guard in November 2013.
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Impunity for violent abuses by security agents against protest activists, opposi-
tion politicians, and journalists has been common. For example, the presidential
guard who killed Manuel Ganga was charged, but at time of writing had not been
arrested. On September 1, however, a Luanda court opened a trial against seven
suspects—all police and intelligence officials in pretrial detention—for the killing
of Cassule and Kamulingue. On September 7, the court suspended the trial alleg-
ing incompetence to judge over one of the main suspects, the former head of Lu-
anda’s domestic intelligence services. The suspect was promoted by President
dos Santos to the rank of general in May. After criticism, the president later with-
drew his promotion, and trial sessions resumed on November 18. 
On August 14, a Luanda court acquitted the activist Manuel Nito Alves, who had
been charged with “outrage” against the president. 
Forced Evictions
Angola’s laws neither adequately protect people from forced eviction nor en-
shrine the right to adequate housing. The majority of Angola’s urban population
lives in informal settlements without legal protection. In 2014, the authorities
forcibly evicted an estimated 17,500 people from their homes in Luanda. Most
evictions were carried out without prior notice or adequate compensation, and
many with excessive use of force by police, armed forces, and government
agents. 
In January, the authorities demolished 2,000 houses in Luanda’s central Chicala-
Quilombo neighborhood. The government provided alternative housing to 700
families, and moved 1,200 families—an estimated 6,000 people—to land plots
without any infrastructure in Quissama, 80 kilometers away. At time of writing,
most were still living in improvised shelters with limited access to social services
and drinking water. In two further large-scale, forced evictions in Luanda in April
and September—both without prior notice or compensation—authorities left an
estimated 7,500 residents homeless.
The authorities also used excessive force in small-scale forced evictions. For ex-
ample, on June 3, military and police destroyed 57 houses without prior notice in
Luanda’s Viana municipality, mistreated four residents, and temporarily arrested
two men, including Rafael Morais, the coordinator of the housing rights organi-
zation SOS Habitat, who lives in the same neighborhood.
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More positively, in August the government provided housing to 166 families in
Luanda’s outskirts—10 years after their forced eviction from the center.
Key International Actors
Angola’s oil wealth and military power have made the country an influential
power in Africa, attracting business interests from all over the world with very lit-
tle consideration for the country’s poor governance and human rights record.
In 2014, for the second time, Angola won a non-permanent seat on the United
Nations Security Council and underwent its second Universal Periodic Review at
the UN Human Rights Council in October. In apparent anticipation of such high-
level reviews of its human rights performance, in September 2013 Angola
signed—but has yet to ratify—four human rights treaties, including the Conven-
tion against Torture and its Optional Protocol. 
Similarly, in April and May 2014, Angola, for the first time, hosted a session of
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and a civil society forum.
However, while the government signalled willingness to engage more construc-
tively with African civil society, Angolan civil society complained about excessive
government control of the participants and claimed that the government ap-
peared more interested in using the gathering to promote its image by organiz-




Argentina’s human rights record remains mixed. While many basic freedoms are
protected, there still ongoing concerns, including threats to freedom of expres-
sion, lack of comprehensive freedom of information legislation, police abuse,
poor prison conditions, barriers to accessing reproductive health products and
services, and failure to protect indigenous rights.
Argentina continues to make significant progress regarding LGBT rights and pros-
ecuting officials for abuses committed during the country’s “Dirty War” (1976-
1983), although trials have been subject to delays.
Freedom of Expression
High fines and criminal prosecutions in specific cases have undermined the right
to freely publish information of public interest. In 2011, the Ministry of Com-
merce imposed a fine of 500,000 pesos (approximately US$ 125,000) on 11
economists and consulting firms for publishing unofficial inflation statistics
challenging the accuracy of official ones. One of the economists, Graciela Bevac-
qua, was subject to two fines, and was also criminally investigated at the re-
quest of the former secretary of commerce for allegedly “defrauding commerce
and industry.” As of November 2014, the criminal case along with one of the
fines against Bevacqua remained pending. 
In May, journalist Juan Pablo Suárez was charged with “incitement of collective
violence” with the intention of “terrorizing the population,”the first time prose-
cutors had invoked a 2011 law allowing enhanced penalties for certain “terror-
ism” crimes. Suárez, who works for an online news outlet, had published
information on police strikes in Santiago del Estero province. The aggravated
penalty was dropped following strong public backlash, but the case against
Suárez continued at time of writing. 
In 2011, journalist Juan Alberto Gaspari was fined 50,000 pesos (approximately
$12,500) for criticizing a public official in Mendoza. According to Gaspari, the
public official’s father, who was “disappeared” during Argentina’s military dicta-
torship, had not been the legitimate owner of land. As of November 2014, an ap-
peal remained pending before the Supreme Court.
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The absence of transparent criteria for using government funds at the federal
level, and in some provinces to purchase media advertisements, creates a risk of
discrimination against media outlets that criticize government officials. In two
2007 and 2011 rulings, the Supreme Court found that while media companies
have no right to receive public advertising contracts, government officials may
not apply discriminatory criteria when deciding where to place advertisements. 
Argentina does not have a national law ensuring public access to information
held by government bodies. An existing presidential decree on the matter only
applies to the federal executive branch, and some provincial governments have
adopted regulations for their jurisdictions. 
In 2009, Congress approved a law to regulate the broadcast media that includes
provisions to increase plurality in the media. In 2013, the Supreme Court estab-
lished clear parameters regarding how the law should be implemented to protect
free expression. However, the federal authority in charge of implementing the
law has failed to ensure a diverse range of perspectives in state-run media pro-
gramming. In 2014, it unilaterally adopted a plan to force Argentina’s largest
media conglomerate, the Clarin Group, to comply with the law’s limits on broad-
casting outlets ownership, after rejecting the company’s proposal on how to do
so.
Transnational Justice 
At time of writing, no one has been convicted for the 1994 bombing of the Argen-
tine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people
and injured over 300. From the investigation’s outset, judicial corruption and po-
litical obstruction hindered criminal investigations and prosecutions. 
In January 2013, Argentina and Iran, which was suspected of ordering the attack,
signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to create an international com-
mission of jurists to review evidence and question Iranian suspects identified by
Argentina. In May 2014, an Argentine federal court ruled the MOU unconstitu-





Several cases of human rights violations committed during Argentina’s military
dictatorship (1976-1983) were reopened in 2003 after Congress annulled existing
amnesty laws. Subsequently, the Supreme Court ruled that the amnesty laws
were unconstitutional, and federal judges struck down pardons favoring former
officials convicted of, or facing trial for, human rights violations.
As of August 2014, 121 trials had been conducted for crimes against humanity
originating from the dictatorship, resulting in 503 convictions. The Center of
Legal and Social Studies (CELS) has reported that 42 people have been acquit-
ted during the trials, and another 1,611 suspects are under investigation. 
Given the large number of victims, suspects, and cases, prosecutors and judges
face challenges in bringing those responsible to justice while also respecting
due process rights of the accused. Other concerns include significant trial de-
lays, the failure to capture two convicted military officers who escaped in July
2013, and the unresolved fate of Jorge Julio López, a former torture victim who
disappeared in 2006 a day before he was due to attend the trial of one of his tor-
turers. 
Argentina has made significant progress in identifying children of the disap-
peared who were illegally appropriated during the dictatorship, and connecting
them to their biological families. In July 2014, the National Bank of Genetic Data
identified the grandson of Estela de Carlotto, the founder of Grandmothers of
Plaza de Mayo. As of August, 115 grandchildren had been found. At time of writ-
ing, a legal challenge to a 2009 law that would limit collection of DNA samples to
cases of the dictatorship was pending before the Supreme Court. 
In December 2013, César Milani, head of the armed forces, was promoted to
army chief of staff, despite being under criminal investigation for the 1976 disap-
pearance of a soldier in Tucumán province, and the torture of a civilian in La
Rioja province in 1977.
Police Abuse 
Police abuse remains a serious problem, despite a 2011 commitment by authori-
ties in at least 19 provinces not to resort to excessive use of force when dealing
with public protests. In May 2014, 22 people were injured after local police
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forces dispersed a workers’ demonstration in the province of Tucumán, using
rubber bullets and police batons with excessive force, according to CELS. In
June, police in the province of Chaco fired rubber bullets at demonstrators and
beat and detained protesters, leaving more than 100 people injured.
Prison Conditions
Overcrowding, ill-treatment by prison guards, inadequate facilities, and inmate
violence continue to be serious problems in prisons. According to the National
Penitentiary Office (Procuración Penitenciaria de la Nación), an official body cre-
ated by Congress, there were 88 deaths, including 41 violent ones, in federal
prisons between January 2013 and October 2014. The office also documented
724 cases of torture or ill-treatment in federal prisons in 2013, and 520 in the
first 10 months of 2014.
Indigenous Rights
Indigenous people in Argentina face obstacles in accessing justice, land, educa-
tion, healthcare, and other basic services.
Existing laws require the government to perform a survey of land occupied by in-
digenous communities by November 2017, before which date authorities cannot
lawfully evict communities. In June 2014, eight human rights organizations filed
an amicus brief before the Supreme Court, arguing that a land survey in Formosa
province had failed to guarantee the rights of members of the Potae Napocna
Navogoh indigenous community.
Reproductive Rights
Abortion is illegal in Argentina, with limited exceptions, and women and girls
face numerous obstacles accessing reproductive health products and services,
such as contraception, voluntary sterilization procedures, and abortion after
rape or if the health or life of the woman is at risk (the few circumstances in
which abortion is not punished). These barriers mean that women and girls may
face unwanted or health or life-threatening pregnancies, and are subject to crim-
inal prosecution for seeking abortions. 
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In June 2014, after seeking medical attention for abdominal pain, a woman in
the province of Jujuy was arrested and charged with homicide based on suspi-
cion that she had had an abortion. The woman, who later confessed under coer-
cion that she had an abortion after being raped, remained incarcerated at time
of writing, along with two co-workers who were also charged with homicide for
their alleged participation in the procedure.
In a landmark ruling in March 2012, the Supreme Court determined that prior ju-
dicial authorization was unnecessary for abortion after rape and urged provincial
governments to ensure access to legal abortions. As of March 2014, more than
half of Argentina’s 23 provinces still had not adopted protocols that met the
court’s requirements, according to local groups.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
In 2010, Argentina became the first Latin American country to legalize same-sex
marriage. The Civil Marriage Law allows same-sex couples to enter into civil mar-
riages and provides for equal rights and the legal protections of marriage af-
forded to opposite-sex couples including, among others, adoption rights and
pension benefits. Since then, nearly 10,000 same-sex couples have married na-
tionwide. 
In 2012, the landmark Gender Identity Law established the right of individuals
over the age of 18 to choose their gender identity, undergo gender reassignment,
and revise official documents without any prior judicial or medical approval. Sur-
gical and hormonal reassignment procedures are covered as part of public and
private health insurance. 
Key International Actors
A December 2013 report of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, the body
that oversees the enforcement of the Convention on the Protection of All Persons
From Enforced Disappearances, recognized that Argentina’s enforced disappear-
ances legislation is largely in line with its international obligations, but noted
with concern that insufficient statistical data is available to assess its compli-
ance with international norms.
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In April, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
found that Argentine authorities had failed to ensure that a prisoner with disabil-
ities had equal access to prison facilities and services, and underscored the
state’s obligation to take steps to rectify this situation and prevent similar viola-
tions in other cases. 
Prompted by its debt crisis, Argentina pushed for an international resolution on
sovereign debt restructuring, arguing that it was necessary for governments to
fulfill certain rights obligations. In September, the UN General Assembly adopted
one, establishing a multilateral framework to assist countries facing such re-
structuring. As a member of the UN Human Rights Council, Argentina supported
UN action to put human rights violations in North Korea, Sri Lanka, Belarus, Iran,
the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and Syria under close scrutiny. Argentina
has been a leading supporter of international efforts to better protect schools
through the process to develop and implement the Lucens Guidelines to Protect
Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict.
In September 2014, Argentina was one of the co-sponsors of an important UN
Human Rights Council resolution on combating violence and discrimination
based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The resolution called on the
high commissioner for human rights to update a 2012 report on violence and




Armenia’s human rights record remained uneven in 2014. Authorities continued
to interfere with peaceful protests. Torture and ill-treatment in custody remained
a problem, and investigations are ineffective, even when opened. Journalists
continued to face pressure and violence. Although changes to alternative service
to compulsory military service garnered praise, serious abuses in the army per-
sist. Local groups documented forced psychiatric hospitalization. Violence and
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity are serious prob-
lems. The government has yet to lift unnecessary restrictions on access to pain
medications for people with terminal illnesses. 
Freedom of Assembly
Authorities interfered with free assembly throughout the year. According to
human rights groups, police in the capital, Yerevan, detained at least 70 activists
in the first half of 2014 during peaceful protests on pension reform, environmen-
tal concerns, utility prices, and other issues. Most people detained were re-
leased within a day; some faced administrative fines. 
Three Yerevan metro employees alleged they were fired after participating in a
February protest about controversial pension reforms and, at time of writing,
were suing for reinstatement and lost wages. During a series of protests in June,
Yerevan police detained activists protesting the demolition of the Afrikyan
House, a historical monument. On June 23, Yerevan police detained 27 people
protesting increased electricity tariffs. The Armenian ombudsperson found the
police actions disproportionate. Authorities opened an investigation into police
conduct and suspended several policemen pending inquiry.
Local human rights activists consider the prosecution and conviction of contro-
versial political opposition leader Shant Harutyunyan and 13 of his supporters to
be politically motivated. Authorities arrested the activists in November 2013
after clashes with police during an attempted march to the presidential adminis-
tration building in Yerevan. In October, a Yerevan court convicted them of vio-
lence against the authorities and sentenced them to prison terms, ranging from
one to seven years. Harutyunyan and activist Vardan Vardanyan allege police
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beat them immediately following their detention; the authorities refused to in-
vestigate. 
In April, authorities charged Harutyunyan’s 15-year-old son with disorderly con-
duct for attempting to interfere with the arrest of his father; he was given a sus-
pended four-year jail term in October.
During the first hearing of the activists’ trial in June, authorities denied journal-
ists and family members access to the courtroom, falsely claiming overcrowding. 
Torture and Ill-Treatment in Custody
Local human rights activists report the continued use of torture and ill-treatment
in custody, including in police stations and pretrial detention to coerce confes-
sions, as well as in prisons and other facilities. Some victims file complaints;
many decline, fearing retaliation and further ill-treatment. The authorities do not
always conduct thorough and impartial investigations.
According to the Armenian Helsinki Association, authorities have refused to in-
vestigate credible allegations that Yerevan police beat, pulled the hair of, and
threatened to harm relatives of Aik Agamalyan, 16, to coerce a confession to an
April 2013 murder. Agamalyan’s trial was ongoing at time of writing. Similarly,
authorities and a Vanadzor court have refused to act on complaints by Karen
Kurngurtsev that police ill-treated him after detaining him in October 2013 on
murder charges. Kurngurtsev denies the charges; his trial was ongoing at time
of writing. 
After an April 4 visit, a public prison monitoring group reported that two inmates
at the Artik Penitentiary alleged Gyumri police had ill-treated them in separate
incidents to force confessions, including with beatings, kicking, and threats of
rape. The investigation was ongoing at time of writing. 
On June 12, police detained and beat Hayk Kyureghyan, who demonstrated out-
side a Yerevan court to support Harutyunyan and other activists on trial. After ex-
tensive media coverage of Kyureghyan’s allegations of ill-treatment, authorities




Media pluralism remains limited. Media nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
condemned a draft law that would hold media outlets responsible for libelous or
insulting comments made in public forums, including social media, by anony-
mous or unidentified users. 
The Committee to Protect Freedom of Expression reported that in the first half of
2014 journalists and media outlets continued to face threats and spurious law
suits, and documented at least five incidents of physical violence against jour-
nalists. 
For example, during the detentions of opposition activists on February 12, police
seized video cameras from, and briefly detained, Ani and Sarkis Gevorgyan, sib-
lings and journalists with the Chorrord Ishkhanutyun newspaper and iLur.am
news site, respectively. While in custody, police erased their cameras, slapped
Ani Gevorgyan, and seized her phone. Following a complaint by Gevorgyan, au-
thorities opened a criminal investigation but concluded it in June, citing absence
of a crime. Gevorgyan appealed. Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media Dunja Mijatović ex-
pressed concern about the incident. 
On June 24, journalists and others waited outside a Yerevan police department
for the release of activists detained earlier that day. As police dispersed the
crowd they also attacked several journalists. Police hit Ani Gevorgyan and Arpi
Makhsudian of CivilNet.TV and smashed GALA TV cameraman Paylak Fahradian’s
laptop. Police detained Sarkis Gevorgyan. Ani and Sarkis Gevorgyan filed a com-
plaint; the investigation was ongoing at time of writing. 
On June 26, a Yerevan court ordered Hraparak newspaper and Ilur.am news por-
tal to disclose their sources as part of a criminal investigation involving a high-
level police official. The OSCE representative on freedom of the media expressed
concern about the ruling’s possible “chilling effect” and emphasized journalists’




Alternative Military Service Reform and Army Abuses
According to the religious freedom monitoring group Forum 18, for the first time
since 1993 there are no Jehovah’s Witnesses imprisoned for conscientious objec-
tion to military service. A June fact-finding mission report by the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) found that 2013 changes to the alter-
native service law corrected long-standing problems and that most religious and
social groups now accept the terms of alternative service. 
However, other concerns related to the army persist. The Helsinki Citizens’ As-
sembly-Vanadzor received 42 complaints following the 2013 winter and 2014
summer call-ups about inadequate medical examinations and medical care for
new conscripts, resulting in some conscripts with serious health problems being
drafted. In some cases, conscripts with health problems were not referred to ad-
ditional testing, or additional tests were only undertaken as a formality. Activists
remain concerned about the thoroughness, transparency, and impartiality of in-
vestigations into non-combat deaths that are officially ruled accidents or sui-
cides but where there may be evidence of violence. 
Disability Rights
A Helsinki Citizen’s Assembly-Vanadzor office study of five state-run psychiatric
hospitals based on over 300 interviews with medical staff and patients found
that some people with actual or perceived psychosocial disabilities are confined
in institutions without their informed consent. Under the civil code, a court can
declare an individual as “mentally incompetent” without the person in question
appearing. No independent mechanism exists to ensure that persons with psy-
chosocial disabilities are not arbitrarily detained in psychiatric institutions.
A deputy ombudsman from the ombudsman’s office stated that the office fre-
quently receives complaints about forced institutionalization in psychiatric hos-
pitals and violence by staff, including beatings, use of restraints, and sedation. 
Palliative Care
Armenia continues to discuss reforming its complicated and time-consuming
prescription and procurement procedures for opioid medications. However,
these shortcomings continue to obstruct the delivery of adequate palliative care,
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condemning most terminally ill patients to unnecessary suffering. Although mor-
phine is a safe, effective, and inexpensive way to improve the lives of terminally
ill people, oral morphine is unavailable in Armenia, and tight police controls on
injectable opioids and restrictive policies on procurement, prescription, and dis-
bursement violate many of the World Health Organization’s recommendations on
palliative care.
Minority Rights
Local lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) activists reported that LGBT
people continue to face discrimination, harassment, and physical violence. Hate
speech against LGBT people, including by public officials, remains a serious
issue. Gender identity and sexual orientation are not included in anti-discrimina-
tion or hate speech laws, limiting legal recourse for many crimes against LGBT
people.
Iravunq newspaper published several online articles calling for LGBT people and
organizations working to protect them to be excluded from public life and for
their families to shun them. A May 17 article included a “blacklist” of 60 people
with links to their social media pages. Several people named in the article re-
quested a retraction, but the paper refused. Sixteen people filed lawsuits for
damage to honor and dignity, but a court rejected their claims in October.
In December 2013, a court upheld the Education Ministry’s refusal, on privacy
grounds, to respond to an information request filed by a nongovernmental or-
ganization regarding 20 teachers allegedly fired from public schools for holding
minority religious views. Media had reported on the dismissals in 2012, citing
the ministry’s claim that the teachers had been proselytizing in schools.
Key International Actors
Following its review of Armenia in May, the United Nations Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights underscored concerns about corruption, the
lack of judicial independence, and need for a comprehensive anti-discrimination
framework.
The PACE fact-finding mission report noted the improved political climate and
progress toward Armenia’s fulfilment of its Council of Europe (CoE) membership
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obligations but also highlighted serious shortcomings, including the lack of judi-
cial independence, abuses in the military, domestic violence, and hostility to-
ward religious minorities and LGBT people.
In its March ‘European Neighborhood’ progress report on Armenia, the European
Union noted concerns with implementation of legislation, poor prison condi-
tions, and the “alarming” prevalence of domestic and gender-based violence.
The report also found that the definition of torture does not comply with interna-
tional standards.
A July joint statement by the UN, EU, OSCE, and CoE commended Armenia for
adopting a Human Rights Action Plan as an opportunity for meaningful account-




Australia has a solid record of protecting civil and political rights, with robust in-
stitutions and a vibrant press and civil society that act as a check on government
power. The government’s failure to respect international standards protecting
asylum seekers and refugees, however, continues to take a heavy human toll
and undermines Australia’s ability to call for stronger human rights protections
abroad. In 2014, Australia introduced new overbroad counterterrorism measures
that would infringe on freedoms of expression and movement. The government
has also done too little to address indigenous rights and disability rights.
Asylum Seekers and Refugees 
To deter boat arrivals of unauthorized migrants, the government has continued
its harsh policy of transferring all asylum seekers who arrive by boat to other
countries for processing and resettlement. In 2014, the government concluded
negotiations with Cambodia to accept refugees from Nauru for resettlement, ig-
noring concerns about safety and the lack of capacity of the Cambodian govern-
ment. 
As of October 31, 2014, 1,056 men were detained on Manus Island, Papua New
Guinea, and 1,095 men, women, and children were detained on Nauru. At time of
writing, only 10 of the Manus Island detainees had received final refugee status
determinations. As of October 31, 2014, 261 of the Nauru detainees had been
determined to be refugees and released into the community; 72 were denied
refugee status. 
The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) has criticized Australia’s offshore
detention policy as “return-oriented.” The detention centers are overcrowded
and dirty. Asylum claims are not processed in a fair, transparent, or expedient
manner, with significant cost to detainees’ physical and mental health. 
According to media reports, gay asylum seekers detained on Manus Island fear
persecution and sexual assault. They also fear resettlement in Papua New
Guinea, where consensual adult same-sex relations are criminalized. 
The government has offered cash payments of thousands of dollars to entice
asylum seekers to return home.
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In February 2014, the Australian Human Rights Commission launched a national
inquiry into the approximately 1,000 children in immigration detention. Staff
working at detention centers gave evidence that conditions were substandard,
unsafe, and inappropriate.
As of October 31, 2014, 2,693 people were in immigration detention on Aus-
tralian territory. About 50 refugees are being detained indefinitely based on ad-
verse security assessments and many have been in detention for over four years.
In May, the government passed the Migration Amendment Bill, further strength-
ening Australian Secret Intelligence Organization’s (ASIO) power to administer
adverse security assessments through a secretive process that is not subject to
judicial review.
Immigration authorities use “enhanced screening” techniques whereby immi-
gration officials conduct cursory interviews to determine asylum claims. More
than 3,500 asylum seekers, over 99 percent of whom are from Sri Lanka, have
been screened under this procedure, with no access to legal representation or
right to appeal. Of the Sri Lankan asylum seekers, 42 percent were screened out
and 32 percent were screened in, but no outcome was given in the remainder of
the cases.
In June 2014, Australian custom officials separately intercepted two vessels in
the Indian Ocean carrying Sri Lankans bound for Australia. After cursory screen-
ing interviews at sea, customs officials handed over all 41 asylum seekers
aboard the first vessel to the Sri Lankan navy who returned them to Sri Lanka.
The High Court issued an interim injunction to prevent the return of the second
vessel. After almost a month of detention at sea and failed attempts to send the
asylum seekers to India, the Immigration department eventually sent all 157 Sri
Lankan Tamil asylum seekers to Nauru for processing. 
In September 2014, incoming UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid
Ra’ad Al-Hussein stated that Australia’s policies are “leading to a chain of
human rights violations, including arbitrary detention and possible torture fol-




The government controversially established an indigenous advisory council
while defunding the Congress of Australia’s First Peoples. The government has
taken some steps towards a possible referendum on changing the constitution
to recognize indigenous Australians. 
While indigenous Australians account for only 3 percent of Australia’s popula-
tion, they account for 27 percent of Australia’s prison population. In part be-
cause they are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system,
indigenous Australians are more likely to face stigma and discrimination in em-
ployment. 
While some health and socioeconomic indicators are improving for indigenous
Australians, they still on average live 10-12 years less than non-indigenous Aus-
tralians, have an infant mortality rate almost two times higher, and continue to
die at alarmingly high rates from treatable and preventable conditions such as
diabetes and respiratory illnesses.
Disability Rights
In April, the Australian Human Rights Commission found that inadequate safe-
guards and poor access to support services leave many people with disabilities
without adequate legal or social protection when they come into contact with
the criminal justice system. 
Forty-five percent of people with disabilities live near or below the poverty line.
People with disabilities are also disproportionately at risk of violence in the com-
munity and in institutional settings, and are more likely to be jailed. Some are
deemed unfit to stand trial based on prejudicial assessments of their compe-
tency to give evidence and then indefinitely detained in prisons, psychiatric fa-
cilities, or other highly restrictive places of detention without appropriate review
mechanisms. 
In its 2014 Federal Budget, the government committed to fully funding the roll-
out of the new National Disability Insurance Scheme but announced changes to
the Disability Support Pension which will likely result in many people with dis-
abilities being moved to significantly lower welfare payments. The government
also effectively abolished the disability discrimination commissioner position at
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the Human Rights Commission, leaving people with disabilities without a full-
time advocate.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Despite increasing public support for same-sex marriage in Australia, marriage
remains restricted to heterosexual relationships in accordance with the federal
Marriage Act. Some states or territories have moved to develop laws recognizing
same-sex marriage, but only one territory actually enacted laws. In December
2013 the High Court ruled that the laws recognizing same-sex marriage were in-
consistent with federal legislation and were therefore invalid.
Freedom of Expression
In July 2014, the government revised its agreements with community legal cen-
ters to prohibit such centers from using federal funds for law reform or advocacy
efforts.
In August, bowing to pressure from ethnic and community groups, the govern-
ment dropped its proposed repeal of section 18C of the Racial Discrimination
Act, which makes it unlawful for a person to commit an act that is likely to of-
fend, insult, humiliate, or intimidate someone on the basis of race, color, or na-
tional or ethnic origin.
Also in August, the government announced the introduction of a range of new
counterterrorism provisions in response to the threat of “home-grown terrorism.”
The law introduces an overly broad new offense of “advocating terrorism” and
extends use of control orders and preventative detention. It also makes it a crim-
inal offense to travel to “declared areas” abroad unless the travel is for a legiti-
mate reason, which overly restricts freedom of movement. 
The government has also proposed additional measures that would force
telecommunications companies to retain metadata for a period of two years so
Australian intelligence organizations can access the data.
The National Security Legislation Amendment Act, passed in October 2014,
grants Australian Security Intelligence Organization officials immunity from civil
and criminal prosecution for acts committed in the course of security operations.
The legislation also makes it an offense for intelligence staff or contractors to
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disclose information relating to “special intelligence operations.” Journalists
who disclose information relating to a “special intelligence operation” face
penalties of up to 10 years prison. The legislation does not provide any “public
interest” exception to this offense.
Foreign Policy
Australia held a two-year rotating seat on the UN Security Council starting in
2013. In 2014, it used its seat to press for resolutions on Syria, call for the provi-
sion of humanitarian aid, and call for unfettered access to the MH17 Malaysian
Air crash site in Ukraine. 
In January 2014, the government announced that it was cutting its foreign aid
budget by more than $A600 million (US$526 million). Its foreign aid priorities
are the Asia-Pacific Region, economic empowerment, and private sector partner-
ships. Indonesia and Papua New Guinea remain the top two aid recipients. 
The government held closed-door human rights dialogues with China and Viet-
nam in 2014 but failed to back up these dialogues with public statements on
rights in high-level visits. 
Besides trade and security, a large driver of the Australian government’s foreign
policy is its single-minded focus on ensuring that all asylum seekers or refugees
are processed at offshore facilities. The government has muted its criticism of
authoritarian governments in Sri Lanka and Cambodia in recent years, appar-
ently in hopes of winning the support of such governments for its refugee poli-
cies. 
In March 2014, the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva voted overwhelmingly in
favor of a resolution establishing an international inquiry into human rights
abuses in Sri Lanka. Australia did not co-sponsor the resolution as it had done in
previous years. Instead, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said that she was not con-
vinced that a resolution calling for “a separate, internationally-led investigation
without the cooperation of the Sri Lankan government is the best way forward”
and that the resolution did not adequately recognize the “significant progress
taken by the Sri Lankan government to promote economic growth.” Australia is




The Azerbaijani government escalated repression against its critics, marking a
dramatic deterioration in its already poor rights record. The authorities convicted
or imprisoned at least 33 human rights defenders, political and civil activists,
journalists, and bloggers on politically motivated charges, prompting others to
flee the country or go into hiding. Authorities froze the bank accounts of inde-
pendent civic groups and their leaders, impeded their work by refusing to regis-
ter foreign grants, and imposed foreign travel bans on some. Many of those
detained complained of ill-treatment in police custody. Many organizations, in-
cluding several leading rights groups, were forced to cease activities.
The crackdown continued even as Azerbaijan in May took over the six-month ro-
tating chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Eu-
rope’s foremost human rights body.
While criticizing the increasing crackdown on civil society groups, Azerbaijan’s
international partners failed to make full use of their relationships with the gov-
ernment to secure rights improvements.
Prosecuting Government Critics
Authorities used a range of spurious charges—including narcotics and weapons
possession, hooliganism, incitement, and even treason—to imprison critics.
These included several leading human rights defenders such as Leyla Yunus, di-
rector of the Institute for Peace and Democracy, and her husband, Arif Yunus, ar-
rested in July and August, and charged with treason, tax evasion, and illegal
entrepreneurship. They also included Rasul Jafarov, Human Rights Club director,
and Intigam Aliyev, head of the Legal Education Society—both of whom were ar-
rested in August and charged with tax evasion, illegal entrepreneurship, and
abuse of authority. All were in pretrial custody at time of writing.
In May, a court convicted eight youth opposition movement activists who were
arrested in 2013 on drug and other charges related to an alleged plan to insti-
gate violence at a peaceful protest, and sentenced them to prison terms ranging
from six to eight years; the president pardoned two of them in October after they
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wrote letters of repentence. At trial, at least three said they were beaten in police
custody, but the authorities failed to effectively investigate. 
In March, a court sentenced Ilgar Mammadov, a prominent political analyst and
chairman of the opposition group REAL, and Tofig Yagublu, deputy chair of the
opposition Musavat party and a columnist with the opposition daily Yeni Musa-
vat, to seven and five years in prison, respectively. Both were found guilty of in-
citing violence. In May, the European Court of Human Rights found that the
authorities had arrested Mammadov “to silence or punish [him] for criticizing the
Government.”
In January, a court sentenced Yadigar Sadigov, a Musavat advisor, to six years in
prison on spurious hooliganism charges. An appeals court reduced the sentence
to four years. In August, authorities arrested Murad Adilov, an opposition Popu-
lar Front Party activist, on spurious drug charges. Adilov’s lawyer claimed that
his client had been beaten in police custody. Authorities failed to effectively in-
vestigate. Also in August, police arrested Khagani Mammad, a Musavat activist,
on criminal hooliganism charges after he complained of being attacked by two
unknown women in a street. Both were in pretrial custody at time of writing.
Freedom of Media
At least 10 journalists, bloggers, and social media activists were arrested or con-
victed in 2014 on spurious charges in apparent retaliation for critical and inves-
tigative journalism.
In April, authorities arrested Rauf Mirgadirov, an outspoken Ankara-based corre-
spondent for two independent Azerbaijani newspapers, after he was unlawfully
deported from Turkey. At time of writing, Mirgadirov was in pretrial custody on
espionage charges stemming from his participation in people-to-people diplo-
macy between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
In May, a court convicted Parviz Hashimli, editor of a news website and a re-
porter for the opposition daily Bizim Yol, on smuggling and illegal weapons pos-
session and sentenced him to eight years in prison.
In August, police arrested Seymur Hazi, a columnist with the opposition daily
Azadlig, on spurious hooliganism charges after an unidentified man assaulted
him near his house. A court remanded him to pretrial custody.
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In 2014, authorities arrested or convicted at least six Facebook and other social
media activists on bogus drug possession charges. They were: Abdul Abilov,
Omar Mammadov, Elsever Murselli, Ilham Muradov, and Faraj and Siraj Karimli.
All had large social media followers and administered Facebook pages that criti-
cized the government.
Courts sentenced Abilov, Mammadov, and Murselli to between five and five-and-
a-half years in prison, while the others remained in pretrial custody at time of
writing. None had access to a lawyer of his choosing during initial interrogations
or remand hearings, and at least three complained of ill-treatment in police cus-
tody, which authorities failed to effectively investigate. An appeals court reduced
Murselli’s sentence to two years after he wrote a letter of apology, and was re-
leased in October following a presidential pardon.
Authorities repeatedly interrogated Khadija Ismayilova, an outspoken investiga-
tive journalist reporting on government corruption, including the businesses of
the ruling family, as a witness to an investigation into leaking state secrets. In
October, authorities imposed a foreign travel ban on Ismayilova without provid-
ing any legal grounds for it. Pro-government media continued the public smear
campaign against her that they had begun in 2012.
The opposition paper Azadlig continued to face financial constraints due to
mounting defamation claims brought by officials, frozen bank accounts, and
government-imposed restrictions on distribution.
Freedom of Association
In February, President Ilham Aliyev signed into law amendments imposing addi-
tional restrictions and requirements on nongovernmental groups (NGOs). Most
are minor but can serve as grounds for penalties, official warnings, and eventu-
ally temporary or permanent closure. The amendments also introduced new ad-
ministrative offenses, higher financial and criminal penalties for other minor
infractions, and new grounds for authorities to deny registration and to tem-
porarily or permanently close local and international groups.
In November, Aliyev signed into law further restrictive amendments requiring
government licensing of all foreign donors and approval of each funded project
by the relevant authorities.
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Following prosecutors’ requests, courts have frozen bank accounts of at least 50
organizations and in some cases accounts of staff, as part of ongoing criminal
investigations against several foreign donors and organizations. Tax offices au-
dited many of those groups, and the prosecutor’s office repeatedly interrogated
their staff. At least three groups closed, and numerous others had to halt opera-
tions as they could no longer make bank transactions. These problems forced
dozens of groups involved in an international natural resource transparency ini-
tiative to suspend operations.
In August, police searched the office of the Institute for Reporters Freedom and
Safety (IRFS), a leading media monitoring group, confiscated computers and re-
ports, and sealed the office. Authorities repeatedly questioned IRFS employees
and prevented its director, Emin Huseynov, from leaving the country. He re-
mained in hiding at time of writing.
Also in August, authorities confiscated computers and documents of the Legal
Education Society and sealed the office. Headed by Intigam Aliyev, the group
had brought hundreds of cases against Azerbaijan to the European Court of
Human Rights. The Prosecutor’s Office also sealed the office of Leyla Yunus’s or-
ganization.
Torture and Ill-Treatment
Torture and ill-treatment continue with impunity. In September, the United Na-
tions Subcommitee on Torture suspended its visit to Azerbaijan, citing official
obstruction in visiting places of detention. In May, police arrested opposition ac-
tivist Kemale Benenyarli at a protest rally following the conviction of activists
from “NIDA,” a youth organization. She alleged that police struck her several
times on the head while questioning her. According to her lawyer, Benenyarli
sustained several bruises on her head and experienced headaches and vomiting
as a result. Interior Ministry denied the allegations and failed to investigate.
Several youth activists arrested in 2014 claimed they were beaten, harassed,
and forced to sign incriminating confessions while in police custody. They also
complained of undue restrictions in accessing their lawyers. For example, blog-
ger Abdul Abilov was able to meet his lawyer only six days after his November
2013 arrest and alleged that he had been punched, insulted, and threatened
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with further violence until he agreed to sign incriminating testimony. Authorities
failed to conclusively investigate.
Human Rights Defenders
In addition to the cases described above, in March, police in Ganja arrested
Hasan Huseynli, a social rights campaigner and head of an independent group,
on hooliganism charges after an unknown person attacked him. In July, a court
convicted him and sentenced him to six years in prison. Months before his ar-
rest, police and local authorities had warned Huseynli to stop co-operating with
foreign donors. Huseynli was released in October, following a presidential par-
don.
In May, a court convicted Anar Mammadli, chair of an independent election mon-
itoring group in Azerbaijan, of tax evasion, illegal entrepreneurship, and abuse
of office, and sentenced him to five-and-a-half years in prison. Together with
Mammadli, the court convicted Bashir Suleymanli, the group’s executive direc-
tor, and Elnur Mammadov, head of one of the group’s partner organizations, and
sentenced them to three years and six months and two years on probation, re-
spectively.
In April and May, police arrested Emil Mammadli, and Tofig Gasimov, head and
member, respectively, of an independent group in southeastern Azerbaijan that
exposed allegations of local corruption. Both were accused of extortion. In Sep-
tember, a court handed them a two-year suspended sentence.
In August, unidentified assailants attacked Ilgar Nasibov, a journalist and human
rights defender with the Nakhchivan Resource Center, the only independent
rights group in the region. The attackers beat Nasibov unconscious and ran-
sacked the group’s office. He sustained a concussion, multiple broken bones,
and temporary loss of vision in one eye. Police claimed that Nasibov was injured
after brawling with his friend, Farid Asgarov, which Nasibov denied. Police ar-
rested Asgarov, who pleaded guilty at a trial. Although Nasibov insisted there
was more than one assailant, he agreed to reconcile with Asgarov and did not




Isa Shahmarly, former chair of the Free (Azad) LGBT group, hanged himself with a
rainbow flag in his Baku apartment in late January 2014, writing in a note that
Azerbaijan society was “not for him.”
Key International Actors
The European Union, United States, and other international and regional actors
and institutions expressed concern about politically motivated prosecutions, but
did not impose concrete consequences for Azerbaijan’s rapidly deteriorating
human rights record.
Following the arrests of prominent rights defenders, three United Nations human
rights experts in August issued a joint statement condemning the prosecutions
and urged the government “to show leadership and reverse the trend of repres-
sion.” Responding to the same, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and
Commissioner Stefan Fule jointly criticized Baku for “systematically restricting
the space for public discourse and civil society in Azerbaijan.” In September, the
European Parliament adopted a resolution stressing that the EU’s closer ties
with Azerbaijan should be conditioned on the release of imprisoned human
rights defenders and calling for an “end to repression and intimidation of
NGOs.”
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s special representa-
tive on media freedom, and the Council of Europe’s (CoE) secretary general and
human rights commissioner also spoke out about the arrests, with the latter call-
ing on the authorities to release “all those who are detained because of the
views they expressed.” In June, the CoE’s Parliamentary Assembly appointed a
rapporteur on the issue of political prisoners in Azerbaijan.
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)—which brings together
governments, companies, and NGOs to foster open public debate in resource-
rich countries about how oil, gas, and mining revenues are used—decided to re-
quire Azerbaijan to undergo an early review, by January 2015, of its compliance
with the group’s membership rules.
The US State Department and the embassy in Baku issued several statements on
related issues during 2014, flagging concerns about restrictions on freedom of




In 2014, the main opposition party continued to refuse to participate in the na-
tional dialogue process to protest authorities prosecuting some of its senior
members and, with other opposition parties, boycotted November’s elections in
protest at an unfair electoral system. 
Bahrain’s courts convicted and imprisoned peaceful dissenters and failed to
hold officials accountable for torture and other serious rights violations. The
high rate of successful prosecutions on vague terrorism charges, imposition of
long prison sentences, and failure to address the security forces’ use of lethal
and apparently disproportionate force all reflected the weakness of the justice
system and its lack of independence. 
Human rights activists and members of the political opposition continued to
face arrest and prosecution, and the government invested itself with further
powers to arbitrarily strip critics of their citizenship and the rights that attach to
it.
Judicial System
Bahraini courts sentenced more than 200 defendants to long prison sentences,
including at least 70 for life, on terrorism or national security charges. 
The number of prosecutions, the often vague nature of the charges, the high
rate of convictions, and the length of the sentences imposed raised serious
due process concerns. Bahrain’s civilian criminal courts failed to provide impar-
tial justice and frequently convicted defendants on terrorism charges for acts
that amount to legitimate exercise of their rights to freedom of expression and
association. 
In 2013, for example, an appeals court concluded that a lower court had been
right to convict Abdul Wahab Hussain, an opposition leader, on terrorism
charges and sentence him to life imprisonment because he had founded a group
dedicated to establishing a republic in Bahrain. The same appeals court also up-
held the terrorism convictions and life sentences for Hassan Mushaima and
Abdul Jalil al-Singace, members of the unlicensed opposition group Al Haq, be-
cause they had participated in meetings of the group that Hussain founded and
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possessed “publications advocating for the group.” The court declared that
while unlawful means, such as the use of force, are required for an act to qualify
as terrorism, such force “need not necessarily be military [askari],” because
“moral pressure” could result in terrorism.
Fifty individuals were convicted on charges of establishing and joining a group
known as the February 14 Coalition with the aim of “sowing chaos in the country,
committing crimes of violence and sedition, attacking public and private prop-
erty, intimidating citizens and harming national unity.” The court found that only
one of the 50 defendants had committed an identifiable act of violence—assault-
ing a policeman during his arrest at his home, causing “cut and scratch injuries”
to the officer. The defendants received sentences ranging from 5 to 15 years in
prison. 
Excessive Use of Force and Lack of Accountability
Security forces fatally shot at least three people in circumstances indicating that
they used excessive force. Bahraini authorities and courts have rarely held mem-
bers of the security forces accountable for unlawfully using force against protes-
tors and detainees. 
In January, security forces shot and killed Fadhel Abbas Muslim Marhoon. Au-
thorities said police officers shot him in self-defense as he drove an “oncoming
car” towards them, but photographs of his body appeared to contradict this ver-
sion and show that he had sustained a gunshot wound to the back of his head.
In February, security forces shot Abdulaziz al-Abar at a funeral procession; sur-
geons removed shotgun pellets from his brain, but he died on May 18. 
In May, security forces shot and killed Sayed Mahmood, 14, after police dis-
persed a funeral protest. A hospital death certificate, three witness accounts, im-
ages of the wound, and a forensic pathologist’s opinion indicated that his death
had resulted from unlawful use of lethal force by security forces, to whom he had
posed no threat when he was shot. 
In 2011, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), appointed to in-
vestigate official conduct during anti-government protests that year, concluded
that “police units used force against civilians in a manner that was both unnec-
essary and disproportionate.” 
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In response to one of the BICI’s recommendations, the government established
the Office of the Ombudsman within the Interior Ministry “to ensure compliance
with professional standards of policing set forth in the Code of Conduct for the
Police” and to report misconduct to the ministry and any criminal acts to the
public prosecutor. The government created a Special Investigations Unit within
the Public Prosecution Office as well. 
The Office of the Ombudsman issued its first annual report in May, which listed
11 deaths under investigation, including that of Fadhel Marhoon, whom police
shot and fatally wounded on January 8. The Ombudsman’s Office told Human
Rights Watch that it had forwarded details of the deaths of al-Abar and Mah-
mood to the Special Investigations Unit for investigation.
The BICI also found that Bahrain’s security forces had killed at least 18 demon-
strators and detainees without justification and recommended that the authori-
ties investigate the deaths “with a view to bringing legal and disciplinary action
against such individuals, including those in the chain of command, military and
civilian, who are found to be responsible under international standards of ‘supe-
rior responsibility.’”
An analysis of court documents conducted by Human Rights Watch showed that
the justice system has failed to hold members of the security forces accountable
for serious rights violations, including in cases where their use of excessive and
unlawful force proved fatal. The authorities have prosecuted only a few of the se-
curity personnel implicated in the serious and widespread abuses that the BICI
documented, focusing almost exclusively on low-ranking officers who, in most
cases, have been acquitted or punished with disproportionately lenient sen-
tences. 
For example, a court convicted a police officer only of assault, although it ac-
cepted that he had shot and fatally wounded a man from a distance of one meter
because it concluded that the officer did not open fire with an intent to kill. The
court imposed a seven-year prison term in this case, which an appellate court
later reduced to six months. In another case, an appeals court slashed to two
years the ten-year prison terms that a lower court imposed on two police officers
convicted of beating a detainee to death. The appeals court said that the two de-
fendants deserved “clemency” on the absurd grounds that they had been “pre-
serving the life of detainees, among them the victim.” These and similar
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decisions by courts threaten to undermine the ability of the Ombudsman’s Office
to carry out its responsibility to ensure that police and other security forces com-
ply with the law.
Human Rights Defenders
On August 30, Bahrain’s public prosecutor charged human rights activist
Maryam al-Khawaja with assaulting a police officer at Manama airport when she
arrived from abroad to visit her father, Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, who is serving a
sentence of life imprisonment for his political activities. Authorities released her
on bail on September 18.
Bahrain authorities arrested a prominent rights activist, Nabeel Rajab, on Octo-
ber 1. At time of writing he faced a three-year prison sentence on charges that he
“offended national institutions” due to comments he made on social media.
Rajab, who was released from prison on May 24 after serving two years for or-
ganizing and participating in demonstrations, criticized the government for
using counterterrorism laws to prosecute human rights defenders and accused
Bahraini security forces of fostering violent beliefs akin to those of the extremist
group Islamic State, also known as ISIS. 
Rights activist Zainab al-Khawaja spent five weeks in prison after her arrest on
October 15 on charges that she insulted the king after she ripped up a photo of
King Hamad during a court hearing. At time of writing, she faced six outstanding
charges, five of which, according to information provided by her lawyer, clearly
violate her right to free expression. She had been released in February 2014 after
serving a one-year prison term for illegal assembly and insulting the police.
German authorities granted political asylum to a senior staff member of the
Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR), Sayed Yousif Almuhafdah, in March. Al-
muhafdah had been the subject of death threats on social media after the BCHR
launched a campaign that accused senior members of the ruling Al-Khalifa fam-
ily of responsibility for serious rights abuses and called for their criminal prose-
cution. Almuhafdah sought asylum after he and his wife received summonses to
appear before Bahrain’s public prosecutor. 
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Freedom of Expression and Association
In April, King Hamad ratified Law 1/2014, which amends article 214 of the penal
code to provide for a maximum jail term of seven years and a fine of up to 10,000
Bahraini dinars (US$26,500) for offending the king, Bahrain’s flag, or the na-
tional emblem.
On July 10, the public prosecutor charged Sheikh Ali Salman and Khalil al-Mar-
zooq, respectively leader and deputy leader of Al Wifaq, Bahrain’s main Shia op-
position party, with violating the law on political associations. This occurred
after they met the visiting United States assistant secretary of state for democ-
racy, human rights and labor, Tom Malinowski, without the government’s permis-
sion. On July 7, the authorities declared Malinowski persona non grata and
ordered him to leave Bahrain.
The year 2014 saw four award-winning Bahraini photographers either in jail or
facing criminal charges, some or all of whom were apparently targeted by the au-
thorities on account of their peaceful exercise of their profession. They included
Hussain Hubail, sentenced by a court to a five-year prison term on April 28 on
charges that included using social media networks to “incite hatred of the
regime,” calling on people to ignore the law, and calling for illegal demonstra-
tions. His family and that of Ahmed Humaidan, another photographer whose 10-
year sentence was confirmed by the Supreme Court in August, alleged that
authorities mistreated the men in pretrial detention. 
Citizenship
The government published amendments to the 1963 Citizenship Law in the Offi-
cial Gazette on July 24. Article 10 now permits the Interior Ministry, with cabinet
approval, to revoke the citizenship of any Bahraini who “aids or is involved in
the service of a hostile state” or who “causes harm to the interests of the King-
dom or acts in a way that contravenes his duty of loyalty to it.” 
Authorities either obstructed the right of appeal or refused to justify their 2012
decision to arbitrarily revoke the citizenship of 31 Bahrainis, including 9 men
and 1 woman who remain in Bahrain, for allegedly “damaging the security of the
state.” Only 1 of the 31 was able to appeal against the Ministry of Interior deci-
sion to revoke his citizenship, but a court upheld the minister’s decision on April
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29 and asserted, without citing evidence, that it was “intimately related to na-
tional security.” The court noted that the Interior Ministry was not obliged to jus-
tify its decision and that the ministry’s actions were “not subject to judicial
oversight as long as its decisions are free from abuse of authority.”
Women’s Rights
Law no. 19 of 2009 on the Promulgation of the Law of Family Rulings regulates
matters of personal status in Bahrain’s Sunni courts. It does not apply in the
country’s Shia courts, with the consequence that Shia women, who comprise the
majority of women in Bahrain, are not covered by a codified personal status law.
Domestic violence is not specifically addressed in the penal code and marital
rape is not considered a crime.
Migrant Workers
Approximately 460,000 migrant workers, mostly from Asia, make up 77 percent
of Bahrain’s private workforce. Due to shortcomings in Bahrain’s legal and regu-
latory framework and the authorities’ failure to enforce relevant labor laws, they
endure serious abuses, such as unpaid wages, passport confiscation, unsafe
housing, excessive work hours, physical abuse, and forced labor. Conditions for
female domestic workers are of particular concern. A regional Gulf Cooperation
Council unified contract for domestic workers has yet to be approved, but early
drafts fall short of the minimum standards outlined in the Domestic Workers
Convention that the International Labour Organization adopted in 2011.
Key International Actors
Forty-seven states, including the US and the United Kingdom, signed a joint
statement criticizing Bahrain and calling for the release of political prisoners at
the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva in June. However, despite
ongoing rights abuses and the expulsion of a senior US diplomat in July,
Bahrain’s key allies—the UK, the US, and the European Union—failed to make
explicit calls for the immediate and unconditional release of 13 high-profile ac-
tivists serving long-term sentences in Bahrain. 
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In February, the European Parliament did, however, adopt a strong resolution
condemning human rights violations in Bahrain and calling on the EU high repre-
sentative and EU member states to develop a clear strategy setting out how the
EU will, both publicly and privately, actively push for the release of imprisoned
activists. No such strategy emerged.
Bahrain, along with its closest regional ally and benefactor, Saudi Arabia, and
other Gulf states, participated in US-led air strikes against Islamic militant




Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League party and its allies swept to
power in the January national elections after key opposition parties refused to
participate. The opposition demanded polls under a neutral caretaker govern-
ment and all attempts at negotiations, including by the United Nations, failed to
resolve the stalemate. Hundreds were killed and injured in violent attacks sur-
rounding the elections. 
The trend toward increasing restrictions on civil society continued, with the gov-
ernment introducing a draft bill that imposes restrictions on already beleaguered
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and their access to foreign funding. The
government also introduced a new media policy that imposes unacceptable lim-
its on free expression and speech.
Security forces carried out abductions, killings, and arbitrary arrests, particularly
targeting opposition leaders and supporters. In a positive development, after
years of impunity for the security forces, several members of the notorious Rapid
Action Battalion (RAB) were arrested following the abduction and apparent con-
tract killings of seven people in May. 
Compensation and relief for victims and survivors of the April 2013 collapse of
the Rana Plaza in Dhaka was slow because international companies that sourced
garments from the five factories operating in the building failed to contribute
enough to the financial trust fund set up to support survivors and the families of
those who died. After the accident, the government amended its labor laws to
make it easier for workers to form unions. However, workers reported tremen-
dous pressure from owners and managers not to do so. 
Electoral Violence
Hundreds were killed and injured in violent attacks surrounding the controversial
January elections. Both Bangladesh’s ruling party, as well as opposition parties,
were responsible for the violence. 
Supporters of the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the Jamaat-e-Is-





fore and after the election, attackers also vandalized homes and shops owned
by members of Bangladesh’s Hindu and Christian communities. 
In response, the government cracked down on opposition members, naming
hundreds of them as suspects in violent attacks. Members of law enforcement
agencies carried out extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary
arrests, and unlawful destruction of private property. 
Civil Society and Media
The government introduced several measures aimed at cracking down on critics,
continuing a trend from the previous year.
In July, the government proposed the draft Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activi-
ties) Regulation Act, designed to regulate operations and funding for any group
receiving foreign grants, including Bangladesh offices of foreign and interna-
tional organizations. The draft law contains unnecessary, onerous, and intrusive
provisions, with vague and overly broad language to control NGOs.
In August, the government published a new media policy for all audio, video,
and audio-visual content transmitted through any means which contains overly
broad language aimed at significantly curtailing critical reporting. Several televi-
sion and news outlets that were shut down in 2013 for critical reporting re-
mained closed through 2014. 
Accountability for Security Forces
Authorities arrested several members of the notorious Rapid Action Battalion
(RAB) following intense public outrage over the abduction and apparent contract
killings of seven men in Narayangunj in April. 
Although the government claims that almost 2,000 RAB members have been
punished for various misdemeanors since the group’s inception, there was not a
single prosecution for extrajudicial executions, torture, or arbitrary arrests be-
fore the Narayanganj incident. Independent organizations estimate that the RAB
has been responsible for approximately 800 unlawful killings over the past 10
years. Allegations of violations by members of the police and other law enforce-





April marked one year since the collapse of the Rana Plaza building, in which
over 1,100 garment workers died and an estimated 2,500 were injured. Six
months prior, a deadly factory fire at Tazreen Fashions killed at least 112 people.
Survivors and relatives reported that they continue to suffer from life-changing
injuries, psychological trauma, and lost income. 
After the Rana Plaza accident, a compensation fund set up through the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO) was designed to raise US$40 million. But one
year later, only $15 million had been raised, with most funds coming from just
one company. 
After the Rana Plaza tragedy, the Bangladesh government and Western retailers
set up an inspection regime for more than 3,500 garment factories to ensure
structural integrity and fire and electrical safety. A group of North American re-
tailers inspected about 587 factories. A second body, formed by mainly Euro-
pean retailers, inspected 1,545 factories. 
While they published details of their inspections, at time of writing, the govern-
ment had not published information on the remaining inspections it had con-
ducted. The government amended its labor laws to make it easier for workers to
form and join unions. However, workers said they continued to face tremendous
pressure—including intimidation, mistreatment, and even death threats from
managers—not to do so. 
Workers in the tanneries of Hazaribagh, a residential area in Dhaka, continue to
suffer from highly toxic and dangerous working conditions. Although some tan-
neries have begun to build new premises at a dedicated industrial zone in Savar,
their planned relocation continued to be delayed. Residents of nearby slums
complain of illnesses caused by the extreme tannery pollution of air, water, and
soil. The government continues its de facto policy of not enforcing labor and en-
vironmental laws with respect to the Hazaribagh tanneries.
Bangladeshi migrant workers, especially in the construction and domestic serv-
ice sectors in the Gulf, are often deceived by recruiters about their contracts and
charged excessive fees that leave them deeply in debt and vulnerable to abuse
abroad, including passport confiscation, unpaid wages, hazardous work, and




Trials against those accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes committed during the country’s 1971 war of independence continued in
spite of serious ongoing concerns about deep flaws in the trials. The prosecution
in the trials urged the law minister to amend the tribunal’s statute to allow it to
prosecute the entire Jamaat-e-Islaami party, which had opposed the movement
for secession from Pakistan, and the issue is still pending before the judges. 
In November, the appellate division of the Supreme Court confirmed the death
penalty in the war crimes case against Muhamed Kamaruzzaman, despite seri-
ous fair trial concerns.
Women
Child marriage in Bangladesh remains extremely prevalent. In July 2014, Prime
Minister Sheik Hasina pledged at the London Girl Summit to reform the law on
child marriage, end child marriage under age 15 by 2021, and end child marriage
completely by 2041. However, proposals from her cabinet in October to lower the
age of marriage for girls from 18 to 16 undermined her call.
Bangladesh’s personal status laws governing marriage, separation, and divorce
overtly discriminate against women, and the government showed no sign of will-
ingness to undertake a comprehensive review to ensure equality and protection
for women and girls.
Children’s Rights
Several children were injured during election violence due to indiscriminate
petrol bombings and other attacks by opposition supporters. In some cases, op-
position groups also recruited children to carry out the attacks. Although mem-
bers of opposition parties were arrested and charged with violence, the
government continued to fail to take action against them for deliberately putting




Bangladesh continues to implement the death penalty. Abdul Qader Mollah, a
leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami party, was hanged in December 2013 after a final
verdict found him guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity during the
1971 war for independence. 
Key International Actors
Several countries condemned the attacks surrounding the polls, which were the
most violent since the country’s independence. The international community at-
tempted to facilitate a negotiated settlement to prevent the one-sided national
elections in January. However, countries including the United States and India,
that have some influence in Bangladesh, were unable to press for an agreement.
Efforts by the UN to mediate also failed.
Several countries including the US and United Kingdom expressed concern
about violations by security forces. However, they failed to call for the RAB to be
disbanded. The US continued to engage with the RAB on establishing internal
discipline mechanisms. 
There was intense international scrutiny on international brands sourcing from
Bangladesh after the collapse of Rana Plaza. 
Both the US and the European Union, Bangladesh’s two largest overseas mar-
kets for garments, called on the government and garments industry to imple-
ment global labor standards. The US continued to suspend Bangladesh’s trade
benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). In July 2013, the EU
warned that Bangladesh might lose its duty-free and quota-free access if it did
not improve its record on labor rights and workplace safety, but did not take any
further steps. 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humani-
tarian organizations working with the Rohingya refugees at the Burmese border





Belarusian authorities made no meaningful improvements in the country’s poor
human rights record in 2014. President Aliaxander Lukashenka’s government
continues to severely restrict freedom of expression and association, including
by harassing journalists and imposing restrictive legislation on nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs). Legislative amendments during the year simplified the
reporting requirements for NGOs, but introduced new pretexts for liquidating
them.
Authorities arbitrarily detained activists to prevent them from participating in
public events, including before the May International Ice Hockey Federation
World Championship. Belarus courts sentenced four people to death and exe-
cuted two of the men, one of whom had a case challenging the legality of the
sentence pending decision before the United Nations Human Rights Committee.
The authorities released human rights defender Ales Bialiatski who had spent al-
most three years in prison on politically motivated charges. Members of the les-
bian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community face deep-rooted
homophobia and discrimination.
Death Penalty
Belarus remains the only European country to have the death penalty. In April,
authorities executed by firing squad Pavel Sialiun, whom a regional court sen-
tenced to death in June 2013 for murder and theft, among other charges. The
Supreme Court upheld the sentence. Sialiun was executed despite a pending
case before the UN Human Rights Committee challenging his conviction and sen-
tence. The exact date of Sialiun’s execution is not known. Sialiun’s mother
learned of her son’s death from his lawyer.
In May, authorities executed Ryhor Yuzepchuk, sentenced to death in April for
murder. At time of writing, two other men remained on death row after the
Supreme Court upheld their death sentences.
In April, the UN special rapporteur on Belarus expressed concern at the lack of
transparency surrounding Belarus’ death penalty system, and in October 2013,
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stated that “the way the death penalty is carried out in Belarus amounts to inhu-
man treatment.”
Arrests and Harassment of Human Rights Defenders and
Critics 
In June, a court found Andrei Bandarenka, who leads the human rights group
Platform Innovation, guilty on spurious criminal hooliganism charges and sen-
tenced him to three years’ imprisonment. Bandarenka previously headed a
prison monitoring group that authorities dissolved in October 2012 for alleged
tax violations. Rights groups believe that Bandarenka’s prosecution was in retal-
iation for his human rights work.
According to rights groups, seven people remain in detention following politi-
cally motivated prosecutions. These prisoners are regularly subjected to undue
restrictions on correspondence and meetings with families, psychological pres-
sure, and other forms of ill-treatment as punishments.
At least 33 former political prisoners, who were pardoned by the government,
still face restrictions and harassment by authorities. The criminal records have
not been expunged, preventing them from occupying governmental jobs or
standing in elections. Some have been forbidden from leaving Belarus. Those
pardoned or released before serving their full sentences remain on law enforce-
ment agencies’ “preventative watch lists,” which authorize police to question
them frequently.
In November, authorities annulled the residence permit of Elena Tonkacheva, a
top Belarusian human rights lawyer and Russian national who had lived in Be-
larus for over 30 years, for speed limit violations.
In a positive development in June, authorities released leading human rights de-
fender Ales Bialiatski, head of a human rights group assisting political prisoners
and their families. Bialiatski served almost 3 years of a 4.5-year prison sentence
on politically motivated charges of tax evasion.
Freedom of Assembly
The authorities continue to arbitrarily detain civil and political activists to pre-
vent them from attending peaceful rallies, and ahead of important public events.
WORLD REPORT 2015
100
Between April 22 and May 25, police detained at least 43 civil society and human
rights activists on misdemeanor charges, detaining some as they walked on the
street or drove to events. Administrative courts ordered up to 25 days of deten-
tion for all activists, some of whom were denied access to a lawyer. Most court
rulings contained identical language alleging hooliganism, disobeying police or-
ders, or both. The “preventative” arrests coincided with the annual Minsk march
commemorating the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster and the International Ice
Hockey Federation World Championship.
Freedom of Expression, Attacks on Journalists 
Authorities routinely harass and interfere with the work of independent and op-
position journalists and bloggers. According to the Belarusian Association of
Journalists, since the beginning of 2014, authorities arbitrarily detained 15 jour-
nalists. For example, in March, Minsk police detained seven journalists covering
a protest near the Russian embassy against Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
Courts charged at least three of them with misdemeanor “hooliganism” and im-
posed fines and up to 10 days’ detention.
Law enforcement officials initiated misdemeanor proceedings against three in-
dependent journalists because of their cooperation with foreign media outlets
not registered in Belarus, and threatened six others with similar charges. In
April, a court fined a reporter for Belsat, a Poland-based satellite television sta-
tion known for its critical reporting of Belarus, approximately US$428.
In February, prosecutors initiated a criminal investigation on charges of
“defamation of government officials” against Aleh Zhalnou, an independent
blogger who published audio and video material allegedly showing unlawful po-
lice actions. The authorities initiated fourteen cases against Zhalnou including
four criminal cases, nine administrative proceedings, and one civil suit. Since
February, police have questioned Zhalnou 40 times.
In June, authorities initiated a criminal investigation on libel charges against
human rights activist Yekaterina Sadovskaya after she criticized, in a Minsk court
visitors’ comments book, the authorities’ harassment and detention of activists
ahead of the International Ice Hockey Federation World Championship. Authori-
ties alleged the comment was “degrading” to President Lukashenka. If con-




Authorities continued to enforce repressive legislation that criminalizes involve-
ment in an unregistered organization, and at the same time arbitrarily refused to
register opposition political groups, human rights, and other groups critical of
the government.
In January, the prosecutor’s office issued a warning to the Belarusian Christian
Democratic party’s organizing committee chairman for acting on behalf of an un-
registered group and reminded him of criminal liability. The party has attempted
to register at least four times since it was established in 2009, but authorities re-
peatedly denied registration requests on arbitrary pretexts.
In August, the Ministry of Justice refused to register the Movement for the Imple-
mentation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Pakt
(Covenant), citing minor spelling errors in the group’s application.
Amendments to the legislation governing NGOs adopted in November 2013 de-
creased the number of documents required for NGO registration and simplified
the process for registering international organizations, but introduced the failure
to submit an annual report within three years as additional grounds for authori-
ties to liquidate organizations.
Authorities continued to harass LGBT persons, and in 2013, banned the main
gathering of the December Gay Pride festival. Also in December 2013, police
raided the Minsk Pride organizing committee’s office, alleging noise, and briefly
detained one organiser.
Key International Actors
Key international actors, including the European Union, the Organization for Se-
curity and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the United Kingdom, and United
States welcomed the release of Ales Bialiatski. The chair of the OSCE Parliamen-
tary Assembly’s Ad Hoc Working Group on Belarus called Bialiatski’s release
“hopefully a sign of more to come” and urged Belarus to immediately release all
those imprisoned on politically motivated charges and to demonstrate “genuine
commitment to upholding OSCE commitments, particularly in the spheres of
democracy and human rights.” The US State Department spokesperson, welcom-
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ing Bialiatski’s release, stated that such actions would “pave the way for normal-
ization of relations between the United States and Belarus.”
Overall, however, Belarus authorities’ remained closed to human rights scrutiny.
The government continued to actively oppose the mandate of UN Special Rap-
porteur on Belarus Miklos Haraszti, insisting that it is political. Ever since the UN
Human Rights Council appointed a special rapporteur for the country in 2012,
Belarus authorities have refused to cooperate with him and have repeatedly de-
nied him a visa. During its June session, the council extended the rapporteur’s
mandate for one year.
In February, the government announced that it would grant access to a number
of UN special procedures mandate holders, including the special rapporteurs on
freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and the independence of judges and
lawyers. At time of writing, the invitations had not been issued.
In its concluding observations from its November 2013 review, the UN Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights urged Belarus to abolish compulsory
labor for persons deprived of their liberty, persons affected by alcoholism, or
drug dependent persons who are interned in so-called medical labor centers,
and parents who have had their parental rights removed.
The committee expressed concern at the lack of adequate social housing for dis-
advantaged groups, including persons with disabilities and refugees, and at the
insufficient level of education of Roma children. It also encouraged the govern-
ment to adopt domestic violence legislation.
In April, the president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
called the recent death penalty execution in Belarus “barbaric” and expressed
regret that little progress has been made to abolish the death penalty.
The EU reaffirmed that developing bilateral relations was conditional on Belarus’
progress towards respect for democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. In
January 2013, the EU and Belarus launched negotiations on a visa facilitation
and a readmission agreement.
The EU also extended existing sanctions for another year and expanded the





In October 2014, Evo Morales was reelected as president of Bolivia with 61 per-
cent of the vote, and the ruling party won two-thirds of the seats in the Plurina-
tional Assembly.
Threats to judicial independence and impunity for violent crime and human
rights violations remain serious problems in Bolivia. Extensive and arbitrary use
of pretrial detention and trial delays undermine defendants’ rights and con-
tribute to prison overcrowding. 
The administration of President Morales continued to target human rights de-
fenders and critical journalists in 2014, and failed to fully respect the right to
free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous groups. Violence against
women, and child labor, are major concerns.
Judicial Independence and Access to Justice 
The Bolivian justice system has been plagued by corruption, delays, and politi-
cal interference for years.The 2009 constitution provided for judicial elections to
overhaul Bolivia’s highest courts, but the Plurinational Assembly selected candi-
dates through a process that lacked transparency and did not adequately con-
sider their qualifications. 
In July 2014, the Plurinational Assembly had initiated an impeachment process,
targeting three Constitutional Court magistrates under a 2010 law that allows the
legislature to remove judges and impose criminal penalties on them, undermin-
ing judicial independence. As of November, the three magistrates had been sus-
pended from office and at least one more was being investigated. 
Impunity for Abuses and Violent Crime
Bolivia has made little progress prosecuting human rights violations committed
under authoritarian governments between 1964 and 1982, and has not ade-
quately compensated victims of political violence. A contributing factor has been
the unwillingness of the armed forces to provide information on the fate of peo-
ple killed or disappeared during this period. A proposal to create a truth commis-
sion to investigate these crimes—made up of seven members, including four
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appointed by the government—was pending before the Plurinational Assembly
at time of writing.
Efforts to bring to justice those allegedly responsible for killings during violent
clashes in 2008 between supporters and opponents of President Morales have
made little progress. As of September 2014, a La Paz court was still hearing evi-
dence in a case involving Leopoldo Fernández, former prefect of Pando Depart-
ment, and five local officials charged in 2008 for their roles in the killing of 13
people. Prosecutorial inefficiency has undermined victims’ right to justice and
suspects’ due process rights.
The government has not reopened an investigation into the April 2009 killing of
two Hungarians (one of Bolivian birth) and an Irishman, who the government al-
leged were mercenaries involved in a separatist plot. Police shot them dead after
storming into their hotel rooms in Santa Cruz. Credible reports suggest that at
least two of the three may have been extrajudicially executed. In October, the
United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention ruled that a Croatian-Boli-
vian citizen implicated in the case had been arbitrarly detained, and called on
Bolivia to release him. 
The government has yet to fully investigate the use of excessive force by police in
2011 to disperse a largely peaceful demonstration against a proposed highway
in the Isiboro Secure National Park and Indigenous Territory (known as “TIPNIS”).
The police gagged, stripped, and beat demonstrators, according to the Ombuds-
man’s Office.
The lack of access to justice has led to mob attacks (or “lynchings”) against citi-
zens or police officers believed responsible for crimes. Ten people were report-
edly killed in lynchings in 2013, and at least another eleven in 2014. Impunity for
lynchings remains the norm.
Military Abuses and Jurisdiction
Human rights violations against soldiers remain a problem. In May, a soldier
who led a demonstration protesting for better working conditions for low ranking
officials was charged with sedition and rebellion. In July, five soldiers were al-
legedly stripped, beaten, and subject to electric shocks by their superiors in re-
sponse to the loss of a rifle. 
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The Constitutional Court ruled in 2012 that a civilian court should have jurisdic-
tion in the case of a conscript who died in 2011 following a combat training exer-
cise after instructors allegedly beat him on the head and chest. The court urged
lawmakers to reform Bolivia’s military justice code to ensure that human rights
violations are heard in civilian courts. As of November, the code had not been re-
formed.
Due Process and Prison Conditions
Judges’ broad discretion to order pretrial detention and lack of access to public
defenders have undermined defendants’ due process rights, particularly among
Bolivia’s poor. 
Bolivia has one of the highest rates of unconvicted prisoners in the region (more
than 80 percent, as of December 2013). Extended pretrial detention and trial de-
lays have led to increased overcrowding and poor conditions in prisons, where
food and medical attention are inadequate and internal control is often left to
prisoners. As of February 2014, there were 14,700 inmates in prisons with a max-
imum capacity of 4,884, according to the Ombudsman’s Office. 
In September, four people died and 11 were wounded during clashes amongst
detainees in a maximum security prision in Cochabamba. According to the Om-
budsman’s Office, penitentiary guards failed to oversee a party organized by in-
mates, and to assist victims after the violence. 
Decrees adopted since 2012 allow the president to lower the sentences of de-
tainees sentenced to less than eight years in prison, and to pardon those in pre-
trial detention for crimes with penalties of up to four years in prison. In August
2014, the director of the penitentiary system reportedly stated that 957 prisoners
had been released. 
Human Rights Defenders
Human rights defenders continue to operate in a hostile environment that under-
mines their ability to work independently. 
In 2013, President Morales adopted a decree granting the government broad
powers to dissolve civil society organizations. Under the decree, any government
office may request the Ministry of Autonomy to revoke an organization’s permit
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to operate if it performs activities different from those listed in its statute, or if
the organization’s representative is criminally sanctioned for carrying out activi-
ties that “undermine security or public order.” The Plurinational Assembly may
also request that the permit be revoked in cases of “necessity or public interest.”
In December 2013, the government expelled the Danish nongovernmental organ-
ization IBIS, which had worked with and funded indigenous groups in Bolivia
since 1984. The minister of the presidency stated that the government would not
tolerate IBIS’s “political interference” in Bolivia, and threatened that “all non-
governmental organizations involved in political interference will be expelled.”
Freedom of Expression
While public debate is robust, the Morales administration has repeatedly ac-
cused journalists of lies and politically motivated distortions. In April, the solici-
tor general brought a criminal case against two journalists from La Razón
newspaper, accusing them of “espionage” and “revealing state secrets” for pub-
lishing an article on the government’s strategy in an international dispute re-
garding maritime borders with Chile. In August, the case was transferred to a
specialized “press court” with powers to impose fines instead of criminal penal-
ties.
A government-sponsored bill on access to information remained pending before
the Plurinational Assembly at time of writing.
Indigenous Rights
The 2009 Bolivian Constitution includes comprehensive guarantees to protect
the rights of indigenous groups, including collective land titling, intercultural ed-
ucation, prior consultation on development projects, and protection of indige-
nous justice systems. A 2011 law establishing jurisdictional boundaries between
indigenous and ordinary justice systems has yet to be fully put into practice.
The implementation of the right to prior, free, and informed consent, particularly
with respect to extractive industry projects, remains pending. According to the
UN Human Rights Committee, the development of a draft law on this topic has




Gender-Based Violence and Reproductive Rights
Women and girls in Bolivia remain at high risk for gender-based violence, de-
spite a 2013 law that provides for comprehensive measures to prevent and sanc-
tion violence against women. Implementation of the law, which created the
crime of “femicide” and called for special prosecutors and courts for gender-
based crimes and shelters for women, has moved very slowly. 
In March, the UN Office in Bolivia stated that 154 cases of political violence
against women in 2013 had not been brought to justice. The law defines “politi-
cal violence” as actions or “physical, psychological, or sexual aggressions”
against women who are candidates or hold public office, or against their fami-
lies, undermining their work. 
In November, the Bolivian police reported there had been 95 “femicides” in the
country in 2014, opened a toll-free number to report such cases, and created a
“group of immediate reaction” to address incoming reports of violence. 
Women and girls face numerous obstacles to accessing reproductive health
products and services, such as contraception and abortion after rape (one of the
few circumstances when abortion is not penalized). According to Ipas, between
2008 and 2013, 775 women were criminally prosecuted for having an abortion,
and thousands sought medical care for incomplete abortions. In February, the
Constitutional Court ruled that obtaining prior judicial authorization and initiat-
ing a formal criminal investigation was not required to obtain access to legal
abortion after rape.
Child Labor
In July 2014, the Plurinational Assembly adopted legislation, which the vice pres-
ident signed into law, allowing children as young as 10 to work, violating interna-
tional standards and making Bolivia the first country in the world to legalize
employment at such a low age. According to the latest available official statistics
from 2008, at least 746,000 children work in Bolivia. 
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Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Impunity for acts of violence and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation
or gender identity persists. In 2014, the Ombudsman’s Office reported that those
responsible for the deaths of 55 LGBT persons since 2004 had not been brought
to justice.
The 2009 constitution defines marriage as the union of a man and a woman.
Several proposals to amend the constitution or legalize same-sex marriage or
civil unions remained pending at time of writing.
Key International Actors
Bolivia has supported a campaign by Ecuador to undermine the independence
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and limit the funding and ef-
fectiveness of its special rapporteurship on freedom of expression. President
Morales announced in 2013 that he was “seriously considering withdrawing”
from the commission, but Bolivia participated in hearings there in October 2014.
The International Labour Organization, which is reviewing Bolivia’s new legisla-
tion on child labor, stated in July 2014 that the law could violate several interna-




Political deadlock in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) continued to impede needed
reforms in 2014 despite widespread protests in February expressing broad eco-
nomic and political dissatisfaction. The protests were marked by incidents of po-
lice brutality. Journalists remained vulnerable to intimidation and threats. A
fresh ruling from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) underscored the
government’s ongoing failure to end restrictions on Jews, Roma, and other mi-
norities running for political office. Roma remain the most vulnerable group, sub-
ject to widespread discrimination.
Ethnic and Religious Discrimination
The government made no progress towards amending the country’s constitution
to eliminate ethnic and religious discrimination in the national tri-partite presi-
dency and House of Peoples, despite a July ruling by the ECtHR affirming its
2009 judgment that the constitution violates the European Convention on
Human Rights. Both institutions currently permit candidates only from the three
main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats). European Union high level di-
alogues with the main political parties to facilitate an agreement collapsed in
February.
General elections were held in October without the constitutional amendments
required by the European Court. A new government had yet to be formed at time
of writing.
Authorities in Mostar missed an August deadline to make changes to its voting
system ordered by the Bosnian Constitutional Court, resulting in Mostar’s exclu-
sion from general elections and the disenfranchisement of its voters.
Roma remain the most vulnerable group in the country, facing widespread dis-
crimination in employment, education, and political representation. Lack of a
free and universal birth registration system means that many Roma are not on
the national public registry that records births, deaths, and marriage. This im-
pedes their access to public services, including health care. 
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Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) only
29 refugees and 66 internally displaced persons (IDPs) returned to their areas of
origin in the first half of 2014, a significant decrease compared to the same pe-
riod in 2013. As of July 2014, there were still 84,500 registered IDPs in BiH. Se-
vere flooding in BiH in May and August disproportionally affected IDPs and
returnees, forcing many families to relocate and further delayed the implementa-
tion of a 2010 strategy aimed at supporting the return of refugees and IDPs to
their pre-war homes or finding them other durable solutions that would allow
the remaining collective centers occupied by IDPs to be closed.
War Crimes Accountability
Implementation by the Bosnian government of the national war crimes strategy,
adopted in 2008 to improve domestic war crimes prosecution, remains slow.
There continues to be insufficient capacity and funding for prosecutors, particu-
larly at the district and cantonal level. By November 2014, the war crimes cham-
ber of the State Court of BiH had reached verdicts in 33 cases, increasing the
total number of completed cases to 250 since the court became fully operational
in 2005. During the year, the Republika Srpska entity prime minister repeatedly
challenged the legitimacy of State Court and Prosecutor’s Office claiming they
are unconstitutional and called for their abolition.
In July, the State Court began the first retrial of a war crimes suspect among the
dozens whose convictions were quashed following a 2013 ECtHR ruling that
stated that Bosnian courts had wrongly applied law not in force at the time of the
offences committed during the 1992 to 1995 Bosnian war. 
The decision in November by the State Court to quash under the ECtHR ruling the
genocide conviction of Milorad Trbic, a former commander with Bosnian Serb
forces, and the prospect of his release from custody pending retrial, prompted
concern from UN experts, who called on the BiH government to ensure victim
protection, the right to truth and justice, and the adoption of a comprehensive
transitional justice strategy. The case had been transferred to the Bosnian court
from the International Cirminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 2007. 
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In April, the State Prosecutor’s Office signed a cooperation agreement with its
counterpart in Montenegro on prosecuting war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide, following similar agreements with Croatia and Serbia from 2013.
The trial of Bosnian Serb wartime General Radtko Mladic continued at the ICTY
with the opening of the defense on May 19. A request to dismiss the case by
Maldic—charged with genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, in-
cluding in Srebrenica in July 1995—on the grounds the prosecution had failed to
provide sufficient evidence of genocidal intent was rejected in April. Mladic’s ill-
health repeatedly interrupted the trial that began in 2011.
In July, Bosnian Serb wartime President Radovan Karadzic, also on trial at the
ICTY under many of the same charges as Mladic, demanded a new trial citing un-
fair treatment and prosecution errors. His claim was rejected and his trial contin-
ued. Closing arguments were heard in late September, and at time of writing a
verdict was expected in the second half of 2015.
National Security and Human Rights
At time of writing, two foreign nationals remained in indefinite detention on na-
tional security grounds in BiH. Imad Al Husin, a naturalized Bosnian from Syria
detained in 2008, remained in indefinite detention, despite a 2012 ECtHR ruling
that required BiH to charge him, find a safe third country to resettle him, or re-
lease him.
Zeyad Khalaf Al Gertani, another foreign national security suspect from Iraq, re-
mained in detention despite United Nations Human Rights Committee findings
from November 2013 that BiH was in breach of article 9 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which prohibits arbitrary arrest or deten-
tion and requires that anyone who is arrested be informed, at the time of arrest,
of the reasons for the arrest.
Freedom of Media
Threats and acts of intimidation against journalists by political and religious au-
thorities continued in 2014. As of November, the national journalists’ associa-
tion recorded 27 violations of freedom of expression, including 5 physical and 14
verbal assaults, and 1 death threat.
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In February, the United States, European Union, and Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) condemned accusations by authorities in the
Republika Srpska entity that certain media outlets are “foreign agents.”
During the February protests, police intimidated and beat journalists and confis-
cated raw footage, violating the right to freedom of expression.
Freedom of Assembly and Expression
Police in Sarajevo and Tuzla used excessive force during the February protests,
as well as during the subsequent detention of protesters. Internal investigations
into the events were ongoing at time of writing. 
Political leaders from among each of three main ethnic groups sought to dismiss
the protests as staged efforts to provoke inter-ethnic violence or attempts by one
entity to destabilize the other, rather than engaging with the concerns voiced by
protesters.
In February, 10 assailants attacked a group of people attending the Merlinka Film
festival, organized by the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights
organization Sarajevo Open Centre, leaving 2 injured. No police were present at
the time, despite a prior agreement between organizers and police to provide se-
curity during the event. At time of writing, no one had been charged in connec-
tion with the attacks. The center documented 15 cases of hate speech and 14
cases of hate crime in the first 10 months of 2014.
Key International Actors
When protests emerged in February, the United States, EU, the Office of the High
Representative (OHR), and OSCE voiced support for the right to peaceful protest
and called on Bosnian authorities to use the opportunity to implement neces-
sary reforms.
In March, amid preparations for the October general elections, the then-head of
the OSCE Mission to BiH called for increased efforts to strengthen gender equal-
ity and women’s representation in political office. The number of women in polit-
ical office at different levels of government continued to fall short of quota
provisions in the election law requiring that at least 40 percent of candidates on
party lists are women.
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Also in March, the UN secretary-general published a report on conflict-related
sexual violence, including a section on BiH, following a June 2013 country visit
by the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zainab Hawa Ban-
gura. The report cited a continued need for increased capacity to prosecute per-
petrators, improve comprehensive support for survivors, and end stigmatization.
An April OSCE report on the same issue highlighted the need to increase capac-
ity to prioritize, investigate, and prosecute conflict-related sexual violence and
improve public awareness, while commending the BiH Prosecutor’s Office on ef-
forts made so far to address concerns.
In April, on the occasion of the International Roma Day, the OSCE, EU, and an in-
ternational nongovernmental organization coalition called in a joint statement
for greater efforts to end Roma exclusion in BiH.
After a May visit, the OSCE high representative for national minorities, Astrid
Thors, stressed the need to improve equal rights and effective political participa-
tion of national minorities, including the need to implement the 2009 ECtHR rul-
ing.
In July, a Dutch district court in The Hague found the Netherlands liable for 300
deaths during the 1995 Srebrenica genocide and ordered compensation pay-
ments to hundreds of victims because its peacekeeping troops had failed to pro-
tect people seeking refuge in a UN compound in the town.
In September, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe deliberated
suspending BiH from the organization unless there is “substantial progress” in
the implementation of the 2009 ECtHR ruling.
In its annual progress report published in October, the European Commission
identified the continued need for constitutional reform and rising political and fi-
nancial pressure on media, as well as violence and discrimination against vul-
nerable minorities, particularly LGBT people, among the main outstanding
concerns.
During the second Universal Periodic Review of BiH at the Human Rights Council
in November, member states cited the need for constitutional reform, increased
efforts to combat human trafficking and violence against women, improving
rights of people with disabilities, and further promoting integration of Roma in




Brazil is among the most influential democracies in regional and global affairs,
and in recent years has emerged as an increasingly important voice in debates
over international responses to human rights problems. At home, the country
continues to confront serious human rights challenges, including the use of tor-
ture and ill-treatment, unlawful police killings, prison overcrowding, and ongoing
impunity for abuses committed during the country’s military rule (1964-1985).
Violent criminal gangs and abusive policing are significant problems in many
Brazilian cities. In recent years, the São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro state govern-
ments have implemented measures aimed at improving police performance and
curbing abuses, yet police misreporting and other forms of cover-up persist.
During the year leading up to the 2014 World Cup, there were major protests
throughout the country. Dozens of people were injured in confrontations be-
tween protesters and police, including journalists. In several incidents, police
used excessive force, including beating people who had not resisted arrest, and
firing teargas canisters at protesters from short range. 
Public Security and Police Conduct
Police were responsible for 436 killings in the state of Rio de Janeiro and 505
killings in the state of São Paulo in the first nine months of 2014. In the state of
São Paulo, this represents an increase of 93 percent over the same period in
2013. According to the most recent available information compiled by the Brazil-
ian Forum on Public Security, a nongovernmental organization (NGO), more than
2,200 people died during police operations throughout Brazil in 2013, averaging
6 people a day. 
Police routinely report these deaths as the result of shoot-outs with criminals.
While some police killings result from legitimate use of force, others do not, a
fact documented by Human Rights Watch and other groups, and recognized by
Brazilian criminal justice officials. 
In an effort to prevent cover-ups of unlawful police killings, the São Paulo state
government issued a resolution in January 2013 prohibiting police from removing
victims’ corpses from the scenes of shootings. Yet significant obstacles to ac-
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countability for unlawful killings in São Paulo persist, including the failure of po-
lice to preserve crucial evidence, and the failure of authorities to allocate suffi-
cient staff and resources to prosecutors responsible for investigating these
cases.
In the state of Rio de Janeiro, nearly 2,900 police officers and other public ser-
vants received financial compensation in May 2014 for meeting crime reduction
targets, including reductions in police homicides.
Prison Conditions, Torture, and Ill-Treatment of Detainees
Many Brazilian prisons and jails are severely overcrowded and plagued by vio-
lence. The country’s incarceration rate increased by 45 percent between 2006
and 2013, according to data from the Ministry of Justice’s Integrated System of
Penitentiary Information (InfoPen). The adult prison population exceeds half a
million people—37 percent more than the prisons were built for, according to the
National Council of Justice in June 2014.
In addition, more than 20,000 children are currently serving prison sentences.
Delays within the justice system contribute to the overcrowding. Over 230,000
individuals are being held in pretrial detention in prisons. In Piauí state, 68 per-
cent of detainees are in pretrial detention, the highest rate in the country. Over-
crowding and poor sanitation facilitate the spread of disease, and prisoners’
access to medical care remains inadequate. 
Torture is a chronic problem in police stations and detention centers. Between
January 2012 and June 2014, the national Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office re-
ceived 5,431 complaints of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
(about 181 complaints per month) from all over the country through a telephone
hotline service. Of these, 84 percent referred to incidents at police stations,
jails, prisons, and juvenile detention centers.
Video footage posted online by the Folha de São Paulo newspaper on January 7,
2014, shows the remains of the decapitated corpses of three of the four inmates
who were killed by fellow prisoners at the Pedrinhas Prison Complex in Maran-
hão state on December 17, 2013. A total of 60 inmates were killed in the state in
2013, according to the National Council of Justice (NCJ), which conducted an in-
vestigation in five Maranhão prisons and found what it called an “utter lack of
WORLD REPORT 2015
116
security” for inmates. In April 2014, the NCJ issued a recommendation to courts
setting out basic steps that judges should take to investigate credible allega-
tions of torture and ill-treatment.
Law enforcement agents who commit abuses against inmates and detainees are
rarely brought to justice. In a notable exception, a total of 73 police officers were
convicted of homicide in 2013 and 2014 for their participation in the 1992 killing
of 111 detainees in the Carandiru prison in São Paulo state.
In July 2014, President Dilma Rousseff appointed the 23 members of the National
Committee for the Prevention and Combatting of Torture, which is part of the Na-
tional System to Prevent and Combat Torture, created by law in August 2013. In
November, the committee appointed a panel of 11 experts that will have the au-
thority to conduct unannounced visits to detention centers, open investigations
into possible cases of torture, and make recommendations to public and private
institutions. 
Freedom of Expression, Internet Freedom, and Privacy
According to the Brazilian Association of Investigative Journalism, state security
forces injured or detained 178 journalists who covered demonstrations in various
parts of the country in the year leading up to the 2014 World Cup. 
A federal access to information law went into effect in 2012; a majority of states
have since passed implementing legislation. The law establishes that the public
should have unfettered access to information regarding violations of fundamen-
tal rights.
Brazil took an important step by enacting the Brazilian Digital Bill of Rights in
April 2014. The Bill of Rights includes protection for the right to privacy and free
expression online, and serves to reinforce application of the rule of law in the
digital sphere. The law establishes Brazilian support for net neutrality as a guid-
ing principle for future Internet developments. It has yet to be implemented. 
Reproductive Rights 
Brazil’s criminal code prohibits abortion except in cases of rape or when neces-
sary to save a woman’s life. In 2012, the Supreme Court expanded the excep-
tions to include cases of anencephaly, in which the fetus has a fatal congenital
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brain disorder. Women and girls who obtain an abortion outside of these excep-
tions may face sentences of up to three years in prison, while people who per-
form abortions face up to four years’ imprisonment. 
Abortions performed in clandestine clinics put women at high risk, as exempli-
fied in the high profile case of Jandira dos Santos Cruz, who police suspect died
from a botched illegal abortion in late August 2014, and whose body was later
mutilated to obscure her identity.
In August 2013, President Rousseff signed into law a bill that requires public
hospitals to provide comprehensive care for victims of sexual violence, including
“pregnancy prophylaxis” for rape victims and information on the right to access
abortion in cases where it is legal. In 2014, the Ministry of Health issued a reso-
lution extending national health insurance to cover legal abortion, but revoked
the resolution a week later in response to political pressure. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
The national Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office received more than 1,500 com-
plaints of violence and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans-
gender (LGBT) persons in 2013. In the first six months of 2014, the Ombudsman’s
Office reported over 500 such complaints. The office also reported a spike in
complaints after a presidential candidate called for LGBT people to get psycho-
logical treatment during a televised debate.
Labor Rights
Federal government efforts to eradicate forced labor have resulted in more than
46,000 workers being freed from slave-like conditions since 1995, according to
official data. However, the Pastoral Land Commission, a Catholic NGO, received
complaints that approximately 3,000 individuals were victims of forced labor in
2013. Criminal accountability for offending employers remains relatively rare. 
In June 2014, the Congress adopted a constitutional amendment that allows the
government to confiscate property, without providing compensation to the prop-
erty owner, where forced labor is found to have been used. Lawmakers have yet
to approve a law defining the meaning of forced labor and explaining how prop-
erty expropriation will be carried out in such cases.
WORLD REPORT 2015
118
Brazil adopted a constitutional amendment in March 2013 that entitles the coun-
try’s estimated 6.5 million domestic workers to overtime pay, unemployment in-
surance, pensions, a maximum 8-hour workday, and a 44-hour work week.
Proposed legislation implementing the constitutional amendment is still pend-
ing in the Brazilian Senate.
Rural Violence
Rural activists and indigenous leaders involved in conflicts over land continue to
face threats and violence. According to the most recent numbers of the Pastoral
Land Commission, 34 people involved in land conflicts were killed and 15 were
victims of attempted murder throughout the country in 2013. As of August, the
commission had already reported 23 people killed in land conflicts in 2014.
Nearly 2,500 rural activists have received death threats over the past decade. 
According to the Indigenous Missionary Council of the Catholic Church (Cimi), 53
indigenous people were killed in Brazil in 2013, 33 of them in Mato Grosso do
Sul, the state with the highest homicide rate of indigenous people in Brazil.
Thirty-three of the victims were members of the Guarani-Kaiowá indigenous
group and two were members of the Terena indigenous group.
Confronting Military-Era Abuses
In May 2012, a national truth commission began investigating the systematic
human rights violations that occurred during military rule from 1964 to 1985, in-
cluding extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, torture, arbitrary detention,
and the curtailment of free expression. In February, the truth commission pre-
sented a preliminary report that identified seven armed forces installations
where political prisoners were tortured and died during the dictatorship period.
At time of writing, the truth commission’s final report was due to be released in
December 2014.
The perpetrators of these crimes have been shielded from justice by a 1979
amnesty law. In April 2010, the Brazilian Supreme Court reaffirmed lower court
rulings that the amnesty barred most prosecutions of state agents for the
crimes. However, six months later, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
ruled that this interpretation violated Brazil’s obligations under international
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law, and that the amnesty should not be an obstacle to prosecuting serious
human rights violations committed under military rule.
In April 2013, São Paulo prosecutors filed criminal charges against a retired army
colonel and police investigator for concealing the body of a medical student
killed during military rule. The case is still being litigated in Brazilian courts. In
June 2013, however, a judge in Rio de Janeiro refused to try state agents for their
alleged involvement in the enforced disappearance of a journalist in 1970.
Key International Actors
Following a petition presented by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, which pointed out ongoing human rights abuses in the Pedrinhas Prison
Complex in Maranhão state, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights called
upon Brazil in November 2014 to immediately adopt measures to protect the life
and personal integrity of all prisoners in the prison complex.
Foreign Policy
As a returning member of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), Brazil maintained
a positive voting record in 2014, supporting the adoption of resolutions on a
number of critical human rights situations. In June, Brazil voted in favor of a reso-
lution condemning military operations conducted by Israeli forces in Gaza, con-
demning abuses against civilians by both sides, and dispatching an
international commission of inquiry to investigate violations of humanitarian law
and human rights law. In September 2014, Brazil was one of the sponsors of an
HRC resolution on combating violence and discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation and gender identity. The resolution called on the UN high commissioner
for human rights to update a 2012 report on violence and discrimination, with a
view to share best practices to overcome these abuses. Brazil abstained, how-
ever, from a contentious HRC resolution that did not recognize the many differ-
ent forms families can take. 
At the UN General Assembly, Brazil has played a leading role in promoting pri-
vacy in the digital era. In December 2013, the General Assembly adopted a reso-
lution proposed by Brazil and Germany calling on all states to protect and
respect the right to privacy and tasking the high commissioner for human rights
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to report on the issue. That report, issued in July 2014, concluded that mass sur-
veillance had become “a dangerous habit” in some countries and that many
states were falling short on privacy protections. Brazil was continuing to press
for further action by the General Assembly on these issues at time of writing. 
In November 2014, Brazil voted in favor of a landmark resolution adopted by the
General Assembly calling for the Security Council to refer North Korea to the In-
ternational Criminal Court for crimes against humanity.
At the Organization of American States, Brazil presented a resolution prohibiting
all types of discrimination against LGBT people, including discrimination that
limits their political participation and involvement in other aspects of public life.
The resolution was approved in June 2014.
In April 2014, Brazil organized and hosted NetMundial, a global gathering of gov-
ernments, nongovernmental groups, technologists, and private sector actors
concerned with the future of the Internet. NetMundial participants produced an
outcome statement that prioritized human rights principles and provided a




The reform process in Burma experienced significant slowdowns and in some
cases reversals of basic freedoms and democratic progress in 2014. The govern-
ment continued to pass laws with significant human rights limitations, failed to
address calls for constitutional reform ahead of the 2015 elections, and in-
creased arrests of peaceful critics, including land protesters and journalists.
Slowing Political Reforms
The government’s commitment to staging free and fair elections in 2015 came
under question in 2014 as it cancelled planned bi-elections and made no com-
mitment to amend the deeply flawed 2008 constitution. The opposition National
League for Democracy party and donor governments pressed for constitutional
reform, particularly article 59(f), which effectively disqualifies opposition leader
Aung San Suu Kyi from the presidency, and article 436, which provides the mili-
tary 25 percent of seats in parliament, granting it an effective veto over constitu-
tional amendments. The government resisted demands for substantive
discussions of federalism. 
The Burmese Defense Services, or Tatmadaw, rejected constitutional amend-
ments, and senior military leaders in numerous speeches vowed to safeguard
the existing constitution as one of the military’s core duties. Military leaders also
maintained that they should retain their quota of reserved seats in parliament,
control of key ministries, and emergency powers.
Freedom of Association and Assembly
There were at least 27 political prisoners in Burma at time of writing, according
to former prisoner groups. Some 200 other people face charges for what appears
to be efforts to exercise their rights to freedom of assembly and expression. The
joint government and civil society political prisoner review committee, formed in
early 2013 to resolve remaining cases, broke down in 2014 due to disputes be-
tween the committee chair, President’s Office Minister Soe Thane, and former
prisoners. Soe Thane reportedly threatened members of the committee with loss
of citizenship if they continued their criticism of the government. A presidential
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amnesty in October released 3,000 prisoners, only about a dozen of whom were
political prisoners, including a number of ethnic Rohingya prisoners. 
Protests over land rights intensified in 2014 as farmers faced evictions, at times
receiving inadequate compensation or relocation terms. Soldiers committed vio-
lence against farmers who had returned to symbolically work their land and call
for its return. Military members of the national parliament shut down parliamen-
tary debates on the extent of land-taking over previous decades by the armed
forces. 
In June, the parliament bowed to popular pressure and amended the Peaceful
Procession and Assembly Law, but maintained controversial section 18, which
grants broad latitude to local officials to deny permission for gatherings. The
draft Association Law, which has attracted widespread civil society criticisms,
was still being discussed at time of writing, with the military controlled Ministry
of Home Affairs unwilling to remove provisions granting the authorities wide
powers to restrict registration of national and international nongovernmental or-
ganizations.
Freedom of Media
Media freedoms, viewed by some donor countries as a key indicator of human
rights progress, took a sharp downturn in 2014 as the government increased its
intimidation of media. 
In January, the Ministry of Information exerted pressure on publishers to change
editorial content and bring publications in line with official spellings, and began
imposing visa restrictions on exiled Burmese and foreign journalists entering the
country by reducing their permission to stay from 3-6 months to only 28 days. 
In July, a court sentenced four journalists and the editor of the weekly journal
Unity to 10 years in prison, later reduced to 7 years, for breaches of the Official
Secrets Act over a story alleging a suspected Burmese military chemical
weapons plant had been built on seized land. The case alarmed many journalists
who saw it as a return to past draconian punishments of media. 
In October, the army detained freelance reporter Aung Kyaw Naing (also known
as Par Gyi) while he was reporting on fighting between the army and ethnic
rebels in Mon State. The army claimed that Par Gyi was shot and killed while at-
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tempting to escape; his body was buried near the army camp. The government
called on the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to investigate, and Par
Gyi’s body was exhumed and examined, which proved he had been severely
torured and shot to death. On December 2, the NHRC determined the case
should be referred to, and heard in, a civil court.
Proposed media laws making their way through parliament will further constrain
journalists from reporting openly. One, the Public Service Media Bill, will foster
the development of a publicly funded media conglomerate that can be expected
to serve as a powerful pro-government voice.
Sectarian Tensions and Violence
Tensions between Burma’s Buddhist and Muslim communities continued
through 2014. Ultra-nationalist Buddhist monks in the “969 Movement” used in-
flammatory rhetoric that at times incited violence against Muslims. In July, at-
tacks against Muslim-owned property in central Mandalay resulted in the killing
of two men, one Buddhist and one Muslim, until security forces acted to end the
violence and impose a curfew. 
The authorities investigated and prosecuted some people involved in violence
against Muslims, including suspects in the Mandalay violence. In October, seven
men were sentenced to seven years in prison for killing ten Muslim pilgrims on a
bus in Thandwe township in Arakan State in 2012. The attack increased tensions
in the region that led to major violence, including a campaign of “ethnic cleans-
ing” against Rohingya Muslims, in June and October 2012. 
The nationwide League to Protect Race and Religion (widely known by its
Burmese acronym, Ma Ba Tha) has continued to urge the government to enact
four laws designed to protect Buddhism, although the laws appear to be thinly
veiled measures to further marginalize Muslim communities. The measures in-
clude draft laws on interfaith marriage, religious conversion, family planning and
polygamy. One draft law on religious conversion was released to the public for
feedback in May, but was criticized as an intrusion into personal matters of faith.
Nearly 100 Burmese civil society groups wrote to protest the law. The 969 leader-





Systematic repression of ethnic Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s western Arakan
State continued in 2014, especially against 140,000 internally displaced Ro-
hingya forced out of their homes during the violence in 2012. An estimated one
million Rohingya in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships along the Bangladesh
border continue to face restrictions on movement, employment, and religious
freedom. 
All Rohingya in Burma are effectively denied citizenship on the basis of the 1982
Citizenship Law, rendering many of them, including children, stateless. The na-
tionwide census conducted in March-April 2014 did not permit Rohingya to self-
identify as such, and according to results released in September, 1.2 million
people in Arakan State were not included in the census. The number of Rohingya
fleeing Arakan State by boat rose dramatically in 2014, with estimates suggest-
ing that 50-100,000 have fled since the start of 2013, mostly for Malaysia.
A January 2014 incident in a Rohingya village called Du Chee Yar Tan in Maung-
daw township reportedly resulted in the killing of between 40 and 60 Rohingya
villagers by security forces and Arakanese residents. One policeman was also re-
portedly killed. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights conducted a short investigation under restrictive government conditions
and confirmed that a violent incident had taken place, and estimated that
dozens of killings had occurred. 
Two government investigations and one by the Myanmar National Human Rights
Commission, which were below international standards and did not include im-
partial investigators, dismissed the incident as exaggerated. Journalists and in-
dependent human rights monitors have not been given adequate access to the
area to investigate. 
Partly as fallout over this incident, the government suspended on a technicality
the work of the humanitarian organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in
Arakan State. This left tens of thousands of Rohingya without badly needed pri-
mary health care until MSF was permitted to resume activities in September. 
In late March, Arakanese ultra-nationalists conducted coordinated attacks on of-
fices and warehouses of UN and international organizations in in Sittwe, forcing
the evacuation of over 200 foreign and Burmese aid workers. Continuing restric-
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tions by security forces and threats by local militants have inhibited aid opera-
tions.
In October, the secretive government Rakhine [Arakan] State Action Plan for
long-term development was leaked. It included provisions for the forced reloca-
tion of all Rohingya camps, housing an estimated 130,000 people, to unspeci-
fied sites, and a nationality verification process to determine eligibility for
citizenship under the discriminatory 1982 Citizenship Law. Those deemed ineli-
gible would be sent to detention camps and face possible deportation. At time of
writing the plan had still not been finalized or publicly released.
Ethnic Conflict and Forced Displacement
Amid nationwide ceasefire talks, fighting between the Burmese government and
ethnic armed groups intensified in 2014, particularly between the Tatmadaw and
Shan, Ta-aung, and Kachin rebels in Kachin and Shan States. Several thousand
civilians have fled military abuses, including reported shelling of populated
areas. 
More than 100,000 civilians in Kachin State have yet to return home following
fighting from 2011 to 2013. The security situation remains tense with a large
Burmese army troop presence, landmines, and continued abuses by government
forces, making the situation not conducive to returns of displaced persons and
refugees in safety and dignity. Displaced persons in government-controlled
areas face arbitrary arrest and torture from security forces, including for allegedly
supporting Kachin insurgents in violation of the Unlawful Associations Act.
An estimated 350,000 people remain internally displaced in eastern Burma, and
more than 110,000 refugees live in nine camps across the border in Thailand.
Discussions between the Burmese military leadership and Thailand’s new mili-
tary junta in 2014 led to an agreement to repatriate these refugees. Under cur-
rent conditions—lack of security in the area, extensive landmine infestation,
poor rule of law, and an absence of even basic infrastructure and services—any




All major aid donors—including those from the European Union, Australia, the
United Kingdom, and Japan—increased aid and development support to Burma
in 2014. The World Bank and Asian Development Bank also increased grants to
Burma in 2014.
Yanghee Lee, the new UN special rapporteur for human rights in Burma, visited
the country in July and reported that despite some progress, the human rights
landscape remained serious, particularly in regards to the Rohingya. President
Thein Sein did not follow-up on his pledge to US President Barack Obama to per-
mit the formal establishment of an office of the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR). 
The government had objected to the inclusion of human rights monitoring and
reporting in addition to capacity-building in the office’s mandate. Four OHCHR
staff members operate in the country on short-term visas and restricted travel,
but they are able to interact with government officials.
In speeches at the UN General Assembly and at the annual Asia-Europe meeting
in Italy, the Burmese president and foreign minister claimed the government had
made sufficient progress to warrant a downgrading of scrutiny of the country’s
human rights record. Even formerly reluctant critics such as Germany’s Chancel-
lor Angela Merkel voiced concern over continuing religious intolerance and eth-
nic violence during Thein Sein’s bilateral visit in September.
The UK, United States, and Australia continued preliminary non-lethal military
engagement with the Burmese armed forces said to be designed to foster re-
spect for the rule of law and military transformation. 
Burma’s armed forces continue to illegally recruit and deploy child soldiers de-
spite cooperation with the UN on a joint action plan to end child recruitment. In
2014 the government staged four child soldier release ceremonies, discharging a
total of 378 underage soldiers. Non-state armed groups, particularly in Burma’s
northern states where fighting has increased, also recruit and use child soldiers,




State repression against opponents and critics increased ahead of elections
scheduled for 2015. The government repeatedly harassed opposition parties,
civil society activists, and journalists, and blocked their activities. Members of
the youth league of the ruling National Council for the Defense of Democracy-
Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) used violence, and carried out
abuses, against perceived opponents. Leading human rights activist Pierre
Claver Mbonimpa was arrested and charged for remarks he made on the radio.
On September 29, judges provisionally released him on grounds of ill-health. 
The split of the opposition party UPRONA into two factions, in part due to alleged
government interference in the choice of party leaders, triggered a political crisis
and led to all three UPRONA ministers resigning. Draft constitutional amend-
ments, which might have allowed President Pierre Nkurunziza to stand for a third
term and altered the voting system in parliament, were defeated by just one vote
in March.
Impunity for human rights abuses, particularly by state agents and youth of the
ruling party, remains a concern. There was very little progress in investigating
scores of extrajudicial killings between 2010 and 2012. The justice system suf-
fers from a lack of independence and allegations of corruption. 
Civil Society 
The government persistently harassed civil society activists and blocked their ac-
tivities, accusing them of being political opponents and interfering with the
course of justice. 
Pierre Claver Mbonimpa, president of the Association for the Protection of
Human Rights and Detained Persons (APRODH), was arrested in the capital, Bu-
jumbura, on May 15. He was charged with endangering internal and external
state security and using false documents, in connection with allegations he
made on Radio Publique Africaine (RPA) on May 6 that young Burundians were
being given weapons and military uniforms and sent for military training in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. The court in Bujumbura turned down his lawyers’
request for his provisional release three times, even after he became seriously ill
WORLD REPORT 2015
128
and was hospitalized. On September 29, following the report of a court-ordered
medical commission that listed several serious medical conditions, judges or-
dered Mbonimpa’s provisional release on grounds of ill-health. His case trig-
gered widespread public reaction and numerous calls for his release inside and
outside Burundi. 
Following the adoption of a new law on public gatherings and demonstrations in
December 2013, government officials repeatedly prohibited demonstrations and
other activities by civil society organizations. The mayor of Bujumbura prohibited
a peaceful march in support of Mbonimpa in June, claiming it had “an insurrec-
tional character.” The minister of interior upheld his decision, telling the organiz-
ers they should let justice do its work instead of “distracting the public.” 
Bujumbura’s mayor also prohibited a civil society demonstration planned for Au-
gust 1 to call for an independent justice system. In July and September, police
stopped Gabriel Rufyiri, president of the anti-corruption organization OLUCOME,
from holding a one-person protest against illicit enrichment. Authorities also
stopped civil society organizations from holding a march in April to mark the fifth
anniversary of the murder of anti-corruption activist Ernest Manirumva. 
Journalists
As with civil society organizations, government officials threatened and ha-
rassed independent journalists, claiming they were mouthpieces of the political
opposition. In July, the National Communications Council (CNC) banned radio
stations from playing a song about Mbonimpa. In August, the CNC warned RPA to
stop broadcasting interviews with people who claimed to have information back-
ing up Mbonimpa’s allegations about military training of Burundians in Congo. 
Following a legal challenge by the Union of Burundian Journalists (UBJ) regarding
a restrictive press law adopted in 2013, the Constitutional Court ruled on January
7, 2014, that several articles of the press law did not comply with Burundi’s Con-
stitution. A parallel case by the UBJ challenging the law at the East African Court




Restrictions on opposition parties increased as the CNDD-FDD tried to position
itself for another victory in the 2015 elections. Government and ruling party offi-
cials blocked and interfered with the activities of opposition parties. Longstand-
ing divisions in the opposition party UPRONA came to a head in early 2014,
when the party broke into two factions, following alleged interference by govern-
ment officials in the choice of party leaders. The government only recognized the
faction headed by the new, CNDD-FDD-compliant leaders, leaving the other fac-
tion unable to operate legally. 
Members of the youth league of the ruling party, known as Imbonerakure, carried
out abuses against real or perceived opponents, including beatings, disruption
of party meetings, and other acts of violence and intimidation. Youths of other
parties sometimes retaliated, leading to violent clashes. 
On March 8 and 9, 70 people, mostly members of the Movement for Solidarity
and Democracy (MSD) opposition party, were arrested, many of them arbitrarily.
Some were arrested in connection with alleged plans to hold an authorized
demonstration, others following a clash between MSD members and the police,
during which some MSD members took two policemen hostage. 
All were tried together, on March 18, charged with rebellion, insults and acts of
violence against law enforcement agents, grievous bodily harm and participation
in an insurrectional movement. During the trial, which lasted just one day, nei-
ther the defendants nor their lawyers were able to prepare their defense prop-
erly, and little attempt was made to establish individual culpability. On March
21, a court in Bujumbura sentenced 21 defendants to life imprisonment, 10 de-
fendants to 10 years in prison, and 14 defendants to five years in prison. It ac-
quitted 22 defendants. A separate chamber for minors tried three defendants
aged about 17 and sentenced them to two years in prison. Appeal hearings were
delayed until the end of December. The government suspended the MSD for four
months following its clash with police. 
Prisoner Releases
On June 27, a presidential decree ordered the release of several categories of
prisoners, including those sentenced to five years’ imprisonment or less, preg-
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nant women, prisoners suffering from incurable illnesses, those aged over 60,
and those under 18. However, progress in releasing prisoners has been slow.
Impunity 
Most of the perpetrators of scores of extrajudicial killings and other acts of politi-
cal violence between 2010 and 2012 continue to evade justice. An appeal hear-
ing in the case of Deputy Police Commissioner Michel Nurweze, alias Rwembe
(“razor blade” in Kirundi), was held on November 6 after being repeatedly de-
layed for more than a year. In a rare prosecution of an official for human rights
abuses, a court in Gitega had tried Nurweze in 2013 on charges of murder, tor-
ture, and attempted murder. However, after at least two prosecution witnesses
refused to testify due to a lack of adequate protection, he was acquitted for mur-
der and torture but found guilty of grievous bodily harm and sentenced to three
months’ imprisonment. He was released as he had already served a year in
prison. 
Three police officers accused of involvement in the killing of nine religious wor-
shippers at Businde in March 2013 had not been tried at time of writing. They
were arrested in 2013 and provisionally released after three months. There were
further arrests of worshippers from the same informal spiritual movement who
make monthly pilgrimages to Businde.
In May, Burundi adopted a law establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion to cover grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law committed between 1962 and 2008. The commission had not been set up at
time of writing. The law did not include any reference to the creation of a special
tribunal or other judicial mechanism to try these crimes. 
Key International Actors
Mbonimpa’s arrest triggered widespread international reactions. Several govern-
ments and embassies, including those of the United States, the European Union,
France, the United Kingdom, and Belgium, expressed concern, particularly after
Mbonimpa’s hospitalization. In September, the European Parliament passed a
resolution calling for his immediate and unconditional release and expressing
concern about other human rights abuses in Burundi. On September 23, US
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President Barack Obama said he stood in solidarity with Mbonimpa and called
for his release.
The mandate of the United Nations Office in Burundi, BNUB, was due to end on
December 31, 2014, despite the worsening human rights situation ahead of the
2015 elections. At time of writing, plans were underway to set up by January 2015
a human rights presence in Burundi under the Office of the UN High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, as recommended by the UN Joint Transition Plan, pre-
sented to the government on May 16. 
The UN Security Council also requested that the secretary-general establish an
electoral observer mission to monitor and report before, during, and after the
elections in response to a request from Burundi’s government. In April, the gov-
ernment expelled BNUB’s security advisor to protest a leaked UN confidential
cable containing allegations that military officers had distributed weapons and
military and police uniforms to the Imbonerakure. 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights agreed to consider four
complaints on extrajudicial killings in Burundi submitted in June by four Burun-
dian civil society organizations and the Swiss-based organization Track Impunity
Always (TRIAL).
On November 25, following a visit to the country, the UN special rapporteur on
the situation of human rights defenders, Michael Forst, condemned as unaccept-
able the “escalation of the harassment of defenders” and criticized attempts to





The past year saw determined and often-violent efforts by the government of
Prime Minister Hun Sen and his Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) to suppress
mass protests against the deeply flawed July 2013 parliamentary elections, and
force the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), to accept the elec-
tion results, and end its boycott of the National Assembly. The government im-
posed bans on peaceful protests, including strikes by trade unions campaigning
for increased wages. In some cases, protesters engaged in attacks in response
to security force repression. 
A July 2014, CPP-CNRP agreement ended the opposition’s boycott of the National
Assembly. The agreement, which followed the arrest of prominent CNRP leader
Mu Sochua, and six other CNRP assembly members on trumped-up charges,
failed to commit the CPP to implement institutional and legal reforms to ensure
that future elections will be free and fair, or to guarantee freedom of expression
and opinion, peaceful assembly and association, or fair trials. 
Poverty remained particularly severe in the countryside, while urban workers
also suffered from wages so low they contribute to widespread malnutrition. Vic-
tims of land concessions to agro-industrial business interests—the major cause
of dispossession of land from farmers, and resulting land disputes—made little
progress in receiving adequate compensation and resettlement packages. Gov-
ernment officials and judges remained mired in corruption, but almost all were
immune from action by courts and the government’s Anti-Corruption Unit, which
only targeted petty cases involving those without CPP political protection. 
Excessive Use of Lethal and Other Force
In early January, authorities banned all protests, in part to try to force organized
labor in the garment industry to lower their demands for a minimum wage in-
crease. Gendarme, police, and para-police personnel killed at least seven peo-
ple and injured dozens of others mostly during the first seven months of the
year, before the ban was partly lifted. Protesters also injured several members of
the security forces. 
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Impunity and Politically Motivated Prosecutions
Since the CPP has been in power, members and commanders of government se-
curity forces have enjoyed impunity from investigation, let alone prosecution, for
serious human rights abuses, including political assassinations, other extrajudi-
cial killings, and torture. Instead, politically partisan police, prosecutors, and
judges pursued at least 87 trumped-up cases against CNRP leaders and activists,
members of other opposition political groups, prominent trade union figures,
urban civil society organizers, and ordinary workers from factories around
Phnom Penh. 
The Phnom Penh Municipal Court sentenced 55 people to prison after unfair tri-
als, on charges such as “treacherously plotting” to stage an armed insurrection,
or instigating, inciting, or perpetrating violence, obstructing traffic, or “violent
resistance against a public official.” In these proceedings, no credible evidence
was presented to support a guilty verdict, while evidence of security force vio-
lence was systematically disallowed. Although 30 of the 55 received suspended
sentences, 23 had already spent many months of pretrial detention in an over-
crowded, substandard, and isolated prison. 
Criminal cases pending included, alleged incitement to violence by CNRP Presi-
dent Sam Rainsy, Vice President Kem Sokha, and union leader Rong Chhun for
opposing the government’s blanket ban on protests; charges against seven
other CNRP assembly members and nine CNRP activists for leading, or participat-
ing in a violent “insurrection” and other crimes related to a security force-pro-
voked melee at a CNRP-sponsored protest in July 2014; charges of incitement to
violence and other crimes against six union leaders in connection with worker
unrest during a general strike in December 2013-January 2014; charges of
“treacherous plotting” and other crimes against a political activist for distribut-
ing a banned book in 2014; and charges against a Buddhist monk and three
youths in connection with protests against election unfairness and other alleged
government abuses dating back to 2011. 
Land Confiscation and Forced Evictions
The ill-effects of often illegal land acquisitions, by politically powerful individu-
als and their business partners, and forced evictions, continued to mount. The
WORLD REPORT 2015
134
number of people affected by state-involved land conflicts since 2000 passed
the half-million mark in March 2014, according to calculations by the local non-
governmental organization LICADHO. The rate of new disputes was higher than
in 2013. Many of the new disputes ensued from the failure of the authorities to
distribute land titles awarded to rural residents as part of a 2012-2013 scheme,
personally conceived and overseen by Hun Sen. 
In August 2o14, Hun Sen blamed his government subordinates for failing to re-
solve disputes, repeating many previous pledges to end unlawful land takings.
At least four people remain imprisoned after convictions in previous years for op-
posing land takings, while charges against at least 19 others were pending in
various provincial courts. 
Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Other Ill-Treatment
The authorities detained hundreds of people they deemed to be “undesirable,”
without judicial recourse in so-called drug treatment centers, where they face
torture, sexual violence, and—in at least two centers—forced labor. Authorities
locked up alleged drug users, homeless people, beggars, street children, sex
workers, and people with disabilities in these centers for arbitrary periods. 
People held during investigation, or prosecution for common criminal offenses,
or convicted in court, were still routinely tortured, or otherwise ill-treated. The
police and prison authorities, beat, pistol-whipped, used electro-shock, kicked,
slapped, and punched inmates, often until they become unconscious. Much of
the torture was aimed at extracting confessions or extorting money. 
New Laws Strengthening Government Control of the Judiciary
Amid politically motivated prosecutions and unfair trials, the CPP further tight-
ened its control over the judiciary by rushing passage of three laws through the
National Assembly during the opposition boycott. 
Laws on the Organization of the Courts, the Statute of Judges and Prosecutors,
and the Organization and Functioning of the Supreme Council of the Magistracy,
promulgated on July 13, 2014, increased government control over a politically




Together, the laws facilitated further encroachment by the government on areas
properly reserved for the judiciary under the principle of separation of powers in-
cluding, government control over the judiciary’s budgetary finance and adminis-
trative matters, restrictions on the rights of judges and prosecutors to freedom of
expression, and fewer safeguards for judicial independence in selection, promo-
tion, removal, and disciplinary procedures for judges. 
The legislation put the minister of justice at the center of all key decision-making
by the judiciary and the Supreme Council of the Magistracy, the body charged
with appointing, disciplining, and overseeing the country’s judicial system. 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal
On August 7, 2014, eight years after the creation of the United Nations-assisted
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, former Khmer Rouge leaders
Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan were convicted of crimes against humanity, in-
cluding extermination and political persecution. These were committed as part
of the Khmer Rouge’s forced relocations of Cambodians from urban areas to the
countryside and around the countryside in 1975, during which many were exe-
cuted. 
The two continued to face trial on other charges, including genocide, in connec-
tion with Khmer Rouge policies and practices from 1975 to 1979. However, given
their advanced age, it was far from certain that a second trial would ever be com-
pleted. Hun Sen’s public opposition to trials of other Khmer Rouge suspects
made it unlikely that others responsible for the deaths of as many as 2 million
people, would be held accountable. While the trial had initially generated con-
siderable interest, the drawn-out proceedings over many years resulted in the
Cambodian public showing little interest by the trial’s end. 
Labor Rights
The brutal suppression of garment and textile worker protests in January, and the
subsequent prosecution of labor leaders and workers on trumped-up charges,
did not deter some trade unions from continuing to protest for an increased min-
imum wage, demanding US$177 monthly, as suggested in a government task
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force report. Instead, the government on November 12 declared a minimum
wage of $128. 
The authorities introduced more burdensome procedures for union registration,
and independent unions complained that their union registration was intention-
ally being delayed. The government also moved toward passage of a revised law
on trade unions that fell far short of international standards guaranteeing free-
dom of association. 
Ongoing reports of employees fainting en masse in factories, prompted authori-
ties to create a committee to investigate the causes. However, the general state
of labor inspection and remedial action remained poor, although officials from
the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training began conducting joint inspections
of “low compliance” factories named in the Transparency Database launched by
the International Labour Organization’s Better Factories Cambodia program. 
Key International Actors
China, Vietnam, Japan, and South Korea were Cambodia’s major foreign in-
vestors during the year, while Japan, the European Union and United States were
the major foreign donors. China, Vietnam, and the US provided material military
assistance and training to the Cambodian security forces, including units known
to have recently been involved in serious human rights violations. 
Positively, the US conspicuously refrained from endorsing the 2013 elections as
free and fair, and repeatedly and publicly called on the authorities to respect
human rights, especially to restore the rights to freedom of association and
peaceful assembly. However, the US was virtually alone among foreign countries
in seriously addressing Cambodia’s human rights crises, whether in public or
private. 
The World Bank, which suspended new lending to Cambodia in 2011 because
the government had forcibly evicted people in a manner violating bank policy,
began to consider resuming funding for government land projects, even though
the government had not fully resolved the problem that had led to the suspen-
sion, or ceased and remedied reprisals against those who have advocated on
these issues, among them activists sentenced to prison in November 
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In September, Cambodia agreed with Australia to accept an unknown number of
refugees transferred from the island nation of Nauru. The Australian government
will pay costs towards “resettling” the refugees, and also agreed to pay $35mil-
lion in developmental assistance over four years towards electoral reform, de-




Canada enjoys a global reputation as a defender of human rights, aided by a
solid record on core civil and political rights protections that are guaranteed by
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Nonetheless, in 2014, the sitting
majority in parliament refused to take essential steps to remedy serious human
rights concerns, particularly with regard to violence against indigenous women,
the legal status of sex work, and the impact of Canada’s extractive industries
abroad. 
Violence against Indigenous Women and Girls
A 2014 data collection effort by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) iden-
tified 1,181 cases of murders and disappearances of indigenous women and girls
between 1980 and 2012, double previous estimates. The study found that in-
digenous women and girls are overrepresented among homicide victims, consti-
tuting 16 percent of female homicide victims, despite making up only 4.3 percent
of Canada’s female population. A 2013 Human Rights Watch report documented
the RCMP’s failure in British Columbia to protect indigenous women and girls
from violence, as well as from abusive police behavior, including excessive use
of force and physical and sexual assault. 
Despite growing public concern over the murders and disappearances, the gov-
ernment of Prime Minister Stephen Harper continued to resist calls from provin-
cial leaders, opposition political parties, and civil society for a national inquiry
into the violence. 
A special parliamentary committee convened to address the issue broke along
party lines, and the Conservative majority failed to recommend an inquiry or any
steps to address police accountability for misconduct. Recent signs that the gov-
ernment may agree to a ministerial roundtable on violence offer some promise
for an inquiry but would not be an adequate substitute. In Canada, public na-





In 2014, parliament began debating new provisions criminalizing aspects of sex
work following the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2013 ruling striking down previ-
ous restrictions that the court deemed violated the rights and security of sex
workers. 
Justice Minister Peter MacKay tabled Bill C-36, which would criminalize commu-
nicating for the purposes of selling sexual services in public, or buying, advertis-
ing or benefitting from the sale of sexual services. The bill would severely limit
sex workers’ abilities to take life-saving measures, such as screening clients.
Criminalizing communication disproportionately impacts street-based sex work-
ers, many of whom are indigenous, poor, or transgender, forcing them to work in
more dangerous and isolated locations.
Surveillance and Privacy
In January 2014, media reported that the Communications Security Establish-
ment of Canada (CSEC) was conducting indiscriminate collection and analysis of
communications data. This information was based on documents widely re-
leased by former US National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden. The
documents revealed that the intelligence agency was provided with metadata
captured from travelers’ wireless devices in a major Canadian airport over a two-
week period. 
The agency then tracked travelers’ subsequent movements as their mobile
phones or laptops connected to other wi-fi access points in airports, hotels, and
restaurants. Reports suggest that this initiative was a 2012 trial run for a program
that may now be operational. Additional media stories revealed that CSEC may
be operating several Internet and phone metadata collection programs. Details
remain secret. 
The programs described to date only involve collection of metadata, not the con-
tent of communications. However, metadata, or data about a communication,
can be highly revealing of movements, associations, and activity. The govern-
ment insists on the legality of metadata collection programs, raising concerns
that legal reforms are necessary to ensure meaningful protections for the right to




Canada has continued to deny Omar Khadr—a Canadian citizen who was de-
tained from the age of 15 in Guantanamo for 10 years and pleaded guilty to ter-
rorism-related charges in the fundamentally flawed military commissions
system—access to rehabilitation and reintegration services as required for for-
mer child soldiers. 
Khadr remains incarcerated. In July, an appeals court ruled that Khadr would
have been considered a youth offender if sentenced in Canada and should serve
out the remainder of his 8-year sentence in a provincial facility, where he would
have access to educational and rehabilitative programming, in accordance with
Canadian law for youth offenders. A federal government appeal is pending. 
Mining Industry Abuses
Canada is the mining industry’s most important global financing hub, home to a
majority of the world’s mining and exploration companies. These firms have an
enormous collective impact on the human rights of vulnerable communities
worldwide. 
In 2013, Human Rights Watch documented allegations that Vancouver-based
Nevsun Resources’ flagship Bisha gold mine in Eritrea was partly built using
forced labor deployed by local state-owned contractor, Segen Construction. In a
statement, Nevsun expressed “regret if certain employees of Segen were con-
scripts” during the mine’s construction and insisted there were no ongoing
abuses. The company subsequently carried out a human rights impact assess-
ment and promised to integrate human rights considerations into its policies.
However, it has refused to sever ties with Segen. 
In 2011, Human Rights Watch documented allegations that security guards em-
ployed by Canadian mining giant Barrick Gold had gang-raped women at a Papua
New Guinea mine site and engaged in other violent abuses. The company has
since taken steps to prevent further abuses. In 2014, it paid out claims consist-
ing of cash and other forms of assistance to over 100 women who suffered sex-
ual violence at the hands of company employees. This unprecedented
remediation scheme has struggled with design and implementation issues and
has attracted considerable criticism. In spite of its flaws, this initiative could
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emerge as a path-breaking example of how companies can move proactively to
respond to serious abuses linked to their global operations. It is too early to
judge whether it will result in lasting, positive outcomes for the women involved. 
The Canadian government neither regulates nor monitors the human rights prac-
tices of Canadian mining companies when they go abroad. Its sole action on this
front was to establish in 2009 a corporate social responsibility counselor whose
office is without oversight or investigatory powers. 
Cluster Munitions
In 2014, the Canadian Parliament continued to debate contentious Bill C-6 to im-
plement the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The convention bans the use, pro-
duction, transfer, and stockpiling of these weapons, as well as assisting anyone
with these activities. The convention further requires states to destroy stock-
piles, clear cluster munition remnants, and assist victims. Canada, a signatory to
the convention, requires the adoption of implementation legislation before rati-
fication. 
Certain provisions of Bill C-6 run counter to the treaty’s spirit and letter. It would
allow Canadian armed forces to assist with use and other prohibited activities
during joint military operations with a state not party. For example, Canadian
commanders could direct or authorize an ally’s armed forces to use cluster muni-
tions. The bill would also allow cluster munitions to be stockpiled and trans-
ported through Canadian territory. 
The Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade
planned to review the bill in October 2014. The House of Commons had made
one change to the original bill, and Human Rights Watch urged the Senate com-
mittee to revise it further to bring Canada in line with its international commit-
ments. It is hoped that Canada will be a state party by the convention’s First
Review Conference in September 2015. 
Despite this, Canada should be commended for completing destruction of its
cluster munition stockpiles in 2014, in accordance with the convention. 
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Central African Republic 
Attacks on civilians remained alarming and widespread in the Central African Re-
public, despite a decrease of violent attacks from the previous year. The sectar-
ian violence between the predominately Muslim Seleka rebels and the
“anti-balaka,” a group harboring hatred towards Muslims, spread from western
parts of the country toward central and eastern areas. Witnesses on both sides
frequently described the attacks as retaliatory in nature, indicating a growing
cycle of revenge killings. By the end of 2014, thousands of civilians had been
killed by both sides and over 800,000 people displaced from their homes, of
which an estimated 415,000 people, many of them Muslim, took refuge across
the borders in neighboring countries. A transitional government, led by the in-
terim president, Catherine Samba-Panza, appointed in January, struggled to es-
tablish security. A ceasefire agreement signed by the warring factions in July was
widely ignored. 
In April, the United Nations Security Council authorized a new peacekeeping
mission for the Central African Republic, known as MINUSCA, to protect civilians,
facilitate humanitarian access, and monitor, investigate, and report on human
rights abuses. It took over from the African Union (AU) on September 15, integrat-
ing 4,800 AU troops into MINUSCA, and began deploying additional troops. At
time of writing, 8,500 of the force’s potential 11,800 had been deployed. Approx-
imately 2,000 French peacekeepers, authorized by the Security Council in late
2013, remained in the country. 
Some AU peacekeepers, while providing important civilian protection during
their deployment, also committed serious human rights abuses, although ac-
cording to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, those facing allega-
tions were not integrated into MINUSCA. 
Tackling impunity and re-establishing the rule of law remain a serious challenge.
In September, the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced it would begin
an investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the





Attacks by Seleka Rebels
The Seleka (“alliance” in Sango, the country’s principal language), a predomi-
nantly Muslim rebel group that launched a coup d’etat in March 2013, were
forced out of power in December 2013 following the deployment of French peace-
keeping forces. The Seleka re-established their military base in Bambari, a city in
the center of the country, from where they sought to control eastern and northern
areas. 
The Seleka continued to carry out brutal attacks against civilians often under the
pretext of seeking out their enemies, the anti-balaka fighters. The Seleka de-
stroyed villages, engaged in wide spread looting, and raped women and girls.
For example, on February 26, Seleka fighters, aided by ethnic Peuhl cattle
herders, killed eight people and wounded at least 10 others—mostly young chil-
dren—in the village of Bowai, northeast of Bossangoa. In a similar attack in June
in Liwa, near Bambari, Seleka rebels together with ethnic Peuhl killed at least 10
people and then burned down the entire village. Civilians were also attacked in
or near their villages along roads that Seleka rebels considered to be strategic.
In June, scores of civilians were killed in and around Bakala, just to the north of
Bambari and near several gold mining sites. A number of the victims were tied
up before the Seleka slit their throats. 
Rival factions within the Seleka vied for control of the group, sometimes through
armed attacks against each other, leading to the death of scores of Seleka fight-
ers in Bambari in September. Several civilians were also killed in the attacks. 
Anti-Balaka Attacks 
The anti-balaka, a collection of local armed groups that emerged in mid-2013 to
fight against the Seleka, continued to commit large-scale reprisal attacks against
Muslim civilians and later against non-Muslim civilians. The majority of Muslims
fled from the capital and the west of the country. Thousands were trapped in en-
claves, such as in Carnot and Boda, where they lived in precarious conditions
with peacekeepers attempting to provide some protection. In February, at least
72 Muslim civilians were killed by anti-balaka forces in the southwest of the
country. In one incident on February 5 in Guen, the anti-balaka attacked a prop-
erty where hundreds of Muslims had sought refuge. The attackers divided some
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45 men into two groups, led them out of the compound, forced them to lie on the
ground, and executed them. The attackers pursued the fleeing Muslims to the
nearby town of Djomo, where many Muslims sought shelter in a Catholic parish.
The anti-balaka continued to attack them there. 
The anti-balaka also attacked Muslims in central and eastern areas. In June, anti-
balaka forces attacked an ethnic Peuhl community at Ardondjobdi, near Bam-
bari, as the men were finishing their morning prayers. At least 20 people,
including women and children, were killed, the majority from machete blows to
the head and neck. Three victims’ throats were cut while they were still inside
the local mosque. 
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons
The situation for the estimated 800,000 refugees and internally displaced per-
sons remained serious, with only a small number feeling secure enough to come
home. In western areas, roughly 12,000 Muslim civilians lived in isolated en-
claves protected by AU, and later UN peacekeepers, too frightened to return. In
Bangui, civilians living in one of the city’s largest Muslim neighborhoods, called
“ 5 Kilo,” remained isolated from the rest of the city, fearing attack if they left the
area. 
Displacement camps and other locations where civilians sought safety were fre-
quently attacked by armed fighters from both sides. On May 28, a displacement
camp in Bangui’s Fatima neighborhood was attacked by armed Muslim men from
5 Kilo after anti-balaka fighters attacked the Muslim enclave. In Bambari at least
27 civilians were killed by Seleka fighters and their allies in July while taking
shelter in a displacement camp at the Saint Joseph Parish and the adjacent
bishop’s residence. In both attacks, AU and French peacekeepers were stationed
within a few kilometers but were unable to respond quickly enough to protect
civilians. 
Lack of humanitarian assistance remained a major problem for the displaced.
The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and other humanitar-




African Union Forces 
AU peacekeepers were implicated in human rights abuses, including enforced
disappearances, and extrajudicial executions. 
Republic of Congo soldiers operating as AU peacekeepers were responsible for
at least two serious incidents of abuse. On December 22, 2013, Republic of
Congo soldiers tortured to death two anti-balaka fighters held in detention in re-
venge for the death of a soldier from within their own ranks. On March 24, Re-
public of Congo soldiers summarily executed between 11 and 18 people, a mix of
both anti-balaka fighters and civilians, in Boali after they were attacked by the
anti-balaka and lost one of their men. The AU suspended the two commanders
responsible for the soldiers in each location, rotated the troops out of the areas,
and publicly declared it would launch an investigation. At time of writing, there
had been little progress in identifying those responsible for the killings. 
In March, Chadian peacekeepers with the AU mission were accused by the tran-
sitional government of firing indiscriminately at civilians in Bangui’s PK 12 neigh-
borhood, killing dozens of people. Following a public outcry, the Chadian
government withdrew its 850 troops from the AU peacekeeping mission. 
National Judicial Efforts
On April 9, interim President Samba-Panza issued a decree establishing a spe-
cial investigative cell to investigate and prosecute serious crimes committed in
the country since 2004. The UN peacekeeping mission also consulted with the
transitional government on the establishment of a judicial mechanism to enable
the country’s judiciary to work alongside international actors to tackle impunity. 
In August, the peacekeeping mission and the government signed a Memoran-
dum of Understanding to create a Special Criminal Court to try grave human
rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law. In the memo-
randum, the government commits to take the necessary legislative steps as soon
as possible to create the special court. 
On September 24, the ICC prosecutor announced that her office would open a
second investigation in the country for crimes committed since 2012, following
an earlier request from interim President Samba-Panza. In 2007, the ICC opened
its first investigation in the country for crimes committed during the 2002-2003
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civil war. The investigation led to the arrest of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, a Con-
golese national and former vice president of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
His trial was ongoing at the ICC at time of writing. 
Key International Actors
Regional African actors and France took a lead in responding to the crisis. Chad
and the Republic of Congo each hosted conferences aimed at establishing
frameworks for peace. France increased its peacekeeping troops to an estimated
2,000 soldiers. 
In April, the Security Council authorized the deployment of a new peacekeeping
mission and in May imposed sanctions on former President Francois Bozize and
two other rebel leaders for their role in the violence. The United States and the
European Union provided important financial support to peacekeeping efforts in
the country. In addition the US has provided more than US$145 million in hu-
manitarian aid to help those affected by the conflict in CAR, including for
refugees outside the country. 
In August, the secretary-general reported to the Security Council that civilians
were the targets of sectarian violence and reprisal killings every day and serious
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law were committed




In March 2014, President Michelle Bachelet began her second term in office with
a committment to tackle social and economic inequality, focusing initially on
overhauling the education and taxation systems. Her campaign platform in-
cluded a pledge to bring Chile’s counterterrorism law into conformity with inter-
national standards, and to present a law to end the prohibition of abortion when
a pregnancy endangers the life of the woman or girl, is unviable, or results from
rape. Her administration also undertook to end the jurisdiction of military courts
over alleged human rights abuses committed by Carabineros (police responsible
for public order and crime prevention). 
While courts continue to prosecute individuals for abuses committed during the
Augusto Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990), the Supreme Court has used its dis-
cretionary powers in many cases to reduce sentences against human rights vio-
lators, resulting in sentences that are incommensurate with the gravity of the
crimes. 
Counterterrorism Laws
Following repeated recommendations by United Nations human rights bodies,
officials announced in 2014 that the Bachelet administration would not use the
1984 counterterrorism law to address violence arising from indigenous protests
over land. 
The law’s overly broad definition of terrorism continues to allow for the prosecu-
tion on terrorism charges of activists allegedly responsible for acts such as arson
and the destruction of private property, although in most recent cases judges
have rejected the terrorism charges as unfounded. Another concern is a provi-
sion in the legislation allowing prosecutors to withhold the identity of certain
witnesses, which has led to the detention of some suspects for over a year on
the basis of evidence they cannot effectively challenge. 
In September 2014, 14 people were injured by a bomb placed in a refuse bin in a
crowded shopping center at a Santiago subway station. A string of such attacks
attributed to anarchist groups had been reported over several years, but until the
September incident, explosive devices had never been left in daytime in
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crowded places, and no bystanders had been seriously injured. Although several
of the past incidents led to prosecutions under the counterterrorism law, in each
case courts rejected terrorism charges for lack of evidence. 
In November, the government presented to the Senate a bill to replace the pres-
ent counterterrorism law. The bill strengthens due process guarantees by giving
defense attorneys the right to be informed of the identity of protected witnesses
as well as to question the witnesses about their evidence and probe their credi-
bility. It also allows police to use undercover agents to gather evidence about
terrorist groups, giving them immunity from prosecution for actions committed in
pursuit of their judicial mandate. 
Military Jurisdiction
Legislation approved by Congress in September 2010 under the administration
of Sebastian Piñera finally ended the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians,
a reform urged by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its 2005 ruling in
the Palamara Iribarne case. However, the reform left untouched the jurisdiction
of military courts over abuses committed by the uniformed police, Carabineros. 
Military courts are composed of military officers on active service, and lack the
independence and due process guarantees of ordinary criminal proceedings. In-
vestigations are secret, criminal proceedings are conducted mainly in writing,
and lawyers have limited opportunities to cross-examine witnesses. 
Most complaints filed with military courts for human rights abuses in which civil-
ians are alleged victims are dismissed. According to data published in 2014 by
the National Institute for Human Rights (INDH—Chile’s human rights ombuds-
man), the number of convictions for police abuses in Chile’s central regions be-
tween 2005 and 2011 fell to 0.48 percent of the complaints filed, compared to
3.2 percent for the period from 1990-2004, even though the number of com-
plaints increased significantly. 
Chile’s top courts have increasingly opposed military jurisdiction in such cases.
In May, the Constitutional Court ruled that the decision of a civilian judge to de-
cline jurisdiction over police accused of blinding a demonstrator by firing a
paintball into his eye during a 2013 street protest was unconstitutional, and is-
sued a similar decision in a separate case the following month. The Supreme
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Court’s criminal chamber has ruled in favor of civilian court jurisdiction in several
cases, including one involving the death of a detainee who suffocated after
being abandoned in a police vehicle in hot temperatures. 
In May 2014, the minister of defense promised to present draft legislation before
the end of June 2015 that would overhaul the military criminal code and end mili-
tary jurisdiction over crimes committed by the armed forces (including Cara-
bineros) against civilians. 
Police Conduct
Information published by the INDH in 2014 revealed that police handling of pub-
lic protests fell short of international human rights standards. The institute con-
cluded that use of anti-riot equipment such as water cannons and tear gas by
Carabineros in response to violence by protesters in 2013 was indiscriminate in
70 percent of the demonstrations it observed. More often than not, Carabineros
used these methods disproportionately to the threat faced, and also used dis-
proportionate force in making arrests. 
Public protests and the number of abuses by Carabineros reported in this con-
text declined significantly in 2014. In August, at the insistence of the INDH, Cara-
bineros for the first time authorized the publication of its operational protocols
when dealing with public protests. 
Prison Conditions
Many of Chile’s prisons are grossly overcrowded and conditions remain poor de-
spite government reform efforts. A study of 44 prisons published in March 2014
by the INDH reported beatings by prison guards, and high levels of inmate vio-
lence in some prisons that resulted in 35 deaths from January to October 2012. 
Prisoners are often arbitrarily confined in punishment cells without adequate
light, ventilation, basic access to water, sanitation, and hygiene, or medical at-
tention. On her retirement in 2014, a Supreme Court official responsible for mon-





Cases of torture continue to be reported and impunity is common. Between 2011
and August 2014, the INDH filed 33 complaints of torture with the courts—16 for
acts allegedly committed by Carabineros, 10 by prison guards, and 7 by the In-
vestigations Police (PDI). 
Confronting Past Abuses
The chief justice stated in March 2014 that 1,022 cases of human rights viola-
tions committed during the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990) were under adju-
dication by the courts, 72 of which were cases of torture. According to the human
rights unit within the Ministry of Interior (a party to about 800 of the cases under
court investigation), as of October, 1,086 individuals had been charged with or
convicted of human rights violations including killings and enforced disappear-
ances, 279 had final judgments rendered against them, and 75 were serving
prison sentences.
The Supreme Court’s criminal chamber has been inconsistent in reviewing sen-
tences in important human rights cases. The Observatory of Transitional Justice
at Diego Portales University, which monitors human rights trials, has found that
in enforced disappearance cases the court often confirms prison sentences that
comply with Chile’s obligation to hold perpetrators accountable through appro-
priate punishments. In extrajudicial execution cases, however, the court has
often reduced prison terms and allowed alternatives to prison if significant time
has elapsed since the criminal act. 
Reproductive Rights
Chile is one of four countries in Latin America (the other three being El Salvador,
Honduras, and Nicaragua) with an absolute prohibition on abortion, even in the
event of medical necessity or rape. In her annual address to the nation in May
2014, President Bachelet announced that her government would present legisla-
tion to decriminalize abortion in cases where there was a risk to the life of the
woman or girl, fetal unviability, or rape. As of November 2014, the government
had not presented its bill to Congress. Two bills presented by members of the
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chamber of deputies and senators in May and July 2013 were still under discus-
sion in committee at time of writing. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
A bill tabled by five senators in May 2013 to achieve legal recognition of the gen-
der identity of transgender people was still under discussion in the Senate in No-
vember 2014. The bill would allow individuals to change their name and legal
gender on birth certificates and identity cards so that official documents match
their gender identity. Another bill presented by former president Sebastián
Piñera in 2011 that would provide legal recognition and protection for same sex
couples was approved by the Senate in October 2014 and at time of writing was
awaiting a vote in the Chamber of Deputies. 
Key International Actors
As a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC), Chile supported
UN efforts to put human rights violations in North Korea, Sri Lanka, Belarus, Iran,
the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Ukraine, and Syria under scrutiny. Chile was
also one of four countries that presented a landmark HRC resolution on combat-
ing violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity
in September 2014, and was the only Latin American member of the HRC oppos-
ing a contentious resolution in June 2014 that did not recognize the many differ-
ent forms families can take. 
In January 2014, Chile’s human rights performance was assessed as part of the
HRC’s “periodic review” process. Several countries praised Chile’s establish-
ment of the INDH as an independent human rights monitoring body and Chile’s
anti-discrimination legislation passed in 2012. 
Many also called for a debate to end the criminalization of abortion. Chile ac-
cepted this recommendation (which it had rejected at the 2009 UPR) while
pointing out that proposed legislation would be limited to pregnancies that en-
dangered the life of the mother, were unviable, or resulted from rape. 
In July 2014, in its concluding observations on Chile’s sixth periodic report, the
Human Rights Committee, the international expert body tasked with interpreting
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, recommended that Chile
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reform its counterterrorism legislation to ensure that terrorism crimes are clearly
defined in the law, and urged Chile not to apply the law in a discriminatory man-
ner to Mapuches. The committee also expressed concern about the Supreme
Court practice of lowering sentences for grave human rights violations commit-
ted in the 1970s and 1980s. 
In Norín Catrimán and others v. Chile, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
ruled in May 2014 that Chile was responsible for violating the rights to due
process, freedom of thought and expression, and personal liberty of seven Ma-




China remains an authoritarian state, one that systematically curbs fundamental
rights, including freedom of expression, association, assembly, and religion,
when their exercise is perceived to threaten one-party rule. Since a new leader-
ship assumed power in March 2013, authorities have undertaken positive steps
in certain areas, including abolishing the arbitrary detention system known as
Re-education through Labor (RTL), announcing limited reforms of the hukou sys-
tem of household registration that has denied social services to China’s internal
migrants, and giving slightly greater access for persons with disabilities to the
all-important university entrance exam. 
But during the same period, authorities have also unleashed an extraordinary
assault on basic human rights and their defenders with a ferocity unseen in re-
cent years—an alarming sign given that the current leadership will likely remain
in power through 2023. From mid-2013, the Chinese government and the ruling
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have issued directives insisting on “correct” ide-
ology among party members, university lecturers, students, researchers, and
journalists. These documents warn against the perils of “universal values” and
human rights, and assert the importance of a pro-government and pro-CCP
stance. 
Rather than embrace lawyers, writers, and whistleblowers as allies in an effort to
deal effectively with rising social unrest, the government remains hostile to criti-
cism. The government targets activists and their family members for harassment,
arbitrary detention, legally baseless imprisonment, torture, and denial of access
to adequate medical treatment. It has also significantly narrowed space for the
press and the Internet, further limiting opportunities for citizens to press for
much-needed reforms. 
The Chinese government’s open hostility towards human rights activists was
tragically illustrated by the death of grassroots activist Cao Shunli in March. Cao
was detained for trying to participate in the 2013 Universal Periodic Review of
China’s human rights record at the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC)
in Geneva. For several months, authorities denied her access to adequate health
care even though she was seriously ill, and she died in March 2014, just days
after authorities finally transferred her from detention to a hospital. 
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The government continued its anti-corruption campaign, taking aim at senior of-
ficials, including former security czar Zhou Yongkang, as well as lower-level offi-
cials. But the campaign has been conducted in ways that further undermine the
rule of law, with accused officials held in an unlawful detention system, deprived
of basic legal protections, and often coerced to confess. The civic group known
as the New Citizens Movement, best known for its campaign to combat corrup-
tion through public disclosure of officials’ assets, has endured especially harsh
reprisals. 
In response to the Chinese government’s decision on August 31 denying genuine
democracy in Hong Kong, students boycotted classes and launched demonstra-
tions. Police initially tried to clear some demonstrators with pepper spray and
tear gas, which prompted hundreds of thousands to join the protests and block
major roads in several locations. 
While senior Hong Kong government officials reluctantly met once with student
leaders, they proposed no changes to the electoral process. Hundreds remained
in three “Occupy Central” zones through November, when courts ruled some
areas could be cleared and the government responded, using excessive force in
arresting protest leaders and aggressively using pepper spray once again. 
Protests continued in other areas, some student leaders embarked on a hunger
strike with the aim of re-engaging the government in dialogue, while other
protest leaders turned themselves in to the police as a gesture underscoring
their civil disobedience. Despite the waning of street protests, the underlying
political issues remained unresolved and combustible at time of writing. 
Human Rights Defenders 
Activists increasingly face arbitrary detention, imprisonment, commitment to
psychiatric facilities, or house arrest. Physical abuse, harassment, and intimida-
tion are routine. 
The government has convicted and imprisoned nine people for their involvement
in the New Citizens Movement—including its founder, prominent legal scholar Xu
Zhiyong—mostly on vaguely worded public order charges. Well-known lawyer Pu
Zhiqiang and journalist Gao Yu, among others, were arrested around the 25th an-
niversary of the Tiananmen Massacre in June 2014. Many activists continue to be
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detained pending trial, and some, including lawyers Chang Boyang and Guo
Feixiong, have been repeatedly denied access to lawyers. Virtually all face sen-
tences heavier than activists received for similar activities in past years. The in-
creased use of criminal detention may stem from the abolition of the RTL
administrative detention system in late 2013. 
China has 500,000 registered nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), though
many are effectively government-run. An estimated 1.5 million more NGOs oper-
ate without proper registration because the criteria for doing so remain stringent
despite gradual relaxation in recent years. The government remains suspicious
of NGOs, and there are signs that authorities stepped up surveillance of some
groups in 2014. 
In June, a Chinese website posted an internal National Security Commission doc-
ument that announced a nationwide investigation of foreign-based groups oper-
ating in China and Chinese groups that work with them. Subsequently, a number
of groups reportedly were made to answer detailed questionnaires about their
operations and funding, and were visited by the police. In June and July, Yiren-
ping, an anti-discrimination organization, had its bank account frozen and its of-
fice searched by the police in connection with the activism of one of its legal
representatives. 
Xinjiang
Pervasive ethnic discrimination, severe religious repression, and increasing cul-
tural suppression justified by the government in the name of the “fight against
separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism” continue to fuel rising tensions
in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). 
In March, at least 30 people were killed when Uighur assailants attacked people
with knives at the train station in Kunming, Yunnan Province. In May, 31 people
died when a busy market in Urumqi was bombed. In August, official press re-
ports stated than approximately 100 people died in Yarkand (or Shache) County
in XUAR when assailants attacked police stations, government offices, and vehi-




Following the Urumqi attack, the Chinese government announced a year-long
anti-terrorism crackdown in Xinjiang. Within the first month, police arrested 380
suspects and tried more than 300 for terror-related offenses. Authorities also
convened thousands of people for the public sentencing of dozens of those
tried. In August, authorities executed three Uighurs who were convicted of or-
chestrating an attack in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in October 2013. Fair trial
rights remain a grave concern given the lack of independent information about
the cases, the government’s insistence on expedited procedures, the fact that
terror suspects can be held without legal counsel for months under Chinese law,
and China’s record of police torture. 
While there is reason for the government’s concern with violence, discriminatory
and repressive minority policies only exacerbate the problem. In January, police
took into custody Ilham Tohti, a Uyghur professor at Beijing’s Minzu University
critical of the Chinese government’s Xinjiang policy. Tohti remains detained and
is charged with “separatism,” which can result in life imprisonment. In August,
Uighur linguist Abduweli Ayup was given an 18-month sentence for “illegal
fundraising” after trying to raise money for Uighur-language schools. 
Tibet
A series of self-immolations by Tibetans protesting Chinese government repres-
sion appeared to have abated by early 2014. The authorities punished families
and communities for allegedly inciting or being involved in these protests; pun-
ishment of individuals included imprisonment, hefty fines, and restrictions of
movement. 
Authorities were intolerant of peaceful protests by Tibetans, harshly responding
with beatings and arrests to protests against mines on land considered sacred
and against detention of local Tibetan leaders. According to press reports, in
June, police beat and detained Tibetans for protesting against copper mining in
southwestern Yunnan province. In August, police in the Ganzi prefecture of
Sichuan province fired into a crowd of unarmed protesters demonstrating
against the detention of a village leader. Also in June, Dhondup Wangchen, who
had been imprisoned for his role in filming a clandestine documentary in Tibetan
areas, was released after six years in prison. 
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China’s mass rehousing and relocation policy has radically changed Tibetans’
way of life and livelihoods, in some cases impoverishing them or making them
dependent on state subsidies. Since 2006, over 2 million Tibetans, both farmers
and herders, have been involuntarily “rehoused”—through government-ordered
renovation or construction of new houses—in the TAR; hundreds of thousands of
nomadic herders in the eastern part of the Tibetan plateau have been relocated
or settled in “New Socialist Villages.” 
Hong Kong
In January 2013, Hong Kong professor Benny Tai first proposed the “Occupy Cen-
tral with Love and Peace” movement, designed to pressure Beijing to grant gen-
uine democracy to Hong Kong in accordance with the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s
quasi-constitution, which applies the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (ICCPR) to the territory. The ICCPR requires that people should have
equal rights to vote and to stand for election. In June 2014, nearly 800,000 voted
in favor of democracy in an unofficial “referendum” organized by Occupy Central;
in July, at least 510,000 people marched for democracy. 
On August 31, China’s top legislature announced it would impose a stringent
screening mechanism that effectively bars candidates the central government
dislikes from nomination for chief executive. In response, students boycotted
classes in late September and held a small peaceful protest outside government
headquarters. The police responded by dispersing the students with pepper
spray and arrests. 
These tactics prompted hundreds of thousands to join the students. Organizers
of the Occupy Central movement announced that they were officially launching
their planned demonstrations and joined the student protest. On September 28,
Hong Kong police declared the protest illegal and cordoned off the government
headquarters grounds. This decision prompted more protesters to gather in the
areas near government headquarters, demanding that police reopen the area.
The two groups of protesters—those corralled in the government headquarters
and their supporters on the other side—eventually walked out onto the major
thoroughfares between them and effectively blocked the roads. 
The protests eventually occupied several large key areas in Hong Kong’s busi-
ness and government centers. After several incidents of excessive force on the
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part of police against the overwhelmingly peaceful protests, including continued
aggressive use of pepper spray and several beatings recorded on video, the gov-
ernment adopted a passive stance, waiting for private groups to win injunctions
before moving to clear out protest sites in a strategy of waiting for public opinion
to turn against the demonstrators. 
When courts handed down the injunctions, police cleared two areas and later
thwarted an effort to block access to government offices, but two other smaller
sites in the city remained occupied at time of writing with students considering
whether to abandon “occupation” as a tactic. 
The underlying political issues, however, remained unresolved, with both Chi-
nese and Hong Kong authorities standing firm on Beijing’s August 31 decision.
Benny Tai and other Occupy Central leaders tried to turn themselves in to police
to underscore both respect for rule of law and their stance of civil disobedience,
while student leaders held peaceful hunger strikes in an effort to persuade the
government to reengage in dialogue. 
Although media has greater freedom in Hong Kong than elsewhere in China,
journalists and media owners, particularly those critical of Beijing, came under
increasing pressure in 2014. In February, a prominent editor, Kevin Lau, was
stabbed by unidentified thugs; in July, HouseNews, a popular independent news
website known for supporting democracy in Hong Kong, was shuttered by its
founder, who cited fear of political retaliation from China; throughout 2014,
Jimmy Lai and his media businesses, known for critical reporting on China, were
repeatedly threatened. 
Freedom of Expression
The Chinese government targeted the Internet and the press with further restric-
tions in 2014. All media are already subject to pervasive control and censorship.
The government maintains a nationwide Internet firewall exclude politically un-
acceptable information. 
Since August 2013, the government has targeted WeChat—an instant messaging
app that has gained increasing popularity—by closing popular “public accounts”
that report and comment on current affairs. Another 20 million accounts were
shuttered for allegedly soliciting “prostitutes.” Authorities also issued new rules
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requiring new WeChat users to register with real names. In July and August 2014 ,
it suspended popular foreign instant messaging services including Kakao Talk,
saying the service was being used for “distributing terrorism-related informa-
tion.” 
Authorities also tightened press restrictions. The State Administration of Press
Publication, Radio, Film, and Television issued a directive in July requiring that
Chinese journalists sign an agreement stating that they will not release unpub-
lished information without prior approval from their employers and requiring
that they pass political ideology exams before they can be issued official press
cards. 
In July, the CCP’s disciplinary commission announced that researchers at the
central Chinese Academic of Social Sciences had been “infiltrated by foreign
forces” and participated in “illegal collusion” during politically sensitive peri-
ods. The party subsequently issued a rule that would make ideological evalua-
tion a top requirement for assessing CASS researchers; those who fail are to be
expelled. 
Freedom of Religion 
Although the constitution guarantees freedom of religion, the government re-
stricts religious practices to officially approved mosques, churches, temples,
and monasteries organized by five officially recognized religious organizations;
any religious activity not considered by the state to be “normal” is prohibited. It
audits the activities, employee details, and financial records of religious bodies,
and retains control over religious personnel appointments, publications, and
seminary applications. In 2014, the government stepped up its control over reli-
gion, with particular focus on Christian churches. 
Between late 2013 and early July, the government removed 150 crosses from
churches in Zhejiang Province, which is considered to be a center of Christianity.
In July, the government handed down a particularly harsh 12-year sentence to
Christian pastor Zhang Shaojie. Also in July, Zhuhai authorities raided the com-
pound of Buddhist leader Wu Zeheng and detained him and at least a dozen fol-
lowers, although no legal reason was given for doing so. The Chinese
government also expelled hundreds of foreign missionaries from China, accord-
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ing to press reports, and it failed to publicly respond to Pope Francis’s mid-Au-
gust statement that the Vatican wishes to “establish full relations with China.” 
The government classifies many religious groups outside of its control as “evil
cults.” Falun Gong, a meditation-focused spiritual group banned since July 1999,
continues to suffer state persecution. In June, authorities in Inner Mongolia de-
tained 15 members of what it called another “evil cult” called the “Apostles’ Con-
gregation” for dancing publicly and “tempting” people to become new members. 
Women’s Rights
Women’s reproductive rights and access to reproductive health remain severely
curtailed under China’s population planning regulations. That policy includes
the use of legal and other coercive measures, such as administrative sanctions,
fines, and coercive measures, including forced insertion of intrauterine devices
and forced abortion, to control reproductive choices. 
In September and October, female protestors in Hong Kong alleged that as-
sailants sexually assaulted them, and that police at those locations did little to
intervene. 
China was reviewed under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women (CEDAW) in October. The committee expressed con-
cerns over the lack of judicial independence and access to justice for women
and retaliation against women rights activists. Chinese authorities prevented
two activists from participating in the review: Ye Haiyan, China’s most prominent
sex worker rights activist, was placed under administrative detention, while HIV-
AIDS activist Wang Quinan’s passport was confiscated. 
In November, the government released for comment the long-awaited law
against domestic violence. While a step in the right direction, it falls short of in-
ternational standards and good practices. The definition of domestic violence is
overly narrow, and the protection orders that women can seek are poor and are
tied to victims subsequently filing a court case against the abuser. 
Disability Rights 
Although China ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD) in June 2008, persons with disabilities face a range of barriers, including
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lack of access to education and forced institutionalization (including as a form of
punishment). 
In China, one in four children with disabilities is not in school because of dis-
crimination and exclusion. Official guidelines even allow universities to deny en-
rollment in certain subjects if the applicants have certain disabilities. In April,
the Chinese Education Ministry announced that it would allow Braille or elec-
tronic exams for national university entrance, but in a landmark case to test this
initiative, blind activist Li Jincheng was not provided with the electronic exams
he had requested, but a Braille version which he did not know how to read. Li’s
case highlights the difficulties people with disabilities have in being provided
with reasonable accommodation, a right that is still not recognized under Chi-
nese law. New regulations on access to education for people with disabilities
drafted in 2013 were not adopted in 2014. 
The Mental Health Law, which came into effect in 2013, stipulates that treatment
and hospitalization should be voluntary except in cases where individuals with
severe mental illnesses pose a danger to, or have harmed, themselves or others.
In an important step in November, a patient currently held in a psychiatric hospi-
tal invoked the law in a lawsuit brought in Shanghai challenging his confine-
ment. According to Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD), central
government rules require local officials to meet a quota of institutionalizing two
out of every 1,000 people who allegedly have “serious mental illnesses.” 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
Homosexuality was decriminalized in 1997, but was remained classified as a
mental illness until 2001. To date there is no law protecting people from discrim-
ination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. There is no legal
recognition of same-sex partnership. 
Despite this lack of legal protection, individuals and organizations brought
cases to court to try to better protect their rights. In February, an activist sued the
government after the Hunan Province Civil Affairs Department refused to register
his organization focused on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) is-
sues, stating that homosexuality had no place in Chinese traditional culture and
“the building of spiritual civilization.” The court dismissed the case in March on
the ground that the government had not defamed homosexuals. 
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LGBT groups continue to document the phenomenon of “conversion therapy,” in
which clinics offer to “cure” homosexuality. In March 2014, a man who calls him-
self Xiao Zhen filed a lawsuit against a clinic in Chongqing, which he said had
administered electroshock therapy to him. It was the first time a court in China
heard a case involving “conversion therapy.” 
In November, a man filed a lawsuit in Shenzhen alleging discrimination on the
grounds of sexual orientation; if the court accepts the case it will be the first
such case heard in China. 
During China’s October CEDAW review, a state representative noted that: “the
rights of all Chinese citizens [are] protected by Chinese law, regardless of their
sexual orientation.” 
Key International Actors 
Even as China has taken major steps backwards on human rights under Xi Jin-
ping, most foreign governments have muted their criticisms of its record, opting
to prioritize economic and security issues or trying to win Chinese co-operation
on issues like climate change. Few bilateral human rights dialogues were held in
2014, and few governments that had pointed to such dialogues as centerpieces
of their human rights strategy developed effective, alternative long-term strate-
gies, such as elevating their engagement with Chinese civil society. 
Foreign governments also largely failed to mark the 25th anniversary of the
Tiananmen massacre, or to speak up for Hong Kong when China ruled out true
universal suffrage for the territory, though several noted the harsh sentences
handed down to high-profile human rights defenders and the release of Gao
Zhisheng, who, however, remains under heavy surveillance. For the third time in
recent years, South African authorities indicated they would not grant a visa to
the Dalai Lama. 
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon similarly failed to criticize the
Chinese government’s deteriorating rights records during his August visit, in-





China’s 2013 leadership change has not yielded fundamental changes in its for-
eign policy, though it has more aggressively advanced its territorial claims in
parts of Asia. 
While China engages with various UN mechanisms, it has not significantly im-
proved its compliance with international human rights standards nor pushed for
improved human rights protections in other countries, such as North Korea.
There are eight outstanding requests by UN special rapporteurs to visit China,
and UN agencies operating inside China remain tightly restricted, their activities
closely monitored by authorities. 
As a member of the UN Human Rights Council, China regularly votes to prevent
scrutiny of serious human rights situations around the world. In 2014, China
voted down resolutions spotlighting abuses in North Korea, Iran, Sri Lanka, Be-
larus, Ukraine, as well as Syria. 
China repeated its calls for “political solutions” in Syria, Sudan, and South
Sudan in 2014, but took steps that prolonged human rights crises in all three.
Particularly noteworthy was its veto of a Security Council resolution referring the
situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court. The latter was its fourth
veto, alongside Russia, of Security Council action to address human rights viola-
tions in Syria since 2011. 
In September 2014, however, a Chinese embassy official in Juba claimed that
Chinese weapons sales to South Sudan had been halted; the change in policy
had not been independently verified at time of writing. China also continued to
pressure governments to forcibly return Chinese asylum seekers and to deny






Civilians in Colombia continue to suffer serious abuses perpetrated by guerrillas,
as well as by paramilitary successor groups that emerged after an official para-
military demobilization process a decade ago. Violence associated with Colom-
bia’s internal armed conflict have forcibly displaced more than 5.7 million
Colombians, and upward of 200,000 continue to flee their homes each year,
generating the world’s second largest population of internally displaced persons
(IDPs). Human rights defenders, trade unionists, journalists, indigenous and
Afro-Colombian leaders, and other community activists face death threats and
violence. The administration of President Juan Manuel Santos consistently con-
demns these attacks, but lack of effective investigations means perpetrators are
rarely arrested. 
The Santos administration continues to promote several bills that would under-
cut accountability for unlawful killings of civilians by the military, including so-
called false positive killings. The proposed legislation creates a serious risk that
such cases will be transferred from the civilian to the military justice system,
which lacks independence and has a very poor record investigating human
rights violations. 
The Colombian government and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
guerrillas have been engaged in peace talks in Cuba since 2012; at time of writ-
ing they had reached an agreement on three of the six items on the negotiating
agenda. On June 10, the government and National Liberation Army (ELN), Colom-
bia’s second largest guerrilla group, announced they had begun exploratory
peace talks. 
In March, the government removed the mayor of Bogotá from office despite a
legally binding precautionary measure issued by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights calling for it not to do so. President Santos subsequently im-
plemented a court order to reinstate the mayor. 
Guerrilla Abuses
FARC guerrillas routinely attack civilians. For example, in Tumaco municipality in
southwest Colombia, the FARC was responsible for widespread abuses in 2013
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and 2014, including killings, disappearances, torture, sexual violence, forced
displacement, recruitment of children, extortion, and death threats against com-
munity leaders. In one case from June, there is compelling evidence that FARC
members abducted, tortured, and killed Mónica Julieth Pernia, a 25-year-old Tu-
maco resident. 
The ELN also continues to commit serious abuses against civilians, such as
killings, abductions, and child recruitment. On September 15, 2014, the ELN shot
dead two oil workers who were inspecting a pipeline in the northeastern munici-
pality of Teorama. 
The FARC and ELN continue to use antipersonnel landmines. The government re-
ported that landmines and unexploded ordnances killed 6 civilians and injured
65 between January and August 2014. 
Paramilitaries and Their Successors
Between 2003 and 2006, right-wing paramilitary organizations with close ties to
security forces and politicians underwent a deeply flawed government demobi-
lization process in which many members remained active and reorganized into
new groups. Successor groups to paramilitaries, often led by members of demo-
bilized paramilitary organizations, commit widespread abuses, such as killings,
disappearances, and sexual violence. 
In Buenaventura, a largely Afro-Colombian port on the Pacific coast, paramilitary
successor groups such as the Urabeños continue to commit atrocities, including
abducting and dismembering people. The groups have caused Buenaventura to
have the highest rate of forced displacement in Colombia, with more than
33,000 residents fleeing their homes in 2013, and 22,383 between January and
November 1, 2014, according to government data released in November. 
The groups have at times benefited from the tolerance and collusion of state
agents. In March, prosecutors ordered the arrest of retired army Col. Robinson
González del Río for allegedly leading a network of active and retired security
force members that sold weapons to the Urabeños. 
Implementation of the Justice and Peace law, which offers dramatically reduced
sentences to demobilized paramilitaries who confess their crimes, has been very
slow. As of September 2014, only 37 of the more than 30,000 paramilitaries who
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officially demobilized had been convicted of crimes under the Justice and Peace
law—9 years after it was approved. The convictions cover a small portion of the
nearly 70,000 crimes confessed by defendants seeking the law’s benefits. 
“Parapolitics” investigations into current and former members of Congress ac-
cused of conspiring with paramilitaries continued: more than 55 legislators have
been convicted since 2006. 
On September 17, 2014, the Colombian Senate held a debate about alleged links
between paramilitaries and former President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010), who be-
came a senator in 2014. 
Abuses by Public Security Forces
During the Uribe administration, Colombian military personnel executed large
numbers of civilians, particularly between 2002 and 2008. In many cases—com-
monly referred to as “false positives”—soldiers and officers under pressure from
superiors to boost body counts killed civilians and reported them as enemy com-
bat casualites. There has been a dramatic reduction in cases of alleged unlawful
killings attributed to security forces since 2009; nevertheless, there were credi-
ble reports of some new cases in 2013 and 2014. 
The government does not keep statistics for “false positives” as a category of
crime distinct from other types of unlawful killings. However, as of July 2014, the
Human Rights Unit of the Attorney General’s Office was investigating more than
3,500 unlawful killings allegedly committed by state agents between 2002 and
2008, and had obtained convictions for 402 of them. The vast majority of the 785
army members convicted are low-ranking soldiers and non-commissioned offi-
cers. Some military personnel convicted of the crimes have enjoyed extravagant
privileges in military detention centers. 
The defense minister and senior military officials have taken actions to discredit
false positive investigations. In September, after the media reported that prose-
cutors had requested that investigations be opened into nine current and former
army generals for their possible role in false positives, the defense minister said
“excessive attention” was being given to the testimony on which the prosecutors
based their requests. In February, President Santos fired the head of the armed
forces after Semana magazine published an audio recording from 2012 in which
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the general told an army colonel under prosecution for false positives to “create
a mafia” to smear prosecutors. 
In February, the head of army intelligence was removed from his post after Sem-
ana revealed that justice authorities had raided a location in Bogotá where mili-
tary intelligence personnel were alleged to be illegally intercepting the
communications of the government’s peace negotiators and others. 
Reforms Promoting Impunity
In 2013 and 2014, the defense minister submitted three different bills to Con-
gress that would open the door to false positives being transferred from civilian
prosecutors to the military justice system, which has long failed to hold perpe-
trators accountable. Under the bills, the military justice system would also han-
dle other past and possible future human rights abuses by military personnel, as
well as other serious crimes such as conspiring with paramilitaries or gangs to
traffic drugs. One of the bills would authorize the security forces to use lethal
force against civilians in a dangerously broad range of situations. 
The bills are similar to a constitutional change to the military justice system that
the Santos administration pushed through Congress in December 2012, which
the Constitutional Court subsequently struck down on procedural grounds in Oc-
tober 2013. 
In June 2012, the government secured Congressional approval of the Legal
Framework for Peace constitutional amendment, which paves the way for wide-
spread impunity for atrocities by guerrillas, paramilitaries, and the military if a
peace agreement is reached with the FARC. The amendment empowers Congress
to limit the scope of prosecutions of atrocities to individuals found “most re-
sponsible”—a category the amendment does not define—and provide statutory
immunity to everyone else. 
While the amendment also enabled Congress to fully suspend prison sentences
for all guerrillas, paramilitaries, and military personnel convicted of atrocities,
the Constitutional Court ruled in August 2013 that those “most responsible” for
crimes against humanity could not have their penalties fully suspended. How-
ever, the amendment still allows for “alternative penalties,” and in April, Colom-
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bia’s attorney general proposed that top FARC commanders could receive an al-
ternative penalty of community service instead of going to prison. 
Internal Displacement and Land Restitution
More than 5.7 million Colombians have been internally displaced since 1985, ac-
cording to government figures. The government registered more than 220,000
newly displaced people in 2013. 
The government’s implementation of land restitution under the Victims Law con-
tinues to be slow. The law was enacted in 2011 to restore millions of hectares of
stolen and abandoned land to internally displace persons (IDPs). The govern-
ment initially estimated that by the end of 2015 there would be judicial rulings in
more than 150,000 land restitution cases under the Victims Law. 
However, as of September 2014, the government had obtained land restitution
rulings for just 1,546 of the nearly 68,000 claims it had received. As of Septem-
ber 2013, the government could only confirm three cases of families who had re-
turned to live on their land due to rulings under the law. At time of writing, the
land restitution office had not provided updated data on the number families
who have returned to live on their land as result of the law. 
IDPs face threats and violence for attempting to reclaim their land. No one has
been held accountable for the majority of killings of land restitution claimants
and leaders. 
Gender-Based Violence
Gender-based violence (GBV) is widespread in Colombia. Lack of training and
poor implementation of protocols create obstacles for women and girls seeking
post-violence care, with the result that victims may face delays in accessing es-
sential medical services. Perpetrators of GBV crimes are rarely brought to justice. 
In June, the government enacted a law to improve access to justice and protec-
tion for sexual violence survivors, especially those who are raped or assaulted in
the context of the internal armed conflict. 
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Violence against Human Rights Defenders, Journalists, 
and Trade Unionists
Rights advocates and journalists continue to be targeted for threats and attacks.
The FLIP, a respected Colombian nongovernmental organization (NGO) that mon-
itors press freedoms, reported 2 journalists killed and 75 threatened in 2013,
and 58 victims of such threats between January and September 2014. 
The National Labor School (ENS), Colombia’s leading labor rights NGO, contin-
ues to report killings of trade unionists. As of September 2014, the special pros-
ecutorial unit dedicated to anti-union violence had opened investigations into
more than 110 cases of trade unionist killings committed since 2009, but ob-
tained convictions in just 9 of them. 
The Inspector-General’s Office continued its disciplinary investigation against
Congressman Iván Cepeda, a prominent victim’s rights advocate, for collecting
information about possible paramilitary abuses and submitting it to justice au-
thorities. The investigation, which relates to Congressman Cepeda’s interviews
of ex-paramilitaries about former President Uribe’s alleged ties to paramilitaries,
appears to be entirely unfounded and could have a chilling effect on others who
seek accountability for human rights abuses. 
The Interior Ministry runs a protection program that covers thousands of at-risk
members of vulnerable groups, including human rights defenders, trade union-
ists, and journalists. 
Key International Actors
The United States remains the most influential foreign actor in Colombia. In
2014, it provided approximately US$225 million in military and police aid, and
$165 million in humanitarian and development aid. A portion of US military aid
is subject to human rights conditions, including a requirement that civilian au-
thorities investigate and try all alleged human rights violations. In September
2014, the State Department certified that Colombia met these conditions, de-
spite the government’s continued promotion of legislation that would place
human rights crimes in military courts, and the recent transfer of some such
cases to the military justice system. The State Department justified its decision
by saying that human rights cases are “generally” prosecuted in civilian courts,
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even though the condition requires that such crimes be subject “only” to civilian
jurisdiction. 
In August, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights published an exten-
sive report on Colombia, which raised serious concerns over the Legal Frame-
work for Peace and military justice system reforms, among other issues. 
The office of the prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) contin-
ues to monitor local investigations into crimes that may fall within the ICC’s juris-
diction. In November 2013, the OTP reported that there is reason to believe that
false positives were committed “pursuant to a policy adopted at least at the
level of certain brigades within the armed forces,” and that it was continuing to




Ahead of the 2015 general election, the government of President Alassane Ouat-
tara made some progress in security sector reform and improving discipline
within the security forces. However, there was insufficient progress in strength-
ening the judiciary, tackling corruption, or pursuing impartial justice for the seri-
ous crimes committed during the 2010-2011 post-election period. The Ivorian
government has failed to arrest any member of the pro-Ouattara Republican
Forces implicated in the post-election violence, undermining hopes for meaning-
ful reconciliation. 
The 2010-2011 crisis capped a decade of conflict and unrest rooted in ethno-
communal tensions and land disputes during which armed groups and security
forces from all sides perpetrated serious human rights abuses with complete im-
punity. International and Ivorian commissions of inquiry found that both sides
committed war crimes and possible crimes against humanity during the 2010-
2011 crisis. 
There were several cross border attacks from Liberia though fewer episodes of
intercommunal violence than in past years. Criminality and banditry by often-vio-
lent armed gangs continued to be a serious problem. Progress on disarmament
was slow and largely benefited pro-Ouattara forces, spurring some protests. 
Members of the security forces continued to be implicated in serious violations,
though the number of incidents decreased compared to past years. Widespread
corruption and plunder, especially by members of the security forces, remain a
serious concern. However, there was some progress in reducing security force
extortion and dismantling illegal checkpoints. 
Côte d’Ivoire’s key partners—the European Union, the United Nations, France,
and the United States—were reluctant to publicly criticize the lack of accounta-
bility for past crimes. The International Criminal Court (ICC) made progress by
way of the investigation of former President Laurent Gbagbo and one of his min-
isters. However, their lack of progress in the investigation of crimes by pro-Ouat-
tara forces drew criticism. 
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National Justice for Post-Election Violence
Since the end of the crisis, progress toward justice has been largely one-sided.
While Ivorian authorities have charged more than 150 pro-Gbagbo civilian and
military leaders for abuses committed during the 2010-2011 crisis, and convicted
nine in a military court, not one member of Ouattara’s Republican Forces has
been brought to account. 
At the start of the year, the work of the Special Investigative Cell (cellule spéciale
d’enquête, or CSE) was stymied by staff cuts and inadequate logistical support.
Although additional staff was provided in May, the CSE’s work continued to be
hampered by its lack of independence from the government. It has focused pri-
marily on crimes by pro-Gbagbo forces. The civilian courts have yet to hold a trial
for those from any side indicted for crimes related to the post-election period, in
violation of the right to a trial within a reasonable time. 
In 2014, the judiciary provisionally released some 200 pro-Gbagbo defendants,
raising concerns of a de facto amnesty for perpetrators from all sides. In August,
the president pardoned 3,000 prisoners convicted of minor crimes, raising con-
cerns about government interference with the judiciary. 
In February, the president extended the mandate of the Dialogue, Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission. In September, it held three weeks of public hearings.
The commission has been widely criticized for doing little to fulfill its mandate. 
International Criminal Court
In June, the ICC confirmed charges against Laurent Gbagbo, rejecting an appeal
and ordering him to remain in detention until his trial that was scheduled at time
of writing to begin on July 7, 2015. 
In March, Charles Blé Goudé, a former youth minister and leader of a pro-
Gbagbo militia, was surrendered to the ICC by Ivorian authorities after being
transferred to Côte d’Ivoire from Ghana, where he had fled in 2011. At year’s end,
ICC judges were deliberating as to whether there was enough evidence to send
his case to trial; if so, prosecutors have asked to combine Blé Goudé’s and Lau-
rent Gbagbo’s cases into one trial. 
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Simone Gbagbo, charged by the ICC with four counts of crimes against humanity,
remained in detention in Côte d’Ivoire. In October 2013, the Ivorian government
challenged the admissibility of the ICC’s case on the grounds that she is being
tried on the same charges in domestic courts. On October 22, 2014 Simone
Gbagbo and 82 other pro-Gbagbo defendants were brought before an Ivorian
court on charges pertaining to threats against state security, but the trial was in-
definitely postponed because the defense needed more time to prepare, among
other reasons. 
Security Force Abuses
Members of the security forces including soldiers, gendarmes, and police perpe-
trated numerous serious human rights abuses, including mistreatment and tor-
ture of detainees, sometimes to extract confessions; extrajudicial killings; rape;
and extortion. Several commanders implicated in serious human rights abuses
remain in key positions in the security forces. 
Many abuses were perpetrated in response to security threats. The UN inde-
pendent expert on the situation of human rights in Côte d’Ivoire reported
that soldiers tortured numerous people they had detained in connection with
raids near the Liberian border, while other abuses were perpetrated as they re-
sponded to the threat of armed criminal gangs in Abidjan. 
In recent years, some soldiers were prosecuted for murder and theft in less polit-
ically sensitive cases. However, impunity for other crimes persisted, including
for the July 2012 attack on the Nahibly internally displaced persons camp, which
left at least 12 dead, and for arbitrary detention and torture committed in 2012
following attacks on military installations. 
Investigations into numerous other crimes by soldiers were blocked largely due
to a legal requirement that the Ministry of Defense sign the prosecutorial order
before an investigation can begin, resulting in soldiers credibly implicated in
crimes being protected from inquiries. 
The government took steps to combat widespread extortion and racketeering at
checkpoints manned by the security forces and other armed groups. Some unau-
thorized checkpoints were dismantled and the military courts prosecuted sev-
eral members of the security forces and pro-government militia for extortion and
WORLD REPORT 2015
176
racketeering. Progress was also made in removing soldiers from properties they
had illegally seized during the crisis. But the security forces’ ability to protect the
population from armed bandits, particularly in the morth, was hampered by in-
adequate personnel and resources.
Land Rights 
Land disputes, particularly in western Côte d’Ivoire, have underscored over a
decade of instability and conflict. They remain largely unresolved. 
Extreme violence during the post-election crisis forced hundreds of thousands of
people to seek refuge in neighboring countries or elsewhere in Côte d’Ivoire.
Many displaced returned home to find their land illegally occupied or sold, vio-
lating their property rights and rights as returning refugees. By mid-2014, over
half of returning refugees were homeless according to the UN High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
In 2013, the Ivorian government passed several reforms to land tenure and na-
tionality laws, but the government’s failure to fund or staff local administrative
and judiciary structures to implement the reforms undermined their ability to re-
solve land disputes. 
Disarmament and Security Sector Reform
Spurred on by concerns related to potential violence during the 2015 presiden-
tial polls, the government made some progress in security sector reform by dis-
arming tens of thousands of former combatants who fought during the crisis. 
As of October, the UN reported over 21,000 former combatants had been dis-
armed, more than 30,000 had benefitted from reinsertion support, and 7,429
weapons had been collected. However, disarmament has been one-sided,
mostly benefitting forces loyal to President Ouattara. Only 13 percent of those
disarmed were combatants affiliated with Gbagbo and large numbers of benefi-
ciaries were not listed in the national Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reinte-
gration database. Demonstrations by former combatants in western Côte d’Ivoire
in February and March turned violent. 
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The government made some progress in returning basic security functions from
the military to the police and gendarmerie, though the military continue to man
checkpoints and at times act as first responders to security threats. In Novem-
ber, thousands of soldiers at several military bases, including Abdijan, Daloa,
Bouaké, and Korhogo demonstrated over claims of unpaid wages. 
Sexual Violence
High levels of gender-based violence continue. Many of these assaults targeted
children and elderly women. In the first five months of 2014, the UN secretary-
general’s report on the UN Operations in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) reported at least
170 cases of rape, including many gang rapes. 
The government has taken some steps to address the widespread sexual vio-
lence. In September, with UN support, the government launched a national strat-
egy against sexual violence with a strong commitment to prosecute perpetrators.
But the cour d’assises mandated to try such cases rarely functioned. Many seri-
ous cases are downgraded to indecent assault in order to be heard in regular
courts, which carry a more lenient penalty, furthering impunity. Social stigma,
lack of access to justice and the cost of a medical certificate are significant barri-
ers to ensuring accountability for violent sexual crimes. 
Trafficking of women and girls, often from Nigeria, into Côte d’Ivoire for sex work,
continues to be a problem. 
Corruption
The Ivorian government has been slow to combat allegations of corruption,
which continues to be a major problem, undermining the fulfillment of key social
and economic rights such as basic healthcare and education. An anti-corruption
law drafted in 2012 has not been adopted and there is no independent anti-cor-
ruption commission with the power to investigate and prosecute. However, in
April, the Defense Ministry pledged to eliminate thousands of “ghost” soldiers
in the army. 
Since Ouattara assumed power, security forces loyal to him have plundered rev-
enues through smuggling and parallel tax systems on cocoa, timber, diamonds
and other natural resources. The UN Group of Experts, appointed by the UN Se-
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curity Council to monitor the sanctions regime in Cote d’Ivoire, reported in 2014
that commanders are using income from illicit sources for personal enrichment
and as a tool for retaining ex-combatant loyalty. 
LGBTI Rights 
Côte d’Ivoire does not criminalize homosexuality and has traditionally been rela-
tively tolerant, though lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual, and intersex (LGBTI)
people are not protected under the law and can be prosecuted for public acts of
indecency. There were a few violent attacks on LGBTI activists in Abidjan in 2014,
with little accountability for those responsible. 
In January, a series of attacks by mobs on Alternative-CI, a local non-profit work-
ing on LGBTI rights and HIV prevention, culminated in an attack on their Abidjan
office. Police intervened and escorted the activists to safety, but failed to launch
an investigation into the incident. Alternative-CI’s director had been targeted a
few days earlier at his home. 
In April, Cote d’Ivoire’s Universal Periodic Review raised some key human rights
recommendations. Cote d’Ivoire rejected all those relating to the prevention of
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. 
Key International Actors
Côte d’Ivoire’s partners largely failed to prioritize the importance of impartial
justice. The UN’s independent expert on human rights published two reports
highlighting continued security force abuses, the prevalence of sexual violence,
and the need for reparations. He also raised concern that provisional releases of
perpetrators of crimes committed during the crisis amounted to a de facto
amnesty, saying that reconciliation and justice cannot be separated.
In June, the Human Rights Council passed a resolution maintaining the mandate
of an independent expert on Cote d’Ivoire, but, at the request of the Ivorian gov-
ernment, imposed changes both of the expert in charge, and of the mandate,
which now prioritizes technical cooperation. On April 29, the UN lifted an em-
bargo on the sale and export of diamonds, in place since 2005, and relaxed its
arms embargo, reflecting improvements in security. The UNOCI began scaling
179
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
down its mission, including the planned elimination of the rule of law compo-
nent. 
The EU, France, and the US continued to take the lead on justice and security




In 2010 and 2011, Cuba’s government released dozens of political prisoners on
condition that they accept exile in exchange for freedom. Since then, the Cuban
government has relied less on long-term prison sentences to punish dissent and
has relaxed draconian travel restrictions that divided families and prevented its
critics from leaving and returning to the island. 
Nevertheless, the Cuban government continues to repress individuals and
groups who criticize the government or call for basic human rights. Officials em-
ploy a range of tactics to punish dissent and instill fear in the public, including
beatings, public acts of shaming, termination of employment, and threats of
long-term imprisonment. 
Short-term arbitrary arrests have increased dramatically in recent years and rou-
tinely prevent human rights defenders, independent journalists, and others from
gathering or moving about freely. 
Arbitrary Detentions and Short-Term Imprisonment
The government continues to rely on arbitrary detention to harass and intimidate
individuals who exercise their fundamental rights. The Cuban Commission for
Human Rights and National Reconciliation (CCDHRN)—an independent human
rights group the government views as illegal—received over 7,188 reports of arbi-
trary detentions from January through August 2014, a sharp increase from ap-
proximately 2,900 in 2013 and 1,100 in 2010 during the same time period. 
Security officers virtually never present arrest orders to justify the detention of
critics and threaten them with criminal sentences if they continue to participate
in “counterrevolutionary” activities. In some cases, detainees are released after
receiving official warnings, which prosecutors can then use in subsequent crimi-
nal trials to show a pattern of delinquent behavior. Dissidents said these warn-
ings aim to discourage them from participating in activities seen as critical of the
government. 
Detention is often used preemptively to prevent individuals from participating in
peaceful marches or meetings to discuss politics. In the days leading up to the
summit meeting of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
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(CELAC), for example, which took place in Havana on January 28 and 29, 2014, at
least 40 people were arbitrarily detained, and 5 held under house arrest until the
conference had ended, according to the CCDHRN. 
Members of the Damas de Blanco (Ladies in White)—a group founded by the
wives, mothers, and daughters of political prisoners and which the government
considers illegal—are routinely detained before or after they attend Sunday
mass. On May 4, for example, more than 80 women were detained before at-
tending mass throughout the island. On July 13, 129 members of the group were
detained as they prepared to attend commemorative ceremonies honoring
Cubans who died attempting to leave the island in 1994. 
Detainees are often beaten, threatened, and held incommunicado for hours and
even days. The former political prisoner Guillermo Fariñas, who was placed
under house arrest for the duration of the CELAC conference and then arrested
when he attempted to leave home, reported suffering two broken ribs and other
injuries as a result of a beating he received while in detention. Yilenni Aguilera
Santos, a member of the Damas de Blanco movement in Holguín, reported suf-
fering a miscarriage when security agents subjected her to a severe beating after
arresting her on her way to mass on June 22. 
Political Prisoners
Cubans who criticize the government may face criminal prosecution. They do not
benefit from due process guarantees, such as the right to fair and public hear-
ings by a competent and impartial tribunal. In practice, courts are “subordi-
nated” to the executive and legislative branches, denying meaningful judicial
independence. Political prisoners are routinely denied parole after completing
the minimum required sentence as punishment for refusing to participate in
mandatory ideological activities, such as “reeducation” classes. 
Scores of political prisoners remain in Cuban prisons according to local human
rights groups. These groups estimate that there are more political prisoners
whose cases they cannot document because the government prevents inde-
pendent national or international human rights groups from accessing its pris-
ons. Iván Fernández Depestre, a member of the Frente Nacional de Resistencia
Cívica Orlando Zapata Tamayo, was detained in July 2013 while participating in a
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public protest. Three days later, he was convicted of “dangerousness” in a
closed, summary trial, and given a three-year prison sentence. 
Freedom of Expression
The government controls all media outlets in Cuba and tightly restricts access to
outside information, severely limiting the right to freedom of expression. Only a
very small fraction of Cubans are able to read independent websites and blogs
because of the high cost of, and limited access to, the Internet. While people in
cities like Havana, Santiago de Cuba, or Santa Clara have access to the Internet,
people in more rural areas are not able to go online. 
A May 2013 government decree directed at expanding Internet access stipulates
that the Internet cannot be used for activities that undermine “public security,
the integrity, the economy, independence, and national security” of Cuba—
broadly worded conditions that could be used against government critics. 
A small number of independent journalists and bloggers manage to write articles
for websites or blogs, or publish tweets. Yet those who publish information con-
sidered critical of the government are sometimes subject to smear campaigns,
attacks, and arbitrary arrests, as are artists and academics who demand greater
freedoms. 
In May 2014, blogger Yoani Sanchez launched the website 14ymedio, Cuba’s first
independent online newspaper. Within hours, the site was hacked, and visitors
were directed to a page dedicated to scathing criticisms of Sanchez. The site was
restored the following day, but blocked again several days later, and has re-
mained inaccessible to Internet users within Cuba ever since. 
In May 2013, the director of the government-run Casa de las Americas cultural in-
stitute, Roberto Zurbano, published an article in the New York Times highlighting
persistent inequality and prejudice affecting Afro-Cubans. He was subsequently
attacked in the government-controlled press and demoted to a lesser job at the
institute. 
Travel Restrictions and Family Separation
Reforms to travel regulations that went into effect in January 2013 eliminate the
need for an exit visa to leave the island, which had previously been used to deny
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the right to travel to people critical of the government and their families. Since
then, many people who had been previously denied permission to travel have
been able to do so, including human rights defenders and independent blog-
gers. 
Nonetheless, the reform included very broad discretionary powers that allow the
government to restrict the right to travel on the grounds of “defense and national
security” or “other reasons of public interest,” allowing the authorities to deny
exit to people who express dissent. For example, authorities have repeatedly de-
nied Manuel Cuesta Morúa the right to travel abroad since he attempted to or-
ganize a parallel summit to the CELAC conference in January 2014. 
The government also continues to arbitrarily deny Cubans living abroad the right
to visit the island. In August 2013, the Cuban government denied Blanca Reyes, a
Damas de Blanco member living in exile in Spain, permission to travel to Cuba to
visit her ailing 93-year-old father, who died in October before she could visit him. 
The government restricts the movement of citizens within Cuba through a 1997
law known as Decree 217. Designed to limit migration to Havana, the decree re-
quires that Cubans obtain government permission before moving to the coun-
try’s capital. It is often used to prevent dissidents from traveling there to attend
meetings and to harass dissidents from other parts of Cuba who live in the capi-
tal. 
Prison Conditions
Prisons are overcrowded, and unhygienic and unhealthy conditions lead to ex-
tensive malnutrition and illness. Prisoners are forced to work 12-hour days and
punished if they do not meet production quotas, according to former political
prisoners. Inmates have no effective complaint mechanism to seek redress, and
those who criticize the government, or engage in hunger strikes and other forms
of protest, are subjected to extended solitary confinement, beatings, restrictions
on family visits, and denial of medical care. 
While the government allowed select members of the foreign press to conduct
controlled visits to a handful of prisons in April 2013, it continues to deny inter-




Human Rights Defenders 
The Cuban government still refuses to recognize human rights monitoring as a
legitimate activity and denies legal status to local human rights groups. Mean-
while, government authorities harass, assault, and imprison human rights de-
fenders who attempt to document abuses. 
Key International Actors
The United States’ economic embargo of Cuba, in place for more than half a cen-
tury, continues to impose indiscriminate hardship on the Cuban people and has
done nothing to improve the country’s human rights record. The UN General As-
sembly has repeatedly called for an end to the US embargo on Cuba. In October
2014, 188 of the 192 member countries voted for a resolution condemning the
embargo. 
In 2009, US President Barack Obama enacted reforms to eliminate restrictions
on travel and remittances by Cuban Americans to Cuba, restrictions put in place
during the administration of President George W. Bush in 2004. In 2011, Presi-
dent Obama used his executive powers to ease “people-to-people” travel restric-
tions, allowing religious, educational, and cultural groups from the US to travel
to Cuba. However, in 2012 the Obama administration established additional re-
quirements for “people-to-people” licenses, which has reduced the frequency of
such trips. 
The European Union (EU) continues to retain its “Common Position” on Cuba,
adopted in 1996, which conditions full EU economic cooperation with Cuba on
the country’s transition to a pluralist democracy and respect for human rights.
However, after a meeting in April 2014 in Havana, European Union and Cuban
delegates agreed on establishing a road map for “normalizing” relations. EU offi-
cials indicated that concerns about civil liberties and democratic participation
would continue to influence EU policy towards Cuba. 
At the Organization of American States General Assembly in June, governments
throughout the region called for the attendance of Cuba at the next Summit of
the Americas in Panama in 2015. 
Former US Agency for International Development contractor Alan Gross remains
in prison despite a UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention report in November
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2012 that called for his immediate release. Gross was detained in Cuba in De-
cember 2009 and later sentenced to 15 years in prison for distributing telecom-
munications equipment to religious groups. The working group said Gross’s
detention was arbitrary and that Cuba’s government had failed to provide suffi-
cient evidence to support the charges against him. 
In November 2013, Cuba was re-elected to a seat on the United Nations Human
Rights Council (UNHRC), defeating Uruguay for a regional position despite its
poor human rights record and its consistent efforts to undermine important
council work. As a UNHRC member, Cuba regularly voted to prevent scrutiny of
serious human rights situations around the world, opposing resolutions spot-
lighting abuses in North Korea, Syria, Iran, Sri Lanka, Belarus, and Ukraine.
Cuba, however, supported the landmark resolution on sexual orientation and
gender identity adopted by the council in September 2014. 
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Democratic Republic Of Congo 
In late 2013, there was a period of optimism that armed violence and attacks on
civilians might decrease in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, following the
defeat of the abusive M23 armed group, and the subsequent surrender of com-
batants from other armed groups. But in 2014, the government made little
progress in capitalizing on these opportunities to improve security for civilians in
the east. 
The M23, whose fighters carried out widespread war crimes during its 19-month
rebellion, was defeated in November 2013 after international pressure on the
group’s Rwandan backers and the deployment of a United Nations “intervention
brigade” to conduct offensive operations against armed groups and strengthen
the MONUSCO peacekeeping mission. Several thousand fighters from other
armed groups surrendered in the weeks that followed. But the government
stalled in implementing a new Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
(DDR) program for former combatants, and there were few efforts made to bring
to justice M23 and other armed group leaders implicated in abuses. Numerous
armed groups remain active and their fighters continue to carry out brutal at-
tacks on civilians. Government security forces also committed serious abuses
against civilians. 
Abuses by Security Forces
In the capital, Kinshasa, the Congolese police launched “Operation Likofi” in No-
vember 2013 to remove gang members known as “kuluna” from the streets. Dur-
ing the operation, the police extrajudicially executed at least 51 young men and
boys and forcibly disappeared 33 others. Police dragged some of victims out of
their houses at night and shot them dead before taking their bodies away. 
In October and November 2013, as the army moved into territories previously
controlled by the M23 in eastern Congo, soldiers raped at least 41 women and
girls. Soldiers and intelligence officers in Rutshuru arbitrarily arrested several






State Neglect of Former Combatants
Over 100 former combatants from various armed groups in eastern Congo, their
wives and children died from starvation and disease in Kotakoli, a remote mili-
tary camp in Congo’s Equateur province, after government officials failed to pro-
vide them with adequate food and health care. The victims were part of a group
of 941 former combatants and their dependents sent to Kotakoli in September
2013 after they had voluntarily surrendered. 
Conditions were also difficult for former combatants in the east. After the M23’s
defeat, several thousand fighters from more than 20 armed groups surrendered.
But the surrender rate quickly slowed as former fighters languished in squalid
conditions at a regroupment site in Bweremana, North Kivu. Tired of waiting and
receiving mixed messages from the government, many fighters and their leaders
left. 
Plans for the government’s new “DDR III” program were finalized in June, but im-
plementation was delayed as wrangling continued among the government,
donors, and MONUSCO about the program’s funding. 
Attacks on Civilians by Armed Groups
Numerous armed groups carried out brutal attacks on civilians in eastern Congo,
including in North and South Kivu, Katanga, and Orientale provinces. Mai Mai
Sheka fighters—led by Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, sought on a Congolese arrest war-
rant for crimes against humanity—killed, mutilated, and raped civilians in North
Kivu. In September and October 2013, Sheka fighters abducted at least 20
schoolchildren, marched them through the forest, and killed those who were too
tired or weak. In late 2013, Raia Mutomboki combatants hacked to death by ma-
chete or shot dead at least 21 Hutu civilians in Masisi, North Kivu. In June, armed
assailants killed at least 30 people in Mutarule, South Kivu, including many who
were attending an outdoor church service. Congolese soldiers and MONUSCO
peacekeepers stationed nearby were aware of the attack but failed to intervene. 
In January, the army began operations in Beni territory, North Kivu, against the
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an armed group made up of Congolese and
Ugandan fighters who have killed and kidnapped numerous civilians. During a
spate of attacks in October and November, over 100 civilians were killed in Beni.
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Many were hacked to death by machetes and axes. At time of writing, it re-
mained unclear who was responsible for the attacks. 
In September, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) at-
tacked Buruko, North Kivu, killing three adults and two children. The FDLR is a
largely Rwandan Hutu armed group, some of whose members participated in the
1994 genocide in Rwanda. FDLR combatants have been responsible for wide-
spread war crimes in eastern Congo, including ethnic massacres and mass
rapes. Soon after the M23’s defeat, and following indications that military opera-
tions might be launched against them, the FDLR leadership announced they
were going to lay down their weapons. In May and June, nearly 200 FDLR combat-
ants surrendered. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
(ICGLR), a regional grouping of 12 countries, gave the FDLR a six-month deadline
to disarm before the Congolese army and MONUSCO would launch military oper-
ations. 
Freedom of Expression and Peaceful Assembly
State agents arbitrarily detained and threatened Virunga National Park rangers
and activists after they criticized plans for oil exploration by SOCO International,
a British oil company. On April 15, unidentified armed men shot and seriously
wounded the park’s director, Emmanuel de Mérode. In April and May, two fisher-
men were found dead hours after they had criticized SOCO’s activities in the park
and argued with soldiers who work alongside SOCO. 
Political tensions increased with protests across the country against proposals
to change Congo’s constitution and allow President Joseph Kabila to run for a
third term. On several occasions, authorities blocked the activities of Vital
Kamerhe, president of one of Congo’s main opposition parties, the Union for the
Congolese Nation (UNC). During an opposition rally in Bukavu in February, at
least 25 civilians were injured when police beat protesters and fired teargas and
live bullets at the crowd. In September, six demonstrators and several student
bystanders were injured when police fired teargas and beat opposition support-
ers during a march in Goma. 
On August 5, UNC Secretary-General Bertrand Ewanga was arrested after giving a
speech at an opposition rally. Following an apparently politically motivated trial
with numerous irregularities, Ewanga was convicted by Congo’s Supreme Court
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and sentenced to one year in prison for insulting the president, the prime minis-
ter, and both presidents of parliament. 
Justice and Accountability
A draft Congolese law to establish specialized mixed chambers to try war crimes
and crimes against humanity committed in Congo since the 1990s was adopted
by the Council of Ministers on April 22 and presented to the National Assembly
on May 2. The proposed chambers would benefit initially from the presence of
non-Congolese staff. Citing technical concerns, members of parliament rejected
the admissibility of the text on May 8. Government officials have said they will
correct the technical errors and resubmit the draft law to parliament. 
A year after the mass rape of at least 76 women and girls by soldiers in and
around Minova, Congo’s Military Operational Court opened a trial on November
20, 2013, for 39 soldiers, including five high-ranking officers, on charges of war
crimes and other offenses. On May 5, the verdict was announced, with only two
low-ranking soldiers convicted of rape. 
On March 7, the International Criminal Court (ICC) found Germain Katanga guilty
of war crimes and crimes against humanity for being an accomplice in murders
and an attack on civilians in Bogoro, Ituri, on February 24, 2003. On May 23, he
was sentenced to 12 years in prison. Katanga is the former chief of staff of the
Patriotic Resistance Front in Ituri (FRPI). Katanga decided not to appeal the deci-
sion and issued an apology to the victims. 
On June 9, the ICC confirmed 18 charges of war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity committed in northeastern Congo in 2002 and 2003 against Bosco Nta-
ganda, a former Congolese military commander and leader of various
Rwandan-backed armed groups in Congo since the late 1990s. Ntaganda had
surrendered to the United States embassy in Rwanda in March 2013 and was
transferred to The Hague. 
The ICC arrest warrant for war crimes against Gen. Sylvestre Mudacumura, the






Since the M23’s defeat, there has been minimal progress in implementing the
“Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of
Congo and the Region” (also known as the “Framework Agreement”), signed by
11 African countries in February 2013, under the auspices of the UN secretary-
general. 
The Congolese government passed an amnesty law in February for insurrectional
acts, acts of war, and political infractions committed between 2006 and 2013.
The amnesty does not apply to grave international and human rights crimes. 
Many of the M23 leaders responsible for serious human rights abuses remain in
Rwanda and Uganda, including over a dozen who are sought on Congolese ar-
rest warrants. They are effectively shielded from justice, despite commitments
made by the Rwandan and Ugandan governments to support regional justice ef-
forts and to neither harbor nor protect people accused of war crimes or crimes
against humanity. 
In July, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Algerian diplomat Said
Djinnit as UN special envoy for the Great Lakes region, succeeding former Presi-
dent of Ireland Mary Robinson. US Special Envoy Russ Feingold continues to play
an important role in pressing regional countries to respect their commitments in
the Framework Agreement. 
Following a high-level Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict in Lon-
don in June, President Kabila appointed Jeanine Mabunda as presidential ad-
viser on sexual violence and child recruitment in Congo. In August, the





The administration of President Rafael Correa has expanded state control over
media and civil society. In 2014, tactics included criminal defamation prosecu-
tions and administrative sanctions against critical journalists and media outlets,
and aggressive efforts to discredit human rights advocates within the country. 
In September, security forces used excessive force to disperse largely peaceful
demonstrations in Quito, subjecting demonstrators and bystanders to serious
physical abuse. The government has also used broad counterterrorism legisla-
tion to prosecute protesters and indigenous leaders who have challenged ex-
tractive industry projects. In December 2013, it arbitrarily shut down a prominent
nongovernmental organization (NGO) dedicated to promoting indigenous and
environmental rights. 
A judicial council made up almost entirely of former members of the Correa ad-
ministration has appointed and removed hundreds of judges through highly
questionable methods, posing a serious threat to judicial independence. 
In October, the Constitutional Court ruled that Congress could initiate a process
to amend 16 articles of the constitution, including reforms that would grant the
armed forces powers to participate in public security operations, grant the gov-
ernment broad regulatory powers over “communications” by calling them a
“public service,” and allow for unlimited re-election of the president. 
Other ongoing problems include poor prison conditions and women’s and girls’
limited access to reproductive health care. 
Excessive Use of Force Against Protesters
In September, security force response to largely peaceful demonstrations in
Quito included many instances of excessive force and arbitrary detention of pro-
testers and bystanders. Dozens of detainees suffered serious physical abuse, in-
cluding severe beatings, kicks, and electric shocks, during arrest and detention.
A minority of protesters engaged in violence, clashing with police and leaving
more than 30 officers injured. 
Within 24 hours of being detained, more than 100 detainees were brought be-
fore judges and charged with offenses such as attacking or resisting authority
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and damaging public or private property. Detainees were not informed of the
charges against them before the hearings and had no contact with family mem-
bers or lawyers until immediately before the hearings. 
The government responded to reports and allegations of abuse by publicly con-
gratulating the National Police on their role during the protests, threatening to
prosecute lawyers who reported human rights violations, and challenging media
outlets that published information on the abuses. 
Freedom of Expression
A 2013 Communications Law gives the government broad powers to limit free
speech. The law requires that all information disseminated by media be “veri-
fied” and “precise,” opening the door to censorship by allowing the government
to decide what information meets these vague criteria. It also prohibits “media
lynching,” defined as “repeatedly disseminating information with the purpose of
discrediting or harming the reputation of a person or entity.” And it prohibits
censorship, which it defines to include the failure of private media outlets to
cover issues that the government considers to be of “public interest.” In Septem-
ber 2014, the Constitutional Court rejected key challenges to the constitutional-
ity of the law. 
The Superintendency of Information and Communication, a government regula-
tory body created by the Communications Law, has repeatedly ordered media
outlets and journalists to rectify or publicly apologize for publishing information
and opinions it considers to be untruthful. For example, in January, it ordered a
cartoonist known as Bonil to “amend” a cartoon that depicted police searching
the house of a journalist who had been convicted of defaming Correa. The Super-
intendency also ordered the newspaper that had published the cartoon, El Uni-
verso, to pay a fine of approximately US$140,000. 
A new criminal code that entered into force in August 2014 eliminates several
defamation provisions, but retains slander, a criminal charge used repeatedly by
Correa to target his critics. In January, the National Court of Justice upheld the
conviction for slander of Cléver Jiménez, an opposition legislator; Carlos




The three had asked the attorney general to investigate Correa for allegedly or-
dering an armed assault on a hospital during a September 2010 police mutiny
that the government considered an attempted coup. The court sentenced
Jiménez and Villavicencio to 18 months in prison, and Figueroa to 6 months. It
ordered them to publicly apologize to the president and pay him approximately
$145,000. Figueroa was arrested in July, while Jiménez and Villavicencio re-
mained at large at time of writing. 
The Correa government frequently requires private media outlets to transmit offi-
cial broadcasts responding to unfavorable news coverage or opinions. For exam-
ple, in December 2013, it required radio stations to interrupt their morning news
programs to air an official broadcast responding to critical statements by Sister
Elsie Monge of the Ecumenical Commission of Human Rights. The broadcast said
that in “no cases” had Ecuador violated human rights. 
Online service providers have blocked videos, photos, and accounts criticizing
the Correa administration after a firm in Spain claimed they violated US copy-
right laws. Even though Ecuadorian authorities have denied involvement, the no-
tices sent to request the takedowns state that the firm represented Ecuadorian
state actors. In October 2013, YouTube blocked access for several weeks to a
documentary purporting to show harassment of the Íntag community for its op-
position to mining activities in the area. The firm in Spain argued that using im-
ages from Ecuador’s public TV violated copyright law. 
Judicial Independence
Corruption, inefficiency, and political influence have plagued Ecuador’s judiciary
for years. With a popular mandate following a 2011 referendum, the Correa ad-
ministration initiated a sweeping judicial reform process to address these
chronic problems. As a part of this process, however, the Council of the Judiciary
appointed and removed hundreds of judges, including all magistrates of the Na-
tional Court of Justice, through highly questionable mechanisms that undermine
judicial independence. 
A report published in July by three international NGOs—the Due Process of Law
Foundation, Dejusticia, and the Institute for Legal Defense—documented routine
executive interference with judicial decisions, misuse of the penal system to tar-
get individuals who question the government’s policies, and misuse of the judi-
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ciary’s internal disciplinary system to sanction judges whose rulings were incon-
sistent with the Correa administration’s policies. 
Disproportionate Criminal Charges against Protesters
Sweeping provisions of the “sabotage and terrorism” chapter in the criminal
code have been repeatedly applied by prosecutors against protesters. The provi-
sions have been used to convict more than 100 people for participating in al-
legedly violent protest activity during the police mutiny in September 2010. 
In March 2014, María Alejandra Cevallos, a university student, was sentenced to
four years in prison. Cevallos was one of several protesters who was accused of
forcibly entering the offices of the public television channel during the mutiny—
after the government had ordered all the other stations to transmit its program-
ming—to demand an opportunity to speak to the public. Another student was
sentenced to two years in prison as an accomplice because “with his applause
he externalized his general agreement with the [group’s] actions.” 
In April, three women protesting with other mostly female demonstrators outside
a prison in Quito against a prisoner’s transfer were detained and charged under
the sabotage and terrorism provisions. According to a police report, the protest-
ers had “shouted ‘torturer’ at [the interior minister] and for this reason the minis-
ter ordered the immediate detention of three citizens.” The three women spent
18 days in prison before a prosecutor dropped the charges. 
Human Rights Defenders and Civil Society Organizations
In 2013, President Correa issued a sweeping executive decree that grants the
government broad powers to intervene in NGO operations, including dissolving
groups on the grounds that they have “compromise[d] public peace” or have en-
gaged in activities that are different from the activities they identified when reg-
istering with the government. 
In December 2013, the government dissolved the Pachamama Foundation, an
NGO that had engaged in environmental and human rights advocacy for more
than 16 years, on the grounds that several of its members had allegedly partici-
pated in a violent demonstration against oil drilling in the Amazon region.
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Pachamama was not given advanced notice of the dissolution, and its legal chal-
lenges to the order were all rejected. 
The government has routinely sought to discredit civil society groups by accusing
them of seeking to destabilize the government. In April, Correa accused mem-
bers of Yasunidos, a grassroots environmental group, of being liars, incoherent,
and “rock throwers.” Yasunidos had collected more than 700,000 signatures for
a referendum on whether the Yasuni National Park in the Amazon should be
opened to further oil exploration. 
Accountability for Past Abuses
Efforts to hold Ecuadoran officials to account for human rights violations com-
mitted from 1984 to 2008 continued to make slow progress. In 2014, a court
ruled that statutes of limitations do not apply to gross human rights violations,
and Edgar Vaca, a key former police commander accused of committing crimes
against humanity during León Febres Cordero’s presidency (1984-1988), was de-
tained in the United States. His extradition was pending at time of writing. 
In 2010, a special prosecutorial unit was formed to investigate 118 cases involv-
ing 456 victims (including 68 victims of extrajudicial execution and 17 of en-
forced disappearance) documented by a truth commission created by the Correa
administration. At time of writing, prosecutors had brought charges in seven
cases, including two in which suspects were convicted and one in which they
were acquitted. 
Reproductive Rights
The right to seek an abortion is limited to instances in which the woman’s health
or life is at risk or when pregnancies result from the rape of a “woman with a
mental disability.” Fear of prosecution drives some women and girls to have ille-
gal and unsafe abortions, and impedes health care and post-rape services for
victims of sexual violence. Fear of prosecution also hinders detection and pre-
vention of sexual and gender-based violence. One in four women over 15 years





According to the latest available official statistics, from 2013, Ecuador has nearly
55,000 registered refugees, the largest number of any Latin American country.
Most are Colombians fleeing armed conflict. 
In September, the Constitutional Court ruled that several provisions of a 2012
presidential decree regulating asylum procedures were unconstitutional. The
court ruled that the decree’s definition of “refugee” was too narrow and was in-
consistent with the definition set forth in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on
Refugees. It also extended the deadline to file an asylum request to three
months after the petitioner’s entry, and provided additional protections for ap-
peal of asylum decisions, stating that refugees cannot be returned until a judge
has made a final decision on the case. 
The ruling, however, upheld other problematic provisions of the decree, includ-
ing unfair procedures for determining which asylum claims should be deemed
“manifestly unfounded,” and overly broad powers to revoke refugee status. 
Prison Conditions
Two long-standing problems in Ecuador are prison overcrowding and poor prison
conditions. Since 2012, the government has invested millions of dollars to con-
struct new detention centers. Yet the distant location of these centers and their
strict and limited visitation rules impede prisoners’ contact with family mem-
bers. Visitors reportedly have been subjected to vaginal and anal inspections. 
Key International Actors
Ecuador, with the support of members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas
(ALBA), continued to engage in an international campaign to undermine the in-
dependence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, especially the
office of its special rapporteur on freedom of expression. The government failed
to participate in public hearings on Ecuador convened by the commission, and
announced it would not comply with precautionary measures ordered by it. In
January, Correa suggested again that Ecuador might leave the Inter-American
Human Rights system. 
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The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), a German political party foundation, shut their offices
in Ecuador in September. USAID stated that this was a “result of the Government
of Ecuador’s decision to prohibit approval of new USAID assistance programs,”
while KAS cited the “increasing control and influence of the government in the




Egypt’s human rights crisis, the most serious in the country’s modern history,
continued unabated throughout 2014. The government consolidated control
through constriction of basic freedoms and a stifling campaign of arrests target-
ing political opponents. Former Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who took
office in June, has overseen a reversal of the human rights gains that followed
the 2011 uprising. Security forces and an increasingly politicized judiciary—ap-
parently unnerved by rising armed group attacks—invoked national security to
muzzle nearly all dissent. 
Judges routinely ordered detainees held for months based on little, if any, evi-
dence. Thousands arrested after mass protests in 2013 remained in pretrial de-
tention. Pervasive impunity characterized the government’s response to security
force abuses. Only four officers have faced charges for human rights violations
since July 3, 2013, when the military overthrew President Mohamed Morsy. All
the charges stemmed from one incident in August 2013 in which police tear
gassed a packed prison van, killing 37 detainees. There has been no accounta-
bility for the deaths of more than 1,000 protesters in a series of mostly peaceful
demonstrations in July and August 2013. 
Protester Killings and Impunity 
Security forces used excessive force to disperse protests early in the year. Nearly
20 people, most of them Morsy supporters, died in clashes with police in the
first three days of January. On January 25, the third anniversary of the 2011 upris-
ing, at least 64 demonstrators died in clashes with police in protests throughout
the country.
Outgoing interim president, Adly Mansour, who handed over power to al-Sisi on
June 8, established a presidential fact-finding committee in December 2013 “to
gather information and evidence for the violent events” that accompanied the
June 30 mass protests and July 3 coup that brought down Morsy, Egypt’s first
freely elected president. An executive summary of the commission’s report, re-
leased on November 26, did not recommend that charges be brought against





date did not authorize it to subpoena witnesses or documents, establish individ-
ual criminal liability, or make its findings public. 
In March, Mansour asked the Justice Ministry to open a judicial investigation
into the August 14, 2013, dispersals of pro-Morsy sit-ins at Rab’a and Nahda
squares in Cairo in which more than 800 protesters died. The ministry an-
nounced it would not assign a judge to investigate these events because this
was the prerogative of the prosecutor general, whose office claimed it was al-
ready investigating. 
A March 18 court ruling sentenced a police captain to 10 years in prison and
three lower-ranking officers to one-year suspended sentences for their role in the
tear gas suffocation of 37 protesters in a police van outside Abu Zaabel Prison on
August 18, 2013. An appeals court overturned the convictions on June 7 and re-
ferred the case to the prosecutor general for further investigation. A retrial is
scheduled to begin on January 22, 2015.
Mass Arrests
An Interior Ministry official acknowledged in July 2014 that since Morsy’s ouster
a year earlier authorities had arrested 22,000 people, most if not all suspected
supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to the Egyptian Center for Eco-
nomic and Social Rights, more than 41,000 people were arrested or faced crimi-
nal charges between July 2013 and May 2014. 
Judges routinely renewed detention orders of many of those arrested for months
without charge or trial and convicted many others in mass trials without estab-
lishing individual guilt for criminal offenses. As of July 2014, according to Interior
Ministry data provided to the presidential fact-finding committee, more than
7,000 people arrested in the fallout from Morsy’s removal remained in pretrial
detention.
Those detained include around 29,000 Brotherhood members, including its high
and mid-level leadership, according to the Brotherhood. The arrest campaign ex-
panded in 2014 to include secular and leftist activists on charges that include
protesting without authorization, incitement, “thuggery,” vandalism, blocking
roads, and belonging to banned or “terrorist” groups.
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Due Process Violations and Mass Death Sentences
Egypt’s judiciary exhibited serious procedural deficiencies that deprived de-
tainees of basic due process rights. Though authorities in November 2013 lifted
the state of emergency imposed at the time of Morsy’s removal, judges often re-
newed pretrial detention orders despite a lack of evidence that would warrant
prosecution.
Many trials violated Egyptian law as well as international standards. In March
and April, a criminal court judge in the governorate of Minya handed down
the death penalty to more than 1,200 people allegedly involved in two attacks on
police that resulted in the death of one officer. The judge did not allow the de-
fendants the right to mount a meaningful defense or ensure that all had access
to counsel. 
The first trial, which resulted in 529 death sentences, lasted less than an hour,
and only 74 defendants were present. The court also barred some defense
lawyers from attending. In the second trial, which yielded 683 death sentences,
none of the defendants attended. 
Following legally mandated advice from the grand mufti, Egypt’s top religious au-
thority, the judge confirmed 220 of the death sentences, which the prosecutor
general automatically appealed as required by law. In December, a separate
judge in the governorate of Giza issued preliminary death sentences to 188 peo-
ple accused of attacking a police station in August 2013 and killing 14 police-
men. According to the Brotherhood, 259 of its members, including Supreme
Guide Mohamed Badie, have been sentenced to death since Morsy’s ouster. 
Egypt’s 2014 constitution permits military trials for civilians, and on October 27,
2014, al-Sisi issued a decree expanding military court jurisdiction to cover
crimes that occur on any public, state-owned, or “vital” property. Since the de-
cree, prosecutors have referred at least 455 people—the vast majority of them
Brotherhood members—to military court. In April, a military court sentenced a
social media manager for the online news website Rassd to one year in prison
for helping to leak a tape of remarks by al-Sisi during his time as defense minis-
ter. The court acquitted one Rassd employee and handed down three-year sen-
tences to an army conscript and two other men who remain at large. In May and
September, military courts handed down one-year sentences to 10 people—most
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of them Brotherhood members or allied politicians—for attempting to cross into
Sudan illegally. In November, a military court in Suez sentenced 17 people to be-
tween 5 and 10 years in prison for throwing rocks and incendiary devices at sol-
diers during the violence following Morsy’s removal. 
Torture and Ill-Treatment
At least 90 people died in local police stations and security directorates in the
governorates of Cairo and Giza alone in 2014, according to an investigation by
the Egyptian newspaper Al Watan, which cited statistics from the Justice Min-
istry’s Forensic Medical Authority. That number represented a 38 percent in-
crease from the year before. 
A spokesman for the authority told the newspaper that prison overcrowding had
forced authorities to hold detainees in police stations and other places of tem-
porary detention which were not well ventilated or otherwise properly equipped.
Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that police and prison authorities often
failed to provide proper medical care to prisoners, leading to death. In some
cases of deaths in detention, lawyers and relatives alleged that authorities had
tortured the victim. 
Detainees also described severe beatings during arrest, arrival at police sta-
tions, and transfer between prisons. Scores detained in January protests com-
plained of torture, including electric shocks, to coerce confessions. The Egyptian
Initiative for Personal Rights documented the enforced disappearance and tor-
ture of dozens of civilians in military detention. 
Attacks by Armed Groups 
The security situation deteriorated, particularly in the Sinai, as armed groups tar-
geted security forces, buildings, checkpoints, and vehicles. An Egyptian insur-
gent group, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, announced that it has joined the extremist
group Islamic State (also known as ISIS). Some attacks targeted tourists or indis-
criminately harmed ordinary citizens. At least 892 people—including militants,
civilians and security forces—died in the governorate of North Sinai in 2014, ac-





Freedom of Association, Expression, and Assembly
Egypt’s new constitution contains language that appears to protect free expres-
sion, peaceful assembly, and association, but authorities detained thousands
solely for their peaceful exercise of these rights.
Free Expression
Authorities detained dozens of people for such offences as possessing flyers
with anti-military slogans, rapping in public against the police, or displaying
signs commemorating victims of the Rab’a dispersal. Journalists, academics, for-
mer lawmakers and human rights defenders were among those charged with
crimes or banned from travel outside Egypt. Police arrested three Al Jazeera Eng-
lish journalists, Mohamed Fahmy, Peter Greste, and Baher Mohamed, in late De-
cember 2013, and a court handed down multi-year prison sentences in June 2014
after a trial in which prosecutors failed to present any credible evidence of crimi-
nal wrongdoing.
Free Assembly
A November 2013 law on public assembly allowed the Interior Ministry to ban
and forcefully disperse protests and arrest participants on vague grounds such
as “imped[ing] citizens’ interests.” On April 7, 2014, a court rejected appeals
from April 6 Youth Movement co-founders Ahmed Maher and Mohamed Adel and
activist Ahmed Douma against their three-year sentences for breaking the law.
Authorities also used the law to detain prominent activist Alaa Abdel Fattah and
human rights defenders Mahienour al-Masry and Yara Sallam.
Free Association
In September 2014, al-Sisi signed an amendment to the penal code that man-
dates a life sentence and a fine of 500,000 Egyptian pounds (US$69,900) for
anyone who takes foreign funding to harm the national “interest” or “unity,” a
provision Egyptian rights activists fear will be used against them and other non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). 
Authorities banned the Muslim Brotherhood and declared it a terrorist organiza-
tion in December 2013, following a bomb attack on a Nile Delta police station
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claimed by Ansar Beit al-Maqdis. Authorities put forward no evidence to support
the designation, but in a television statement Deputy Prime Minister Hossam
Eisa cited as justification the 1948 assassination of Egypt’s prime minister and
the alleged torture of Brotherhood opponents during the pro-Morsy sit-ins in July
and August 2013. Authorities froze the assets of more than 1,000 associations
allegedly tied to the Brotherhood, such as the Islamic Medical Association,
which served residents of poor neighborhoods, in addition to dozens of Brother-
hood-affiliated schools. 
On April 28, the Court of Urgent Matters banned activities of the April 6 Youth
Movement and authorized the authorities to shut its headquarters on grounds
that it engaged in espionage and harmed Egypt’s image abroad, based on a
complaint from lawyer Ashraf Said, who said recorded phone calls among April 6
members aired on television “proved” the activists had “conspired against state
institutions.” 
Authorities raided the Alexandria office of the Egyptian Center for Economic and
Social Rights on May 22, briefly arresting at least 15 activists and lawyers and
subjecting them to sexual harassment and beatings. Riot police and military
troops also broke up labor protests and strikes. 
The Social Solidarity Ministry in June 2014 presented a draft law on associations
that would give the government security agencies veto power over NGO activities
as well as their registration and funding. The law would also cripple their capac-
ity to communicate or co-operate with groups abroad.
The Social Solidarity Ministry did not enforce a November 10 deadline for all
NGOs to register under the current Law of Civic Associations and Foundations
(Law 84 of 2002), which would give the government tight control over their activ-
ities. Many Egyptian human rights organizations are currently registered as civil
companies or law firms due to the highly restrictive law. However, several high-
profile human rights defenders left the country fearing arrest and prosecution,
and some groups suspended their activities. The government has pledged to
make the NGOs register. 
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Freedom of Religion and Sectarian Violence 
Egypt’s 2014 constitution guarantees freedom of religion and the rights of mi-
norities, but authorities continued to prosecute writers and activists on charges
of “contempt of religion” and “blasphemy,” including religious minorities and
proclaimed atheists. In June, an appeals court in the governorate of Beni Suef
upheld a five-year sentence in absentia for author Karam Saber, a Muslim con-
victed for contempt of religion in 2013 for his short story collection Where Is
God? Attacks on churches and properties of Christians continued in 2014, and in
many cases authorities failed to intervene. 
Violence and Discrimination against Women
Sexual harassment and assault of women and girls in public spaces continued in
spite of recent government efforts to combat the practice, including arresting
and prosecuting some men for such crimes, which have long been committed
with impunity. 
Egyptian rights groups documented at least nine incidents of mob sexual assault
and harassment in Cairo’s Tahrir Square between June 3 and June 8, 2014, as
demonstrators celebrated al-Sisi’s election. Seven men were eventually handed
sentences ranging to life for the attacks, and interim President Mansour issued a
law on June 5 that for the first time defined and outlawed sexual harassment and
set escalating penalties for different offenses. 
Al-Sisi ordered the formation of a ministerial committee to determine a national
strategy to address harassment. On June 12, the committee met and proposed
plans that included increasing security for women in public squares and gather-
ings, as well as raising awareness about harassment against women through
media campaigns and schools. The committee has not proposed a comprehen-
sive law on violence against women nor a national strategy to implement such a
law.
No law criminalizes domestic violence. Other forms of violence against women,
including child marriage and female genital mutilation (FGM), continued in some
areas, despite laws prohibiting them. On November 20, the country’s first trial
for FGM, which began after a 13-year-old girl died from an allergic reaction to
penicillin, ended in an acquittal for the girl’s father and the doctor who per-
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formed the procedure. The prosecutor appealed the acquittal. Personal status
laws in Egypt continue to discriminate against women in relation to marriage, di-
vorce, child custody, and inheritance. 
LGBT Rights
Authorities arrested more than 95 lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
people between July 2013 and December 2014. On December 7, police raided a
Cairo bathhouse and arrested at least 25 men whom they accused of “practicing
debauchery.” Activists said police used fake online dating profiles to target gay
men and others, including sex workers. 
On September 25, a court sentenced six men to two years in jail with labor for
“committing debauchery.” Earlier in September, prosecutors filed charges of “in-
citing debauchery” against eight men who allegedly participated in a videotaped
same-sex wedding which later circulated on social media. In April, a court sen-
tenced four men to eight years in prison for “debauchery” after finding makeup
and women’s clothing in an apartment where they allegedly held parties. 
Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Migrants 
Egypt violated the rights of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants within its
borders. Syrians represent one of the largest refugee populations, with nearly
140,000 registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). Egypt prevented the UNHCR from registering Palestinians from Syria,
and security officials maintained a restrictive visa and security clearance require-
ment enacted following the ouster of Morsy. In some instances authorities co-
erced refugees from Syria to leave to Lebanon, without assurances they would be
protected there, and to Syria, where they face persecution, detention, and vio-
lence. 
Key International Actors 
The United States welcomed al-Sisi’s election despite the climate of political in-
timidation. Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) strongly
urged the US to normalize relations with al-Sisi’s government despite ongoing
human rights abuses. Washington announced in September 2014 that it would
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deliver 10 Apache attack helicopters earlier placed on hold by Congress to sup-
port counterterrorism efforts in the Sinai. 
According to the White House, US President Barack Obama raised human rights
concerns when he met with al-Sisi during the United Nations General Assembly
in September. Secretary of State John Kerry in April said he was unable to certify
that Egypt was engaged in a “democratic transition” in order to release addi-
tional military aid unrelated to counterterrorism. In December, the US Congress
included new language in the law governing military aid to Egypt that would
allow Kerry to waive the required democracy certification if it is in the interest of
national security. 
The report of the European Union mission to monitor the May presidential elec-
tion noted that “respect for the freedoms of association, assembly and expres-
sion remained areas of concern” and that police used “disproportional force
against peaceful protesters,” resulting in a “chilling impact on the expression of
political dissent.” 
The EU suspended military exports to Egypt in August 2013. In September,
French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said he was “confident” that co-opera-
tion between the countries would increase “in areas that affect security.” 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE pledged more than $18 billion in loans, fuel
subsidies, and grants, in addition to investments in residential and commercial
property. 
The African Union suspended Egypt following the July 2013 coup but reinstated
Egypt’s membership in June, after the constitution had been approved by refer-
endum and al-Sisi took office. 
On May 1, International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutors dismissed a communi-
cation filed by lawyers representing Morsy and his defunct Freedom and Justice
Party seeking ICC jurisdiction in Egypt. The ICC dismissed the declaration on the
grounds that the statement purporting to grant the ICC jurisdiction was not filed




Corruption, poverty, and repression continue to plague Equatorial Guinea under
President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who has been in power since 1979.
Vast oil revenues fund lavish lifestyles for the small elite surrounding the presi-
dent, while a large proportion of the population continues to live in poverty. Mis-
management of public funds and credible allegations of high-level corruption
persist, as do other serious abuses, including torture, arbitrary detention, secret
detention, and unfair trials. 
Throughout the year, President Obiang made sizable donations to international
organizations, hired public relations firms, traveled widely to visit leaders in
other countries, and hosted international events in order to improve his image.
His efforts bore some results: the United Nations secretary-general and other
dignitaries made official visits during the African Union Summit held in June, and
an association of Portuguese-speaking countries in July accepted Equatorial
Guinea’s bid for membership, which the country had pursued for a decade. 
Obiang’s eldest son and possible successor, Teodorin, was indicted in France in
March on money-laundering charges stemming from a long-running investiga-
tion, while the United States agreed to settle its forfeiture claim against Teodorin
in October in a separate case that produced thousands of pages of evidence of
alleged corruption, extortion, and money laundering. To pay the US$30 million
settlement, Teodorin had to sell his Malibu mansion and other US holdings. The
US Justice Department said the seized assets would be used to benefit Equato-
rial Guinea’s people. 
Economic and Social Rights
Equatorial Guinea is among the top five oil producers in sub-Saharan Africa and
has a population of approximately 700,000 people. It is classified as a high-in-
come country by the World Bank. According to the UN 2014 Human Development
Report, the country has a per capita gross domestic product of $37,478.85,
which is the highest wealth ranking of any African country and one of the highest
in the world, yet it ranks 144 out of 187 countries in the Human Development
Index that measures social and economic development. As a result, Equatorial
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Guinea has by far the world’s largest gap of all countries between its per capita
wealth and its human development score. 
Despite the country’s abundant natural resource wealth and government’s obli-
gations to advance the economic and social rights of its citizens, it has directed
little of this wealth to meet their needs. About half of the population lacks ac-
cess to clean water and basic sanitation facilities, according to official 2012 sta-
tistics. Childhood malnutrition, as seen in the percentage of children whose
growth is stunted, stands at 35 percent, according to the United Nations Chil-
dren’s Fund, UNICEF. A large portion of the population also lacks access to qual-
ity healthcare, decent schools, or reliable electricity. Net enrollment in primary
education was only 61 percent in 2012. Despite tremendous resources, Equato-
rial Guinea has very low vaccination rates, including the worst polio vaccination
rate in the world, 39 percent, according to the World Health Organization. As of
mid-2014, five cases of polio were confirmed there, prompting a belated vaccina-
tion campaign. 
The government’s statistics are unreliable and it makes few efforts to reliably
track basic indicators. International organizations frequently have to make their
estimates based on computer models because they only have limited informa-
tion. According to such models, Equatorial Guinea has reduced maternal mortal-
ity rates by 81 percent since 1990 and has met a Millenium Development Goal
target ahead of schedule. 
The government does not publish basic information on budgets and spending,
and citizens and journalists are unable to effectively monitor the use of the
country’s natural resource wealth. In August, the government confirmed that it
would seek to reapply to an international transparency initiative on oil, gas, and
mining payments from which it was expelled in 2010. A key requirement of the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative is that governments openly engage
with activists about the management of the country’s natural resources, without
intimidation or reprisal, and guarantee an “enabling environment” for their full
participation. 
Freedom of Expression and Association 
Equatorial Guinea has long had a poor record on press freedom. In January, se-
curity officials detained two Financial Times journalists for several hours and
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confiscated their computers, notebooks, and recording equipment, which were
not returned. The journalists were able to recover their passports and mobile
phones, then left the country earlier than planned. 
Local journalists are unable to criticize the government or address issues the au-
thorities disapprove of without risk of censorship or reprisal. Only a few private
media outlets exist in the country, and they are generally owned by persons
close to President Obiang; self-censorship is common. Foreign news is available
to the small minority with access to satellite broadcasts and the Internet; others
have access only to limited foreign radio programming. 
Freedom of association and assembly are severely curtailed in Equatorial
Guinea, greatly limiting space for independent groups. The government imposes
restrictive conditions on the registration and operation of nongovernmental
groups. The country has no legally registered independent human rights groups.
The few local activists who seek to address human rights-related issues face in-
timidation, harassment, and reprisals. 
Political Parties and Opposition 
The ruling Democratic Party (PDGE) maintains a monopoly over political life. All
but two officially recognized political parties are aligned with the ruling party.
Equatorial Guinea’s two-chamber parliament with a total of 175 seats has only
one opposition representative in each chamber. President Obiang appointed 20
senators, five more than allowed under the 2011 constitution. 
Members of the political opposition face arbitrary arrest, intimidation, and ha-
rassment. In July, Santiago Martín Engono Esono, the leader of the youth wing of
the Convergence for Social Democracy (CPDS), was arbitrarily arrested and jailed
for five days in Bata, the country’s second largest city. 
In August, President Obiang announced that a national political dialogue sched-
uled for November would for the first time include opposition leaders in exile. In
preparation for this dialogue, President Obiang declared general political
amnesty for exiled opposition figures in October but did not extend it to jailed
political prisoners convicted for alleged security offenses. In part for this reason,
three political parties, including the only opposition party with representation in
parliament, withdrew from the dialogue and declared it a failure. 
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Presidential elections are scheduled for 2016 but there is speculation they may
be brought forward in 2015. National legislative elections in 2013 were marred by
serious human rights violations and a denial of fundamental freedoms, includ-
ing arbitrary arrests and restrictions on freedom of assembly. 
Torture, Arbitrary Detention, and Unfair Trials
Due process rights are routinely flouted in Equatorial Guinea and prisoner mis-
treatment remains common. Torture continues to take place, despite government
denials. Many detainees are held indefinitely without knowing the charges
against them. Some are held in secret detention. Poor conditions in prisons and
jails can be life-threatening. 
President Obiang exercises inordinate control over the judiciary, which lacks in-
dependence. The president is designated as the country’s “chief magistrate.”
Among other powers, he chairs the body that oversees judges and appoints the
body’s remaining members. 
In February 2014, the Obiang government announced a temporary moratorium
on the death penalty. The Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP)
admitted Equatorial Guinea on that basis, believing it was a first step toward
eliminating the death penalty. Only two weeks before announcing the morato-
rium, the government executed up to nine people who had been sentenced to
death. In July, President Obiang stated in an interview that he continued to sup-
port the death penalty. 
Agustín Esono Nsogo, a teacher held without charge for over a year, was re-
leased in February 2014. According to his lawyer, Esono was tortured on three
occasions in an effort to get him to confess to an alleged plot to destabilize the
country. He was denied medical attention for his injuries. 
Cipriano Nguema Mba, a former military officer who was granted refugee status
in Belgium in 2013, was abducted while visiting Nigeria in late 2013 and illegally
returned to Equatorial Guinea, where he was secretly held by government au-
thorities and tortured. 
This is the second time Nguema was kidnapped from exile abroad. On both
ocassions, authorities belatedly acknowledged holding him and claimed he was
discovered inside the country and imprisoned to serve an earlier sentence. Fol-
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lowing a new trial, in September 2014 Nguema was convicted for an alleged
coup attempt and and sentenced to 27 years in prison. His lawyers were not able
to visit him and were unable to represent him at trial. Five other people allegedly
connected to Nguema were also tried without legal representation, convicted,
and handed harsh sentences. 
During the year Roberto Berardi, an Italian national, was tortured, held for
months in solitary confinement in inhumane conditions, and repeatedly denied
medical treatment and access to his lawyer or diplomatic representatives. His
family said he was denied food and water for several days in September after a
visit to the prison by the ambassador of Equatorial Guinea to Italy, in which she
reportedly rebuked Berardi for an open letter he published from jail. Berardi is
imprisoned in an apparent attempt to protect his business partner, Teodorín,
from disclosures about corruption allegations. President Obiang did not release
Berardi on humanitarian grounds, as promised in April under international pres-
sure. He remained in prison at time of writing. 
Key International Actors
The United States is Equatorial Guinea’s main trading partner and source of in-
vestment in the oil sector. It raised human rights concerns throughout the year.
In August, Obiang participated alongside dozens of other leaders in the US-
Africa Summit hosted by US President Barack Obama, sparking media contro-
versy that he was permitted to attend despite Equatorial Guinea’s poor record on
human rights and corruption. While in Washington, Obiang was also the guest of
honor at a dinner and conference organized by the Corporate Council on Africa. 
Spain, the former colonial power, eased pressure on Equatorial Guinea to im-
prove its human rights record. In June, Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy attended
the African Union Summit outside Malabo, marking the first visit by a Spanish
prime minister since 1991. Early in the year, Rajoy had declined to meet bilater-
ally with Obiang. 
Irina Bokova, director-general of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) traveled twice to Equatorial Guinea, including to
attend a September prize ceremony hosted by President Obiang for an award he
funded and sought to have named after himself. She had previously tried to
block UNESCO’s approval of the controversial award. 
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Equatorial Guinea underwent a second cycle of the Universal Periodic Review at
the UN in Geneva and received many recommendations on torture, arbitrary de-
tention, rule of law, freedom of association, press freedom, anti-corruption, and
social and economic rights. The government accepted most recommendations
and rejected very few. Expectations that this would lead to positive change on
the ground are low, however, as the government did not implement changes




Eritrea’s dismal human rights situation, exacerbated by indefinite military con-
scription, is causing thousands of Eritreans to flee their country every month. In
early 2014, President Isaias Afewerki confirmed his lack of interest in an open
society, stating: “[I]f there is anyone who thinks there will be democracy or [a]
multiparty system in this country . . . then that person can think of such things in
another world.” 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that
about 4,000 Eritreans flee the country each month and that as of mid-2014,
more than 313,000 Eritrean –over 5 percent of the population–have fled. More
than 5,000 crossed into Ethiopia in October alone. Many have experienced fur-
ther abuses or death at the hands of traffickers en route to Israel and Europe,
while thousands of others have been detained in Libya and Israel in deplorable
conditions. 
In June, the Human Rights Council condemned Eritrea’s “continued widespread
and systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms,” and
adopted a resolution establishing a commission of inquiry to investigate abuses
in the country. The most common patterns of abuse include open-ended military
conscription; forced labor during conscription; arbitrary arrests, detentions, and
disappearances; torture and other degrading treatment in detention; restrictions
on freedoms of expression, conscience, and movement; and repression of reli-
gious freedom. Members of the Afar and Kunama ethnic groups flee because of
land expropriations and discrimination by the government. 
In September, Eritrea acceded to the United Nations Convention against Torture. 
Indefinite Conscription and Forced Labor
The threat of indefinite military conscription compels thousands of young Eritre-
ans to flee their country. Among recent defections were 11 members of the na-
tional football team, including the coach, who fled while in Kenya in December
2013. The national football squad has lost almost 50 members in such defec-
tions over the past five years. 
By law, each Eritrean is compelled to serve 18 months in national service starting
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at age 18 but in practice conscripts serve indefinitely, many for over a decade.
One 14-year-old refugee said, “The military does not have an end, it is for life.”
While most young Eritreans begin military training for the last year of high
school, children as young as 15 are sometimes conscripted. Desertions and re-
fusals to report became more common in 2014. 
Conscripts receive inadequate pay to support family members, a financial plight
exacerbated by food-price inflation in 2014. Conscripts are also subject to mili-
tary discipline and are harshly treated throughout their long service. Perceived
infractions result in incarceration and in physical abuse often amounting to tor-
ture. The length of incarceration and type of physical abuse inflicted is at the
whim of military commanders and jailers. Female conscripts are frequently sexu-
ally abused by commanders. 
While some conscripts work in civil service jobs at conscript pay, others are used
as forced labor on construction sites and government-owned farms. The Eritrean
construction industry is a government monopoly that uses forced conscript
labor. In 2013, Human Rights Watch found that several hundred conscripts had
been used by state-owned Segen Construction Co. to build infrastructure at the
Bisha mine, Eritrea’s only operating mineral mine. Bisha is majority-owned by
Nevsun Resources, a Canadian mining company. Nevsun has expressed “regret if
certain employees of Segen were conscripts” during the mine’s construction, but
insists there are no ongoing abuses. Segen remains a contractor at Bisha. Able-
bodied men older than 50 have been forced to perform militia duty several times
a week without pay since 2012. They are used as armed guards and as labor on
public workprojects, prompting some to flee. 
Arbitrary Arrest, Prolonged Detention, and Inhumane
Conditions 
Arbitrary arrests are the norm. A prisoner may or may not be told the reason for
the arrest; even prison authorities may not be informed. Detainees are held in-
definitely; releases are as arbitrary as arrest, and few, if any, detainees are
brought to trial. The most prominent political prisoners are 21 senior government
officials and journalists arrested in September 2001 and held in solitary confine-
ment ever since; defecting jailers claim that half have died in captivity. The then-
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15-year-old daughter of a government minister arrested immediately after her fa-
ther defected in 2012 remains incarcerated. 
Prisoners are held in vastly overcrowded underground cells or shipping contain-
ers, with no space to lie down, little or no light, oppressive heat or cold, and ver-
min. Food, water, and sanitation are inadequate, beatings and other physical
abuse are common, deaths not unusual. Some of the leaders of an attempted
2013 takeover of the Ministry of Information died in prison in 2014, according to
unconfirmed reports. 
Freedom of Expression and Association 
In May, the country’s Roman Catholic bishops released an unprecedented letter
underlining their concern at “the prospect of a drastic depopulation of the coun-
try.” The letter highlighted forced “military service unlimited in terms of time and
monetary reward” and “the imprisonment of many young people in actual prison
or in punishment camps.” The bishops called on the government to “initiat[e] a
political system that is clear, transparent and lawful,” to liberate “those who
have been detained illegally, those forgotten in prison,” and to allow “open dis-
cussion of the problems of the country . . . [and] access to objective verifiable in-
formation.” 
The bishops’ letter is a rare public criticism of the government from within the
country. Since 2001, the government has tightly controlled access to informa-
tion, permitting no independent media, labor unions, or nongovernmental asso-
ciations to operate. 
At least six government journalists arrested in 2009 and 2011 remain in solitary
confinement without trial. Foreign broadcasts are sometimes jammed. 
Internet access is available but few can afford private access, and Internet cafés
are monitored, as are telephone calls. 
Freedom of Religion 
The government severely harasses citizens who practice religions other than the
four it recognizes–Sunni Islam and the Eritrean Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and
Lutheran churches. Prayer meetings of unrecognized religions are disrupted and
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participants arrested. A condition for release is often a signed statement by the
prisoner recanting their religious affiliation. 
Jehovah’s Witnesses are especially persecuted. Three who were arrested in 1994
for refusing to serve in the military remain imprisoned 20 years later. They are
among 73 jailed Jehovah’s Witnesses. The latest group of 19 was arrested in April
2014 during Bible study. 
The government interferes with the practices even of the four religions it recog-
nizes. The government appointed the Sunni imam in 1996, deposed the patri-
arch of the Eritrean Orthodox Church in 2005, and appointed his successor. The
deposed patriarch remains under house arrest nine years later. In October, sev-
eral monasteries denounced the government-appointed administrators of the
church. 
Migration and Asylum
Eritreans fleeing their country have experienced horrific abuses. Since 2004,
over 200,000 Eritreans have fled to remote border camps in eastern Sudan and
Ethiopia, evading Eritrean border guards with shoot to kill orders against people
leaving without permission. The lack of work prospects in or near the camps
caused tens of thousands to pay smugglers to take them through Sinai to Israel.
Egyptian traffickers have tortured scores of Eritreans for ransom in the Sinai
Peninsula, including through rape, burning, and mutilation. Some victims said
the Egyptian traffickers had tortured them to extort up to US$40,000 from their
relatives. 
Despite these atrocities, about 37,000 Eritreans had entered Israel by the time
Israel all but sealed off its border with Egypt in December 2012. Since June 2012,
Israeli authorities have indefinitely detained thousands of Eritreans for entering
Israel irregularly and have applied coercive measures to “make their lives miser-
able” and “encourage the illegals to leave,” in the words of Israeli officials.
Measures include indefinite detention, obstacles to accessing Israel’s asylum
system, the rejection of 99.9 percent of Eritrean claims, ambiguous policies on
being allowed to work, and severely restricted access to healthcare. In Septem-
ber 2014, the Israeli Supreme Court held the detention law to be unconstitu-




President Isaias uses the lingering tension from the 1998-2000 border war with
Ethiopia as an excuse for keeping the country on a permanent emergency mili-
tary footing. Eritrea’s foreign policy of supporting Ethiopian, Somali, and other
rebel groups has also led to its political isolation in the region. Eritrea fought a
brief border skirmish with Djibouti in 2008, and Qatar has been trying to medi-
ate this border dispute since 2011 without progress. Eritrea denies it holds 18
Djibouti prisoners of war even though three escaped in 2011. 
The United Nations Security Council voted to retain an arms embargo on Eritrea
and to renew the mandate of its Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea for an-
other year. 
Foreign mining company projects in which the Eritrean government has 40-50
percent stakes provide it with significant foreign exchange. Nevsun, the Cana-
dian owner of Bisha, estimates it will pay $14 billion to Eritrea over the next 10
years, according to the UN Monitoring Group. Another Canadian company, Sun-
ridge Gold Corporation, announced it will begin gold and copper production in
2015. The largest extraction projectof potash salts in the Danakil Depression, by
South Boulder Mines of Australia, remains in the pre-feasibility study stage. 
Economic relations with China remain important. One Chinese firm, SFECO
Group, reportedly received orders worth $340 million in 2014 for agricultural and
industrial construction projects. The Chinese government in July agreed to fund
part of a $33 million first-phase project to construct a college of science south-
west of Asmara. 
Canada threatened in 2014 to close the Eritrean consulate in Toronto unless it
stopped collecting taxes from Eritrean-Canadians. A 2 percent tax on the income





Hopes that Ethiopia’s government would ease its crackdown on dissent ahead of
the May 2015 elections were dashed in 2014. 
Instead the government continued to use arbitrary arrests and prosecutions to
silence journalists, bloggers, protesters, and supporters of opposition political
parties; police responded to peaceful protests with excessive force; and there
was no indication of any government willingness to amend repressive legislation
that was increasingly condemned for violating international standards, including
at Ethiopia’s Universal Periodic Review at the United Nations Human Rights
Council. 
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly 
Security forces have harassed and detained leaders and supporters of Ethiopian
opposition parties. In July, leaders of the Semawayi (“Blue”) Party, the Unity for
Democracy and Justice (UDJ), and the Arena Tigray Party were arrested. At time of
writing, they had not been charged but remained in detention. 
The Semawayi Party’s attempts to hold protests were regularly blocked in 2014.
Its applications to hold demonstrations were denied at least three times and or-
ganizers were arrested. Over the course of the year, authorities repeatedly ha-
rassed, threatened, and detained party leaders. 
In June, Andargachew Tsige, a British citizen and secretary general of the Ginbot
7 organization, a group banned for advocating armed overthrow of the govern-
ment, was deported to Ethiopia from Yemen while in transit. The transfer violated
international law prohibitions against sending someone to a country where they
are likely to face torture or other mistreatment. Tsige had twice been sentenced
to death in absentia for his involvement with Ginbot 7. He was detained incom-
municado in Ethiopia without access to family members, legal counsel, or United
Kingdom consular officials for more than six weeks. He remains in detention in
an unknown location. 
Protests by members of some Muslim communities against perceived govern-
ment interference in their religious affairs continued in 2014, albeit with less fre-





arrests from security forces. The trials continue of the 29 protest leaders who
were arrested and charged under the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation in July 2012. 
In April and May, protests erupted in towns throughout the region of Oromia
against the planned expansion of Addis Ababa’s municipal boundary into Oro-
mia. Security personnel used excessive force, including live ammunition, against
protesters in several cities. At least several dozen people were confirmed dead
and hundreds were arrested. Many of them remain in custody without charge. 
Restrictions on human rights monitoring and on independent media make it dif-
ficult to ascertain the precise extent of casualties and arrests. Foreign journalists
who attempted to reach the demonstrations were turned away or detained by se-
curity personnel. Ethnic Oromos make up approximately 45 percent of Ethiopia’s
population and are often arbitrarily arrested and accused of belonging to the
banned Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). 
Freedom of Association 
The Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSO law), enacted in 2009, has se-
verely curtailed the ability of independent nongovernmental organizations to
work on human rights. The law bars work on human rights, good governance,
conflict resolution, and advocacy on the rights of women, children and people
with disabilities if organizations receive more than 10 percent of their funds from
foreign sources. The law was more rigorously enforced in 2014. 
In March, Ethiopia was approved for membership in the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI), which promotes transparency on oil, gas, and min-
ing revenues, despite the requirement for candidate countries to make a com-
mitment to meaningful participation of independent groups in public debate on
natural resource management. Ethiopia’s previous application was denied in
2010 based on concerns over the CSO law. 
Freedom of Expression 
Media remain under a government stranglehold, with many journalists having to
choose between self-censorship, harassment and arrest, or exile. In 2014,
dozens of journalists and bloggers fled the country following threats. In August
2014, the owners of six private newspapers were charged following a lengthy
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campaign of threats and harassment against their publications. According to the
Committee to Protect Journalists, Ethiopia is one of three countries in the world
with the highest number of journalists in exile. 
Since 2009, the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation has been used to target political op-
ponents, stifle dissent, and silence journalists. In July, Ethiopia charged 10 blog-
gers and journalists known as the Zone 9 Collective under the Anti-Terrorism
Proclamation after they spent over 80 days in pre-charge detention. The charges
included having links to banned opposition groups and trying to violently over-
throw the government. The bloggers regularly wrote about current events in
Ethiopia. Among the evidence cited was attending a digital security training
course in Kenya and the use of “security in-a-box”-a publicly available training
tool used by advocates and human rights defenders. Due process concerns have
marred the court proceedings. 
Other journalists convicted under the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation-including Es-
kinder Nega, Reeyot Alemu, and Woubshet Taye-remain in prison. 
The government continues to block even mildly critical web pages and blogs. The
majority of opposition media websites are blocked and media outlets regularly
limit their criticism of government in order to be able to work in the country. 
The government regularly monitors and records telephone calls, particularly in-
ternational calls, among family members and friends. Such recordings are often
played during interrogations in which detainees are accused of belonging to
banned organizations. Mobile networks have been shut down during peaceful
protests and protesters’ locations identified using information from their mobile
phones. The government has monitored digital communications using highly in-
trusive spyware that monitors all activity on an individual’s computer, including
logging of keystrokes and recording of skype calls. The government’s monopoly
over all mobile and Internet services through its sole, state-owned telecom oper-
ator, Ethio Telecom, facilitates abuse of surveillance powers. 
Abuses of Migrant Workers 
Hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians continue to pursue economic opportuni-
ties in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain, and other Gulf countries, risking mistreat-
ment from human traffickers along the migration routes. In Yemen, migrants
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have been taken captive by traffickers in order to extort large sums of money
from their family members. In late 2013 and early 2014, hundreds of thousands
of migrant workers, mainly Ethiopians, were detained and deported from Saudi
Arabia to Ethiopia. Saudi security forces and civilians attacked Ethiopians,
prompting restrictions on migration to certain countries. 
Forced Displacement 
Both the government of Ethiopia and the donor community failed to adequately
investigate allegations of abuses associated with Ethiopia’s “villagization pro-
gram.” Under this program, 1.5 million rural people were planned to be relo-
cated, ostensibly to improve their access to basic services. Some relocations
during the program’s first year in Gambella region were accompanied by vio-
lence, including beatings, arbitrary arrests, and insufficient consultation and
compensation. 
A 2013 complaint to the World Bank’s Inspection Panel from Ethiopian refugees,
the institution’s independent accountability mechanism, continues to be investi-
gated. Ethiopian refugees alleged that the bank violated its own policies on in-
digenous people and involuntary resettlement in the manner a national program
was implemented in Gambella. In July, a UK court ruled that allegations that the
UK Department for International Development (DFID) did not adequately assess
evidence of human rights violations in the villagization program deserved a full
judicial review. The judicial review had yet to be heard at time of writing. 
Ethiopia is continuing to develop sugar plantations in the Lower Omo Valley,
clearing 245,000 hectares of land that is home to 200,000 indigenous people.
Indigenous people continue to be displaced without appropriate consultation or
compensation. Households have found their grazing land cleared to make way
for state-run sugar plantations, and access to the Omo River, used for growing
food, restricted. Individuals who have questioned the development plans face
arrest and harassment. Local and foreign journalists have been restricted from




Ethiopia’s criminal code punishes consensual adult same-sex relations with up
to 15 years in prison. In March, Ethiopia’s lawmakers proposed legislation that
would make same-sex conduct a non-pardonable offense, thereby ensuring that
LGBT people convicted under the law could not be granted early leave from
prison. However, in April the government dropped the proposed legislation. 
Ethiopia came for Universal Periodic Review in May 2014, and they rejected all
recommendations to decriminalize same-sex conduct and to take measures to
combat discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
Key International Actors
Ethiopia continues to enjoy unquestioned support from foreign donors and most
of its regional neighbors, based on its role as host of the African Union (AU); its
contribution to UN peacekeeping, security and aid partnerships with Western
countries; and its stated progress on development indicators. 
Its relations with Egypt are strained due to Ethiopia’s construction of the Grand
Renaissance Dam, which will divert water from the Nile and is due to be com-
pleted in 2018. In 2014, Ethiopia negotiated between warring parties in South
Sudan, and its troops maintained calm in the disputed Abyei Region. Ethiopia
continues to deploy its troops inside Somalia; they were included in the AU mis-
sion as of January. 
Ethiopia is one of the largest recipients of donor aid in Africa, receiving almost
US$4 billion in 2014, which amounted to approximately 45 percent of its budget.
Donors remain muted in their criticism of Ethiopia’s human rights record and
took little meaningful action to investigate allegations of abuses. Donors, in-
cluding the World Bank, have yet to take the necessary measures to ensure that
their development aid does not contribute to or exacerbate human rights prob-
lems in Ethiopia. 
Ethiopia rejected recommendations to amend the CSO law and the Anti-Terror-
ism Proclamation that several countries made during the examination of its




The success in May of populist and Eurosceptic parties in European Parliament
elections amid continued economic and political fragility underscored the need
for a stronger European Union commitment to human rights protection inside its
own borders. In March, the European Commission agreed a rule of law mecha-
nism for crisis situations, and in June, the Council of the European Union en-
dorsed the idea of an EU internal human rights strategy. But the EU, particularly
the council, remained reluctant to press member states on abusive practices. 
EU Migration and Asylum Policy
Strategic guidelines that the European Council adopted in June on migration and
asylum, while affirming respect for human rights and the need for a comprehen-
sive EU migration policy, largely emphasized enhanced border control without
envisioning new measures to facilitate legal migration or safe access to asylum
in the EU. 
By mid-November, over 155,000 people had reached EU shores—primarily those
of Italy, but also Malta, Greece, Spain, and Cyprus. Italy’s Mare Nostrum opera-
tion rescued tens of thousands of people from boats in distress, but over 3,000
died at sea since January according to a September International Organization
for Migration estimate, including in some cases as a result of deliberate actions
by smugglers. In November, the EU border agency Frontex launched a more lim-
ited operation in the Mediterranean as Italy wound down Mare Nostrum. 
New Frontex regulations clarifying search and rescue obligations, as well as pro-
cedures to ensure speedy disembarkation, entered into force in July. 
There were reports throughout the year of summary returns, including of Syrians,
by Bulgaria, Greece, and Spain, and of excessive use of force by border guards of
those three countries. There were almost 122,030 asylum applicants in EU mem-
ber states in the first half of 2014, according to Eurostat, up 22 percent from the
same period in 2013. 
People fleeing Syria enjoyed high protection rates, but also faced returns to the
first EU country of entry under the EU’s Dublin regulation and under bilateral





cluding family reunification. Fourteen EU countries offered to resettle 31,817 vul-
nerable Syrian refugees, with Germany’s quota of 25,500 far outstripping all oth-
ers, although the numbers actually resettled at time of writing was far smaller. 
Asylum seekers were held in substandard reception conditions in several coun-
tries, including Italy, Bulgaria, Greece, and Cyprus. Abysmal conditions in Bul-
garia improved significantly early in the year as the number of asylum seekers,
primarily from Syria, fell, although numbers were again rising at time of writing. 
In June, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) said lack of identity pa-
pers cannot justify extending immigration detention. 
The UN Human Rights Committee expressed concern in October over automatic,
lengthy detention of migrants in Malta. Malta continued to detain migrant chil-
dren whose age is disputed, despite a pledge in March to end immigration de-
tention of children. 
In January, the European Committee of Social Rights expressed concern about
access to health care for undocumented migrants in several EU countries, in-
cluding Spain, Belgium, Bulgaria, and France. In March, the EU Fundamental
Rights Agency (FRA) expressed concern about criminalization of irregular immi-
gration, and recommended improving access to justice for undocumented mi-
grants. 
A June European Commission proposal to clarify responsibility for processing
asylum claims from unaccompanied children was pending examination by the
European Parliament and Council at time of writing. 
Discrimination and Intolerance
Roma continue to experience discrimination, social exclusion, and deprivation
across the EU, with an October EU FRA survey finding that Roma women are dis-
proportionately affected. In December 2013, the Council of the EU made recom-
mendations to guide implementation of national Roma integration strategies. In
September, the European Commission announced enforcement action against
the Czech Republic over the long-standing failure to desegregate Roma children
in school. 
In January, Council of Europe (CoE) Human Rights Commissioner Nils Muižnieks
warned of growing anti-Semitism in Europe. There was repeated evidence to jus-
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tify his warning during the year, including a gun attack at a Jewish museum in
Brussels that left four dead, and rising reports of anti-Semitic violence and inci-
dents including in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Authorities gener-
ally responded strongly. The alleged museum attacker was on trial at time of
writing. 
The Council of the EU adopted conclusions in December 2013 calling for ade-
quate recording, investigation, and prosecution of hate crimes, as well as assis-
tance, support, and protection for victims. 
The CoE Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and
domestic violence (known as the Istanbul Convention) came into force in August.
At time of writing, eight EU countries had ratified. In March, the FRA published
results of the first ever EU-wide survey on violence against women, with one in
three women reporting they had experienced physical and/or sexual violence
since the age of 15. 
A FRA report in March noted that fear of deportation deters irregular migrants
from reporting crimes to the police, either as a victim or as a witness. 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in July approved France’s 2010 law
banning the full face-veil, despite its negative impact on women’s right to per-
sonal autonomy and religious freedom. Similar laws exist in Belgium and several
towns in Spain. 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) called on European
governments in June to tackle racism in the police, including by prohibiting
racial profiling, and providing training on identity checks. A December report by
FRA made similar recommendations. 
In October, the results of a FRA survey of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) people across the EU found high rates of bullying in schools and harass-
ment and discrimination against transgender people and lesbian women. Re-
spondents said they rarely report such incidents to the authorities. 
A May survey by the FRA concluded that persons with disabilities face consider-
able obstacles to political participation, while in 15 EU countries, people with in-





In a March resolution on communications surveillance, the EP called on EU mem-
ber states, particularly the UK, France, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and
Poland, to review laws governing their intelligence agencies to ensure they are in
line with the ECHR and subject to effective oversight. 
In a report on the right to privacy in the digital age published in July, the UN high
commissioner for human rights urged states to conduct surveillance only if nec-
essary and proportionate. 
The CJEU struck down the EU Data Retention Directive in April, finding that re-
quiring telecom providers to engage in blanket data retention violated privacy
rights. 
The ECtHR ruled in July that Poland was complicit in the rendition, secret deten-
tion, and torture of two terrorism suspects by the CIA in 2002 and 2003 and had
made no real progress in investigating the abuses. Despite credible evidence
that many other EU countries—including Denmark, Germany, Lithuania, Macedo-
nia, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the UK—were involved in the CIA renditions
program, only Italy has prosecuted anyone. 
Croatia
Despite limited reforms in June, the guardianship system continues to deny
roughly 18,000 persons with disabilities the right to make decisions about their
lives. Implementation of a 2011 deinstitutionalization plan progressed slowly,
with 554 people transitioned to community living, while more than 8,200 re-
mained institutionalized as of September. 
Croatia’s constitution was amended in December 2013 to ban same-sex marriage
following a referendum. In July, Croatia’s parliament passed a law allowing civil
partnership for same-sex couples.
In June, the ECtHR ruled that Croatia failed to investigate adequately the death of
a Serb civilian killed by the Croatian police during the 1991-1995 war. National
courts have yet to address more than 200 war crimes cases. 
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Serbs continued to face discrimination, with those stripped of tenancy rights
during the war facing ongoing difficulties benefitting from the 2010 government
program that permits the purchase of property at below market rates. 
Harassment and discrimination against Roma continue, with stateless Roma fac-
ing particular difficulties accessing basic state services such as health care, so-
cial assistance, or education. 
The asylum and migration system remains inadequate. In the first half of 2014,
there were 271 new applications, and 19 people granted protection. Asylum
seekers continue to be detained. Unaccompanied children are placed in a resi-
dential home for children with behavior problems in Zagreb without adequate
guardianship. 
France
The government failed to enact in-depth reforms to address abusive police iden-
tity checks, including ethnic profiling. A new code of police ethics entered into
force in January requiring the use of the polite form of address but with minimal
guidance on the use of pat-downs. 
Evictions of Roma living in informal settlements continued, with rights groups re-
porting that 10,355 people had been evicted between January and September
2014, most of whom did not have adequate alternative housing. In September,
the CoE human rights commissioner called on France to end such forced evic-
tions. An internal police instruction to police to systematically evict Roma living
in the streets of Paris’ 6th arrondissement was leaked to the press in April. The
government subsequently announced that it had been rectified. 
In June, a 16-year-old Roma boy was badly beaten and left unconscious in a
shopping cart in a Paris suburb. A criminal investigation into attempted homi-
cide, abduction, and detention by an organized group was ongoing at time of
writing, but no arrests had been made. 
Hundreds of migrants and asylum seekers were evicted from makeshift camps
around Calais area in May and July. In most cases, authorities did not provide
adequate alternative accommodation. 
Parliament passed a new gender equality law in July with measures to encourage
paternity leave, protect victims of domestic violence, and ensure equal pay be-
WORLD REPORT 2015
234
tween men and women. The new law also removes a requirement that women
who seek an abortion are “in distress.” 
In July, the government banned several pro-Palestinian demonstrations and a
pro-Israeli demonstration on public order grounds, in breach of the rights to free-
dom of expression and assembly. In July, a kosher restaurant in Paris was at-
tacked. In nearby Sarcelles, a kosher store and a Jewish-owned chemist were
burned, amid riots that erupted after a pro-Palestinian demonstration was
banned. A dozen people had been convicted or were under investigation for the
violence in Sarcelles at time of writing, including a man sentenced to four years’
imprisonment in October for burning the kosher store, looting, and attacking po-
lice officers. Also in July, police arrested a man for an attempted arson attack
against a Jewish cultural center in Toulouse. 
In July, the government proposed a new asylum bill to increase accommodation
for asylum-seekers, give suspensive effect to all appeals against negative asy-
lum decisions, and speed-up the asylum process. It also proposed a new immi-
gration bill allowing French authorities to ban citizens from other EU countries
from traveling inside France for up to three years if they are deemed a threat to a
“fundamental interest of society” or “abuse the law”—a move that appears to
target Roma. Both bills were before parliament at time of writing. 
In November, parliament approved a counterterrorism law prohibiting people
from going abroad if it is suspected they would participate in terrorist activities,
or would pose a threat to public safety on return; creates a criminal offense of
“individual terrorist enterprise;” and allows the authorities to require Internet
service providers to block websites that incite or promote terrorism. 
In October, a man died during a demonstration against the construction of a
dam in the Tarn area. His death appeared to have been caused by a stun grenade
fired by gendarmes. An investigation was underway at time of writing. 
In its annual report published in April, the National Consultative Human Rights
Commission found widespread and increasing prejudice against Roma, and, for
the third year in a row, an increase in attacks and threats against Muslims. 
A December 2013 law allowing for far-reaching government surveillance of com-






In February, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)
highlighted the practice of ethnic profiling by police in Germany, inadequate
state response to crimes with a racist motivation, and discrimination against
LGBT people. 
Demonstrations against the conflict in Gaza in July were overshadowed by anti-
Semitic assaults in several German cities. In August, the federal government
tabled a new hate crimes law to include racist motivation as an aggravating cir-
cumstance in criminal prosecution, pending in parliament at time of writing. 
Asylum seekers and refugees protested conditions in reception centres and re-
strictions of freedom of movement throughout 2014, including with hunger
strikes. Police launched an investigation in September into allegations that pri-
vate security guards repeatedly abused asylum seekers at a reception center in
North Rhine-Westphalia state. At time if writing, there were 34 open criminal in-
vestigations involving similar allegations against security guards in 7 out of 20
facilities in the state since January 2013. 
The German Institute for Human Rights raised concerns about a draft law on asy-
lum policy adopted in September that designates Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ser-
bia, and Macedonia as safe countries of origin subject to accelerated asylum
procedures. At least three federal states continued to return Roma, Ashkali, and
Egyptians to Kosovo despite concerns about discrimination and inadequate inte-
gration measures on return. 
The trial continued of an alleged member of a neo-Nazi cell and four alleged ac-
complices accused of murdering nine immigrants and a policewoman between
2000 and 2007. 
Media reports indicated that there was cooperation between German and US
agencies in mass surveillance activities. A commission of inquiry formed in
March is investigating mass surveillance in Germany. 
Greece
In a report released in March, the UN independent expert on foreign debt and
human rights warned that the impact of the austerity measures in Greece had
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been particularly severe on the most vulnerable. Golden Dawn established itself
as the third most popular party in the country with 9.4 percent of the vote in
May’s European Parliament elections. 
Attacks on migrants and asylum seekers, and LGBT people continued, with a net-
work of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) recording more than 400 inci-
dents over the last three years. 
A ministerial decree adopted in June introduced residence permits on humani-
tarian grounds for undocumented victims and witnesses of hate crimes. In Sep-
tember, an Egyptian migrant seriously injured in an attack in 2012 became the
first person to receive such a permit. 
In September, an anti-racism law improving state response to hate crimes and
lifting barriers to justice for victims of racist attacks entered into force, but meas-
ures criminalizing speech falling short of incitement raised free expression con-
cerns. 
In April, two men were sentenced to life imprisonment for the January 2013 mur-
der in Athens of a Pakistani worker. The court failed to classify the act as racially
motivated. 
The trial over the September 2013 murder of anti-fascist rapper Pavlos Fyssas by
an alleged member of Golden Dawn was expected to start before the end of the
year. 
At time of writing, criminal charges had been brought against 70 suspects, in-
cluding all Golden Dawn members of parliament and several high-ranking party
officials, for creation and participation in a criminal organization.
In July, two of the four men charged for the 2013 shooting of 28 migrant straw-
berry pickers were acquitted, including the farm’s owner. In October, the
Supreme Court decided that the case should not be retried. The victims’ lawyers
said they would appeal to the ECtHR. 
Increased security along the land border with Turkey coincided with increasing
numbers of migrants and asylum seekers, including Syrians, seeking access
through Aegean Sea islands. In October, the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) warned that the situation on the islands was becoming a
crisis. Sea crossings were marked by at least 40 deaths. There were continuing
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allegations that Greek border guards engaged in collective expulsions and push-
backs of migrants and asylum seekers at the borders with Turkey. 
The CoE human rights commissioner raised concerns in August over the shelving
of an incident in January 2013 in which 12 women and children died off the Greek
island of Farmakonisi, in what survivors allege was a pushback operation in poor
weather. 
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in June and FRA in December 2013
criticized abusive stops during police operation Xenios Zeus against irregular mi-
grants. In July, the government launched police operation Theseus against drug
users, sex workers, and irregular migrants in the center of Athens. 
The ECtHR held Greece responsible for inhuman and degrading treatment in im-
migration detention in eight separate cases since December 2013. In May, an
Athens court ruled that the government’s February decision to permit detention
of migrants beyond the 18 months permitted by EU law violated national and in-
ternational law. 
In an October report, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT)
described as “totally unacceptable” the conditions in which irregular migrants
are held in police stations for prolonged periods. 
Despite improvements in the asylum system and significant increase in Greece’s
protection rates, asylum seekers under the old system still face a backlog of an
estimated 45,000 cases. Access to asylum outside Athens and in detention re-
mained difficult. 
In January, a man was sentenced to 10 months in jail, suspended for three years,
for running a satirical Facebook profile making fun of a deceased Greek Orthodox
monk.
Hungary
Rule of law and human rights further deteriorated in 2014. The ruling party won
another term in April with a two-thirds majority in Hungary’s single chamber par-
liament. In a speech to ethnic Hungarians in Romania in late July, Prime Minister
Viktor Orban declared his desire to end liberal democracy in Hungary. There was
fresh pressure on media and civil society. 
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The Constitutional Court ruled in May that website operators are responsible for
any comments to blog posts or news commentary that violate the media law,
hamper free speech, public debate, or Internet freedom. 
In a June judgment, the Supreme Court held that ATV, a TV station critical of the
government, had violated the media law’s restrictions on commentary by de-
scribing the Jobbik party as “far-right” in a newscast. The same month, the edi-
tor-in-chief of Origo, an independent news website, was dismissed after
publishing a story on alleged misuse of public funds by the prime minister’s cab-
inet chief. 
Neelie Kroes, then-European Commission vice president, stated in July that an
advertising tax adopted in June shows that free and plural media remains under
threat in Hungary. The tax primarily affects RTL Klub, one of few remaining inde-
pendent TV channels. 
Civil society came under pressure in June when the state audit office conducted
surprise inspections of three NGOs that administer foreign donor money, and
the government published a list smearing 13 other recipient NGOs, including
leading rights groups, as “left-leaning” and “problematic.” 
In September, police raided two NGOs that disburse grants, seizing laptops, doc-
uments, and servers. In October, the state audit office published a report of its
audit of the four grant administering NGOs and 55 others that receive grants, al-
leging fraud, misappropriation of assets, and other financial irregularities. At
time of writing, there were at least two criminal investigations into the alleged fi-
nancial irregularities. 
US President Barack Obama identified Hungary in a September speech about
pressure on civil society. In contrast, EU institutions were reluctant to speak out
on the issue. 
By November 2014, 234 homeless people were charged with misdemeanors
under a local decree banning homeless people from residing habitually in public
spaces. At time of writing, there were no reports of homeless people being
jailed. 
Roma continue to face discrimination and harassment. In May, a Roma house in
northeast Hungary was attacked with two petrol bombs. No one was hurt, and
police were investigating at time of writing. Two Roma families were evicted in a
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larger eviction campaign by local government in the city of Miskolc that targeted
some 923 Roma. 
Hungary signed the Istanbul Convention in May but had yet to ratify it at time of
writing. In September, the ECtHR upheld its April ruling finding Hungary in viola-
tion of freedom of religion and association for stripping religious groups of their
status as churches in 2010. 
Italy
Between January and November, over 155,000 people reached Italy by sea, many
of them rescued in the Mediterranean by the Italian navy. While many traveled
onward to other EU countries, over 44,000 people applied for asylum in Italy by
October, amid concerns about substandard reception conditions, including in
roughly 200 emergency shelters. 
The government increased to 13,000 spaces in specialized reception centers.
Tensions flared in some communities hosting reception centers, including in
Rome in November when authorities removed 45 migrant children from a center
after neighborhood residents protested violently. The ECtHR ruled in November
that Switzerland could not return an Afghan asylum-seeking family to Italy due to
the risk of inadequate reception arrangements, particularly for children. 
In October, parliament reduced maximum immigration detention from 18 to 3
months. Throughout the year, detainees in such centers had protested condi-
tions and length of stay. 
Undocumented entry and stay was decriminalized in April, though it remains an
administrative offense. 
In October, the ECtHR ruled against Italy over its practice of summarily returning
migrants to Greece without individual screening for protection needs and de-
spite risk of inhuman and degrading treatment upon return. 
Episodes of xenophobic violence occurred throughout the year. In March, police
intervened but made no arrests during attacks over two days on an informal
Roma settlement in Naples, leading to its evacuation. Eight men went on trial in
September for the racially motivated firebomb attack on a Roma camp in Turin in
December 2011. A 17 year old who beat a homeless Pakistani man to death in
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Rome in September was charged with the killing but police discounted racist mo-
tivation. 
The European Commission initiated enforcement action against Italy during 2014
over its discriminatory segregation of Roma in substandard, official camps.
Roma living in informal settlements were subject to serial evictions. 
In July, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention urged measures to end
over-incarceration and disproportionate use of pretrial detention against foreign-
ers and Roma. Prison overcrowding remained a problem despite measures, in-
cluding reforms adopted in June, to reduce sentences and increase recourse to
alternatives to detention. 
The fatal shooting by a Carabiniere of 17-year-old Davide Bifolco in Naples in
September reignited concerns about excessive use of force. In October, an ap-
peals court acquitted six doctors, three nurses, and three prison officers over the
2009 death of Stefano Cucchi. Prosecutors alleged medical staff failed to treat
injuries he suffered while beaten in custody. A lower court had convicted five of
the doctors of manslaughter in 2013 and acquitted the others.
The Netherlands
Following criticism from political parties and rights groups, the Dutch govern-
ment in April abandoned plans to criminalize irregular stay. 
Dozens of rejected asylum-seekers continued to live in degrading conditions in
squats in Amsterdam. Many were from countries to which they could not be
safely returned, such as Somalia and Eritrea. The government did not provide
them with any support. 
In July, the European Committee of Social Rights found that the European Social
Charter required the Dutch government to provide shelter, clothes, and food to
irregular migrants at risk of destitution. At time of writing, the government had
yet to implement the decision. 
In April, the UN Committee against Enforced Disappearances urged the Dutch
government to ensure that the appeals procedure for rejected asylum applica-




A law allowing transgender people from the age of 16 to change their gender on
their identity papers without having to undergo sex reassignment surgery en-
tered into force in July. Applicants must provide a statement from a medical ex-
pert affirming their permanent conviction to belong to another gender. 
In a report published in October, the CoE human rights commissioner criticized
the extensive use of detention for migrants and asylum seekers. 
In November, the Council of State, the highest administrative court, ruled that
Somalis cannot be deported to Somalia on the ground that such removals could
not be carried out within a reasonable amount of time. 
In July, the UN Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent expressed
concerns about racial profiling by Dutch police. The experts welcomed the de-
bate on the traditional “Black Piet” (Zwarte Piet) figure of the Sinterklaas festival
and called for a respectful tone by media during the discussions. 
In August and September, the government proposed revoking the Dutch citizen-
ship of dual nationals enlisted in a terrorist group but not convicted of a criminal
offense and of those convicted of various terrorism-related offences. Neither pro-
posal had been adopted at time of writing. 
Poland
The six-year investigation into secret CIA detention in Poland continued amid
criticism and lack of transparency. In September, the Krakow Prosecutor’s Office
requested a four-month extension. In October, the government lodged an appeal
against the ECtHR ruling on the issue. In March, Polish prosecutors refused to
recognize a Saudi national detained at Guantanamo Bay as a victim in the pend-
ing investigation. 
In a June report, the CPT warned about a significant number of allegations of ill-
treatment in police custody, and called upon the government to strengthen safe-
guards against such abuse. 
In March, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ex-
pressed concern over the small number of hate crime cases referred to the





A January change to the criminal code permitted prison governors to apply for
detention orders for long-term prisoners deemed to pose a threat to the life,
health, or sexual freedom of others. There are concerns among civil society that
the law creates a form of preventive detention and will allow for the long-term
detention of people after they complete their sentences. 
There was pressure in May to narrow Poland’s already restrictive abortion law
when over 3,000 people, mostly medical professionals, signed a “declaration of
faith” against abortion and other reproductive services. 
A so-called conscience clause in Poland permits medical professionals to refuse
to carry out an abortion if it conflicts with their faith. In June, then-Prime Minister
Donald Tusk stated that medical personnel must put legal obligations to the pa-
tient above personal beliefs. 
Following its October review of Poland, the UN Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women recommended the establishment of less restric-
tive conditions and clear standards for legal abortion and effective remedies to
contest refusals of abortion.
Spain
The government responded to increased attempts by migrants and asylum seek-
ers to enter Spanish enclaves in Morocco, Ceuta, and Melilla (in the latter, up
234 percent compared to 2013), with enhanced border control. Fifteen people
died in February as they attempted to reach Ceuta by sea; the Spanish Guardia
Civil fired rubber bullets and tear gas in their direction. The judicial investigation
into the deaths was ongoing. 
In September, a judge in Melilla charged the head of the local Guardia Civil over
summary returns to Morocco. NGOs documented pushbacks and excessive use
of force. Several investigations and trials were ongoing in Spain against a hand-
ful of officials for violence against detainees in immigration detention facilities. 
The European Commission, the Council of Europe, and the UN expressed concern
about proposed legal changes to formalize summary returns from the enclaves
to Morocco. The government announced in November it would create border
posts where asylum seekers could register. 
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Widespread opposition forced the government to abandon, in September, a bill
that would have restricted access to safe and legal abortion. The government in-
dicated it would pursue changes to require parental consent for 16 and 17 year
olds. 
Government bills to modify the criminal code and create a new public security
law, under examination in parliament at time of writing, raised concerns about
interference with fair trial rights and the rights to peaceful assembly and free-
dom of expression. In October, the ECtHR ruled twice against Spain for failing to
investigate effectively allegations of ill-treatment during incommunicado deten-
tion and endorsed the CPT’s recommendations to Spain to allow access to a
lawyer from the outset of detention and medical examination by a doctor of
choice. 
In September, data showed mortgage evictions remain a serious problem, ex-
posing vulnerable persons to insecure housing and significant debt, and the
government announced an extension of the moratorium on evictions without
broadening narrow criteria. The CJEU ruled in July, for the second time in two
years, that Spain’s inadequate safeguards against unfair mortgage terms violate
EU law. 
In separate July reports, the UN Working Group on Enforced Disappearances and
UN special rapporteur on truth and justice criticized March reforms limiting the
ability of courts to prosecute suspects of grave international crimes committed
outside Spain. Both made recommendations to ensure accountability for Franco
era crimes, including by making enforced disappearance a domestic crime. In
October, a military court indicted five servicemen for the 2004 torture of two
Iraqi prisoners in Iraq. 
Spain ratified the Istanbul Convention in April, and at time of writing continued a
review of existing national law on domestic violence. By the end of August, 28
women had been killed by their intimate partner since the start of the year. 
According to the Spanish General Council of the Judiciary, the number of people
with disabilities stripped of their legal capacity increased 172 percent between




The government failed to honor its promise of a new independent judge-led in-
quiry into the UK’s involvement in renditions and complicity in overseas torture.
In December 2013, the government announced the inquiry would be conducted
by the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), a parliamentary body that
lacks full independence from government and has repeatedly failed to exercise
effective oversight of the security services. 
The law enabling same sex marriage in England and Wales came into effect in
March. In Scotland, the law was passed in March and is expected to go into force
in December. 
A government-sponsored bill to combat modern slavery, before parliament at
time of writing, included inadequate safeguards against employer abuse of mi-
grant domestic workers. In April, a parliamentary committee urged the govern-
ment to restore the ability of migrant domestic workers in the UK to change
employer, having found that a visa tying them to one employer “institutionalizes
their abuse.” 
During a visit in April, the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women
Rashida Manjoo was barred from entering Yarl’s Wood immigration removal cen-
ter, where migrant and asylum-seekers, most of them women, are detained. In
her initial report, Manjoo noted the impact of legal aid cuts on access to justice
for women victims of violence. 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor announced in May a prelimi-
nary examination into allegations of systematic abuse of detainees by UK armed
forces in Iraq between 2003 and 2008. 
In July, the High Court ruled that the accelerated “detained fast track” procedure
denies asylum applicants the legal representation needed to prepare their case
effectively. Rights group charge the system puts people at risk of being removed
to countries where they risk persecution, torture, or other ill-treatment. 
In July, parliament passed emergency legislation renewing the government’s
powers to collect data on the communications of millions of people, contradict-
ing the April ruling by the CJEU on blanket data retention. The law also extended





the existence of policies allowing UK intelligence agencies to intercept confiden-
tial lawyer-client communications on national security grounds. 
A law passed in July allows the government to revoke the citizenship of natural-
ized UK citizens if they engage in terrorism or other actions “seriously prejudicial
to the vital interests” of the UK, even if it renders them stateless. In November,
the government published draft legislation to ban people suspected of involve-
ment in terrorism abroad from returning to the UK for two years and allow police
to confiscate the passports of those suspected of travelling overseas to join
armed groups. 
An NGO,recorded an increase in anti-Semitic incidents from January to June com-
pared to the same period in 2013, including violent assaults, damage, and dese-
cration of property and threats. In London, the Metropolitan police recorded a
92.8 percent increase in anti-Semitic crime in the 12 months leading to October
2014. 
According to official statistics, there were 88 suicides in prison between April
2013 and March 2014, a 69 percent rise compared to the previous 12 month pe-
riod and the highest figure in a decade. 
Foreign Policy
The EU remained among the largest humanitarian donors to the Syrian crisis. In
March, EU foreign ministers finally expressed clear EU support for referring the
situation in Syria to the ICC. However, the EU high representative missed the op-
portunity to engage the entire EU framework with a strategy on how best to ad-
vance strong global support for a UN Security Council referral. 
In March, Xi Jinping paid his first visit to Brussels as China’s president. During
this visit, EU leaders, including European Parliament President Martin Schulz,
ducked their obligation to publicly raise concerns about the shrinking space for
rights advocates in China. 
In May, EU foreign ministers adopted EU Guidelines on Freedom of Expression
online and offline, adding to the EU’s Human Rights Guidelines. The guidelines,
which include specific commitments and objectives, were designed to enable
the EU to better promote and protect freedom of expression worldwide. 
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The EU’s 28 member states rallied behind a Swiss-led joint statement on the
human rights situation in Bahrain delivered at the UN Human Rights Council in
June. The statement called on Bahraini authorities to release all individuals “im-
prisoned solely for exercising human rights” in the country. In response to EU
support for the statement, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) cancelled the EU-
GCC Ministerial meeting that had been scheduled to take place in late June. 
Marking the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the EU Guidelines on Human
Rights Defenders, EU foreign ministers adopted conclusions reiterating their
strong support to human rights defenders. However, throughout 2014, the EU’s
response to the crackdown on human rights defenders and activists worldwide
was inconsistent. Strong responses, such as EU condemnation of the life sen-
tence handed to Uighur scholar Ilham Tohti in China, tended to be the exception
rather than the norm. 
Numerous weak statements were issued in response to the arrest of leading
rights defenders in countries such as Azerbaijan and Burundi. While the EU sup-
ported the above-mentioned Joint Statement on Bahrain, the EU high represen-
tative and EU member states failed to pursue any meaningful strategy, as called
for by the European Parliament, to secure the release of imprisoned Bahraini ac-
tivists, two of whom hold EU citizenship. 
The EU continued to be one of the most outspoken international actors criticiz-
ing Israel for its illegal settlement activities. The EU’s guidelines excluding West
Bank Jewish settlements from EU-funded projects came into effect on January 1.
Under the guidelines, the EU will only give “grants, prizes and other financial in-
struments [loans]” to Israeli entities that do not operate in the occupied Pales-
tinian territories and promise not to spend the money there. 
Despite the EU being a staunch supporter of the ICC and of accountability for war
crimes and crimes against humanity, some EU member states continued to press
Palestine not to seek access to the ICC. On July 22, EU foreign ministers seem-
ingly warned Palestinians against the ICC, asking the Palestinian leadership “to
use constructively its UN status and not to undertake steps which would lead fur-
ther away from a negotiated solution.” The same statement recognized that Is-
rael’s continued settlement expansion, settler violence, evictions, forced
transfer of Palestinians, and demolitions (including of EU-funded projects)
risked the irreversible “loss of the two state solution.” Near total impunity for se-
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rious international crimes in the Palestine-Israel conflict continued to fuel
abuses by all sides.
The EU imposed restrictive measures against Russia in response to its occupa-
tion of Crimea in March, support for abusive separatists and interference in East-
ern Ukraine. The sanctions target individuals and Russia’s state finances,
energy, and arms sectors. In September, the European Parliament gave its con-
sent to an EU-Ukraine Association agreement.        
The EU continued to play a leadership role on certain country resolutions at the
UN Human Rights Council and UN General Assembly, including on Belarus, North
Korea, and Burma, securing continuation of important UN reporting mechanisms
for all three countries. But the EU failed to play a leading role in bringing new
human rights crisis, such as the recent crackdown in Egypt or the situation in
Uzbekistan, to the agenda of multilateral forums.
The European Parliament awarded the 2014 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of
Thought to Dr. Denis Mukwege from the Democratic Republic of Congo for his
fight for survivors of sexual violence.
In August, Italy’s Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini was appointed as the next
EU high representative for security and foreign policy at an EU leaders meeting in
Brussels. Mogherini, who is also vice president of the European Commission,




Georgia’s ruling coalition swept to an overwhelming victory in municipal elec-
tions in 2014 amid some concerns of pre-election pressure on opposition candi-
dates and violence. Investigations into past abuses continued to raise some
questions regarding selective justice and politically motivated prosecutions.
Lack of accountability for abuses committed by law enforcement remained a
problem. Other areas of concern include minority and women rights. 
Georgia deepened its ties with the European Union by signing and ratifying the
Association Agreement that is closely tied to progress in governance and human
rights. 
Municipal Elections
The ruling Georgian Dream party won an overwhelming victory in local municipal
elections in June and July, giving it full control of all the executive branches of
local self-governing bodies across the country, as well as a majority of seats in
local councils. Domestic election observers noted some technical flaws and pro-
cedural irregularities during the vote, but claimed these had no effect on the
overall outcome.
During the pre-election period, however, media and nongovernmental groups
(NGOs) reported multiple allegations of pressure on opposition candidates to
withdraw their candidacies, including actual withdrawals in more than a dozen
municipalities, disruption of opposition gatherings, and several episodes of vio-
lence against candidates’ campaigners. In June, the Chief Prosecutor’s Office
said that it had launched criminal investigations into four cases out of 80 com-
plaints they received related to alleged pressure on opposition candidates. 
Violent incidents included mobs disrupting the opposition United National
Movement’s (UNM) campaign events in four cities and towns in April, and an at-
tack by unidentified assailants in March on Nugzar Tsiklauri, an outspoken UNM
MP who was briefly hospitalized for minor injuries. In May, several men attacked
Zurab Chiaberashvili, a former health minister and leading UNM member; Chi-
aberashvili was briefly hospitalized for head injuries. The authorities failed to
prosecute his assailants despite the fact that they were publicly identified. 
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Shortly after the elections, a number of employees of Tbilisi municipality re-
ported pressure on them to “voluntarily” resign from their jobs or face criminal
prosecutions. According to ISFED, a local election monitoring group, between
August 1 and September 7, Tbilisi City Hall dismissed 155 employees including
115 based on “voluntary” resignation letters, allegedly written under pressure,
raising concerns that they had been targeted for their political affiliations. 
Investigations into Past Abuses
The Prosecutor’s Office studied thousands of complaints received after the gov-
ernment change in 2012, categorizing them into property rights violations, tor-
ture and ill-treatment, and misuse of the plea bargaining system. In response to
those complaints, it initiated dozens of criminal cases, mostly against former of-
ficials. The absence of clear criteria to determine which cases to prosecute, as
well as the impression that such investigations were overwhelmingly targeting
UNM officials, led the opposition to allege that its activists were targeted for po-
litical reasons. Transparency International’s trial monitoring report of high-pro-
file criminal cases, published in July, did not reveal any significant violations of
due process and fair trial norms. 
In July, authorities charged ex-President Mikheil Saakashvili with a number of of-
fenses, including embezzlement and exceeding his authority in several separate
cases. In August, a court impounded Saakashvili’s property, along with that of
his spouse, sons, parents, and grandmother. Charges against Saakashvil, who
left the country soon after leaving office in November 2013, include an episode
related to the November 7, 2007 crackdown on opposition protests and ordering
a police raid and seizure of a private TV channel. The court ordered Saakashvili
be subject to pretrial detention in absentia. 
In July, authorities detained Gigi Ugulava, UNM campaign head and a former
mayor of Tbilisi, and a court sent him to pretrial detention on alleged embezzle-
ment of GEL 48.2 million (US$30 million) prior to the 2012 parliamentary elec-
tion. The opposition claimed that Ugulava’s arrest violated a moratorium on
criminal prosecutions of people involved in the municipal election campaign an-
nounced by Prime Minister Garibashvili in April. 
In February and August, courts convicted Vano Merabishvili, the UNM’s secretary
general and former interior minister, on three separate sets of criminal charges
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of misspending and bribery, infringement on property rights, and exceeding his
authority, sentencing him to various prison terms. 
In August, the authorities questioned Davit Bakradze, UNM’s parliamentary mi-
nority leader, and his wife, over undeclared bank accounts. 
Concerns about politicized justice intensified in October, when one former and
four serving Ministry of Defense officials were arrested on charges of mis-
spending GEL 4.1 million (roughly US$2.31 million) arising from an allegedely
sham tender. The authorities denied defense lawyers full access to evidence,
claiming it consisted of classified documents. This undermined the right to an ef-
fective defense. The Tbilisi City Court sent the detainees to pretrial custody. At
time of writing the lawyers were still unable to study the evidence. Garibashvili
sacked Defense Minister Irakli Alasania shortly after the latter stated that the
charges were politically motivated. 
Torture, Ill-Treatment, and Prison Conditions 
Lack of accountability for law enforcement officials remained a problem, as Geor-
gia does not have an independent effective mechanism for investigating crimes
committed by law enforcements officials. 
In August, the Human Rights Center, a local NGO, reported that police in a Tbilisi
district physically assaulted Giorgi Tsomaia, a man who had entered a police sta-
tion at night inebriated and demanded that police return a cellphone they had
confiscated in 2013 as evidence in a criminal investigation. Tsomaia claimed that
about 11 officers physically assaulted him, and he sustained injuries to his face
and head. He was then detained for violence against police and a court sent him
to pretrial custody. An investigation into his claims was pending at time of writ-
ing. 
Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA), a leading domestic human rights
group, received at least 50 complaints in 10 months in 2014; 31 of them
about physical and verbal abuse by police, and 19 by penitentiary staff. Accord-
ing to GYLA, the authorities failed to effectively investigate those allegations. 
In his annual report released in May, the public defender noted positive changes
in the penitentiary system, particularly in healthcare, but also highlighted sev-
eral cases of alleged ill-treatment of inmates which had not been effectively in-
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vestigated, and “alarming circumstances surrounding death of several inmates
in prisons.” 
Georgia overhauled its flawed system of administrative detention, reducing the
maximum custodial sentence possible for misdeamanor offences from 90 to 15
days ,and introducing due process rights. 
Anti-Discrimination and Minority Rights 
In May, parliament adopted an anti-discrimination bill that provides for protec-
tion against discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, age, sexual orienta-
tion, and gender identity. Some criticized the bill for lacking efficient
implementation mechanisms, including means for imposing financial penalties
for perpetrators. The bill put the Ombudsman’s Office in charge of overseeing
anti-discrimination measures. 
In February, the constitutional court in Georgia struck down a 13-year-old ban on
homosexual men being blood donors. 
In October, police used disproportionate force to break up a protest in a small
village and detain 14 participants demonstrating against the government’s plans
to rebuild a former mosque as a library. Courts fined 11 of them GEL 250 (roughly
$140) each for petty hoolganism and disobeying police orders. Authorities did
not effectively investigate police conduct. 
Women’s Rights
According to media reports, at least 23 women died in the first 10 months of
2014 due to domestic violence. 
The ombudsman reported that early marriage of girls was a persistent problem,
which took place either with an agreement between parents or through kidnap-
ping. The public defender highlighted a case in eastern Georgia where a father
sold his minor daughter for 10 cows to a 45-year-old man. The ombudsman docu-
mented three cases of kidnapping girls for marriage in January-February 2014,
and more than 20 cases of early marriage. 
According to data from the Education Ministry, 7,367 girls stopped going to




Georgia deepened its political and economic ties with the European Union by
signing and ratifying the Association Agreement with the EU, which requires
Georgia to fulfill strong human rights commitments as part of the approximation
process of aligning national laws and procedures with that of the EU. 
Georgia’s international partners, including the EU and the United States, ex-
pressed concerns about the criminal charges filed against former President
Saakashvili, urging authorities to adhere strictly to due process, and ensure that
the prosecution is free from political motivations. 
In its March European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) progress report, the EU noted
that Georgia “continued to deliver on a busy reform and approximation agenda,”
but also highlighted the need to ensure judicial independence, avoid a percep-
tion of selective justice, and increase accountability and democratic oversight of
law enforcement agencies. 
In an October resolution, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly wel-
comed Georgia’s comprehensive reform plans and called on authorities to en-
sure that prosecutions of former officials are impartial and fully respect fair trial
norms. 
Following its July review of Georgia, the United Nations Human Rights Committee
welcomed the adoption of the anti-discrimination law, while calling on Georgia
to combat existing patriarchal attitudes and stereotypes regarding gender roles
in the family and society. 
Also in July, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) issued an assessment of Georgia, voicing concerns about the
continuously decreasing number of women in local legislative bodies, and call-
ing on Georgia to introduce mandatory quotas for political parties to swiftly and
significantly increase the number of women in both national and local legislative
bodies. 
The US-Georgia bilateral working group on democracy and governance under the
strategic partnership charter met in April in Tbilisi to discuss Georgia’s efforts to





Former Guatemalan leader Efraín Ríos Montt was found guilty in May 2013 of
genocide and crimes against humanity, the first time that any head of state has
been convicted of genocide in a national court. The ruling was overturned on
procedural grounds days later, however, and a new trial is scheduled for early
2015. 
The Attorney General’s Office has also made progress on other prominent human
rights cases, but impunity remains pervasive. In May, then-Attorney General
Claudia Paz y Paz, recognized for her advances in reforming the country’s prose-
cutorial system, was removed from office by the Constitutional Court seven
months before her term was due to end. 
The mandate of the United Nations-backed International Commission Against
Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), which since 2007 has supported efforts to inves-
tigate and prosecute organized crime, will end in September 2015. President
Otto Pérez Molina has said that this will be the commission’s final term. 
Accountability for Past Atrocities 
In a landmark ruling, former head of state Efraín Ríos Montt was found guilty in
May 2013 of genocide and crimes against humanity and sentenced to 80 years in
prison. The retired general led a military regime from 1982 to 1983 that carried
out hundreds of massacres of unarmed civilians. The ruling was overturned sev-
eral days later by the Constitutional Court. A retrial is scheduled to commence in
early 2015. 
In April 2014, the judge who initially convicted Ríos Montt of genocide was sus-
pended and fined by an ethics tribunal for unprofessional conduct, an event de-
scribed by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in
Guatemala as a serious assault on judicial independence. She has since been
reinstated. 
In May, Guatemala’s Congress passed a resolution denying that acts of genocide
were committed during the country’s civil war, despite findings to the contrary by
a UN-sponsored Truth Commission in 1999. President Otto Pérez Molina had pre-
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viously expressed his support for a public letter signed by a group of politicians
calling genocide charges against former military officers a “fabrication.”
Ríos Montt has also been charged in a separate case involving the massacre of
300 men, women, and children in the town of Dos Erres in 1982. The trial is
stalled pending the resolution of an appeal by defense attorneys who have
called into question the independence of the presiding judge. 
In July, Felipe Solano Barillas became the first ex-guerrilla to be convicted in con-
nection with atrocities committed during the country’s civil war. Found guilty of
ordering the massacre of 22 residents of the town of El Aguacate in 1988, he has
been ordered to serve 90 years in jail. 
In June, Colonel Esteelmer Reyes and Military Commissioner Heriberto Valdez
were arrested in connection with sexual violence perpetrated against 15 Q’eqchi’
women in the community of Sepur Zarco in 1982. 
In June, three former members of the National Police were arrested in connection
with the murder of prominent human rights activist Myrna Mack. Mack was killed
in 1990 for her role in documenting abuses committed during the country’s civil
war. 
Public Security and the Criminal Justice System 
Powerful criminal organizations engage in widespread acts of violence and extor-
tion. Rampant corruption within the justice system, combined with intimidation
and inefficient procedures, contribute to high levels of impunity. Frustrated with
the lack of criminal enforcement, some communities have resorted to vigilan-
tism. According to the human rights ombudsman, 49 people were killed by
lynching in 2013, more than twice the number in 2012. 
Despite these problems, prosecutors have made progress in cases of violent
crime, as well as torture, extrajudicial killings, and corruption—due in large part
to the work of former Attorney General Claudia Paz y Paz, as well as the support
of CICIG. 
In February, nine members of the Zetas Cartel were convicted for the massacre of
27 farmhands during a dispute over drug trafficking routes in the Petén region.
The gang members were sentenced to a total of over 100 years in jail. 
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In September, former army officer Byron Lima Oliva, imprisoned since 2006 for
his role in the 1998 murder of Bishop Juan José Gerardi, was charged with run-
ning a criminal network in the prison. At least seven other people were impli-
cated in the case, including the national prison director, Sergio Camargo. The
investigation was initiated in 2013 by CICIG, in collaboration with the Attorney
General’s Office. 
Progress in holding perpetrators of serious abuses to account has been undercut
by the dilatory strategy of defense lawyers, including the abuse of amparo pro-
tection appeals, leading to the postponement of trials by months or even years. 
Use of Military in Public Security Operations 
The government continues to use the military to address public security chal-
lenges, despite the latter’s long history of human rights abuse. More than
20,000 soldiers are currently deployed throughout the country. 
In May, the government announced the creation of a new inter-agency task force
to provide security against drug trafficking and related crimes throughout
Guatemalan territory. The force is known by the acronym FIAAT, and includes mil-
itary personnel. 
Attacks on Human Rights Defenders, Journalists, 
and Trade Unionists 
Attacks and threats against human rights defenders are common, significantly
hampering human rights work in the country. Acts of violence and intimidation
against trade unionists endanger freedom of assembly and association and the
right to organize and bargain collectively. Fifty-three trade unionists were killed
between 2007 and 2013, according to the International Trade Union Conference. 
Journalists, especially those covering corruption and drug trafficking, also face
threats, attacks, and legal intimidation. In November 2013, President Otto Pérez
Molina and Vice President Roxanna Baldetti filed charges against José Rubén
Zamora, editor of El Periodico, after the newspaper published articles referring
to alleged links between the administration and organized crime. In February, a
judge barred Zamora from leaving the country pending investigation of the alle-
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gations. The president subsequently dropped the charges; the vice president
said she would as well, but at time of writing had not done so. 
In April, the Guatemalan opposition party LIDER brought charges against the
magazine ContraPoder after the latter incorrectly claimed that letters of support
to the leader of the opposition had been fabricated. Criminal charges have been
filed against the organization, despite a public retraction of statements and an
apology by the magazine. 
Key International Actors
The UN-backed CICIG, established in 2007, plays a key role in assisting
Guatemala’s justice system in prosecuting violent crime, working with the Attor-
ney General’s Office, the police, and other government agencies to investigate,
prosecute, and dismantle criminal organizations operating in the country. The
CICIG can participate in criminal proceedings as a complementary prosecutor,
provide technical assistance, and promote legislative reforms. 
Iván Velásquez Gómez, a prominent Colombian jurist, was appointed to lead the
CICIG following the resignation of the previous head. Formerly an auxiliary mag-
istrate on Colombia’s supreme court, Velásquez played a leading role in investi-
gating ties between politicians and paramilitaries in that country. 
The CICIG’s mandate will terminate in September 2015, however, and President
Pérez Molina has stated that it will not be renewed for an additional term. 
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has maintained an of-
fice in Guatemala since 2005. The office monitors the human rights situation in
the country and provides policy support to the government and civil society. 
In June, a Swiss court convicted the former director of the National Police for his
role in planning the extrajudicial killings of prisoners in the El Pavón and El In-
fiernito Prisons in 2005 and 2006. He was sentenced to life in prison. 
Despite a recent ban on universal jurisdiction cases in Spanish courts, Judge
Santiago Pedraz has stated that he will continue investigations into eight




The United States continues to restrict military aid to Guatemala on human rights
grounds. The US Consolidated Appropriations Act 2014, requires the
Guatemalan government to take “credible steps” to implement the reparations
plan for communities affected by construction of the Chixoy Dam, ensure that
the army’s role is limited to combating external threats, and support the investi-
gation and prosecution of military officers implicated in past atrocities before




The government of President Alpha Condé made progress in addressing the seri-
ous governance and human rights problems that characterized Guinea for more
than five decades. However, gains in promoting the rule of law and development
could be reversed by the 2015 presidential elections, a major trigger for unrest
and state-sponsored abuse; lingering ethnic tension; and the Ebola crisis, which
appears to have originated in the country’s forest region. 
The successful completion in 2013 of parliamentary elections advanced Guinea’s
transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, mitigated the concentration of
power in the executive branch, and led to a drastic reduction in violent political
unrest and state-sponsored abuses. However, local elections scheduled for 2014
failed to take place, which periodically stoked political tensions. There were also
regular protests over electricity cuts, as well as several lethal incidents of com-
munal violence. 
Reports of human rights violations by security forces declined significantly. How-
ever, security forces were implicated in numerous incidents of excessive use of
force and unprofessional conduct as they responded to criminal acts and
protests, resulting in several deaths.  
Fear of Ebola led to unrest and attacks on health workers and treatment centers
in southeastern Guinea, where the outbreak emerged in early 2014: in one such
attack, a mob murdered eight health workers and journalists. At years end, the
outbreak had killed more than 1,000 Guineans. The Ebola crisis led to deteriora-
tion in the right to basic healthcare and a significant economic downturn. 
The government made some progress in ensuring accountability for past atroci-
ties, including the 2009 massacre of unarmed demonstrators by security forces.
Inadequate progress on strengthening the judiciary and endemic corruption con-
tinued to undermine respect for the rule of law and directly led to violations. 
There was little progress in establishing a reconciliation commission and inde-
pendent human rights body. However, the Ministry of Human Rights and Civil
Liberties consistently advocated for respect for human rights. 
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International actors—notably the European Union, United Nations, France, and
the United States—rarely spoke out on the need for justice for past and recent
crimes by state actors, but worked to strengthen weak rule of law institutions. 
Impunity and Accountability for Crimes 
Since 2010, the judiciary has opened several investigations into serious viola-
tions by the security forces, including the 2007 killing of some 130 unarmed
demonstrators, the 2009 massacre and rapes of opposition supporters in a
Conakry stadium; the 2010 torture of members of the political opposition; the
2012 killing of six men in the southeastern village of Zoghota; and the 2013
killing of demonstrators protesting the delay in holding parliamentary elections. 
In 2014, investigative judges took steps to move most of these investigations
forward, but their efforts were severely hampered by the failure of members of
the army, gendarmerie, and police to respond to judicial summons. 
Justice for the 2009 Stadium Massacre 
More than five years on, the domestic investigation continues into the Septem-
ber 2009 massacre of opposition supporters at a rally in Conakry, largely by
members of the elite Presidential Guard. Security force members are implicated
in the killing of some 150 people and rape of over 100 women during military
rule under Moussa Dadis Camara. 
Since legal proceedings began in 2010, the panel of judges appointed to investi-
gate the massacre has made important strides, having interviewed more than
400 victims and indicted at least eight suspects, including high-level members
of the security forces. Meaningful steps taken in 2014 include the questioning of
several key witnesses and accused and of Dadis Camara himself, who has taken refuge in
Burkina Faso. 
Inconsistent financial and political support from the government, including the
failure to suspend high-level suspects from their government posts, undermined
the panel’s work, as did inadequate security for the judges. Some suspects have
been in pre-trial detention for longer than the two years permitted by Guinean
law. However, the new minister of justice showed increased commitment to en-
suring the panel is able to complete its work.
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Judiciary and Detention Conditions
Decades of neglect of the judiciary has led to striking deficiencies in this sector,
allowing perpetrators of abuse to enjoy impunity for crimes. The operational
budget for the judiciary remained at around 0.5 percent of the national budget,
resulting in severe shortages of judicial personnel and insufficient infrastructure
and resources. Unprofessional conduct in this sector, including absenteeism
and corrupt practices, contributed to widespread detention-related abuses. 
Progress in 2014 was evident in improved conditions for judges; the establish-
ment of the Superior Council of Judges (Conseil supérieur de la magistrature)
tasked with discipline, selection, and promotion of judges; and the revision of
key legal texts to bring them in line with international standards, including the
Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Military Code of Justice. 
Prison and detention centers in Guinea are severely overcrowded and operate far
below international standards. However, the Ministry of Justice took steps to im-
prove prison administration, leading to a sharp reduction in recorded malnutri-
tion rates among inmates and some improvements in healthcare. 
Malnutrition rates dropped from 21 percent in 2013 to 13 percent in 2014. The
largest detention facility—designed for 300 detainees—accommodates some
1,200. An estimated 65 percent of prisoners in Conakry are held in prolonged
pretrial detention. The failure of the Cour d’assises—which hears matters involv-
ing the most serious crimes—to meet regularly greatly contributes to the prob-
lem. 
Women’s and Children’s Rights
Despite a lack of data, sexual and gender-based violence against women and
girls remains of grave concern. In 2013, the UN documented 72 cases of rape and
sexual assault, 55 of which involved girls. Forced and child marriage is common,
and according to government statistics, some 95 per cent of girls and women un-
dergo female genital mutilation, although the government is making efforts to
address the problem. 
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Legislative and Institutional Framework 
In 2014, the Reflection Commission, created by presidential decree in June 2011
to promote reconciliation, made little progress in fulfilling its mandate. There
was likewise no progress in setting up the independent human rights institution,
as mandated by Guinea’s 2010 constitution. The institution can be established
only by a law approved by the national assembly. 
However, the Ministry for Human Rights and Civil Liberties, created in 2012, ac-
tively promoted respect for human rights, despite budgetary constraints. Minis-
ter Gassama Kalifa Diaby visited prisons, liaised with civil society, and
advocated for strengthening the judiciary and respect for freedom of the press. 
Guinea has still not ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Tor-
ture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, or the Op-
tional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women. Furthermore, Guinea has yet to codify the crime
of torture into its penal code. Guinean law permits the death penalty; however, a
moratorium is in effect and the minister of human rights pledged to initiate a na-
tional dialogue to build support for abolition. 
Security Forces
Discipline within, and civilian control over, the security forces continues to im-
prove, and authorities showed somewhat more willingness to sanction those im-
plicated in violations. The military hierarchy largely ensured that the army and
presidential guard—responsible for the most serious abuses during past periods
of political unrest—remain in barracks and those mandated to respond to civil
unrest, the police and gendarmerie, did so proportionally. 
However, members of the security forces were in 2014 implicated in numerous
incidents of excessive use of force or the mistreatment of detainees as they re-
sponded to protests and criminality. Torture of detainees declined somewhat,
but incidents in 2014 resulted in a few deaths. The security forces have also
been implicated in numerous acts of extortion, bribe-taking, outright theft and
banditry, and, to a lesser extent, rape. 
Security forces have long demonstrated a lack of political neutrality evident in
the use of racial slurs and failure to provide equal protection to citizens of all
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ethnic and religious groups, notably those supporting the political opposition.
The government’s failure to acknowledge this problem raises concern in advance
of the 2015 elections. 
Key International Actors
Guinea’s key international partners, notably the UN, the European Union, France,
and the United States, focused on the need to strengthen the rule of law with
more limited attention on combatting impunity for past violations of human
rights. 
In January, the EU, Guinea’s biggest donor, released €140 million (USD$192 mil-
lion) in aid, which had been suspended by delays in parliamentary elections.
The funds will be used to finance projects in justice, security sector reform, and
the transport sector. In April, the EU lifted the arms embargo in place since
2009. The EU and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) took the lead in
strengthening Guinea’s judicial system. 
The country Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) ac-
tively engaged in human rights education and documentation, though largely
failed to publicly denounce human rights concerns. In September, on the fifth
anniversary of the Guinea stadium killings, the High Commissioner for Human
Rights urged the government to take immediate and concrete steps to advance
the investigation and ensure accountability for those responsible. The Office of
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Con-
flict continued to support accountability for crimes committed during the 2009
stadium massacre and rapes.  
The UN Peace Building Commission (PBC) continued to fund programs support-
ing security sector reform and reconciliation. In July, the board of the Extractives
Industry Transparency Initiative deemed Guinea fully “EITI compliant.” 
The International Criminal Court, which in October 2009 confirmed that the situ-
ation in Guinea was under preliminary examination, maintained its pressure on
the national authorities to conduct proceedings within a reasonable time frame.




The Haitian government and international community made limited progress in
2014 to address the devastating impact of recent natural disasters and a deadly
cholera epidemic. Political stalemates, resource constraints, and weak govern-
ment institutions continued to hinder the Haitian government’s efforts to meet
the basic needs of its people and address long-standing human rights problems,
such as violence against women and inhumane prison conditions. 
For the fourth consecutive year, Haiti failed to hold constitutionally mandated
elections, leading to a deteriorating political environment. The terms of another
one third of the Senate and a number of deputies were due to end in early 2015,
leaving almost all elected national and local positions in Haiti (with the excep-
tion of a remaining one third of senators and the president) open or filled by ap-
pointees. 
As of June, 103,565 internally displaced persons (IDPs) were living in camps es-
tablished in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, according the International
Organization for Migration, down more than 90 percent since 2010. The United
Nations estimates that some 70,000 of the remaining IDPs have no prospect of a
durable solution. 
The cholera epidemic has claimed more than 8,500 lives and infected over
700,000 people in four years. Nevertheless, 2014 marked a significant decrease
in the number of suspected cases and a dramatic reduction in deaths, down to
51 deaths for the year as of September, compared to over 4,100 deaths in the
first three months of 2010. 
Criminal Justice System and Detention Conditions
Haiti’s prison system remains severely overcrowded, in large part due to high
numbers of arbitrary arrests and prolonged pretrial detentions. 
The weak capacity of the Haitian National Police (HNP) contributes to overall in-
security in the country. While the government and the United Nations Stabliza-
tion Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the UN peacekeeping operation in the country,
have made police reform a priority, there have been difficulties training suffi-
cient numbers of entry-level cadets. The latest report of the UN secretary-general
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on MINUSTAH estimated the police-to-population ratio by the end of 2014 would
likely be half the minimum recommended number. 
Accountability for Past Abuses
Former President Jean-Claude Duvalier returned to Haiti in January 2011 after
nearly 25 years in exile. He was charged with financial and human rights crimes
allegedly committed during his 15-year tenure as president. From 1971 to 1986,
Duvalier commanded a network of security forces that committed serious human
rights violations, including arbitrary detentions, torture, disappearances, sum-
mary executions, and forced exile. 
In 2012, the investigating judge in the case found, contrary to international stan-
dards, that the statute of limitations prevented prosecuting Duvalier for his
human rights crimes. An appellate court heard testimony in a challenge to the
ruling in 2013, with Duvalier appearing in court and answering questions posed
by the court and victims’ attorneys. In a historic ruling on February 20, the Port-
of-Prince Court of Appeal found that the statute of limitations cannot be applied
to crimes against humanity and ordered additional investigation into charges
against Duvalier. However, Duvalier died on October 4 without having been
brought to trial for his crimes. At time of writing, a reopened investigation into
crimes committed by Duvalier’s collaborators was still pending. 
Violence against Women
Gender-based violence is a widespread problem. A draft law on combatting vio-
lence against women that would bring Haiti’s criminal code in line with interna-
tional standards has been discussed among members of parliament, but not
officially introduced for debate. 
A council of advisers to the president was reviewing two pending draft revisions
to Haiti’s criminal code that include acts of gender-based violence, such as rape
and sexual assault, not currently in the code, with the expectation that a concili-




Use of child domestic workers—known as restavèks—continues. Restavèks, the
majority of whom are girls, are sent from low-income households to live with
wealthier families in the hope that they will be schooled and cared for in ex-
change for performing light chores. 
Though difficult to calculate, some estimates suggest that 225,000 children
work as restavèks.These children are often unpaid, denied education, and physi-
cally or sexually abused. Haiti’s labor code does not set a minimum age for work
in domestic services, though the minimum age for work in industrial, agricul-
tural, and commercial enterprises is 15. Most of Haiti’s trafficking cases are
restavèks. In May, Haiti passed legislation outlawing many forms of trafficking,
including hosting a child for the purpose of exploitation. 
Human Rights Defenders
Human rights defenders continue to face threats of violence. Malya Vilard
Apolon, co-founder of Komisyon Fanm Viktim Pou Viktim (KOFAVIV), a women’s
rights organization, left Haiti in March after repeated death threats, harassment,
and the poisoning of her family dogs. Marie Eramithe Delva, KOFAVIV’s other co-
founder, reported to police in May that she received death threats by text mes-
sage from a woman in police custody, and provided screenshots of the threats
and phone number. To her knowledge, there was no further investigation into
her claims and she received no protection from police, prompting her also to
leave Haiti in June. 
In February, Daniel Dorsinvil, the general coordinator for the Platform of Haitian
Human Rights Organizations (POHDH), and his wife Girldy Lareche were killed
while walking in a Port-au-Prince neighborhood near the POHDH offices. In the
days after the murders, government officials claimed that the crime occurred
during an armed robbery and was unrelated to Dorsinvil’s human rights activities
or criticism of the government. This claim was not substantiated by a thorough
investigation, according to local civil society representatives. 
Pierre Espérance, executive director of the Réseau National de Défense des
Droits Humains (RNDDH), received a death threat in April accusing him of report-
ing false human rights claims in an effort to destabilize the government. The
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handwritten threat also included a bullet and stated “this time you won’t es-
cape,” referring to an incident in 1999 when Espérance was shot but survived. 
Key International Actors
The UN mission, MINUSTAH, has been in Haiti since 2004 and has contributed to
efforts to improve public security, protect vulnerable groups, and strengthen the
country’s democratic institutions. The UN Security Council extended MINUSTAH’s
mandate through October 15, 2015. 
There is mounting evidence that the cholera epidemic that began in October
2010 is likely to have been introduced by UN peacekeepers. A member of the
UN’s Panel of Experts on the outbreak, stated that “the most likely source of the
introduction of cholera into Haiti was someone infected with the Nepal strain of
cholera and associated with the United Nations Mirebalais camp.” 
Responding to the UN’s dismissal of claims for compensation from 5,000 victims
of the epidemic, the victims’ representative, the Institute for Justice and Democ-
racy in Haiti and the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux filed a lawsuit before a
US court. At time of writing, a motion to dismiss was pending. To date, there has
been no independent adjudication of the facts surrounding the introduction of
cholera and the UN’s involvement. 
According to figures from the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, at least 93
allegations of sexual abuse or exploitation have been made against MINUSTAH
personnel in the last eight years, including 11 in 2014, as of September 30. 
In February, the UN independent expert on Haiti, Gustavo Gallón, called for
“shock treatment” to significantly reduce the number of persons in pretrial de-
tention. 
In May, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights called on all Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS) member states to make their archives and official
files on the human rights abuses committed under Duvalier open for use as evi-
dence in the investigation. It was unknown whether OAS member states had




Honduras suffers from rampant crime and impunity for human rights abuses. The
murder rate was again the highest in the world in 2014. The institutions respon-
sible for providing public security continue to prove largely ineffective and re-
main marred by corruption and abuse, while efforts to reform them have made
little progress. 
Journalists and peasant activists are particularly vulnerable to violence, yet the
government routinely fails to prosecute those responsible and provide protec-
tion for those at risk. 
After it arbitrarily dismissed four Supreme Court judges in December 2012, Con-
gress passed legislation empowering itself to remove justices and the attorney
general, further undermining judicial and prosecutorial independence. 
Police Abuses and Corruption 
The unlawful use of force by police is a chronic problem. According to a report by
the Observatory on Violence at the National Autonomous University of Honduras,
police killed 149 people between 2011 and 2012. Then-Commissioner of the Pre-
ventative Police Alex Villanueva affirmed the report’s findings and said there
were likely many more killings by police that were never reported. The govern-
ment did not respond to calls by the National Autonomous University rector ask-
ing it to provide information on how many of those killings had been subject to
investigations or resulted in criminal convictions. 
Efforts to address endemic corruption within the police force have made little
progress. While tests designed to identify corruption have been administered to
more than 4,500 police officers, only a fraction of those who have failed the test
have been removed from their posts. According to the Public Security Reform
Commission, the institution formerly responsible for designing reforms to justice
and public security organs, just 3 percent of the 230 officers recommended for
dismissal in 2012 were ultimately removed from their posts. 
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Use of Military in Public Security Operations 
In November 2011, Congress passed an emergency decree allowing military per-
sonnel to carry out public security duties, which has been extended periodically.
In August 2013, a law was passed authorizing the creation of a military police
force with powers to impose control over violent neighborhoods and carry out ar-
rests, among other duties, despite a history of abuses by the military against
civilians. The military police force was deployed in January 2014. 
In August, soldiers detained Marco Medrano Lemus close to his home in La
Lima, Cortés. According to local press accounts, he was found dead shortly
thereafter and an autopsy showed signs he had been tortured. Eight soldiers
were arrested in relation to the incident, and investigations were continuing at
time of writing. 
Accountability for Post-Coup Abuses 
Following a military coup in June 2009, the de facto government suspended key
civil liberties, including freedom of the press and assembly. In the ensuing days,
security forces responded to generally peaceful demonstrations with excessive
force and shut down opposition media outlets, causing several deaths, scores of
injuries, and thousands of arbitrary detentions. A truth commission established
by former President Porfirio Lobo published a report in July 2011 that docu-
mented 20 cases of excessive use of force and killings by security forces. 
In August 2014, José Arnulfo Jiménez, a former military officer, was sentenced to
five years in jail for the arbitrary closure of Channel 36 in June 2009. Jiménez had
led a contingent that occupied the premises of the media outlet, preventing
broadcasting for several days. At time of writing, there has been little progress in
prosecuting other abuses committed during the post-coup period. 
Judicial Independence 
Judges face acts of intimidation and political interference. In December 2012,
Congress voted to remove four of the five justices in the Supreme Court’s Consti-
tutional Chamber after they ruled that a law aimed at addressing police corrup-
tion was unconstitutional. Replacements were appointed in January 2013, and
the new court rejected a legal challenge by the dismissed justices the following
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month. Since their removal, the former justices have reported being subject to
repeated acts of intimidation, including death threats and police harassment. 
A 2011 constitutional reform established a Council of the Judiciary with the au-
thority to appoint and dismiss judges. According to the International Commis-
sion of Jurists, the selection process for the council’s members lacked
safeguards to protect against political interference and was marred by irregulari-
ties, including the exclusion of representatives from one of Honduras’s two judi-
cial associations. More than 40 judges have been suspended since the council
began its work. 
Attacks on Journalists 
Journalists in Honduras continue to suffer threats, attacks, and killings. Authori-
ties consistently fail to investigate and prosecute these crimes. More than 30
journalists have been murdered since 2009, according to the National Human
Rights Commission (CONADEH), though the motive in many of the cases has not
been determined. 
In December 2013, Juan Carlos Argeñal Medina, a reporter for Globo TV, was shot
dead in the city of Danlí, El Progreso, after receiving death threats in connection
with his work on corruption in a local hospital. In the past, Globo TV was subject
to a series of violent attacks following its critical reporting on the 2009 coup. 
Rural Violence
More than 90 people have been killed in recent years in land disputes in the
Bajo Aguán Valley, most of them since 2009, according to a March 2013 report by
CONADEH. Scores more have been victims of attacks and threats. The disputes
often pit international agro-industrial firms against peasant organizations over
the rightful ownership of lands transferred following a reform to the country’s
agrarian law. While most victims have been peasants, private security guards
have also been killed and wounded. 
Honduran authorities have failed to effectively investigate abuses or provide
protection for those at risk. A Human Rights Watch investigation into 29 cases of
homicides and 2 abductions in Bajo Aguán found that none of the cases had






Inhumane conditions, including overcrowding, inadequate nutrition, and poor
sanitation, are systemic in Honduran prisons. The country’s jails, which can hold
a maximum of approximately 8,600 inmates, were holding more than 13,000 in
August 2013, according to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Cor-
ruption among prison officials is widespread. 
Human Rights Defenders 
Human rights defenders continue to be subject to violence, threats, and killings.
In May, José Guadalupe Ruelas, director of international children’s charity, Casa
Alianza, which has criticized authorities for failing to protect children from or-
ganized crime, was arbitrarily detained and violently beaten by military police.
He was released the next day after local human rights organizations intervened
on his behalf. 
The Lobo administration submitted draft legislation to Congress in August 2013
to protect human rights defenders, journalists, and legal practitioners, but the
law had not been passed at time of writing. 
Violence against Children
Children experience high levels of violence, largely perpetrated by gangs and
other forms of organized crime. In May, five adolescents believed to be associ-
ated with the Mara Salvatrucha gang were killed in the El Carmen Pedagogical
Center for Rehabilitation, reportedly by members of rival gangs. According to
CONADEH, 458 children were murdered between 2010 and 2013. Casa Alianza re-
ports that in the first 4 months of 2014, 270 people under the age of 23 were
killed. 
It is likely that gang violence has contributed to a surge in youth migration to the
United States in recent years. A 2014 report by the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees found that 34 percent of child migrants from Honduras iden-
tified this violence as a motive for leaving their home country.
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Key International Actors 
The United States allocated more than US$50 million in security aid to Honduras
from 2010 to 2014 and continues to provide assistance through the Central
American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). US legislation granting military
and police aid to Honduras stipulates that 35 percent of the funds will be avail-
able only if the Honduran government meets several important human rights re-
quirements. As of February 2013, the US Congress was reportedly withholding
approximately $30 million of aid over human rights concerns. 
In February 2013, the United Nations Working Group on the use of mercenaries
stated that the government had failed to properly regulate private security firms
and expressed concern regarding their “alleged involvement … in widespread
human rights violations including killings, disappearances, forced evictions, and
sexual violence.” 
In January 2014, the ombudsman for the International Finance Corporation (IFC),
the private-sector lending arm of the World Bank, found that the IFC had failed to
conduct adequate due diligence and to assess and respond to known risks of vi-
olence and forced evictions associated with its investment in Dinant, a palm oil
and food company that was at the center of a spate of violence and killings in
Honduras. 
In August, the ombudsman similarly found that the IFC had fallen short in identi-
fying and addressing risks in its investment in Banco Ficohsa, the largest bank in




India elected a new government in May 2014 led by Narendra Modi of the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as prime minister. After 10 years in opposition, the
BJP won a decisive mandate with a significant majority in parliament. The BJP
promised to revive growth, end corruption, and pursue development projects. 
Modi has stressed protection of women from violence and other abuses, and ac-
cess to healthcare and sanitation. He has urged members of parliament to estab-
lish model villages with better infrastructure and modern sanitation facilities in
rural areas, and, in his first public speech, called for a decade-long moratorium
on communal divisions and discrimination. 
The new government has expressed a commitment to freedom of speech but has
not ended state censorship or taken decisive action against ultranationalist and
other religious militant groups that respond to views they do not like with threats
of violence. In 2014, authorities tightened restrictions on nongovernmental or-
ganizations (NGOs). One reason for this has been that civil society groups have
been highly critical of big development projects that they say will have a nega-
tive impact on the environment, and on the health and livelihoods of affected
populations. 
While Modi took office with a reputation for having overseen economic growth
and improved governance as chief minister of Gujarat, his inability to protect Gu-
jarati Muslims during religious riots in 2002 and promptly prosecute perpetra-
tors continues to cause concern. Some inflammatory remarks by BJP politicians
have added to a sense of insecurity among religious minorities. 
Caste-based discrimination and neglect of tribal communities is also a continu-
ing problem in India, as is sexual abuse and other violence against women and
children. The awarding of the 2014 Nobel Peace Prize to activist Kailash Satyarthi
spotlighted the fact that millions of children in India are still engaged in the
worst forms of labor. Lack of accountability for security forces and public officials
responsible for abuses perpetuates impunity and leads to further abuses. Police







Incidents of violence against religious minorities spiked in 2013 in the run-up to
national elections; according to government sources 133 people were killed and
2,269 injured in 823 incidents. 
More than a year after communal violence killed over 60 people, mostly Mus-
lims, and displaced tens of thousands in Muzaffarnagar and Shamli districts of
Uttar Pradesh state, both the central and the state governments had not pro-
vided proper relief or justice. The BJP even chose Sanjeev Balyan, charged with
inciting violence during the riots, as their candidate in parliamentary elections
and appointed him as a minister, intensifying Muslim insecurities. The state gov-
ernment forcibly closed down relief camps and failed to act on allegations that
lack of adequate relief services caused the death of over 30 children in the
camps. 
In June 2014, an ultranationalist Hindu group organized violent protests in the
western city of Pune against a social media post derogatory to some Hindu his-
torical and political figures. Some members of the group, assuming that the
anonymous post was the work of Muslims, arbitrarily beat and killed Mohsin
Shaikh—who had no links to post—but was easily identified as Muslim because
of his prayer cap. 
Dalits (so-called Untouchables) and tribal groups continued to face discrimina-
tion and violence. The difficulties the Dalit community has in obtaining justice
were highlighted by recent court verdicts in four cases in Bihar and one in
Andhra Pradesh states. In each of the cases, the courts overturned convictions
in high-profile incidents that took place between 1991 and 2000 involving
killings of Dalits due to lack of evidence, highlighting the failure of prosecutorial
authorities. 
Despite numerous initiatives and laws prohibiting “manual scavenging”—the
cleaning by hand of human waste by members of communities considered low-
caste—the practice persists. Those who try to leave such work face retribution,
including threats of violence or displacement. In March 2014, the Supreme Court




Members of India’s security forces continue to enjoy impunity for serious human
rights violations. 
In a rare case in November 2014, the army reported that a military court had sen-
tenced five soldiers, including two officers, to life in prison for a 2010 extrajudi-
cial execution of three innocent villagers. The army ordered a military trial after
using the draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) to block prosecu-
tion by civilian courts. 
The army also chose a military trial for the alleged March 2ooo extrajudicial
killing of five civilians in Pathribal in northern Jammu and Kashmir state. How-
ever, in January, the army court of inquiry dismissed charges against five offi-
cers. AFSPA, which has been in force for decades in Jammu and Kashmir and
India’s northeastern states, has provided effective immunity to members of the
armed forces for killings of civilians and other serious human rights violations.
Numerous independent commissions in India have recommended repealing or
amending the law but the government has failed to do so in the face of stiff op-
position from the army. 
Proposed police reforms have also languished even as police continue to com-
mit human rights violations with impunity. These include arbitrary arrest and de-
tention, torture, and extrajudicial killings. In several states, police are poorly
trained and face huge caseloads. 
Two separate reports—one by a think tank and another by three senior police of-
ficials—found a deficit of trust between Muslim communities and the police.
Muslims perceive the police to be communal, biased, and insensitive in part be-
cause of the misconduct of some police personnel, especially during communal
tensions. 
Women’s Rights
In November 2014, more than a dozen women died and many others were criti-
cally ill after undergoing sterilization procedures in the central Indian state of




Legal reforms were introduced in response to the 2012 Delhi gang-rape and mur-
der, but at time of writing the Indian government had yet to introduce monitoring
and reporting mechanisms to track their implementation. Reports of rape—in-
cluding of Dalit women, individuals with disabilities, and children—continued to
make national news in 2014, leading to protests. 
In early 2014, the government introduced guidelines for the medical treatment
and examination of women and children who report rape, but failed to allocate
resources necessary for their implementation. At time of writing only two states
had adopted the guidelines. 
Maternal mortality rates have declined in India but remain a concern because of
weak referral systems and poor access to medical assistance in many parts of
the country. 
Children’s Rights
By awarding its peace prize to Kailash Satyarthi, the Nobel committee drew at-
tention to the continuing employment of children in the worst of labor. The Right
to Education Act and government schemes have resulted in near-universal en-
rollment of children in early grades. But millions of children, particularly from
vulnerable Dalit, tribal, and Muslim communities, facing discrimination, inade-
quate support in government schools, and pressures to earn money, soon drop
out and start working. 
In August 2014, the government introduced amendments to the Juvenile Justice
Act that, if adopted, would subject 16-18 year olds to prosecution in adult courts
when charged with serious crimes such as rape and murder. Child rights activists
and the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights strongly opposed the
amendments. 
In June 2014, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child identified
several areas in which the Indian government had failed to ensure protection of
children from discrimination, harmful practices, sexual abuse, and child labor. It
also raised concerns about Maoist militants recruiting children and attacking
schools, and about government armed forces occupying schools in Maoist-af-





Protection of LGBT Rights
The rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) people suffered a
setback in December 2013 when the Supreme Court reversed a landmark 2009
Delhi High Court decision striking down a colonial-era law criminalizing adult
consensual same-sex relations. At time of writing, a petition to review the deci-
sion was pending before the Supreme Court. 
In April 2014, the Supreme Court recognized transgender individuals as a third
gender and asked the government to treat them as a minority eligible for quotas
in jobs and education. 
Palliative Care
In February 2014, India’s parliament amended the country’s drug laws to allow
for better access to pain medicines including morphine. The crucial amendments
to the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act eliminated archaic rules
that obligated hospitals and pharmacies to obtain four or five licenses, each
from a different government agency, every time they wanted to purchase strong
pain medicines. More than 7 million people in India require palliative care every
year and the new revisions to the law will help spare them the indignity of suffer-
ing needlessly from severe pain. 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Mental health and support services are severely lacking in India. Fewer than 20
percent of the people who need mental health care have access to treatment.
Due to stigma and the shortage of government community-based services, fami-
lies find it difficult to cope and often end up abandoning or forcibly institutional-
izing relatives with intellectual or psychosocial disabilities. 
Restrictions on Free Speech
Vaguely worded laws that criminalize free speech continue to be misused. Police
in various states have filed charges under the Indian Penal Code or the Informa-
tion Technology Act for online comments critical of important political figures, in-
cluding the prime minister. In one instance, five young men were questioned by





geted student magazines in two instances for critical comments on some politi-
cal figures, including Modi. 
Despite commitments to protect freedom of speech, the government has not
taken decisive action against militant groups that threaten and attack people
over views they do not like. In the face of weak government responses and
threats of lawsuits from Hindu ultranationalist groups, a few publishers with-
drew or cancelled books being prepared for publication. 
Civil Society and Freedom of Association
Authorities have tightened restrictions on civil society organizations. Officials
use the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA), which tracks grants from for-
eign donors, to harass organizations that question or criticize government poli-
cies, to stymie their activities, and to cut off funds from abroad. 
The impact on Indian civil society has been severe. When the Indian Home Min-
istry conducts an investigation pursuant to the FCRA, it often freezes the ac-
counts of the NGO being investigated, cutting its source of funding, and forcing
it to stop its activities. Such tactics have a wider chilling effect on the work of
other groups. 
In 2014, the Modi government asked the country’s central bank to seek prior per-
mission before moving foreign funds into Greenpeace India’s accounts, intensi-
fying concerns that the government would be less tolerant of organizations that
questioned the government’s development and infrastructure projects. 
Death Penalty
While there were no executions in 2014, death sentences continued to be
handed down. This was despite a Supreme Court decision in November 2012
stating that the “rarest of rare” case standard had not been applied uniformly
over the years and needed review. 
In a landmark judgment in January 2014, India’s Supreme Court commuted the
death sentences of 15 prisoners. It ruled that death penalty can be commuted
where the defendants are mentally ill or where there are inexplicable govern-
ment delays in deciding mercy pleas. It also set forth guidelines to safeguard the




The new government intensified engagement with world leaders to promote
trade and investment and revive the Indian economy. Modi invited to his inaugu-
ration all neighboring heads of state, including Pakistan’s, signifying his com-
mitment to build stronger ties in the region. 
Despite repeated militant attacks on Indian assets, including a May 2014 attack
on the consulate in Herat, India continued to provide significant assistance to re-
construction efforts in Afghanistan and some training for Afghan security person-
nel. It has also provided assistance for reconstruction efforts in Sri Lanka. 
Both the prior prime minister, Manmohan Singh, and now Modi’s government
have been reticent on many regional and global human rights issues where their
voice could make a difference. The Modi government has focused on foreign pol-
icy to revive trade and investment, and called for international cooperation to
counter terrorism threats and money laundering. However, it has not made any
significant announcements suggesting greater commitment to protecting human
rights even in countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, or Burma where it has
considerable influence. It has abstained on key UN resolutions, including on
North Korea in November 2014. 
After supporting two resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council on Sri Lanka in
2012 and 2013, in March 2014 India abstained on a resolution requesting the Of-
fice of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to investigate serious violations
during the conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam that ended in May 2009. India said that Sri Lanka should instead
be supported in addressing these concerns through wholly domestic efforts.
Human rights did not feature very strongly in public statements when Indian
leaders met with counterparts from the United States, Australia, China, and
Japan, although they agreed to cooperate on regional issues. 
Although it has not ratified the UN refugee conventions, India continued to ac-
cept refugees from Tibet, Burma, and, in recent years, Afghanistan. 
However, India failed to publicly condemn efforts by Australia to return Sri Lanka
refugees without properly evaluating the risk of torture. Nor did India speak up to




The US, United Kingdom, Japan, China, and Australia, among others, saw the
election of Modi as an opportunity to strengthen trade ties with India. With the
focus on investment and trade, and given longstanding Indian sensitivity to per-
ceived intervention in its domestic affairs, these countries maintained a low-key
approach to human rights, choosing to ignore concerns about protection of reli-
gious minorities. 
India’s record on children’s rights and women’s rights were reviewed in 2014 by
the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child and the UN Committee on the Elimi-
nation of Discrimination against Women. Both committees raised concerns





Joko Widodo, popularly known as “Jokowi,” took office on October 20, 2014,
after winning a tightly contested presidential election on July 9. The election was
a watershed; Widodo is the first Indonesian president who has neither a military
background nor an elite family pedigree. 
Widodo’s campaign focused primarily on economic issues, but he made commit-
ments on several of the pressing human rights issues he inherited, including
pledges to investigate the enforced disappearance of 13 pro-democracy activists
in 1998 in the dying days of the Suharto dictatorship and to lift restrictions on
foreign journalists from traveling to and reporting from Papua and West Papua
provinces. Those commitments are vague, however, and had yet to be backed by
specific directives or policy measures at time of writing. 
The human rights record of Jokowi’s predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in
office for 10 years, was characterized more by failures and missed opportunities
than by successes. Yudhoyono’s government made little progress in ending im-
punity for past serious human rights abuses by security forces; failed to protect
the rights of Indonesia’s religious minorities from increasing harassment, intimi-
dation, and violence by Islamist militants; allowed the enforcement of local Is-
lamic bylaws that violate rights of women, LGBT people, and religious minorities;
and failed to address continuing abuses in Papua. 
Freedom of Religion
According to the Jakarta-based Setara Institute, which monitors religious free-
dom, there were 230 attacks on religious minorities in Indonesia in 2013 and 107
cases in 2014 through November. The alleged perpetrators were almost all Sunni
Islamist militants; the targets included Christians, Ahmadiyah, Shia, Sufi Mus-
lims, and native faith believers. 
Throughout 2014, two Christian congregations in the Jakarta suburbs—GKI Yas-
min and HKBP Filadelfia—continued to worship in private houses due to the gov-
ernment’s failure to enforce Supreme Court decisions ordering local officials to
issue building permits for the congregations. National regulations, including
ministerial decrees on constructing houses of worship and a decree against reli-
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gious practice by the Ahmadiyah community, discriminate against religious mi-
norities and foster intolerance. 
On May 29, Islamist militants carrying wooden bats and iron sticks attacked the
home of book publisher Julius Felicianus in Yogyakarta while his family con-
ducted an evening Christian prayer meeting. The attack resulted in injuries to
seven participants, including fractures and head wounds. Police arrested the
leader of the attack but later released him after local authorities pressured Feli-
cianus to drop charges on the basis of “religious harmony.” 
On June 1, Islamist militants attacked a building in Pangukan village in Sleman,
Central Java, in which residents had been conducting Pentacostal services. Po-
lice arrested the leader of the attack, but also filed criminal charges against pas-
tor Nico Lomboan, the owner of the property, for violating a 2012 government
ban against using private residences for religious services. 
While Yudhoyono condemned sectarian violence by the extremist Islamic State
group in Iraq and Syria, he downplayed the harassment, intimidation, and vio-
lence committed by Islamist militants against Indonesia’s religious minorities,
claiming it is “understandable that sometimes there will be conflict between dif-
ferent groups.” 
In July, Minister of Religious Affairs Lukman Saifuddin publicly expressed sup-
port for allowing followers of the Bahai faith to receive national identification
cards, marriage certificates, and other official documents that identify them as
Bahai. But Home Affairs Minister Gamawan Fauzi rejected Saifuddin’s proposal,
arguing that he could only legally issue documents listing one of Indonesia’s six
officially recognized religions: Islam, Protestanism, Catholism, Hinduism, Bud-
dhism, and Confucianism. Fauzi suggested Bahai members choose one of these
instead.
On September 4, five law students from the University of Indonesia in Jakarta
filed a petition at the Constitutional Court, demanding revocation of an article of
the 1974 Marriage Law that bans inter-religious marriage. The petition argues




Papua (used here to refer to the provinces of Papua and West Papua) remained
tense in 2014 as security forces continued to confront a low-level pro-indepen-
dence insurgency movement led by the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua
Merdeka, OPM). On July 28, Indonesian media reported that suspected OPM
guerrillas killed two police officers and wounded two others in Indawa village,
Lanny Jaya regency. 
As of October, according to the “Papuans Behind Bars” website, 68 Papuans
were imprisoned or awaiting trial for peaceful advocacy of independence. 
Indonesian police arrested French journalists Valentine Bourrat and Thomas
Dandois on August 6 in Wamena on charges of “working illegally” without a jour-
nalist visa while filming a documentary for Franco-German Arte TV. Areki Wan-
imbo, the Lanny Jaya tribal chief, whom the journalists had interviewed, was also
arrested. A police spokesman initially said that the journalists would be charged
with subversion for allegedly filming OPM members, but the two ultimately were
charged with and convicted of “abusive use of entry visas” on October 24. They
left Papua three days later, having served the requisite time in custody. Wan-
imbo, however, was still being held at time of writing, charged with subversion
without a clear factual basis, and facing trial. 
On August 26, Martinus Yohame, leader of the West Papua National Committee
in Sorong, was found dead inside a sack in the sea, a week after he went missing
in the lead-up to President Yudhoyono’s visit to Sorong. Yohame had also talked
to the French journalists. 
Although Jokowi pledged to open Papua to foreign journalists, as noted above,
his cabinet also proposed subdividing Papua from two provinces into four
smaller provinces and encouraging greater migration to Papua, proposals likely
to exacerbate tensions there. 
Land Rights 
The Ministry of Forestry continued in 2014 to include forest lands claimed by in-
digenous communities within state forest concessions awarded to timber and
plantation companies. In May 2013, the Constitutional Court rebuked the min-
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istry for the practice and declared unconstitutional a provision of the 1999
Forestry Law that had enabled it. 
In October 2014, President Widodo merged the Agriculture Ministry and the Na-
tional Land Authority into a single ministry and did the same with the Ministry of
Forestry and the Ministry of Environment. Activists hope the consolidation will
improve efficiency, reduce corruption, and allow for more effective government
oversight of land issues. 
Freedom of Expression
The Indonesian government continues to arrest peaceful protesters who raise
separatist flags. On April 25, police in Ambon arrested nine people who led a
prayer to commemorate the 1950 declaration of an independent “South Moluc-
cas Republic.” The nine were charged with treason and in November were still on
trial. 
On August 30, Florence Sihombing, a graduate student at Gadjah Mada Univer-
sity in Yogyakarta, was arrested on criminal defamation charges after she called
the city “poor, stupid and uncultured” on a social media network. Police
dropped all charges and released Sihombing on September 1 on condition that
the university impose academic sanctions against her. The university responded
on September 9 by suspending Sihombing for one semester. 
On August 30, Adrianus Meliala, a member of the official National Police Com-
mission, apologized for calling the force corrupt in a television interview.
Meliala’s apology followed a threat of criminal defamation charges by National
Police Chief General Sutarman. 
On August 15, police detained journalist Aprila Wayar of Jubi, a Papuan news
service, for photographing police beating nine student protesters with rifle butts
at Cenderawasih University in Jayapura, Papua. Police released Wayar, along
with the photos she had taken, after several hours. 
Military Reform and Impunity
Security forces responsible for serious violations of human rights continue to
enjoy impunity. September 2014 marked the 10th anniversary of the murder of
the prominent human rights defender Munir Said Thalib. Munir was poisoned on
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a Garuda Indonesia flight on September 7, 2004. Despite strong evidence that
the conspiracy to kill Munir went beyond the three individuals convicted in con-
nection with the crime and involved high levels of the National Intelligence
Agency, Yudhoyono failed to deliver on promises to bring all perpetrators to jus-
tice. 
Parliament failed to amend the 1997 Law on Military Tribunals even though the
Yudhoyono administration submitted a new draft law in February. The 1997 law
is widely seen as providing impunity to members of the military involved in
human rights abuses and other crimes. If approved, the amendment would pave
the way for soldiers to be tried in civilian courts for human rights violations. 
No progress was made on accountability for serious security force abuses during
the 32-year rule of President Suharto, including the mass killings of 1965-66,
atrocities in counterinsurgency operations in Aceh, East Timor, and Papua,
killings in Kalimantan, Lampung, Tanjung priok, and other prominent cases. 
Women’s and Girls’ Rights
Discriminatory regulations against women and girls continued to proliferate in
2014. Indonesia’s official Commission on Violence against Women reported that,
as of August, national and local governments had passed 23 new discriminatory
regulations in 2014. 
Indonesia has a total of 279 discriminatory local regulations targeting women. A
total of 90 of those rules require girls and women, mostly students and civil ser-
vants, to wear the hijab. The mandatory hijab is also imposed on Christian girls
in some areas. 
On September 27, the Aceh parliament passed two Islamic bylaws which create
new discriminatory offenses that do not exist in the Indonesian criminal code.
The bylaws extend Islamic law to non-Muslims, criminalizing alcohol drinking,
consensual same-sex sexual acts, homosexuality, as well as all sexual relations
outside of marriage. The bylaws permit as punishment up to 100 lashes and up
to 100 months in prison. 
In October, Human Rights Watch released a short report documenting the Na-




Refugees and Asylum Seekers
Indonesia remains a transit point to Australia for refugees and asylum seekers
fleeing persecution and violence in countries including Somalia, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Burma. 
As of May 2014, there were approximately 10,509 refugees and asylum seekers
in Indonesia, all living in legal limbo because Indonesia lacks an asylum law.
This number includes 331 migrant children detained in immigration centers, of
which 110 were unaccompanied minors. 
While Indonesia delegates responsibility for processing refugees and asylum
seekers to the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), it often refuses to release even UNHCR-recognized refugees from de-
tention centers, where conditions are poor and mistreatment is common. Those
who are released face the constant threat of re-arrest and further detention. 
Disability Rights
On July 8, the parliament passed a new mental health act to address Indonesia’s
dire mental healthcare situation. Conditions are particularly horrific for the tens
of thousands of Indonesians with psychosocial disabilities who spend their lives
shackled (pasung) instead of receiving community-based mental health care.
When implemented, the new law will address the treatment gap by integrating
mental health into general health services, making affordable drug treatments
available for people with psychosocial disabilities, and facilitating the training
of more mental health professionals. 
The law seeks to reduce stigma and discrimination against people with psy-
chosocial disabilities and guarantees the right to protection from neglect, vio-
lence, and exploitation. The law also provides accountability for abuses,
including pasung, and promises access to services in the community. However,
the law also contains problematic provisions that allow for treatment without in-





On August 29, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon spoke in Bali and
described the country as “living wisely, harmoniously, side-by-side resolving all
differences of opinion through dialogue,” failing to mention religious intolerance
and related violence. 
On September 6, US Secretary of State John Kerry issued a statement on the 10th
anniversary of rights activist Munir’s assasination: “Still today, justice has not
been served. Full accountability for all those allegedly involved remains elusive.” 
In August, Australia and Indonesia signed a vaguely worded agreement on sur-
veillance and intelligence gathering. In October, the Australian senate passed a
motion calling for the release of the two French journalists imprisoned in Papua





2014 saw no significant improvements in human rights in the first full year in of-
fice of President Hassan Rouhani. Repressive elements within the security and
intelligence forces and the judiciary retained wide powers and continued to be
the main perpetrators of rights abuses. Executions, especially for drug-related
offenses, continued at a high rate. Security and intelligence forces arrested jour-
nalists, bloggers, and social media activists, and revolutionary courts handed
down heavy sentences against them. 
Death Penalty
According to Iranian media sources, authorities executed at least 200 prisoners
as of October 2014, but opposition sources said they carried out another 400
unannounced executions. Some executions were public. 
Under Iranian law, many crimes are punishable by death, including some that do
not involve violence such as “insulting the Prophet,” apostasy, same-sex rela-
tions, adultery, and drug-related offenses. Convicted drug offenders sentenced
after flawed trials in revolutionary courts formed the majority of prisoners exe-
cuted in 2014. On November 24, the Supreme Court upheld a criminal court rul-
ing sentencing Soheil Arabi to death for Facebook posts he had written that were
interpreted as “insulting the Prophet.” 
According to unofficial sources, at least eight executed prisoners may have been
child offenders aged under eighteen at the time of the murder and rape crimes
for which they received death sentences. Dozens of child offenders reportedly
remained on death row and at risk of execution. Iranian law allows capital pun-
ishment for persons who have reached the official age of puberty: nine for girls,
fifteen for boys. 
Authorities executed at least nine people in 2014 whom revolutionary courts had
sentenced for moharebeh (“enmity against God”) on account of their alleged ties
to armed opposition groups. In January, authorities executed two Iranian Arab
activists, Hadi Rashedi and Hashem Shaabaninejad, for moharebah according to
rights groups. On May 31, authorities executed Gholamreza Khosravi Savadjani,
sentenced for his alleged ties to the outlawed Mojahedin-e Khalq opposition
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group. Dozens of others sentenced on terrorism-related charges, including many
Iranian Kurds and Baluch, were on death row following trials rife with due
process violations. On June 12, authorities informed the families of Ali Chabishat
and Seyed Khaled Mousavi, Iranian-Arabs from Ahvaz in Khuzestan, that they
had secretly executed and buried them, despite appeals by the United Nations. 
The judiciary continued to allow the execution of prisoners convicted of mohare-
beh despite penal code changes requiring that it review and vacate death sen-
tences unless there is proof that the alleged perpetrator resorted to the use of
arms. 
Freedom of Expression and Information
Security authorities continued to clamp down on free speech and dissent. In Oc-
tober, according to Reporters Without Borders, Iran held at least 48 journalists,
bloggers, and social media activists in detention. 
In May 2014, police arrested four young men and three women after a video
showing them dancing to the popular song “Happy,” went viral on YouTube. Au-
thorities released them to face trial on charges that included engaging in “illicit
relations.” In May, a Tehran revolutionary court sentenced eight Facebook users
to a total of 127 years in prison for allegedly posting messages deemed to insult
government officials and “religious sanctities,” among other crimes. 
Security officials arrested Saba Azarpeik, a journalist for the Etemad and Tejarat-
e Farda media outlets, on May 28 and held her incommunicado for almost three
months, then released her on bail, reportedly to face trial on vague charges of
“propaganda against the state” and “dissemination of falsehoods.” On June 19,
a judiciary official announced that 11 people convicted of “designing sites, web-
sites, and creating content for media hostile to the regime” had received prison
sentences up to 11 years. They appeared to be people associated with Narenji, a
popular website, whom Revolutionary Guards had detained on December 3,
2013. 
On July 22, unidentified agents arrested Washington Post correspondent, Jason
Rezaian, his wife Yeganeh Salehi, also a journalist, and two unnamed people—a
photojournalist and her spouse. At time of writing, authorities continued to de-
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tain Rezaian without charge and without allowing him access to a lawyer, but
had released Salehi and the two others. 
On August 7, 2014, an appeals court confirmed the manslaughter conviction of a
police officer accused in connection with the November 6, 2012 death in custody
of blogger Sattar Beheshti. The court imposed a three-year prison term, followed
by two years of internal exile, and a flogging of 74 lashes.
Judiciary officials also shut down at least four newspapers apparently for breach-
ing content-based restrictions. They ordered the closure of Aseman in February
and the arrest of its managing editor for an article that described the Islamic
qesas retribution laws as “inhumane.” Authorities allowed some newspapers to
resume publication after bans, but they continued to block websites and jam for-
eign satellite broadcasts. 
Freedom of Assembly and Association
Scores of people held for their affiliation with banned opposition parties, labor
unions, and student groups were in prison. The judiciary continued to target in-
dependent and unregistered trade unions. On May 1, police attacked and ar-
rested at least 25 workers who were protesting poor wages and labor conditions
outside the Labor Ministry and a Tehran bus terminal. Police took the workers to
Evin Prison before releasing them. Several of them face charges related to illegal
gathering. 
Rouhani’s interim minister of science, Reza Faraji Dana, responsible for most of
Iran’s universities, led efforts to reinstate professors and students barred be-
tween 2005 and 2012 for their peaceful activities. Dozens remained unable to
continue their studies or teach, however, and in August the parliament voted to
impeach the minister and refused to confirm several other Rouhani nominations
for the post. 
Political Prisoners and Human Rights Defenders 
The authorities continued to imprison dozens of activists and human rights de-
fenders, such as lawyers Mohammad Seifzadeh and Abdolfattah Soltani, on ac-





overturned an order that had banned Nasrin Sotoudeh from practicing law for 10
years following her release from prison in 2013, but on October 18 the Iranian
Bar Association’s disciplinary committee told Sotoudeh that it had revoked her
law license for 3 years because of her revolutionary court conviction on vague
national security charges in 2011. On November 9, security officials summoned
Narges Mohammadi, a rights defender, for questioning after she gave a speech
criticizing government policies. 
Prominent opposition figures Mir Hossein Mousavi, Zahra Rahnavard, and Mehdi
Karroubi, held without charge or trial since February 2011, remained under house
arrest. Prisoners, especially those sentenced on politically motivated charges,
faced regular abuse by guards and were denied necessary medical treatment. In
April, guards severely beat several dozen political prisoners in Ward 350 of Evin
Prison and forced around 30 to pass between two rows of guards, who punched,
kicked, and beat them with batons, causing some to sustain serious injuries, ac-
cording to relatives of the victims. Officials later subjected at least 31 prisoners
to prolonged solitary confinement and degrading treatment. 
Women’s Rights
In 2014, authorities announced or implemented discriminatory policies, includ-
ing restricting the employment of women in coffee shops, certain restaurants,
and other public spaces and limiting access to family planning as part of official
measures to boost Iran’s population. 
On June 30, authorities arrested Ghoncheh Ghavami, 25, a dual Iranian-British
national, and others who had participated in a peaceful protest against an offi-
cial ban on women attending men’s volleyball matches in Tehran’s Azadi Sta-
dium. Ghavami, who was initially detained at Evin prison, where authorities
denied her access to a lawyer, was later tried and convicted on the charge of
“propaganda against the state” in a closed trial. In September, authorities an-
nounced that Shahla Sherkat, editor of a new women’s magazine, was to appear
before the press court for promoting un-Islamic ideas.
Iranian women face discrimination in many aspects of their lives, including per-
sonal status matters related to marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody.
Regardless of her age, a woman cannot marry without the approval of her male
guardian, and women generally cannot pass on their Iranian nationality to a for-
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eign-born spouse or to their children. Child marriage, though not the norm, con-
tinues, as the law allows girls to marry at 13 and boys at age 15, and at younger
ages if authorized by a judge. 
Treatment of Minorities
The government denies freedom of religion to Baha’is, Iran’s largest non-Muslim
religious minority, and discriminates against them. At least 136 Baha’is were
held in Iran’s prisons as of May 2014. State authorities also desecrated Baha’i
cemeteries, including one in Shiraz which the authorities began excavating in
April. Security and intelligence forces also continued to target Christian converts
from Islam, Persian-speaking Protestant and evangelical congregations, and
members of the home church movement. Many faced charges such as “acting
against the national security” and “propaganda against the state.” 
Authorities restrict political participation and public sector employment of non-
Shia Muslim minorities, including Sunnis, who account for about 10 percent of
the population. They also prevent Sunnis from constructing their own mosques
in Tehran and conducting separate Eid prayers. Government targeting of mem-
bers of Sufi mystical orders, particularly members of the Nematollahi Gonabadi
order, continued. In March, police beat and arrested several demonstrators who
gathered outside a judiciary building in Tehran to seek the release of several de-
tained Sufis. 
The government restricted cultural as well as political activities among the coun-
try’s Azeri, Kurdish, Arab, and Baluch minorities. Afghan refugees and migrant
workers, estimated at between 2.5 and 3 million, continued to face serious
abuses. 
Key International Actors
The government continued to block access to Iran by the United Nations special
rapporteur on the human rights situation in Iran, Ahmed Shaheed, and other UN
rights bodies, but announced in November that they would allow two UN experts
to visit the country in 2015. The special rapporteur and other UN officials criti-
cized the “ongoing spike in executions” in Iran and urged the government to im-




Human rights conditions in Iraq deteriorated in 2014. Suicide attacks, car
bombs, and assassinations became more frequent and lethal, killing more than
12,000 people and injuring more than 22,000 between January and December.
Government forces’ attacks on largely peaceful demonstrations on December 20,
2013, helped trigger a renewal of armed conflict in Anbar province between local
residents, Iraqi security forces, and multiple armed groups. The fighting, which
has included indiscriminate attacks by government forces on civilian areas, dis-
placed close to 500,000 people from and within Anbar province between January
and September and killed an unknown number of civilians. 
The conflict spread north after the extremist group Islamic State, also known as
ISIS, took over Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, on June 10. The group has com-
mitted numerous atrocities in Iraq, including ongoing car bombings and suicide
attacks in civilian areas; summary executions; torture in detention; discrimina-
tion against women; forced marriage; sexual assault and slavery of some Yezidi
women and girls; destruction of religious property; and killings and kidnappings
of members of religious and ethnic minorities –Shia and Yezidis—in Nineveh
province.
Government security forces and pro-government militias carried out attacks on
civilians in Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shia areas, including kidnapping and sum-
mary executions, and were responsible for arbitrary arrests, disappearances,
and torture. 
In April, in the lead up to parliamentary elections, authorities closed media sta-
tions critical of the government and issued mandatory “guidelines” for journal-
ists prohibiting unfavorable coverage of government military and security
operations.
Elections on April 30 were largely peaceful but marred by irregularities, including
harassment and bribing of voters. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s State of Law
coalition won a plurality but Hayder al-Abadi, from the prime minister’s party, re-
placed Maliki as prime minister on September 9 as a result of waning support for
Maliki in the aftermath of the loss of Mosul to ISIS. Abadi formed a government
on the same day, but was unable to bring parties to agree on the appointment of
interior and defense ministers. 
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On September 14, Abadi order the air force to cease strikes on civilian areas even
where ISIS was present, but airstrikes continued in Fallujah and northern Iraq to
the end of the year. On September 7, US President Barack Obama authorized US
air strikes against ISIS at the request of the Iraqi government. As of December,
the US had carried out over 160 air strikes throughout the country.
According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, as of September 2014,
more than 900,000 Iraqis were internally displaced due to conflict. 
Attacks on Civilians 
Both government forces and armed groups were responsible for attacks that tar-
geted or indiscriminately harmed civilians. 
Indiscriminate air and artillery shelling by government forces killed numerous
civilians between February and December. Government forces battling armed
groups in Anbar repeatedly struck Fallujah General Hospital with mortar and ar-
tillery shells. 
Since early May, government forces dropped barrel bombs on residential neigh-
borhoods of Fallujah and surrounding areas, causing civilian casualties and forc-
ing thousands of residents to flee. 
Seventeen airstrikes, six of them involving barrel bombs, killed at least 75 peo-
ple in the first half of July. 
Abuses by Security Forces and Government-Backed Militias 
In March, former Prime Minister al-Maliki told senior security advisers that he
would form a new security force consisting of three militias: Asa’ib, Kita’ib
Hezbollah, and the Badr Brigades. These militias kidnapped and murdered
Sunni civilians throughout Baghdad, Diyala, and Hilla provinces, at a time when
the armed conflict between government forces and Sunni insurgents was intensi-
fying. 
According to witnesses and medical and government sources, pro-government
militias were responsible for the killing of 61 Sunni men between June 1 and July
9, 2014, and the killing of at least 48 Sunni men in March and April in villages
and towns in an area known as the “Baghdad Belt.” Dozens of residents of five
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towns in the Baghdad Belt said that security forces, alongside government-
backed militias, attacked their towns, kidnapping and killing residents and set-
ting fire to their homes, livestock, and crops. 
A survivor of an attack on a Sunni mosque in eastern Diyala province in August
said that members of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq entered the mosque during the Friday
prayer, shot and killed the imam, and then opened fire on the other men in the
mosque, killing at least 70 people. Three other Diyala residents reported that
Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq had kidnapped and killed their relatives. 
Iraqi security forces and militias affiliated with the government were responsible
for the unlawful execution of at least 255 prisoners in six Iraqi cities and towns in
June. The vast majority of security forces and militias are Shia, while the mur-
dered prisoners were Sunni. At least eight of those killed were boys under age 18.
Abuses by Armed Groups
ISIS took over the northern Iraqi city of Mosul on June 10, killing, kidnapping,
and threatening civilians, particularly religious and ethnic minorities. It report-
edly killed at least 40 Shia Turkmen, including children, and issued orders bar-
ring Kurdish, Yazidi and Christian employees from returning to their government
jobs. According to Shabak and Shia Turkmen leaders, ISIS killed seven Shabak
and at least four of the Turkmen it had taken prisoner. 
ISIS summarily executed large numbers of captured Shia security officers. In the
largest reported incident, ISIS captured more than a thousand soldiers fleeing
Camp Speicher, near Tikrit, then summarily executed at least 800 of them. 
Other anti-government Sunni armed groups fighting against the government, in-
cluding Ba’athists, the Naqshabandi Army, the Islamic Army, Jeish al-Mu-
jahideen, and groups of community-based fighters have also committed abuses
against civilians, sometimes fighting alongside ISIS and sometimes against ISIS.
In February, fighters from the Military Council, a group of local military leaders,





Freedom of Assembly 
On December 30, 2013, security forces attacked demonstrators in a public
square in Ramadi where Sunnis had gathered every Friday for a year to protest
perceived government abuses of the Sunni population. The attack left 17 people
dead and helped to trigger renewed conflict in Anbar province that continued
throughout the year. The army closed the main eastern, northern, and southern
checkpoints to Fallujah, and elsewhere in Anbar, refusing to allow people, medi-
cine, or food to enter or leave the city. 
The government failed to investigate the April 23, 2013 attack on a demonstra-
tion camp in Hawija in which soldiers, federal police, and SWAT forces fired on a
crowd of about 1,000 demonstrators, killing more than 50. 
Freedom of Expression
The Committee to Protect Journalists named Iraq the “worst nation” on its 2014
Impunity Index of unsolved journalist murders, noting that a resurgence of
armed groups “propelled a spike” in journalist killings. 
The government-run Communications and Media Commission issued “manda-
tory” guidelines on June 18 to regulate media “during the war on terror.” Article 1
forbids media from broadcasting or publishing material that “may be interpreted
as being against the security forces” and instead requires that they “focus on
the security achievements of the armed forces, by repetition throughout the
day.” This includes “praising the heroic acts of security personnel.” 
On June 21, the commission wrote to a media outlet that reported critically about
the government, warning that “if this kind of broadcasting is repeated” the com-
mission would revoke their license. On June 24, Egypt’s broadcast regulator
barred two privately owned Iraqi television stations based in Cairo from access
to Egypt’s main satellite system, after Egyptian officials received complaints
from Baghdad about the stations’ content. According to a staff member of one of
the channels, Al-Baghdadiyya, 16 police officers came to the station’s Baghdad
office around June 20, beat two guards so badly that they required hospitaliza-
tion, and confiscated some of the station’s equipment. 
On June 13, the central and Kurdish regional governments separately blocked so-
cial media platforms including Facebook, Twitter, Skype, and YouTube, and in
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some places tried to block the Internet completely. The government lifted the
ban intermittently throughout the rest of the year. 
Women’s and Girls’ Rights
On February 6, Human Rights Watch issued a report documenting how authori-
ties illegally detained women and subjected many to torture and ill-treatment,
including sexual abuse. Iraq’s judiciary frequently based convictions on coerced
confessions and trial proceedings fell far short of international standards, in-
cluding in cases against women. 
Authorities detained many women for months and even years before seeing a
judge. Women were frequently detained with their young children, who were de-
prived of access to education and adequate health care. The government has not
investigated these documented allegations of abuse. 
On February 25, Iraq’s Council of Ministers passed a draft Jaafari Personal Status
Law. As of December, parliament had not voted on the discriminatory legislation,
which would restrict women’s rights in matters of inheritance and parental and
other rights after divorce, make it easier for men to take multiple wives, and
allow girls to be married from age nine. 
Many Iraqi women, having lost their husbands as a result of armed conflict, gen-
eralized violence, and displacement, are vulnerable to trafficking for sexual ex-
ploitation and prostitution. The parliament passed a counter-trafficking law in
April 2012, but authorities have done little to enforce it. 
After it took over Mosul, ISIS kidnapped hundreds of Yezidi women and children,
and forced some young women and girls to marry its members. The group sys-
tematically separated unmarried women and girls as young as 12 from adult rela-
tives. Some women and girls were also subject to sexual assault and slavery. In
October, ISIS confirmed that they were enslaving women and attempted to pro-
vide religious justification for their actions. 
Refugees and Displacement
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Iraq continues
to receive large numbers of Syrian refugees, 500,000 since 2011, as well as the
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return of many Iraqi refugees from Syria. The conflict in Anbar displaced some
500,000 Iraqis. The Iraqi government prevented residents in many parts of Anbar
province from leaving areas where fighting is taking place and obstructed hu-
manitarian aid from getting in. 
Displaced persons within Iraq in December topped 1.9 million and many reside
in squatter settlements without access to necessities such as clean water, elec-
tricity, and sanitation, and the government has announced no plan for their re-
turn to their homes. 
Key International Actors 
Despite plentiful evidence that Iraqi security forces systematically abused de-
tainees and indiscriminately attacked civilian areas—abuses that increased in
the escalating conflict with ISIS and other armed groups—the US delivered two
shipments of weapons, including Hellfire missiles, after Prime Minister al-Maliki
visited Washington in December 2013. 
On August 7, President Obama authorized military strikes on ISIS forces in Iraq.
According to the US Department of Defense, as of September 20 the US had con-
ducted more than 160 strikes near Erbil, Amerli, Sinjar, the Mosul Dam, and Ha-
ditha. France, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates all also carried out air strikes,
ostensibly against ISIS targets, in September. 
US officials have not publicly called on the Iraqi government to investigate
abuses committed by security forces and pro-government militia, and has not
conditioned military support to Iraq on human rights reforms as required by US
law. 
On September 1, the UN Human Rights Council requested that the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights dispatch a fact-finding committee to inves-
tigate violations committed by ISIS and its associates. The council’s request




Israel and Hamas committed serious violations of the laws of war during fighting
in the Gaza Strip in July and August 2014. At least 2,100 Palestinians were killed,
of whom the United Nations identified more than 1,500 as civilians, and approxi-
mately 11,000 people, mostly civilians, were injured. The tens of thousands of Is-
raeli attacks caused the vast majority of destruction during the fighting, which
left uninhabitable 22,000 homes, displacing 108,000 people, and left hundreds
of thousands without adequate water or electricity. 
Hamas and Palestinian armed groups in Gaza carried out about 1,700 mortar at-
tacks and 4,800 indiscriminate rocket attacks on Israeli population centers dur-
ing the fighting. The attacks killed five civilians in Israel, wounded thirty-six, and
caused thousands of civilians in communities near Gaza to temporarily leave
their homes. Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense undoubtedly reduced the possi-
ble civilian toll. Sixty-six Israeli soldiers died during the fighting. 
Israel and Egypt continued their seven-year blockade of Gaza, which has had a
devastating impact on Gaza’s economy, infrastructure, and the free flow of peo-
ple and goods, particularly exports. In September, Israel agreed to allow more
imports to Gaza of goods needed for reconstruction, but severe restrictions on
exports and travel remain. 
Armed groups in Gaza in August summarily executed at least 25 Palestinians
whom they accused of collaborating with Israel. Hamas authorities in Gaza con-
ducted arbitrary arrests and tortured detainees. The authorities permitted some
local human rights organizations to operate, but suppressed political dissent,
freedom of association, and peaceful assembly. 
In 2014, Israeli forces killed 43 Palestinians in the West Bank, including East
Jerusalem, as of October 31, including unlawful killings of protesters and others
who posed no imminent threat to life. Following the June abduction and killing
by Palestinian suspects of three Israeli teenagers, Israeli authorities conducted
hundreds of apparently arbitrary arrests and punitively destroyed three family
homes. 
Israeli authorities demolished hundreds of homes under discriminatory policies
and practices, forcibly displacing hundreds of Palestinian residents in the West
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Bank, including East Jerusalem, as well as Bedouin citizens of Israel. Israeli au-
thorities took inadequate action against Israeli settlers who attacked Palestini-
ans and damaged their property in 307 incidents in 2014 as of December 1, the
UN reported. Israel continued to expand unlawful settlements in the occupied
West Bank and unlawfully appropriated 400 hectares of land. It also imposed se-
vere restrictions on Palestinians’ right to freedom of movement and arbitrarily
detained hundreds of Palestinians, including children and peaceful protesters. 
In the West Bank, Palestinian Authority (PA) security services beat peaceful
demonstrators, detained and harassed journalists, and arbitrarily detained hun-




The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched an aerial offensive in Gaza on July 8,
followed by a ground offensive on July 17. A ceasefire agreement was reached on
August 26. The UN has identified 538 children among the 1,563 Palestinian civil-
ians it counted as killed. 
Among other unlawful attacks, an Israeli attack on July 9 killed nine civilians, in-
cluding two boys, who had gathered to watch a televised World Cup game in a
beach café. An attack on July 16 killed four boys as they played on Gaza City
beach. Attacks striking UN schools serving as shelters for displaced people on
July 24 and 30 killed 32 people, including 9 children. An August 3 attacker ap-
parently targeting three Palestinian fighters on a motorbike chose to strike as
they were just outside a school housing displaced people killed 9 civilians, in-
cluding 8 children. 
Israeli aerial attacks killed two municipal workers cleaning up war damage in the
Bureij refugee camp on July 11. In late July, Israeli ground forces in Khuza`a used
civilians as human shields, fired at ambulances, and prevented them from
reaching the wounded, and shot and killed fleeing civilians. 
Israeli military operations severely damaged or destroyed 28 schools, dozens of
wells, two major sewage plants, and electricity and other civil infrastructure, ac-
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cording to the UN. Almost all Gaza residents lost access to running water and
electricity for days or weeks. 
There has been no real accountability for laws of war violations by either side.
The Israeli military opened about 100 probes into attacks by its forces in the
2014 fighting and referred 13 cases for criminal investigations, but the nearly
complete absence of criminal prosecutions resulting from self-investigations of
alleged war crimes committed in Gaza during the fighting in 2008-2009 and
2012 leaves little reason for expecting a different outcome. Hamas took no steps
to prosecute Palestinian combatants for indiscriminate and unlawful rocket and
mortar attacks at Israeli population centers in 2014 or for prior similar attacks. 
In July, the UN Human Rights Council established a Commission of Inquiry to ex-
amine alleged laws-of-war violations by all parties to the July-August fighting. In
November, Israel stated it would not cooperate with the Commission, alleging it
was biased. 
Blockade 
Israel’s continuing blockade of the Gaza Strip amounted to collective punish-
ment of the civilian population. Egypt also blocked all regular movement of
goods at the Rafah crossing, and severely restricted the movement of people
through the border. More than 80 percent of Gaza’s 1.8 million people receive
humanitarian assistance, and unemployment had reached 45 percent even be-
fore the July-August hostilities in which 128 workshops and businesses were de-
stroyed and another 291 damaged. 
Even before the 2014 fighting, Israeli imports to Gaza amounted to a mere 15
percent of 2006 levels (before the blockade). Again, even before the fighting,
the blockade had caused a shortage of 71,000 homes and 200 schools in Gaza,
according to the UN. 
Palestinian armed groups used construction materials, almost certainly im-
ported from Egypt, to build tunnels they used to launch attacks in Israel. To pre-
vent military use of concrete and steel bars, Israel and the Palestinian Authority
agreed to a monitoring mechanism for imports of the materials. By December,
imported materials fell drastically below the levels needed to rebuild civilian
homes and infrastructure destroyed during the summer fighting. Israel main-
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tained restrictions on commercial exports from Gaza without a similar security
rationale with severe economic consequences. 
After taking power in July 2013, Egypt’s military-backed government tightened re-
strictions on the movement of Palestinians between Gaza and Sinai, cutting the
number of Gaza residents passing through the crossing by two-thirds, to an aver-
age of 6,444 per month in the first half of 2014. Egypt did not permit regular im-
ports or exports of goods through Rafah. After an October attack by an armed
group killed 30 security forces north of the Sinai town of al-Arish, Egypt further
restricted border-crossings. 
“No-Go” Zones 
Before the July-August fighting, Israeli forces continued to shoot at Palestinian
civilians in the Israeli-declared “no-go” zone inside Gaza’s northern and eastern
borders and more than six nautical miles from Gaza’s shore. In the first half of
2014, Israeli forces killed four Palestinian civilians and wounded 87 at distances
up to 500 meters inside Gaza, the UN reported. 
Following the August 26 ceasefire, Israel eased its restrictions on Palestinian
fishermen, allowing them to fish up to six, rather than three, nautical miles from
shore. The closures still prohibited access to 70 percent of Gaza’s maritime area
as recognized under international law. In the first six months of 2014, Israeli
naval forces shot at or otherwise used force against fishermen 181 times, and
wounded eight, according to the UN. 
Hamas and Palestinian Armed Groups 
Palestinian armed groups launched more than 5,000 rockets and mortars into Is-
rael, killing 5 civilians, including 370 rockets before the escalation of fighting on
July 8, repeatedly forcing civilians in cities throughout Israel to seek protection in
shelters. The rockets launched by armed groups in Gaza cannot be accurately
aimed at military objectives and amount to indiscriminate or deliberate attacks
on civilians when directed at Israeli population centers, in violation of the laws
of war. 
During the July-August fighting, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees (UNRWA) discovered that Palestinian armed groups had stored rockets
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in three vacant schools run by UNWRA. Palestinian fighters endangered civilians
by launching rockets from populated areas. 
On August 21-23, Palestinian armed groups, most likely acting with Hamas’s ap-
proval, summarily executed 25 men in public who were accused of collaborating
with Israel. Armed groups took at least 16 of the men from Hamas-controlled
prisons. 
Hamas took no apparent steps to arrest or prosecute those responsible. 
The Internal Security Agency and Hamas police in Gaza tortured or ill-treated 338
people as of October 31, according to complaints received by the Independent
Commission for Human Rights (ICHR), a Palestinian rights body. 
Hamas security forces arbitrarily detained civil society activists, university pro-
fessors, and members of the rival Fatah political faction. 
West Bank 
Israel 
Israeli security forces fatally shot at least 43 Palestinian civilians, including 11
children, in the West Bank as of October 31, many in circumstances that suggest
the killings were unlawful. In May, Israeli forces killed Nadim Nuwarah, 17, and
Muhammad Abu Thahr, 16, during a Palestinian protest near Ofer, an Israeli mili-
tary base and prison in the West Bank. Videos showed that at the time he was
killed neither of the boys was throwing stones or posed any imminent threat to
life. In November, Israeli police arrested a Border Police official suspected of
killing Nuwarah unlawfully. 
Most of the killings occurred after June 11, when the Israeli military undertook
operations in response to the abduction and killing of three Israeli teenagers by
Palestinian suspects in the West Bank. Israeli forces conducted more than 1,200
raids on homes, offices, and businesses, often destroying personal property,
and arrested more than 500 people, many allegedly Hamas supporters. The men
were allegedly Hamas members, though there was no public evidence that
Hamas ordered the killings; the group praised the abduction but denied respon-
sibility for the teenagers’ murders. 
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Israeli forces used excessive force responding to protests by Palestinian resi-
dents of East Jerusalem after a group of Israelis abducted and burned alive a
Palestinian teenager in reprisal for the killing of the three Israeli teens. Under-
cover Israeli forces arrested and beat unconscious the murdered Palestinian’s
cousin, a United States citizen, and later raided his uncle’s home and arrested
him and other relatives, without apparent justification. In August, Israeli forces
punitively demolished the Hebron-area family homes of three men suspected in
the Israeli teens’ killing. In November, Israel punitively demolished the family
home of an East Jerusalem man who in October drove his car into a crowded
light rail station, killing an infant girl and a 22-year-old woman. 
In August, Israeli forces killed three men, including Hashem Abu Maria, who
worked with Defense for Children International–Palestine, after a protest in Beit
Ummar. None of the men posed an imminent threat to life at the time of their
killing. 
Israeli authorities failed to take adequate action against Israeli settlers who in-
jured Palestinians and destroyed or damaged Palestinian mosques, homes,
schools, cars, and other property. As of October 31, the UN reported 296 such at-
tacks in 2014, including 117 in which Palestinians were injured. 
Settlement Building and Discriminatory Home Demolitions 
In September, Israel declared 400 hectares of the West Bank “state land,” a
move settler leaders praised as paving the way for the construction of a large
new settlement in the area. Construction work began on 507 settlement housing
units during the first half of 2014, a decrease from the 1,807 begun during the
same period in 2013, according to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics. 
As of December 1, Israeli authorities demolished 552 Palestinian homes and
other buildings in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), displacing 1,170
people. Building permits are difficult or impossible for Palestinians to obtain in
East Jerusalem or in the 61 percent of the West Bank under exclusive Israeli con-
trol (Area C), whereas a separate planning process readily grants settlers new
construction permits in those areas. 
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Freedom of Movement 
Israel maintained onerous restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the
West Bank, including checkpoints and the separation barrier. Settlement-related
movement restrictions forced Palestinians to take time-consuming detours and
restricted their access to agricultural land. 
In one week in May, Israeli forces twice evicted all 62 residents of a Bedouin
community, Humsaal-Buqai’a, from their homes to allow “military training” exer-
cises lasting several hours, the UN reported. Israeli forces had displaced resi-
dents 14 times since 2012. 
Israel continued construction of the separation barrier around East Jerusalem.
Some 85 percent of the barrier’s route falls within the West Bank rather than
along the Green Line marking the pre-1967 border. The barrier separates Pales-
tinian farmers in 150 communities on the eastern side of the barrier from their
lands on the western side, the UN reported. 
Arbitrary Detention and Detention of Children 
Israeli security forces continued to arrest children suspected of criminal of-
fenses, usually stone-throwing, in their homes at night, at gunpoint; question
them without a family member or lawyer present; and coerce them to sign con-
fessions in Hebrew, which they do not understand. As of October 31, 163 Pales-
tinian children were in Israeli detention. 
As of October 31, Israel held 457 Palestinian administrative detainees without
charge or trial, based on secret evidence. Israeli prison authorities shackled hos-
pitalized Palestinians to their hospital beds after they went on long-term hunger
strikes to protest their administrative detention. 
Palestinian Authority (PA) 
Complaints of torture and ill-treatment by West Bank PA security services per-
sisted. The ICHR reported 108 complaints as of October 31. 
In April, PA security forces violently dispersed and arbitrarily detained peaceful
protesters in Ramallah. The PA continued to ban the distribution of two pro-
Hamas weekly newspapers in the West Bank. 
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Palestinian courts did not find any West Bank security officers responsible for
torture, arbitrary detention, or prior cases of unlawful deaths in custody. 
Attacks by Palestinian civilians injured 61 Israeli settlers in the West Bank as of
October 31, the UN reported. In addition to the three Israeli teenagers who were
killed in June, nine Israeli civilians were killed by Palestinians from August to De-
cember, including four men and a police officer killed during an attack in a
Jerusalem synagogue for which the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, a Palestinian
armed group, claimed responsibility. 
Palestinian governing authorities in the West Bank, as well as in Gaza, delegated
jurisdiction over personal status matters such as marriage and divorce to reli-
gious courts. In practice, women seeking marriage and divorce suffered discrimi-
nation. Courts required Muslim women to obtain a male relative’s consent to
marry and to obtain the husband’s consent to divorce except in limited cases. 
Israel
Bedouin citizens of Israel who live in “unrecognized” villages suffered discrimi-
natory home demolitions on grounds that their homes were built illegally. Israeli
authorities refused to prepare plans for the communities or approve construc-
tion permits, and rejected plans submitted by the communities themselves, but
retroactively legalized Jewish-owned private farms and planned new Jewish com-
munities in the same areas. The Supreme Court rejected a petition for the state
to provide “unrecognized” villages with greater security, such as bomb shelters
or coverage by Israel’s “Iron Dome” anti-rocket system, after rockets from Gaza
killed a man and severely wounded three children in Bedouin villages in July. 
As of June 1, according to the Israeli Bedouin rights group Dukium, Israeli author-
ities carried out 52 demolitions of Bedouin homes and property, including
ploughing up crops and demolishing protest tents in the village of al-Arakib,
where residential structures had been destroyed 64 times, as well as the vil-
lage’s cemetery. 
Many of the estimated 200,000 migrant workers in Israel continued to be ex-
cluded in practice from rights afforded to other workers, such as paid overtime,
under Israel’s Work Hours and Rest Law. From 2008 to 2013, 122 Thai migrant





turnal death syndrome,” which affects young and healthy Asian men, and 22 for
unknown reasons because police did not request a post-mortem, according to
government figures. 
Government policies restrict migrant workers from forming families by deporting
migrants who marry other migrants while in Israel, or who have children there. 
Around 60,000 African migrants and asylum seekers entered Israel irregularly
from Egypt since 2005, before Israel completed construction of a fence along its
border with Egypt, which prevented any new arrivals in 2014. Israel continued to
deny asylum seekers who entered the country irregularly the right to a fair asy-
lum process and detained around 2,500 people, primarily Eritrean and Sudanese
nationals. From 2013 through August 2014, some 8,000 Eritreans and Sudanese
under indefinite detention or the threat of indefinite detention “chose” to leave
Israel. 
Israel continued to delegate jurisdiction over marriage, divorce, and some other
aspects of personal status to Jewish, Muslim, Christian, and Druze religious
courts. In practice, women seeking divorces suffered discrimination, such as re-
fusal of divorce by state-funded Jewish religious courts without the husband’s
consent in up to 3,400 cases per year, according to women’s rights groups. The
government did not publish data on spouses denied divorce, but women were
reportedly the vast majority. 
Key International Actors
Palestine ratified core international human rights treaties, the Geneva Conven-
tions, and other treaties in April, following the collapse of US-sponsored peace
talks with Israel in the same month. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas took
no serious steps to obtain the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court for
grave crimes in the West Bank and Gaza. Israel, the US, and European states
pressured Abbas not to take such steps. Sweden recognized Palestine as a state
in its bilateral relations. 
In October, international donors allocated about half of pledges totaling $5.4 bil-
lion to humanitarian assistance to Gaza. Economists estimated the damage from
the fighting at more than $5 billion. 
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The US allocated a total of $4.1 billion in military aid to Israel in 2014, including
$1 billion in funding for anti-rocket and missile-defense systems, and $440 mil-
lion in assistance to Palestinian security forces and economic support to the PA. 
The EU allocated €130 million ($160 million) in direct financial support to the PA
and €450 million ($555 million) in development and security sector support to
the Palestinian territory for 2014. 
The EU in 2013 signed a memorandum of understanding with Israel that ensured
that no EU research and development funding would support Israeli settlement
businesses or activities. In 2014, it indicated it would ban some Israeli agricul-
tural imports unless Israel distinguished them from settlement products. Several
European government-run pension funds divested from Israeli businesses they





Jordan hosted over 618,000 Syrian refugees in 2014, although the authorities
tightened entry restrictions and limited new refugee arrivals. The authorities re-
fused entry to all Palestinian refugees escaping Syria and detained and forcibly
deported dozens of those who entered the country irregularly. The government
amended the State Security Court law to restrict the court’s jurisdiction to five
crimes, and broadened the anti-terrorism law to include provisions that threaten
freedom of expression. 
Freedom of Expression and Belief
Jordanian law criminalizes speech deemed critical of the king, government offi-
cials, and institutions, as well as Islam and speech considered defamatory of
others. In 2014, the authorities failed to amend the penal code to bring it into
compliance with constitutional free speech guarantees strengthened in 2011,
and continued to prosecute individuals on charges such as “insulting an official
body,” using vaguely worded penal code articles that place impermissible re-
strictions on free expression. 
In June, Jordan issued amendments to its 2006 Anti-Terrorism Law that broaden
the definition of terrorism and include acts such as “disturbing [Jordan’s] rela-
tions with a foreign state,” a charge already criminalized in the penal code that
is regularly used to punish peaceful criticism of foreign countries or their rulers.
The amendments remove the requirement of a connection to an act of violence,
instead including a vague definition that references acts that “sow discord” or
“disturb public order.” 
Pursuant to 2012 amendments to the Press and Publications Law, Jordan’s
Media Commission continued to censor independent news websites that failed
to obtain registration from the commission. On June 30, the Media Commission
blocked nine news websites, including an alternate domain name set up by citi-
zen journalism website 7iber, whose website authorities first blocked in June
2013. Some news websites such as 7iber refused to register in protest against





On June 6, police raided the headquarters of al-Abbasiya TV, an Amman-based
Iraqi opposition television channel, arresting 13 staff members, but later re-
leased them without charge. 
On August 17, police arrested Abd al-Hadi al-Majali, a columnist for the govern-
ment-owned Al-Ra’i newspaper, after a he wrote a Facebook post that criticized
security officials and cursed the country. An Amman court released him on bail
August 24, but he faces trial on the charge of “disclosing state secrets” (penal
code article 355). 
In January, a court convicted four students from Al al-Bayt University in Mafraq
on the charge of “insulting a religious symbol” and sentenced them to one
month in prison. Prosecutors alleged that their style of dress and musical tastes
indicated that they were “devil worshippers.” 
Freedom of Association and Assembly
Since the amended Public Gatherings Law took effect in March 2011, Jordanians
no longer require government permission to hold public meetings or demonstra-
tions. However, Amman hotels and other venues continued to seek the General
Intelligence Directorate’s permission to host public meetings and events. 
The State Security Court delivered judgments in cases against political activists
and demonstrators arising from protests in 2011 and 2012. In most cases, the
court threw out the charge “undermining the political regime,” a terrorism
charge under the penal code, and issued convictions on lesser charges carrying
three-month jail sentences, which can be substituted with a fine under Jordanian
law. 
In January, the government amended the State Security Court law to restrict the
court’s jurisdiction to terrorism, espionage, treason, money counterfeiting, and
drugs offences. This would bring the court into compliance with article 101 of the
constitution, which allows military judges to try civilians only for these five
groups of crimes; however, as the penal code classifies vaguely worded offenses
such as “undermining the political regime” as terrorism, the court will still be




By November, over 618,000 persons from Syria had sought refuge in Jordan
since 2011, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). Of these, approximately 81,000 were housed at the Zaatari Refugee
Camp in northern Jordan, down from over 200,000 in 2013, and 3,900 others
were at the Emirates-Jordan camp in Zarqa Governorate. The remaining refugees
were living outside the camps. In April, Jordan opened a new camp for Syrian
refugees near al-Azraq, around 100 kilometers east of Amman, where authorities
began placing newly arrived Syrian refugees. When completed, the camp will
have the capacity to host 130,000 refugees, though by November only 11,700
were residing in the camp. 
In 2014, Jordanian security forces continued to turn away Palestinian refugees
seeking to enter Jordan from Syria at the country’s borders. Security forces also
detained and deported Palestinians who entered at unofficial border crossings
using forged Syrian identity documents, or who entered illegally via smuggling
networks. Officially, Jordan allowed Palestinians from Syria who hold Jordanian
citizenship to enter, but in practice Jordan denied entry to such Palestinians
whose Jordanian documents had expired, in some cases arbitrarily stripping
them of their Jordanian citizenship and forcibly returning them to Syria. 
In 2014, the International Labour Organization (ILO) issued two reports highlight-
ing the prevalence of child labor in Jordan, and Jordan’s Ministry of Labor re-
ported that the number of Syrian refugee child laborers had doubled over the
previous year, up to 60,000. 
Jordan hosted over 70,000 migrant domestic workers in 2014, mostly from the
Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. Nongovernmental organizations repeat-
edly referred domestic workers who had suffered multiple abuses to labor min-
istry investigators who, however, rarely classified them as victims of the crime of
trafficking. Instead, they treated each aspect of abuse such as non-payment of




Women’s and Girls’ Rights 
Jordan’s personal status code remains discriminatory despite a 2010 amend-
ment, which included widening women’s access to divorce and child custody.
Marriages between Muslim women and non-Muslims, for instance, are not rec-
ognized. 
Article 9 of Jordan’s nationality law does not allow Jordanian women married to
foreign-born spouses to pass on their nationality to their spouse and children. In
November, the cabinet said it would direct government ministries to grant spe-
cial privileges to non-citizen children of Jordanian women, including free educa-
tion and access to health services in government institutions. The privileges,
however, do not apply to children whose mothers have not resided in Jordan for
a minimum of five years, and do not guarantee residency permits. 
Despite a minimum age of marriage set at 18, child marriage continued in Jor-
dan, including in the Syrian refugee community. 
Penal code articles 98 and 340, which allow reduced sentences for perpetrators
of “honor crimes,” remained in force. News reports indicated that at least 10
women and girls were killed by male family members in 2014, including Batool
Haddad, a Christian-born woman whose father and brother killed her after she
converted to Islam. 
Torture, Police Violence, and Administrative Detention
Perpetrators of torture or other ill-treatment continued to enjoy near-total im-
punity due to the authorities’ reliance on special police prosecutors and judges
to investigate allegations against, prosecute, and try fellow officers. At the Police
Court, where many such cases are heard, two out of three sitting judges are serv-
ing police officers appointed by the police. To date, no police or intelligence offi-
cer has ever been convicted of torture under article 208 of the penal code. 
In June, the State Security court exonerated prominent Salafi cleric Omar Uth-
man, known as Abu Qatada, of terrorism charges stemming from a 1998 plot to
bomb several targets in Amman, including an American school. During the pro-
ceedings the court admitted into evidence a confession allegedly obtained
through torture in contravention of a treaty it signed with the United Kingdom
stating that such confessions could not be admitted into the record without prior
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justification. In September, the court exonerated Abu Qatada on all charges
stemming from a second separate terrorism plot and released him. 
The authorities failed to investigate credible allegations of excessive use of force
by police while dispersing protests. Eight journalists reported that riot police
beat them as they covered the dispersal of a July 9 protest near the Israeli em-
bassy in Amman calling for the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador over Israeli
airstrikes on Gaza. The Public Security Directorate announced an independent
investigation, bypassing the normal complaint procedure, but its outcome was
unknown at time of writing. 
Local governors continued to use provisions of the Crime Prevention Law of 1954
to place individuals in administrative detention for up to one year in circumven-
tion of the Criminal Procedure Law. 
Key International Actors
In February, the United States announced the renewal of a five-year aid package
to Jordan through 2019, which provides a minimum of US$360 million in eco-
nomic assistance, and $300 million in foreign military financing annually. The
US granted an additional $340 million in 2014 for “costs related to instability in
the region, including for security requirements along the border with Iraq.” The
US did not publicly criticize human rights violations in Jordan in 2014 except in
annual reports. 
The European Union continued to disperse funds from a 2012 pledge of 230.9
million Euros ($298 million) to Jordan for refugee support. 
In May, Saudi Arabia announced three memorandums of understanding with Jor-




Kazakhstan heavily restricts freedom of assembly, speech, and religion. In 2014,
authorities closed newspapers, jailed or fined dozens of people after peaceful
but unsanctioned protests, and fined or detained worshipers for practicing reli-
gion outside state controls. Government critics, including opposition leader
Vladimir Kozlov, remained in detention after unfair trials. 
In mid-2014, Kazakhstan adopted new criminal,criminal executive, criminal pro-
cedural, and administrative codes, and a new law on trade unions, which con-
tain articles restricting fundamental freedoms and are incompatible with
international standards. Torture remains common in places of detention. 
Legal Reforms
Rights groups, diplomats, and international bodies raised concerns that the
criminal and administrative codes that Kazakhstan adopted contain key articles
that would restrict fundamental speech, assembly, association, and religious
freedoms. 
In July, the European Union, United States, and United Kingdom issued state-
ments of concern, saying the codes could “negatively affect” or “limit” funda-
mental freedoms. Human rights groups called President Nursultan Nazarbaev to
veto the bills. 
Civil Society
Civil society activist Vadim Kuramshin continues to serve a 12-year prison sen-
tence, despite procedural violations during his trial and concerns that his sen-
tencing in December 2012 was retribution for public criticism of the government.
Kuramshin staged a short hunger strike in June to demand medical attention and
transfer to a different colony, alleging other inmates beat and harassed him. 
On November 19, labor activist Rosa Tuletaeva was released on parole from the
penal colony where she had been serving her five-year prison sentence. In
March, labor activist Maksat Dosmagambetov, who is serving a six-year sen-
tence, was transferred to a penal colony, affording him more freedoms than a
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prison. Dosmagambetov underwent an operation in 2014 to remove a tumor in
his cheekbone that developed after he was imprisoned. 
In March, political opposition leader Vladimir Kozlov was transferred from a
prison in north Kazakhstan to one outside Almaty, close to his residence. In May,
an Almaty court upheld orders to confiscate Kozlov’s apartment, where his wife
and infant son were living, despite legislation preventing the confiscation of a
person’s sole property. 
On July 2, authorities detained Zinaida Mukhortova, a lawyer, after Kazakhstan’s
Supreme Court upheld a ruling to put her in involuntary psychiatric detention.
Mukhortova has been repeatedly subject to forced psychiatric detention since
2009, when she alleged a member of parliament from the ruling party interfered
in a civil case in which she was involved. On September 18, the United States
called on Kazakhstan to immediately release Mukhortova. 
After a January court ruling to extradite Mukhtar Ablyazov to Russia and Ukraine
was annulled, another French court in September again ruled to extradite
Mukhtar Ablyazov to both countries. His lawyers have challenged the decision,
but at time of writing, his case had not been reviewed. In December 2013, six
months after they were forcibly taken to Kazakhstan, Ablyazov’s wife and daugh-
ter were permitted to return to Italy, where they were granted asylum. 
On March 11, financial police searched the office of Aman Saulyk, a health and
human rights group, and confiscated equipment in connection with a criminal in-
vestigation into allegations of “use of funds obtained through illegal means.” 
Freedom of Expression
Despite widespread calls to decriminalize libel and amend the overbroad crimi-
nal offense of “inciting social, national, clan, racial, or religious discord,” au-
thorities increased sanctions for these offenses in the new criminal code. The
government also adopted implementing legislation in January that excessively
restricts freedom of expression during states of emergency. In April, the govern-
ment also introduced criminal charges for “spreading false information.” 
Independent and opposition media continued to face harassment and interfer-
ence in their work. In April, police tried to block journalists from covering a
protest outside the Prosecutor General’s office in Astana. A Radio Free
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Liberty/Radio Europe journalist was jailed for four days on hooliganism charges
after covering an anti-Eurasian Economic Union meeting in May. 
Media watchdog AdilSoz reported an increase in civil and criminal defamation
cases in the first half of 2014, including cases against Internet project Insider-
man Editor-in-Chief Valeriy Surganov, and former Assandi Times journalist Na-
talya Sadykova. 
Courts closed the newspaper Pravdivaya Gazeta in February and the Assandi
Times in April. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Media Freedom Representative Dunja Mijatovi described the closure of Pravdi-
vaya Gazeta as “curb[ing] media pluralism.” 
Websites, including LiveJournal.com, were blocked at times in 2014. At time of
writing, the criminal case against Aleksandr Kharlamov, a journalist, for “inciting
religious discord” remained open, although he was released from pretrial deten-
tion in 2013. 
In a ruling that chills freedom of expression and condones homophobia, an Al-
maty court in late October awarded 34 million tenge (US$187,000) in damages
against Havas Worldwide Kazakhstan, an advertising agency, for a poster featur-
ing Kazakh composer Sagyrbauly Kurmangazy kissing Russian poet Aleksander
Pushkin. In September, the agency had been separatelyfined 314 thousand
tenge ($1,730) after a court found the same poster “unethnical.” 
Torture
National Preventative Mechanism Coordination Council monitors began deten-
tion visits in 2014. Some police officers faced charges of torture, but impunity re-
mains the norm. According to media reports, on several occasions in 2014,
detainees’ relatives publicly raised concerns about mass beatings and ill-treat-
ment in detention. At its November review of Kazakhstan,the United Nations
Committee Against Torture (CAT) expressed concern about the gap between law
and practice and continued impunity for torture. 
The committee found Kazakhstan responsible for torture and failure to investi-
gate in the cases of Oleg Evloev in November 2013 and Rasim Bairamov in May
2014. In both cases, the committee urged Kazakhstan to investigate the com-
plainant’s allegations, provide redress, and ensure full and adequate reparation.
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On July 30, the Prosecutor’s Office opened a criminal case into Bairamov’s tor-
ture allegations. 
Mukhtar Dzhakishev, the former president of the state-owned nuclear company
imprisoned on embezzlement and fraud charges, alleged that prison officials
beat him after his transfer to a penal colony in February. Authorities denied the
allegations. In March, the UN Human Rights Committee requested that Kaza-
khstan “take all necessary measures to protect Mr. Dzhakishev’s health.” 
Freedom of Religion
Minority religious groups continued to be subjected to fines and short-term de-
tention in 2014 for violating a restrictive religion law. According to Forum18, a re-
ligious freedom watchdog, as of July, 12 people had been jailed and over 45
people fined. In July, an Almaty court imprisoned five men for up to seven-and-a-
half years in connection with their membership in the banned religious organiza-
tion Hizb ut-Tahrir. 
In February, an Astana court released Protestant pastor Bakhytzhan Kashkum-
baev after handing him a four-year suspended sentence for “intentionally inflict-
ing grievous bodily harm” on a congregation member. 
On April 4, after his mission to Kazakhstan, the UN special rapporteur on free-
dom of religion recommended “far-reaching reforms” to the 2011 religion law,
finding, for example, that “non-registered religious communities … suffer from
serious infringements of their freedom of religion.” 
Freedom of Assembly
Authorities took no steps to amend a restrictive law on public assemblies and
throughout 2014 detained and fined people for organizing or participating in
peaceful protests. In February, for example, police in Almaty broke up small-
scale protests, including a one-person protest by an Almaty-based blogger.On
September 26, police broke up a four-person protest against a Baikonur rocket
launch outside the Russian embassy in Astana. The participants were later fined. 
In 2014, the rights group Ar.Rukh.Khak filed 32 individual complaints with the
UN Human Rights Committee concerning violations of the right to peaceful as-
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sembly in Kazakhstan. At time of writing, 11 of the complaints had been regis-
tered for consideration by the Human Rights Committee. 
Labor Rights
In June, Kazakhstan adopted a new restrictive law on trade unions despite re-
peated calls by independent unions to amend the draft to bring it in line with in-
ternational human and labor rights standards. In addition, provisions in the new
criminal code further limit workers’ right to strike. One such provision is the in-
troduction of criminal sanctions for calling on workers to continue a strike de-
clared illegal by courts. 
Other legislation governing the organization, financing, and collective bargain-
ing rights of trade unions remain restrictive. In some instances, authorities inter-
fered in independent trade union activity. For example, the Almaty-based
independent union of journalists has repeatedly been denied registration on
technical grounds, most recently in November 2014. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
In late 2013 and again in early 2014, several parliamentarians called for the
adoption of legislation banning propaganda of homosexuality. At time of writing,
no bill had been proposed for consideration. 
Key International Actors
In March 2014, a European Parliament resolution noted that “the human rights
situation in [Kazakhstan] has deteriorated” since the violent end to extended
labor strikes in Zhanaozen in December 2011. In October, the leaders of the EU
and Kazakhstan announced the completion of the negotiations for an Enhanced
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The EU failed to use the negotiations to
secure human rights reforms despite pledges to that effect made previously by
then-foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton, and as called for in EP resolutions. 
The United States remains largely muted on human rights concerns in Kaza-
khstan. Public comments by Assistant Secretary of State Nisha Biswal in April
and Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns in May focused on security, com-
329
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
mercial, and energy aspects of the bilateral relationship and its role in support
of the US mission in Afghanistan. 
In October, Kazakhstan underwent its second Universal Periodic Review at the
UN Human Rights Council. Kazakhstan accepted a number of recommendations,
including to abolish the death penalty, but rejected others, including to review
the religion law, amend the trade union law, release Zinaida Mukhortova, de-
criminalize defamation, and remove restrictions on freedom of assembly. 
In its March concluding observations, the UN Committee on Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women called on Kazakhstan to ensure effective
investigations into complaints of violence against women and appropriate sanc-
tions for perpetrators. 
In March, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination urged
Kazakhstan to continue efforts to adopt a comprehensive anti-discrimination
law; expressed concern about “the overly broad” charge of “inciting social, na-
tional, clan, racial, or religious discord,” saying it could “lead to unnecessary or
disproportionate interference with freedom of expression”; and called on Kaza-




Kenya’s efforts to tackle a wide array of security threats have been marred by on-
going patterns of serious human rights violations by Kenyan security forces, in-
cluding extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, and torture. Despite evidence
of these abuses, the government rarely investigates or prosecutes abusive secu-
rity officers. 
The government has been slow in implementing key reforms that were identified
in 2008 as crucial to addressing Kenya’s political crisis , including land and ac-
countability, and security sector reforms. There has been no tangible progress on
accountability for crimes committed during the post-elections violence of 2007-
8, which left at least 1,100 dead and 650,000 displaced. President Uhuru Keny-
atta, his deputy William Ruto, and journalist Joshua arap Sang faced charges at
the International Criminal Court (ICC) for their role in the violence; in early De-
cember, the charges against President Uhuru Kenyatta were dropped, amid con-
cerns over widespread intimidation of witnesses.
The government signaled its intention to introduce new restrictions on non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and passed a law that increases the execu-
tive branch’s control over the police service. Human rights activists and civil
society groups reported harassment and threats for their work on justice and ac-
countability. 
Abuses by Government Security Forces
Kenyan security forces conducted several abusive counterterrorism operations in
Nairobi, on the coast, and in North Eastern region in 2014 following attacks and
intercommunal clashes. The operations largely targeted ethnic Somali and Mus-
lim communities. 
During the Usalama Watch operation in Nairobi and Mombasa in April, security
officers from multiple agencies raided homes, buildings, and shops, carting
away money, cell phones, and other goods. They harassed and detained thou-
sands—including journalists, refugees, Kenyan citizens, and international aid
workers—without charge, and in appalling conditions for periods well beyond





Various police units have also been implicated in the torture, disappearance,
and unlawful killing of alleged terrorism suspects and individuals of Somali ori-
gin, Somali refugees, and Muslims in Mombasa, Nairobi, North Eastern region,
and other parts of the country. 
In August, Human Rights Watch found evidence of at least 10 cases of extrajudi-
cial killings of terrorism suspects by the Anti Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU). Some
of the victims who were last seen in ATPU custody, had been threatened by the
unit’s officers after being released by courts, or had received death threats from
ATPU officers they recognized. 
Suspects were shot dead in public places, abducted from vehicles and court-
rooms, severely beaten during arrest, detained in isolated blocks, and denied
contact with their families or access to lawyers. In some cases, members of the
anti-riot forces known as the General Service Unit (GSU), military intelligence,
and National Intelligence Service (NIS) were also implicated in abuses alongside
the ATPU. 
Kenyan police have been implicated in hundreds of extrajudicial killings over the
past six years, but police have frequently failed to make a report to the Inde-
pendent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA), a civilian oversight authority, a legal
requirement that facilitates investigations. 
IPOA has made some progress since it was founded three years ago: it charged a
police officer in Nairobi in September for the extrajudicial killing of two brothers
who allegedly engaged in criminal activities, and, in August 2014, successfully
went to court to nullify a nationwide police recruitment exercise over widespread
and systematic corruption. 
Lack of Accountability
Accountability mechanisms introduced under the 2010 constitution remain weak
and have not been adequately supported by the executive arm of government.
For example, although the IPOA issued a public report about the Usalama Watch
operation describing 29 complaints of police abuses, those responsible have
not been disciplined or prosecuted. 
Authorities have rarely investigated or prosecuted police officers, including
members of the APTU, alleged to be responsible for killings. A spate of brutal
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gang attacks on villages in Bungoma and Busia counties in March 2013 left 10
people dead and over 100 seriously wounded. The violence, which marred the
national elections and pointed to the government’s failure to dismantle criminal
gangs often linked to political actors, has gone unpunished. 
The response to major incidents such as the September 2013 attack on Nairobi’s
upscale Westgate mall, which left 67 people dead, has been poor, with authori-
ties failing to follow up on the promise to investigate security lapses and the
botched security force response that saw officers from different agencies shoot-
ing at each other during the terrorist attack. 
The government has made no progress regarding accountability for the post-
election violence of 2007-2008. At time of writing, President Kenyatta, his
deputy William Ruto, and former radio journalist Joshua arap Sang faced charges
of crimes against humanity at the ICC for their alleged roles in the violence. 
While Ruto and Sang’s trial began in September 2013, Kenyatta’s trial has been
postponed several times and had yet to start at time of writing, due to witness
withdrawals and lack of cooperation from the Kenya government. 
Treatment of Refugees
Following a series of grenade and gun attacks in Nairobi’s Eastleigh neighbor-
hood and Mombasa in March that killed 12 people and injured 8 others, Kenyan
police responded in April and May with widespread abuses, including round
ups, torture, detentions of at least 4,000 people, extortion, deportations, and
beatings of mainly ethnic Somali Kenyans and Somali refugees. 
Kenyan authorities deported 359 Somali and other nationals, including at least
three registered refugees, in April and May. The authorities did not allow United
Nations or other independent organizations to monitor the screening process,
carried out at Nairobi’s Kasarani stadium, or challenge deportations to conflict-
ridden Somalia. 
Detainees were beaten and held in appalling conditions. In Eastleigh’s Pangani
station, hundreds of detainees were packed into cells designed for just 20 peo-
ple. Detainees had no room to sit; cells were filthy with urine and excrement. Po-
lice also held detainees beyond the 24-hour limit proscribed under Kenyan law,
without taking them to court. 
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The operation followed a March 2014 government directive ordering urban
refugees to relocate to the overcrowded refugee camps. In July 2013, the High
Court had ruled that an almost identical encampment order violated refugees’
freedom of movement and right to dignity as enshrined in the Kenyan constitu-
tion. But in June, the High Court upheld the reissued directive, and expressed no
concern that it would violate these same fundamental rights and freedoms, al-
though the factual situation remained the same. 
Civil Society and Human Rights Defenders
Since early 2013, civil society groups advocating for justice for the victims of
2007-2008 post-election violence and victims of police extrajudicial killings
have faced increasing pressure from government and security officials. 
During their 2013 election campaign on the Jubilee party ticket, Kenyatta and
Ruto accused civil society actors and human rights defenders of serving foreign
interests by supporting the ICC. The Jubilee manifesto proposed restricting NGO
funding from foreign sources, and the government has since introduced amend-
ments to the Public Benefits Organizations (PBO) Act, 2013, seeking to increase
government control over the public benefits authority. 
Incidents of intimidation and harassment of NGOs, activists, and perceived wit-
nesses for the ICC increased in 2014. In March, police stopped a meeting of a
media NGO with Nakuru residents, arrested and detained the NGO officials and
participants briefly, and questioned them on whether the meeting was about the
ICC. 
On November 24, 2013, the Uasin Gishu county deputy governor stopped a meet-
ing in Eldoret convened by a peace and security NGO. In December 2013, one for-
mer and one current official of Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) received
death threats following the release of the organization’s joint report with Open
Society Justice Initiative on extrajudicial killing and disappearance of terrorism
suspects by Kenyan security forces. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Existing Kenyan law criminalizes same-sex conduct with up to 14 years’ impris-
onment. In the coastal county of Mombasa, the municipal by-laws provide fur-
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ther criminal sanctions against “homosexuality.” These criminal sanctions
against same-sex conduct exacerbate abuses by police and other state agents,
who subject LGBTI persons to harassment, extortion, arbitrary arrest and deten-
tion without charge or on trumped up charges, denial of services, sexual assault,
and rape. 
Although these laws are rarely enforced, Kenya’s LGBT community continue to
experience intolerance and discrimination from members of the community, reli-
gious leaders, and politicians. In August, the Republican Liberty Party sought to
introduce a law banning all forms of same-sex conduct with maximum sentences
of life imprisonment and death by stoning for “homosexuality” and “aggravated
homosexuality” respectively. The bill was before the Parliamentary Committee
on Justice and Legal affairs for review pending tabling before the house for debate.
Key International Actors
Kenya’s relations with some European nations deteriorated in 2014, but Western
governments have refrained from clear, public backing for accountability. In
2013, Kenyatta responded to Western criticism of Kenya’s lack of accountability
by warming up to Russia and China. The Kenyatta administration improved trade
ties with these two nations, and in late 2013, Kenya signed a loan agreement
worth US$5 billion with China. 
Kenyatta visited the United Kingdom in 2013 and the United States in August and
September 2014 during the US-Africa Summit and the UN General Assembly. Dur-
ing the US-Africa Summit, the US government announced a Security Governance
Initiative (SGI) of up to $65 million that would benefit six African countries, in-
cluding Kenya. 
The Kenyatta adminsitration said Kenya would prioritize relations with African
nations, following attempts to seek African Union’s (AU) backing for Kenya’s
anti-ICC campaigns. In 2013, the AU passed a resolution calling for sitting heads
of state to have immunity from prosecution before international courts, urging
the Kenyan president not to appear before the ICC. In July 2014, the AU approved
immunity for some senior officials in a newly adopted protocol to extend the ju-





The government aggressively cracked down on free speech throughout 2014,
using provisions in the constitution, the national security law, and other legisla-
tion to stifle political dissent. The authorities stripped 33 Kuwaitis of their na-
tionality, including three who appeared to have been targeted because they
represented opposition voices. 
Freedom of Expression
The authorities used several laws to prosecute at least 13 people in 2014 for criti-
cizing the government or institutions in blogs or on Twitter, Facebook, or other
social media. These included the constitution and penal code, laws on printing
and publishing, public gatherings, and misuse of telephone communications,
and the National Unity Law of 2013. Those accused faced charges such as harm-
ing the honor of another person; insulting the emir or other public figures or the
judiciary; insulting religion; planning or participating in illegal gatherings; and
misusing telephone communications. Other charges included harming state se-
curity, inciting the government’s overthrow, and harming Kuwait’s relations with
other states. In 2014, courts convicted at least five of those charged, imposing
prison sentences of up to five years and fines. 
The government took sweeping new powers to block content, deny access to the
Internet, and revoke service providers’ licenses without giving reasons under a
new telecommunications law adopted in May. The law imposes severe penalties
on people who create or send “immoral” messages, and gives unspecified au-
thorities the power to suspend communication services on national security
grounds. Any communication service provider that “contributes” to the dissemi-
nation of messages that violate these vague standards can be punished. The law
provides no opportunity for judicial review.
The government adopted a new method to penalize some critics. Between July
and September, it revoked the citizenship of 33 individuals, three apparently for
political reasons. The revocation process allows no room for appeal or review. 
On July 21, a week after it demanded that authorities take action against people
engaged in “acts aiming to undermine the country’s security and stability, bring-
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ing harm to its institutions,” the cabinet stripped five Kuwaitis of their citizen-
ship. One of the five, Ahmed Jabr al-Shammari, owned media outlets that had
defied a government ban. He tried to appeal the decision but the Kuwaiti court
ruled that it had no jurisdiction over citizenship revocations. On August 11, the
government said it had revoked the citizenship of 10 more Kuwaitis, including
Nabil al-Awadhi, a conservative cleric widely known for his TV talk shows.
On September 29, a new round of revocations included Saad al-Ajmi, the
spokesman for Musalam al-Barrak, a leading opposition politician.
The Law of Nationality, 15/1959, allows the authorities to revoke the citizenship
of any Kuwaiti, and their dependants, and deport them under certain circum-
stances. For example the authorities can revoke a person’s citizenship if they
consider it in the “best interest” of the state or its external security, or if they
have evidence that the person concerned has promoted principles that under-
mine the country’s wellbeing. Citizenship can also be revoked if it was obtained
fraudulently or if a court convicts a naturalized citizen of a crime related to honor
or dishonesty within 15 years of becoming a Kuwaiti.
The government resorted to deportations to remove non-citizens of whom it dis-
approved. In June, authorities deported an Egyptian imam and his wife and chil-
dren after he denounced the 2014 Egyptian presidential election in a sermon
that he delivered in a Kuwait mosque. The authorities deported him and his fam-
ily after the Religious Endowments Ministry issued regulations banning “interfer-
ence in the domestic affairs of other countries” in sermons.
Treatment of Minorities
At least 105,702 Bidun residents of Kuwait remained stateless. 
After an initial registration period for citizenship ended in 1960, authorities
shifted Bidun citizenship claims to administrative committees that for decades
have avoided resolving the claims. Authorities claim that many Bidun are “illegal
residents” who deliberately destroyed evidence of another nationality in order to
get the generous benefits that Kuwait provides to its citizens. 
Members of the Bidun community frequently take to the streets to protest the
government’s failure to address their citizenship claims, despite government
warnings that Bidun should not gather in public. Article 12 of the 1979 Public
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Gatherings Law bars non-Kuwaitis from participating in public gatherings. At
least seven were arrested for taking part in protests in 2014. 
Women’s Rights
In March and April 2014, the Justice Ministry prohibited women, but not men,
from applying for legal researcher posts until the two-year evaluation of the first
group of women admitted in 2013 is completed. A legal researcher post allows
women for the first time to become eligible, pending evaluation, for posts as
prosecutors, enabling them thereafter to pursue careers as judges. In April 2014,
a court struck down the Justice Ministry’s order and 21 women have now been
admitted. 
Women continue to face discrimination in many aspects of their lives, and large
legal gaps remain in protections for women. Kuwait has no laws prohibiting do-
mestic violence, sexual harassment, or marital rape. Legislation proposed in
April to penalize sexual harassment had still to be debated by November 2014.
Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis, unlike Kuwaiti men, cannot pass on
their citizenship to their children or spouses. Kuwaiti law also prevents a woman
marrying a partner of her choice without her father’s permission. 
Migrant Workers
Recognizing the vulnerabilities of foreign migrant workers, particularly domestic
workers who are excluded from the Labour Law or any other legal regime, in 2013
the authorities opened a shelter for domestic workers who flee abusive employ-
ers. Inadequate staffing prevented the shelter from becoming fully operational
and providing in-house services. Designed to accommodate up to 700 people,
the shelter had 210 women residing there in September 2014. The shelter ac-
cepts victims on referral from a foreign embassy or international organization.
Victims are not able to leave the shelter unescorted if they want to return to the
shelter. 
Terrorism
Extremist militant groups Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State, also known as
ISIS, are responsible for systematic rights abuses, including the intentional tar-
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geting and abduction of civilians during military operations in Syria and Iraq in
2014. Media reports indicate that ISIS members have included Kuwaiti nationals,
and that individual Kuwaitis have financed and supported ISIS and Jabhat al-
Nusra military operations. 
In August, Kuwait announced new measures to curb funding for extremists.
These included banning all fundraising in mosques, requiring greater trans-
parency from charities regarding the sources and destinations of their dona-
tions, and obtaining receipts.
On August 6, the US Treasury department sanctioned three Kuwaitis for funding
extremist militant groups in Syria and Iraq, by freezing any US-based assets and
banning US citizens from doing business with them. 
Key International Actors
The parliament debated whether Kuwait should become party to the 2012 Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) joint security agreement in response to government
pressure to ratify it. On April 3, the parliament’s foreign affairs committee re-
jected the agreement, with a majority asserting that it violates Kuwait’s constitu-
tion. The 20 provisions of GCC agreement could be used to suppress free
expression and undermine privacy rights of citizens and residents. 
The United States, in its 2014 US State Department annual Trafficking in Persons
report, classified Kuwait as Tier 3—among the most problematic countries—for
the eighth consecutive year. The report cited Kuwait’s failure to prosecute traf-
ficking offenders using the 2013 anti-trafficking law or other laws that address
trafficking crimes. It found that efforts to help abused workers were not accom-
panied by any enforcement activities against the employers from whom the





Discriminatory legislative proposals, including related to “foreign agents” and
“homosexual propaganda,” persistent impunity for ill-treatment and torture, and
shortcomings in law enforcement and the judiciary undermine and erode demo-
cratic progress that Kyrgyzstan has made in recent years. Impunity for violence
and discrimination against women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) people remains pervasive. Freedom of expression and assembly also suf-
fered setbacks in 2014. 
Attacks on defendants and lawyers in courts continued in 2014. Rights defender
Azimjon Askarov remained wrongfully imprisoned at time of writing, despite his
renewed attempts during the year to have a court review his case. 
Access to Justice
Since the outbreak of ethnic violence in June 2010, Kyrgyzstan’s flawed justice
process has produced long prison sentences for mostly ethnic Uzbeks after con-
victions marred by torture-tainted confessions and other due process violations.
Seven further cases related to crimes committed during the violence are pend-
ing, including that of a man detained in July 2014. All defendants are ethnic
Uzbeks, reinforcing concerns of judicial bias. 
Impunity for violent physical and verbal attacks at some hearings continued in
2014, undermining defendants’ fair trial rights. After a January hearing in the
case of Mahamad Bizurukov, an ethnic Uzbek defendant standing trial for June
2010-related crimes, the United States embassy issued a statement expressing
deep concern. 
On August 11, Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Court declined to grant Turkish national
Ahmet Gunan a retrial despite a United Nations Human Rights Committee 2011
decision finding violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. The committee noted that Kyrgyzstan is obligated to remedy the viola-
tions, including by releasing Gunan or granting him a retrial, and by providing




Although the government acknowledges that torture occurs in Kyrgyzstan, im-
punity for torture remains the norm. Criminal cases into allegations of ill-treat-
ment or torture are rare, and investigations and trials are delayed or ineffective.
In its June concluding observations, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
(CRC) expressed concern about “widespread torture and ill-treatment of chil-
dren” in detention and closed institutions and called for prompt and effective in-
dependent investigations. 
According to statistics provided by the Prosecutor General’s Office to Golos Svo-
body, a local anti-torture group, authorities declined to open criminal investiga-
tions into 100 of 109 registered complaints of torture in the first half of 2014. 
Monitors from the National Center for the Prevention of Torture encountered
some problems accessing places of detention. After one incident in March, the
center filed a complaint against the director of the Issyk Kul region temporary de-
tention facility for refusing the monitors entry, but at time of writing the director
had not been held accountable. 
Civil Society 
In May, two draft laws were registered in parliament that would restrict the work
of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and endanger freedom of association
in Kyrgyzstan. On May 19, the Justice Ministry proposed “banning” unregistered
NGOs, but in November it withdrew the proposed provision. On May 26, parlia-
ment deputies registered a bill that would require foreign-funded domestic NGOs
engaging in “political activities” to register as “foreign agents” and would create
criminal liability for leaders of organizations “whose work incites citizens to re-
fuse to fulfill their civic duties or commit other unlawful acts.” At time of writing,
parliament had not yet considered the bill. 
Civil society activists were harassed via media and physically attacked in 2014.
In February, threats were made against an LGBT activist over social media net-
works after he participated in a Human Rights Watch report release. On March 5,
two feminist activists handing out equal rights flyers near a central bazaar
were attacked people in a crowd who confused the female gender symbol for a
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cross and accused the activists of proselytizing. The activists filed a complaint,
but authorities twice declined to open a case. 
On September 4, Makhamajan Abdujaparov, a senior lawyer at Spravedlivost, a
Jalalabad-based rights NGO, was attacked in his office by an unidentified as-
sailant who accused Abdujaparov of cutting him off on the road. Abdujaparov
filed a complaint, but was pressured to withdraw it. The man was identified as a
National Security Agency (GKNB) officer. 
In late September, the GKNB opened a criminal investigation into allegations
that a survey on the rights of ethnic minorities in southern Kyrgyzstan conducted
by a local group with the support of US-based rights organization Freedom
House would incite inter-ethnic discord. The groups challenged the legality of
the investigation, but an Osh court rejected their suit. The investigation re-
mained ongoing at time of writing. 
Azimjon Askarov, a human rights defender, continues to serve a life sentence
after being wrongfully convicted on charges related to the June 2010 violence.
His prosecution was marred by serious violations of fair trial standards and alle-
gations of torture. In February, the Prosecutor General’s Office declined to re-
open his case following a nine-month-long review. After multiple appeals, on
September 3 the Supreme Court upheld the decision. Askarov’s November 2012
complaint to the UN Human Rights Committee was under review at time of writ-
ing. 
Freedom of Expression
Kyrgyzstan backtracked on freedom of speech by adopting a new law in May ef-
fectively reintroducing criminal libel. Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE) Media Freedom Representative Dunja Mijatovic had called on
the president to veto the bill. The US embassy said the law “tarnished Kyrgyzs-
tan’s image as an emerging democracy.” 
On August 17, several assailants attacked Davron Nasipkhanov, a journalist in
Osh, outside his home. They called him “sart,” a derogatory term for Uzbek, and
said that “sarts” should be killed. Authorities opened an investigation but had





Sexual Orientation and Gender-Based Violence 
Authorities have not effectively addressed longstanding problems of gender-
based violence. Violence and abduction for forced marriage (bride-kidnapping)
remain pervasive forms of violence against women and girls in Kyrgyzstan. Im-
punity remains the norm. Work on a new domestic violence law was ongoing at
time of writing. 
In June, the CRC noted 2013 Criminal Code amendments increasing sanctions for
kidnapping child “brides” younger than 17, and fewer such incidents, but called
on Kyrgyzstan to ensure effective investigations, accountability for abuses, and
redress for victims. 
LGBT people in Kyrgyzstan experience abuse and discrimination from both state
and non-state actors. Police violence and harassment against LGBT people in-
cludes extortion, ill-treatment, and sexual violence such as rape, including with
external objects. Due to widespread homophobia in Kyrgyzstan and fear that
personal information will be disclosed, most LGBT victims of police abuse do not
file reports. 
On October 15, parliament passed in its first reading a homophobic and blatantly
discriminatory bill that would impose criminal and administrative sanctions for
“creat[ing] a positive attitude toward nontraditional sexual relations” in media
or public assemblies. The Anti-Discrimination Coalition, a network of LGBT and
other rights groups, collected nearly 800 signatures for an open appeal urging
legislators to reject the bill. The US embassy, the OSCE media freedom represen-
tative and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights spoke out
against the adoption of the bill. 
Freedom of Assembly
A court banned all public assemblies in Ala Too Square and other central loca-
tions in Bishkek from March 31 to May 1 to prevent “destabilization of the so-
ciopolitical situation by destructive forces.” Local rights groups urged authorities
to reverse the ban on violating Kyrgyzstan’s law on peaceful assemblies. The ban
was lifted in April after an appeal by the prosecutor general. 
While Kyrgyzstan’s constitution guarantees freedom of assembly, on three sepa-
rate occasions in June and July, police detained activists staging peaceful
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protests in central Bishkek. In each case the participants received official warn-
ings for allegedly disobeying the police. 
Freedom of Religion
According to Forum 18, a religious freedom watchdog, harassment continued in
2014 of minority religious communities, including Jehovah’s Witnesses and Ah-
madi Muslims, who in 2013 were refused registration by the State Commission
for Religious Affairs (GKDR). In July, the GKDR withdrew work permission from the
bishop of the Russian Orthodox Church on the grounds that he “threatens the
public security of Kyrgyzstan and sows religious discord.” 
Lawyers told Human Right Watch that authorities in the south continue to arbi-
trarily detain individuals on extremism-related charges and that they are particu-
larly vulnerable to ill-treatment and torture in custody. 
At a roundtable in October, rights activists in Bishkek raised concern that a draft
religion law, if adopted, would restrict the right to freedom of religion and belief,
for example, by requiring additional licensing and re-registration requirements
of religious workers. 
Key International Actors
In April, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe granted Kyrgyzstan
partnership for democracy status, despite a pending propaganda bill that con-
travenes Council of Europe norms. The accompanying resolution highlighted key
areas of concern that Kyrgyzstan was expected to address to strengthen respect
for human rights, including rejecting the propaganda law and other laws aimed
at limiting civil society. 
In its April concluding observations, the UN Human Rights Committee noted seri-
ous concerns about violence against LGBT persons and the need for a compre-
hensive approach to prevent and address violence against women, strengthen
efforts to tackle torture and ill-treatment, and ensure the right to freedom of ex-
pression and association. 
During its annual human rights dialogue with Kyrgyzstan in April, the European
Union expressed “serious concerns” about reports of ill-treatment and torture,
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fair trial shortcomings, discrimination against minority groups, mistreatment of
LGBT people, and draft legislation that would restrict civil society. 
At the EU-Kyrgyzstan Cooperation Council meeting in November, the EU called on
Kyrgyzstan “to pursue reforms leading to transparency, independency of the ju-
diciary, inter-ethnic reconciliation and respect for human rights.” 
In June, the CRC issued a comprehensive list of recommendations. It called on
Kyrgyzstan to take urgent measures to prevent discrimination against marginal-
ized and disadvantaged children, including in minority groups, and to ensure
that children from minority communities, especially Uzbeks, have unrestricted




The security situation in Lebanon deteriorated in 2014. Violence spilled over
from the conflict in Syria and democratic institutions faltered as the parliament
failed to elect a president. Parliamentary elections, planned initially for June
2013 and then November 2014, were postponed again until 2017. 
Syrian refugees in Lebanon topped 1,143,000 in November and suffered from in-
creasing abuses including locally-imposed curfews, evictions, and violence by
non-state actors with little reaction from Lebanese authorities. With limited in-
ternational support, the government struggled to meet the refugees’ needs. Draft
laws to stop torture and improve the treatment of migrant domestic workers
stalled, but in a breakthrough for women’s rights, a law to protect women from
domestic violence passed in April. 
Spillover Violence from Syria
In 2014, there were multiple shelling attacks from Syria into north Lebanon and
the Bekaa Valley, which killed at least 10 civilians and injured at least 19. 
There were 14 car bombings or suicide bomb attacks, at least five targeting civil-
ians. Of the 12 attacks, three took place in the Shia Beirut suburbs and three in
the Shia town of Hermel in the Bekaa Valley killing 32 people and injuring at
least 332. The extremist group Islamic State, also known as ISIS, claimed respon-
sibility for one of these attacks, Jabhat al-Nusra for four, and the Abdullah Azzam
Brigade, an Al-Qaeda-affiliate, one. In five other bombings security personnel or
Hezbollah officials appeared to be the targets of bombings. These attacks killed
11 people, including five soldiers and a Hezbollah official, and injured 50. 
Clashes between militants based in Syria, including from ISIS and Jabhat al-
Nusra, and the Lebanese army occurred between August 2 and 5 in Arsal and
ended when the Lebanese army pushed the militants outside of the town. During
the clashes some Lebanese security personnel were taken as hostages by the
militants and at time of writing three of the hostages had been executed. 
Lebanese residents of Arsal and Syrians residing there reported that Lebanese
soldiers refused to allow Syrians to flee from the town during the fighting and
that refugee settlements and other civilian targets were subject to indiscriminate
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fire including by the Lebanese army. A field hospital in Arsal reported that 489
people were wounded and at least 59 civilians—44 Syrians and 15 Arsal natives—
were killed in the fighting.
The hostage taking of Lebanese soldiers and Internal Security Force members
led to a string of retaliatory measures against Syrians in the weeks that followed,
including the imposition of blanket curfews by municipalities across the country,
forced evictions, and violence by non-state actors. By September, at least 40 mu-
nicipalities had imposed curfews affecting Syrians. Lebanese security forces
also conducted arrest operations, sometimes targeting refugee settlements, and
in some cases reportedly abused or arbitrarily detained Syrians. 
Refugees
By November, over 1,143,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon had approached
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for registration. Regis-
tration does not grant legal status, but enables Syrians in some cases to receive
assistance. Syrians who enter at official border crossings are granted a six-
month residency permit with a one-time possibility of renewal, after which ex-
tension requires a US$200 renewal fee. Absent legal status, refugees face the
risk of detention for illegal presence in the country. 
The Lebanese government began implementing measures in 2014 to reduce the
number of Syrians in the country. On October 23, the Lebanese cabinet decided
to prevent Syrian refugees from entering Lebanon except in “extreme humanitar-
ian cases,” but did not define what constitutes such a case. According to
refugees and aid workers, General Security officers at the border seemed to be
implementing their own interpretation of the government’s recent announce-
ment and making arbitrary and discriminatory entry determinations. 
There are approximately 45,000 Palestinians from Syria seeking refuge in
Lebanon, joining the estimated 300,000 Palestinian refugees already living in
Lebanon. In May, new regulations by the minister of interior limited Palestinians
ability to enter the country or renew their residencies. These restrictions followed
the forcible deportation of about three dozen Palestinians to Syria on May 4. Au-
thorities began arbitrarily barring Palestinians from Syria from entering the coun-




In the northern city of Tripoli, there were two weeks of deadly violence between
armed groups in March in which at least 30 people were killed and 175 wounded,
including 33 soldiers. The fighting was most concentrated in the mainly Alawite
neighborhood of Jabal Mohsen and the adjacent Sunni neighborhood of Bab al-
Tabbaneh. 
On April 1, the army implemented a security plan to arrest militants and seize
weapons in Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh. Some local militia leaders and
fighters were detained, some of whom are still in detention, but many militia
members and leaders remained at large and on August 5-6 clashes resumed as
the army withdrew its forces from Bab al-Tabbaneh. An 8-year-old girl was killed
in these clashes. 
In September, clashes resumed between the army and gunmen and continued
into October resulting in casualties on both side and from the residential popu-
lation. 
Lengthy Pretrial Detention, Ill-Treatment
In 2014, Lebanese security forces arrested and pursued investigations in relation
to car bombings and other attacks on civilians in Lebanon. Some of these sus-
pects, like those detained in relation to clashes that took place in Saida in June
2013 between the army and supporters of pro-Syrian opposition Imam Sheikh
Ahmed al-Assir, have suffered from lengthy pretrial detention and have reported
being beaten and tortured by security forces. 
Lebanon has not yet established a national preventive mechanism to visit and
monitor places of detention, as required under the Optional Protocol to the Con-
vention against Torture, which it ratified in 2008. In its annual report, released in
October, the United Nations Committee Against Torture found that “torture in
Lebanon is a pervasive practice that is routinely used by the armed forces and




In 2014, charges and prosecutions against news outlets, journalists, and blog-
gers threatened freedom of expression. Defaming or criticizing the Lebanese
president or army is considered a criminal offense in Lebanon, which can carry a
jail sentence. The publications court on February 12 sentenced Jean Assy, a blog-
ger, to two months in jail for defaming and insulting President Michel Sleiman on
Twitter. 
Ambiguous definitions of defamation and slander open the door for silencing le-
gitimate criticism of public officials. The Internal Security Forces Cybercrimes Bu-
reau brought blogger Imad Bazzi in for questioning on defamation charges on
March 13 over his criticism of former State Minister Panos Mangyan for abuse of
power. 
On February 26, the publications court fined Mohammed Nazzal, an Al Akhbar
journalist, 27 million LBP (US$18,000) for an article on judicial corruption. Rasha
Abou Zaki, an Al Akhbar contributor, was fined 4 million LBP ($2,667) by the pub-
lications court in February for defaming former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora,
after she alleged corruption and embezzlement in the Finance Ministry. 
Migrant Workers’ Rights
Migrant domestic workers are excluded from the labor law and subject to restric-
tive immigration rules based on the kafala system, the visa sponsorship system
that ties workers to their employers and puts workers at risk of exploitation and
abuse. In June, a judge ruled in favor of a female migrant domestic worker who
was suing her employer for withholding her passport, finding that the practice
was discriminatory and an unlawful infringement on her freedom of movement. 
Migrant domestic workers suing their employers for abuse continue, however, to
face legal obstacles and risk imprisonment and deportation due to the restrictive
visa system. From May 2014, and perhaps earlier, Lebanon began denying resi-
dency permit renewals for a number of Lebanon-born children of low-wage mi-




On April 1, parliament passed the Law on the Protection of Women and Family
from Domestic Violence. The new law establishes important protection measures
and related policing and court reforms, but leaves women at risk of marital rape
and other abuse. One month after the law’s implementation, four protection or-
ders were issued based on the law. 
In September, a landmark verdict was issued by a judge who ordered the perma-
nent eviction of a woman’s husband, son, and daughter-in-law from their house
after it was established they had abused her. Under the 15 various Lebanese per-
sonal status laws, which are determined by an individual’s religious affiliation,
women continue to suffer from discrimination including unequal access to di-
vorce and child custody. Lebanese women, unlike Lebanese men, cannot pass
on their nationality to foreign husbands and children, and continue to be subject
to discriminatory inheritance laws. 
Legacy of Past Conflicts and Wars
In October 2012, Justice Minister Shakib Qortbawi put forward a draft decree to
the cabinet to establish a national commission to investigate the fate of
Lebanese and other nationals who “disappeared” during and after the 1975-
1990 Lebanese civil war. The cabinet formed a ministerial committee to examine
the draft, but no further action was taken in 2014. 
On March 4, Lebanon’s State Council ruled that relatives of people who have dis-
appeared in Lebanon have the right to know what happened to their missing
family members. On September 20, the families of the disappeared were pro-
vided with a copy of the government’s investigation file after the judiciary re-
quested in May to postpone the delivery of the file on the grounds that it might
endanger civil peace. 
In January, the UN’s Special Tribunal for Lebanon inabsentia trial began against
four indicted members of Hezbollah for the killing of former Prime Minister Rafik





Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia maintain a strong influence on Lebanese politics
through local allies, and increasingly so as Lebanon becomes more involved in
the conflict in Syria. 
Many countries have given extensive, albeit insufficient, support to help
Lebanon cope with the Syrian refugee crisis and to bolster security amidst
spillover violence. 
The Lebanese armed forces and Internal Security Forces also receive assistance
from a range of international donors including the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the European Union, all of which have taken some steps to im-






Political infighting and clashes between rival militias escalated, triggering armed
conflicts in Benghazi and other parts of the east in May, and in Tripoli and its en-
virons in July. 
The fighting caused widespread destruction of property, and civilian injuries and
deaths. Around 400,000 were internally displaced in Libya, including about
100,000 residents of Tripoli. Another 150,000 people, including foreigners, fled
Libya. Most foreign embassies, the United Nations, the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC), and international agencies withdrew their staff and
closed their missions in July. 
Militias attacked, threatened, assaulted, or arbitrarily detained journalists,
judges, activists, politicians, and ordinary citizens with impunity. Lack of protec-
tion for the judiciary resulted in a near breakdown of the justice sector in cities
such as Tripoli, Benghazi, Sirte, Sebha, and Derna. 
Political Transition and Constitution 
Following an election marred by boycotts and violence, Libyans voted in a 60-
member Constitution Drafting Assembly on February 20 to draw up a new consti-
tution. The assembly was expected to produce a new draft constitution by
December 2014. 
Boycotts, violence, and low voter turnout also marred the June 25 elections for
the House of Representatives, a new 200-seat parliament that replaced the in-
terim General National Congress (GNC). Due to boycotts and insecurity, only 188
seats were filled. Following their election, around 158 of the new members of
parliament convened in Tobruk, in the east, citing security fears in Tripoli.
Around 30 members of parliament boycotted the move. On September 1, the par-
liament confirmed caretaker Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni as Libya’s prime
minister.
After the Misrata-led Libya Dawn alliance took control of Tripoli in August, some
members of the former GNC declared Omar al-Hassi prime minister, in opposi-
tion to the Tobruk-based parliament. 
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The Libyan Supreme Court issued a ruling on November 6, declaring unconstitu-
tional an amendment to the Constitutional Declaration, which paved the way for
the House of Representative’s election law. The elected parliament rejected the
Supreme Court decision, and some members of the former legislature, the GNC,
reconvened claiming to be the legitimate legislature and demanded the dissolu-
tion of the House of Representatives. At time of writing, both entities remained
embroiled in armed conflicts. 
Security and Armed Militias
Scores of armed groups remained on the government’s payroll and controlled
key locations and resources. Some pro-federalism militias, in a dispute over
their pay, maintained a blockade of major oil export terminals for a year until
July. They had been contracted by the government to guard petroleum facilities
after the 2011 revolution as Petroleum Facilities Guards (PFG), operating under
the Defense Ministry. 
Armed groups and individuals continued to commit unlawful killings, mostly in
Benghazi and Derna in the east. At least 250 people died in apparently targeted
assassinations in the first nine months of 2014, including security officials,
judges and prosecutors, journalists, activists, and Imams. Victims included
some women. At time of writing, the authorities conducted no investigations
into these attacks and killings, and had not arrested or prosecuted any suspects. 
Armed groups continued to target foreigners and diplomats. Unknown armed
groups abducted two Tunisian embassy employees in March and April, releasing
them on June 25, and unidentified armed men abducted Jordan’s ambassador to
Libya on April 15, releasing him on May 13 in exchange for the release of a Libyan
imprisoned in Jordan since 2007 on terrorism charges. On June 4 in Sirte, un-
known assailants gunned down Michael Greub, an ICRC delegate, as he visited
the Libyan Red Crescent. 
Lack of border controls and tribal infighting aggravated the security situation, al-
lowing continued trafficking of humans, drugs, and weapons across Libya’s bor-
ders with Chad, Sudan, Egypt, and Algeria. 
Credible evidence emerged showing that one or more militia groups used an-
tipersonnel landmines during the armed conflict at Tripoli Airport in July and Au-
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gust 2014. The unit in charge of clearing the airport area, operating under Libya
Dawn, said in November it had found and cleared at least 600 landmines. 
In October, armed groups in eastern Libya affiliated with the extremist group Is-
lamic State (also known as ISIS), announced the establishment of an au-
tonomous province divided into the Derna and Benghazi sectors. The Islamic
Shura Youth Council in Derna, which affiliated itself with ISIS, established an Is-
lamic Court, Islamic Police, and carried out public executions and floggings. 
Armed Conflict and War Crimes
In May, former army Gen. Khalifa Hifter launched a military operation against Is-
lamist factions in eastern Libya, ostensibly to “eradicate terrorism.” His Libya
Dignity Alliance, based in eastern Libya, included army, air force, and special
forces personnel, and targeted Islamist factions such as Ansar al-Sharia and the
Islamic Shura Youth Council in Derna. In July, the conflict spread to Tripoli where
Libya Dawn, a Misrata-led militia alliance that includes Islamist factions,
wrested control of the capital from a Zintan-led militia alliance aligned to Libya
Dignity. In November, the House of Representatives reinstated General Hiftar
and 16 other officers into active duty. 
Warring factions indiscriminately shelled civilian areas in both Benghazi and
Tripoli, seized people, and looted, burned, and otherwise destroyed civilian
property in attacks that in some cases amounted to war crimes. Those seized
and still held by militias at time of writing included Suliman Zubi, a former GNC
member held since July 21 by the Katibat Barq al-Nasr militia from Zintan, and a
Tripoli based activist, Abdelmoez Banoon.  
Judicial System and Transitional Justice
Libya’s justice system suffered serious setbacks. Militias attacked judges, pros-
ecutors, lawyers, and witnesses, causing the closure of courts and prosecutors’
offices in Benghazi, Derna, Sirte, and Sebha, and a near breakdown of the jus-
tice system. The Justice Ministry in Tripoli shut down in July due to the fighting
there. 
The government failed to secure control over detainees held in militia-run facili-
ties, including Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and retained only nominal control of facili-
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ties formally under its authority. Authorities failed to grant detainees basic due
process rights, including access to lawyers, judicial reviews of their cases, and
access to key evidence. 
On March 24, the trial commenced in Tripoli of 37 Gaddafi-era officials and em-
ployees accused for their alleged roles during the 2011 revolution. They included
Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Sanussi, Muammar Gaddafi’s former intelli-
gence chief. On March 6, Niger extradited another Gaddafi son, al-Saadi
Gaddafi, to Libya. At time of writing, the court trying the 37 accused had ad-
journed hearings and al-Saadi Gaddafi remained in pre-charge detention. 
On September 14, the House of Representatives passed a counterterrorism law
which could undermine freedom of speech, assembly, and association due to
overbroad and sweeping definitions of terrorism and harsh prescribed punish-
ments. 
Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Deaths in Custody
The Justice Ministry held approximately 6,100 detainees in 26 prisons, mostly
under the nominal authority of the Judicial Police. Only 10 percent of those held
had been sentenced, and the rest remained held in pre-charge detention. In ad-
dition, the Interior and Defense Ministries continued to hold undisclosed num-
bers of detainees, while many militias also continued to hold unknown numbers
of detainees in informal facilities. Militias remained responsible for widespread
abuses, including torture and deaths in custody. 
Death Penalty
The former GNC and the newly elected House of Representatives both failed to
amend any of over 30 articles in the penal code that provide for the death
penalty, including as punishment for exercising rights to freedom of expression
and association. Since the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, civil and military
courts have imposed at least 29 death sentences. The authorities had not car-
ried out any executions at time of writing. 
The Islamic Shura Youth Council armed group carried out at least three public




International Justice and the International Criminal Court
The government failed to uphold its legal obligation to surrender Saif al-Islam
Gaddafi to the International Criminal Court (ICC), where he is wanted on charges
of crimes against humanity for his alleged role in trying to suppress the country’s
2011 uprising . The ICC has had jurisdiction over the situation in Libya since Feb-
ruary 15, 2011, under UN Security Council resolution 1970. On May 21, the ICC is-
sued a final decision rejecting Libya’s request to try Gaddafi domestically. On
December 10, the ICC issued a finding of non-compliance by Libya after two re-
quests for cooperation to surrender Saif al-Islam Gaddafi to The Hague and re-
ferred the issue to the Security Council. 
In the case of Abdullah Sanussi, ICC judges approved Libya’s bid to prosecute
the former intelligence chief at home for his alleged role during the 2011 upris-
ing. 
In response to ongoing grave violations, on June 24, the ICC prosecutor issued a
statement warning that she would not hesitate to investigate and prosecute per-
petrators of crimes within the court’s jurisdiction, but at time of writing she had
yet to open a new investigation. 
Forced Displacement
Miltias mostly from Misrata continued to prevent about 40,000 residents of Taw-
ergha, Tomina, and Karareem from returning to their homes as a form of collec-
tive punishment for crimes allegedly committed by some Tawergha residents
during the 2011 revolution. Those displaced continued to seek safety and shelter
in makeshift camps and private housing in many areas, but they remained sub-
ject to attack, harassment, and arbitrary detention by the militias . Libyan au-
thorities and militia commanders failed to end the attacks or hold those
responsible to account. The forced displacement of residents of Tawergha
amounts to a crime against humanity. 
Freedom of Speech and Expression
Armed factions threatened and assaulted dozens of journalists and attacked
several media outlets, including private television stations Alassema, Libya Al-
Ahrar, and Barqa TV. Several journalists and an activist were abducted or seized.
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Abdelmoez Banoon was kidnapped by unknown assailants in July and was still
missing at time of writing. 
Six journalists were assassinated. Miftah Bouzeid, editor-in-chief of Burniq
newspaper, was killed on May 26 by unknown assailants in Benghazi. On June
25, unidentified assailants killed activist Salwa Bughaighis at her home in Beng-
hazi. Dozens of journalists fled the country due to attacks, threats, and intimida-
tion. Authorities failed to conduct investigations, or arrest and prosecute
perpetrators. 
Prosecutors brought criminal defamation charges against several journalists, po-
litical analysts, lawmakers, and politicians. Amara al-Khatabi, editor of Al-
Ummah newspaper, was sentenced in absentia to five years in prison on charges
of defaming members of the judiciary; radio presenter Sami al-Sharif faced
charges for allegedly defaming a local council official on one of his shows; and
political analyst Jamal al-Hajji appealed against a 2013 criminal court sentence
of eight months in prison for allegedly libeling businessmen and politicians. 
The former GNC failed to amend penal code provisions that breach international
law, and instead adopted new repressive measures. On January 22, it passed
resolution 5(2014) to ban and prevent the transmission of satellite television
stations that criticize the government and the 2011 revolution, and on February
5, the GNC promulgated Law 5(2014) to make any act “harming” the “February 17
revolution” of 2011 a criminal offense. 
Women’s Rights
Amid the breakdown of law and order and in the prevailing climate of impunity,
women continued to suffer from discrimination. Some armed groups imposed re-
strictions on women based on their ideological beliefs. Guards harassed univer-
sity students in Tripoli for refusing to wear the hijab. Some women faced
harassment while attempting to travel out of Libya without a male guardian. In
April, a militia group responsible for security at a university in Derna insisted
that a wall be constructed to segregate the sexes, limiting women students’ ac-
cess to education. 
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Guards at the court trying former Gaddafi officials denied female Libyan journal-
ists access to the court because of their gender and, in April, denied access to
foreign female journalists unless they wore head scarves. 
In February, the prime minister issued a decree promising compensation for vic-
tims of sexual violence but the government had not allocated funds for this pur-
pose at time of writing. 
Migrants, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers
Record numbers of migrants and asylum seekers embarked on the perilous sea
journey from Libya to Europe with 60,000 reaching Italy alone in 2014. The Ital-
ian navy’s large- scale rescue operation, Mare Nostrum, rescued around 100,000
from unseaworthy boats, but at least 3,000 still perished at sea. 
At time of writing, Libyan authorities held 5,000-10,000 migrants and asylum
seekers in detention facilities where they face torture and other abuses, includ-
ing overcrowding, dire sanitation, lack of access to adequate medical care, and
inhuman or degrading treatment. Guards subjected migrants and asylum seek-
ers to beatings, whippings, cigarette burns, and electric shocks. The authorities
failed to address these abuses and hold perpetrators accountable. 
Key International Actors
Long awaited military training for a Libyan General Purpose Force commenced in
Italy, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. 
A United States Navy Seals team forcibly took control of an oil tanker on March
16 as it sailed near Cyprus, and returned it to Libya and placed it under the gov-
ernment’s control. Pro-federalist militias had intended to sell fuel on their own
behalf in response to a long dispute with the government over pay. 
On June 15, a US special unit apprehended a Libyan suspect, Ahmed Abu Khatal-
lah, near his Benghazi home. The unit transferred him to the US, where he faces
charges for his alleged role in the September 11, 2012 attack on the US consulate
in Benghazi that killed four US citizens, including Ambassador Chris Stevens. 
The United Nations Security Council passed resolution 2174 (2014) on August 27.
This extended sanctions against Libya to target those who engage in or support
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acts that “threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya” or individuals re-
sponsible for human rights abuses. At time of writing, no new names had been
added to the existing sanctions list. 
In August, the US said the United Arab Emirates and Egypt had conducted air
strikes in Tripoli on August 18 and 23, against military positions of the Misrata-
led militia alliance, Libya Dawn. On September 15, unidentified warplanes con-
ducted further air strikes against military positions of Libya Dawn-aligned
militias in Gharyan. In September, Libya’s government accused Sudan of funnel-
ing weapons to militias aligned with Libya Dawn, despite the active UN arms em-
bargo. In the same month, the government also accused Qatar of several
weapons shipments to forces aligned with Libya Dawn. 
On November 19, the Security Council added two entities—Ansar Sharia in Beng-
hazi and in Derna—to the Al-Qaeda Sanctions Regime. Members of these entities




Following 2013 parliamentary elections that returned the ruling party to power,
even though the political opposition won a majority of the popular vote, the
Malaysian government launched a crackdown on freedom of expression and
other civil and political rights that continues to the present. Human rights de-
fenders, activists, and political figures, including opposition leader Anwar
Ibrahim, face continuing harassment and persecution. 
Freedom of Expression
Article 10 of Malaysia’s Constitution guarantees that every citizen has the right
to freedom of expression, but the Malaysian government violates that right on a
regular basis. 
The biggest threat to free speech comes from the government’s redoubled use of
the Sedition Act to prosecute activists and political opponents for making state-
ments critical of the government, its political leaders, or the prime minister’s
party, United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), or for remarks the govern-
ment considers to be derogatory toward Malaysia’s sultans or disrespectful of re-
ligion. 
From January 2013 to November 2014, the government charged at least 20 peo-
ple with sedition, including four opposition members of parliament. Charges
were also brought against state assemblymen, community and NGO activists, In-
ternet bloggers, an academic, and others. Four people, including the late jurist
Karpal Singh, were convicted of sedition for remarks and several were sentenced
to prison or fined. 
Widespread use of the act has marked serious backtracking by Prime Minister
Najib Razak on multiple prior pledges to revoke the Sedition Act and replace it
with a so-called Harmony Act. Under fire from political conservatives in UMNO,
Najib effectively abandoned the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) that
he had established to make legislative proposals and conduct consultations on
the Harmony Act. On October 16, in only the fourth public march in its history,
the Malaysia Bar Council demanded repeal of the act. On November 27, Najib
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told the annual UMNO convention that the Sedition Act would be retained, and
amendments made to strengthen it.
On October 1, Professor Azmi Sharom filed a constitutional challenge to the act,
claiming that it violates free speech guarantees in article 10 of the constitution.
In early November, the High Court transferred the case to the Federal Court,
Malaysia’s apex court, for consideration. 
During the year, the government also charged and sentenced activists for ex-
pressing views in ways the government claimed violated penal code provisions
criminalizing defamation and “insult with intent to provoke a breach of the
peace.” It also made use of article 233 of the Communications and Multimedia
Act outlawing any communication the government considers “obscene, inde-
cent, false, menacing or offensive.”
The government continues to use the Printing Presses and Publication Act
(PPPA), which requires that all publishers obtain a license, to limit the content of
publications. The home minister may suspend or revoke a license at any time on
grounds of security, public order, or morality.
Malaysiakini, an outspoken online daily, has been a frequent government target.
Despite an October 2013 Court of Appeal decision holding that a license to pub-
lish is a constitutional right, the Ministry of Home Affairs has refused to issue a
license to Malaysiakini on grounds that its articles cause “controversy,” “lack
neutrality,” and could cause its readers to “hate national leaders.” On May 15,
Prime Minister Najib sued Malaysiakini for defamation based on reader com-
ments on two Malaysiakini columns, one focused on government corruption, and
the other on Najib’s leadership capabilities. In August 2013, FZ Daily newspaper
received a license to publish, which was suspended a week later and revoked in
January 2014. Another newsweekly, The Heat, had its license suspended without
explanation on December 21, 2013; it was only permitted to start publishing
again in February 2014. 
The government also continued the prosecution of NGO activist Lena Hendry in
2014 for allegedly violating the Film Censorship Act for her involvement in
screening the documentary film “No Fire Zone: The Killing Fields of Sri Lanka” in
Kuala Lumpur in July 2013. 
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Freedom of Assembly and Association
Organizers of assemblies, marches, and demonstrations had more space in 2014
to spontaneously protest government policies due to an appeals court ruling in
May that struck down a provision of the Peaceful Assembly Act (PAA) requiring
that organizers give police 10-day advance notice. However, the government has
appealed the decision and government prosecutors have continued to press
charges against at least 20 political activists for allegedly violating the notice re-
quirement when they held so-called Black 505 protests after the May 2013 elec-
tions. 
The government permitted a May 1 rally protesting price and tax hikes to proceed
without interference. But on June 22, police badly beat members of Himpunan
Hijau protesting the government’s licensing of the Lynas rare earth plant in Pa-
hang. Later, after 15 protesters were arrested and taken to Kuantan police head-
quarters, thugs roughed up those waiting outside without police intervening. 
The government restricts the right to freedom of association by requiring that or-
ganizations with seven or more members register with the Registrar of Societies
(ROS). The ROS is answerable only to the minister of home affairs who has “ab-
solute discretion” to declare a society illegal. In November, the minister declared
the Sarawak Association for Peoples’ Aspiration (Sapa) an illegal organization.
The ROS remained locked in an almost two-year dispute with the opposition
Democratic Action Party (DAP), refusing to recognize the party’s central executive
committee or its 120 branch offices. The Ministry of Home Affairs stated the Ne-
gara-Ku human rights movement would be considered “illegal” if it did not regis-
ter with the ROS. 
Political Prosecution of Anwar Ibrahim and Karpal Singh
The government continued its politically motivated persecution of opposition
leader Anwar Ibrahim. Prosecutors appealed his 2012 acquittal on sodomy
charges and in a rushed appeals court process, on March 7, 2014, the court over-
turned the verdict and sentenced him to a five-year prison term. The appeal to
the Federal Court was heard in late October and early November, but the verdict





Similarly, in February 2014, the High Court overturned DAP chairman Karpal
Singh’s acquittal on a politically motivated sedition charge and issued a fine
that would have disqualified him from serving as a legislator. Karpal appealed
but died in a car crash in April before the appeal could be heard. 
Police Abuse and Impunity
New cases of police torture of suspects in custody, in some cases resulting in
their deaths, and excessive use of force in apprehending suspects continued to
be reported in 2014. At least 10 suspicious deaths in police custody were
recorded in the first nine months of the year. 
Human Rights Watch’s report No Answers, No Apology: Police Abuses and Ac-
countability in Malaysia released in March found a pattern of police impunity
and a lack of effective external oversight. Rather than following up on the find-
ings, police officials dismissed them and would not consider the report’s sub-
stantive recommendations for improving rights performance and accountability. 
On April 15, the government announced the creation and operation of a “coro-
ner’s court” with a sessions court judge in each state assigned the duty of exam-
ining wrongful deaths and deaths in custody. While this is a small improvement
over the previous system in which inexperienced magistrate court judges over-
saw inquests, the new approach still is wholly dependent on the police investi-
gating their fellow officers, a situation that has consistently led to cover-ups and
impunity. 
The government continues to ignore calls from the Malaysia Bar Council and civil
society groups to establish an Independent Police Complaints and Misconduct
Commission (IPCMC) with the power to receive complaints focused on the police,
independently investigate abuses, and sanction those found to have engaged in
misconduct. On November 5, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong consented to the ap-
pointment of a new chairman and several commissioners for the Enforcement
Agencies Integrity Commission (EAIC), the government’s preferred yet ineffectual
alternative that to date has lacked necessary resources or effective leadership to
ensure oversight and accountability of the police and other enforcement agen-




The government undermined positive steps it had taken in prior years, including
its repeal of the Internal Security Act (ISA) and the Emergency (Public Order and
Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, when it adopted amendments to the Prevention
of Crime Act (PCA) that allow for administrative detention of suspects without ju-
dicial review. Under the act, a five-member board has the authority to impose a
two-year detention, renewable indefinitely, or order the attachment of electronic
monitoring devices to suspected offenders. 
The similarly restrictive 2012 Security Offenses Special Measures Act (SOSMA),
that replaced the ISA, still permits initial, albeit shortened, police detention
without judiciary input. It also broadened the definition of a security offense,
ceded to the police rather than the judiciary the power to intercept communica-
tions, and even in cases where the suspect is acquitted, permits indefinite ap-
peals during which time the person may be held in custody or tethered to a
monitoring device. 
Malaysia’s inspector-general of police dismissed civil society calls for the abol-
ishment of the Dangerous Drugs Act (DDA), which permits detention of suspects
without trial or warrant. The National Anti-Drug Agency continues to operate
around 20 drug detention centers (recently rebranded as Cure & Care Rehabilita-
tion Centers) where people who use drugs are held for between six months to
two years.
Malaysia retains the death penalty for various crimes, including drug trafficking,
and is not transparent about when and how decisions are made to carry out exe-
cutions. More than 1,000 persons are estimated to be on death row. Malaysia
undertook a review of sentencing guidelines for drug trafficking in line with its
pledge at the United Nations Human Rights Council in October 2013 but the re-
sults of that review, conducted by the Attorney General’s Office, had not been
publicly released at time of writing. 
Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Trafficking Victims
Malaysia’s immigration law does not recognize asylum seekers or refugees. The





for the education of refugee or migrant children, and does not give refugees
legal permission to work. 
The Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants law conflates traf-
ficking and people smuggling and fails to meaningfully protect victims of traffick-
ing. In 2014, the United States government demoted Malaysia to tier 3 in its
“Trafficking in Persons” report.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people is
pervasive in Malaysia. In September, Human Rights Watch issued a report “I’m
Scared to be a Woman”: Human Rights Abuses against Transgender People in
Malaysia that focused on the impact of state-level Sharia (Islamic) laws that pro-
hibit cross-dressing. The report revealed that transgender persons face arbitrary
arrest, physical and sexual assault, imprisonment, discriminatory denial of
health care and employment, and other abuses. Three transgender women chal-
lenged the Sharia ordinance on constitutional grounds in the state of Negeri
Sembilan and on November 7, won their appeal in a major victory for rights in the
country. However, government prosecutors are expected to appeal the decision. 
Key International Actors
Malaysia seeks to position itself in the UN and the international community as a
moderate Muslim state prepared to stand up to Islamist extremism, a position
for which it gains support from the US and its NATO allies. In October, Malaysia
was elected to a seat on the UN Security Council for the 2015-2016 term.
In April, Malaysia hosted US President Barack Obama, and the two countries
agreed to upgrade their ties to a “comprehensive partnership.” Obama raised
human rights prominently during the visit. 
Malaysia also has continued its close engagement with China, its largest trading
partner, despite frictions caused by the disappearance on March 8 of Malaysia





While the political situation in Mali stabilized in 2014, persistent attacks by nu-
merous pro and anti-government armed groups in the north led to a marked de-
terioration in security in Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu regions, where the 2013
French-led intervention sought to restore state control. 
Throughout 2014, armed groups linked to Al-Qaeda, along with ethnic Tuareg
and Arab movements, some seeking autonomy, dramatically increased attacks
on Malian soldiers and neutral peacekeepers, and to a lesser extent, on aid
workers and other civilians. Little progress was made in reaching a negotiated
settlement, advancing justice for abuses, or addressing development chal-
lenges. 
The withdrawal in May of Malian civil servants and soldiers from key towns in the
north, following a brief resumption of hostilities, resulted in a rise in ethnic ten-
sion, left large swaths of territory devoid of state authority, and led to a signifi-
cant rise in banditry by unidentified gunmen. Meanwhile, there was little
progress on security sector reform or the disarmament of fighters in the north. 
Malian authorities made little effort to investigate and hold accountable those
implicated in serious abuses committed during the 2012-2013 armed conflict.
However, there was a decrease in abuses by state security forces and progress in
the investigation into the 2012 torture and killing of 21 elite soldiers. Rule of law
institutions countrywide were weak, in part due to unprofessional practices and
inadequate budgetary allocations for the criminal justice system. Corruption, en-
demic at all levels of government, further impeded Malians’ access to basic
health care and education. 
Concerns about the deteriorating security situation and re-entrenchment of Al-
Qaeda-linked groups in the north sustained diplomatic interest in Mali. The
French government played a key role in military matters, the European Union on
training and security sector reform, and the United Nations, through the Multidi-
mensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), on rule of law
and political stability. These actors were largely reluctant to publicly call for in-
vestigations into past and ongoing crimes. The International Monetary Fund and





Abuses by Armed Groups in the North 
Since late September 2013, opposition armed groups carried out several dozen
ambushes and suicide bombings, and deployed improvised explosive devices
and landmines. Most attacks targeted Malian and French troops, though others
targeted civilians and peacekeepers in violation of the laws of war. Landmines
on key roads and rocket attacks in major towns generated a climate of fear for
civilians, and killed and wounded several. Over 30 UN peacekeepers died in at-
tacks. 
In February, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) kidnapped
five aid workers from the International Committee of the Red Cross; they were
freed in April during a French military operation. In May, two aid workers with the
Norwegian Refugee Council were killed when their vehicle struck an improvised
explosive device near Timbuktu. 
A visit by the prime minister to the National Movement for the Liberation of Aza-
wad (MNLA) stronghold of Kidal in May led to brief resumption of hostilities. Dur-
ing the clashes, eight civilians, including six civil servants, were allegedly
summarily executed by the armed groups occupying Kidal. 
Security in the north was further undermined by persistent inter-communal
clashes, particularly involving people from the Peuhl, Tuareg, and Arab ethnic
groups, which left dozens dead. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) contin-
ued at time of writing to hold four hostages; one from France, one from the
Netherlands, one from Sweden, and a dual British and South African national.
During 2014, one French and one Algerian hostage reportedly died in captivity,
while two Algerians captured in Gao in 2012 were released. 
Abuses by State Security Forces
In 2014, the number of violations committed by the Malian army decreased, but
soldiers were implicated in several cases of arbitrary detention, one instance of
excessive use of force in responding to a demonstration in Kidal, and several
summary executions, largely targeting Tuareg men. The military hierarchy made
some effort to investigate and hold to account soldiers implicated in several of
these incidents. Members of the security forces were also implicated in acts of
extortion, bribe taking, and to a lesser extent rape. 
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Accountability for Abuses during the 2012-2013 
Armed Conflict
The government made little progress in holding to account those from all warring
factions responsible for laws of war violations committed during the 2012-2013
armed conflict. The government’s provisional release in 2014 of over 40 men as-
sociated with the conflict, including several commanders credibly implicated in
abuses, raised concern of a de facto amnesty for these crimes. The government
characterized the releases, which began in late 2013, as “confidence building
measures” in advance of negotiations. They were carried out without regard as
to whether the men might have been responsible for serious crimes in violation
of international law. 
Supreme Court orders passed in 2013 permitted a Bamako court to hear criminal
cases from the three northern provinces, and during 2014, dozens of families
filed complaints to judicial authorities. With few exceptions, these authorities
failed to investigate any of these cases or others that human rights groups and
journalists brought to their attention. 
There was, however, meaningful progress in the investigation into the torture
and enforced disappearance of 21 elite “Red Berets” in 2012. In late 2013 and
early 2014, some 25 soldiers, including former coup leader Gen. Amadou Haya
Sanogo, were charged in connection with the crimes. 
In July 2012, Mali, a state party to the International Criminal Court (ICC), referred
“the situation in Mali since January 2012” to the ICC prosecutor for investigation.
On January 16, 2013, the ICC prosecutor formally opened an investigation into
grave crimes allegedly committed in the northern three regions of Mali, and dur-
ing 2014, ICC investigators conducted several missions to the country. 
Truth and Reconciliation Mechanism
After assuming office in September 2013, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita dis-
solved a pre-existing truth commission and, by two executive orders, estab-
lished the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission; on March 20, the
National Assembly ratified the orders. The commission has a three-year man-
date, will cover the period from 1960 to 2013, and will consist of 15 members and
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7 working groups. It will function under the Ministry of National Reconciliation
and Development of the North. 
By late 2014, the commissioners had yet to be appointed and the body’s credi-
bility was limited because of the failure to consult sufficiently with a wide variety
of stakeholders on its members, mandate powers, and degree of independence.
Judiciary
During 2014, there was progress in re-establishing the judiciary in Timbuktu and
Gao regions, evident in the rehabilitation of local courthouses and jails and re-
deployment of prosecutors, judges, and judicial police who had fled during the
armed conflict. However, their ability to conduct investigations outside major
towns was limited by the precarious security situation. 
Neglect and mismanagement within the Malian judiciary countrywide led to
striking deficiencies, including insufficient staffing and logistical constraints.
These shortfalls hindered efforts to address impunity for perpetrators of all
crimes and contributed to violations of the right to due process. 
Because of the courts’ inability to adequately process cases, hundreds of de-
tainees are held in extended pretrial detention in overcrowded jails and deten-
tion centers. Judges in Bamako mandated to investigate several hundred
suspects detained during the offensive to retake the north made some progress,
resulting in the release of scores of men who appeared to have been arbitrarily
detained, largely as a result of their ethnicity. 
Recruitment of Children and Child Labor
Armed groups in the north continued to recruit and use child soldiers, some as
young as 12. During 2014, some 20 schools in the north were at various times oc-
cupied by members of the armed groups, pro-government militias, the Malian
army and, in one case, MINUSMA. Several children suspected of supporting the
armed groups were detained in both the Bamako Central Prison and a gendarme
camp in Bamako, in contravention of a 2013 protocol signed by the government
stipulating that children were to be placed in a care center managed by the UN
Children’s Rights Emergency and Relief Organization. 
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Child labor in agriculture, domestic service, mining, and other sectors was com-
mon, and often included dangerous work that Malian law prohibits for anyone
under the age of 18. Child laborers in artisanal gold mining were exposed to
health risks from accidents and exposure to toxic mercury. 
Key International Actors
In June, the UN Security Council renewed the mandate of MINUSMA, the peace-
keeping mission with a troop ceiling of 11,200 military personnel, some 70 per-
cent of whom are currently deployed. The UN independent expert on the
situation of human rights in Mali, Suliman Baldo, conducted two missions and
pressed for progress in the fight against impunity. In March, the UN Human
Rights Council passed a resolution that welcomed progress, expressed concerns
on continued violations and abuses, and renewed the mandate of the independ-
ent expert. The UN Peacebuilding fund supported demobilization, reconciliation,
and justice projects. 
The African Union (AU) brokered a ceasefire in May that paved the way for Alger-
ian and AU-led negotiations between the Malian government and several armed
groups; the talks took place in the Algerian capital, Algiers. 
The 1,700 strong French military operation known as Operation Serval was in Au-
gust transformed into a 3,000-strong regional operation—known as Operation
Barkhane—to address the threat of instability in Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger,
and Chad. 
The European Union Training Mission in Mali trained eight battalions of Malian
soldiers, while the EU Capacity Building Mission, EUCAP Sahel Mali, was estab-
lished to train the police, gendarmerie, and National Guard. 
The EU and Dutch took the lead on justice sector reform and support. The UN De-
velopment Programme supported the rehabilitation of courthouses, while the
United States provided forensic support to the Ministry of Justice. 
In May and June 2014, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank col-
lectively delayed almost US$70 million in payments to the Malian government
following questions surrounding the extra-budgetary purchase of a presidential
plane and inflated military contracts. An audit revealed overbilling of over $56




Upon taking office in December 2012, President Enrique Peña Nieto acknowl-
edged that the “war on drugs” launched by his predecessor Felipe Calderón had
led to serious abuses by the security forces. In 2014, the administration adopted
a National Human Rights Program outlining its policies for the next 4 years, and
recognized that the whereabouts of more than 22,000 people who had been re-
ported missing since 2006 remained unknown. 
The forced disappearance of 43 students in September in Iguala, Guerrero, led to
widespread protests calling on the government to determine the whereabouts of
the missing students, and address the broader problem of corruption and abuse
that the case exposed. 
Yet the government has made little progress in prosecuting widespread killings,
enforced disappearances, and torture committed by soldiers and police in the
course of efforts to combat organized crime, including during Peña Nieto’s
tenure. 
Other ongoing problems include restrictions to press freedoms, abuses against
migrants, and limits on access to reproductive rights and health care. 
Enforced Disappearances 
Mexico’s security forces have participated in widespread enforced disappear-
ances since former President Calderón (2006-2012) launched a “war on drugs.”
Members of all security forces continue to carry out disappearances during the
Peña Nieto administration, in some cases, collaborating directly with criminal
groups. 
In September, approximately 30 municipal police officers in Iguala, Guerrero,
opened fire without warning on three buses carrying about 90 students from a
rural school that trains teachers. During that incident and two subsequent ones
in which unidentified people opened fire on the students and others, more than
15 people were injured and 6 were killed. The policemen ordered students in the
third bus to leave the vehicle, beat them, and forced them at gunpoint to lie
down on the roadside before driving away with them in at least three police cars. 
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At time of writing, the whereabouts of 42 students remained unknown. The Attor-
ney General’s Office claimed that, based on the confession of three alleged per-
petrators, the students were handed over to members of a criminal group, who
killed them, burnt their bodies, and threw them in a municipal dump. The DNA of
a forty-third student was identified among the remains that the Attorney Gen-
eral’s Office reports having found in the area. More than 80 people were de-
tained and charged for their alleged involvement in these incidents. 
In August 2014, the government acknowledged that the whereabouts of over
22,000 people who had gone missing since 2006 remained unknown, but failed
to disclose corroborating evidence, or information on how many of these cases
are alleged enforced disappearances. Mexico’s National Human Rights Commis-
sion (CNDH) has issued 12 reports documenting the enforced disappearance of
30 victims during this time, and found evidence of probable participation of
state agents in approximately 600 other disappearances cases. 
As of April, according to official information, no one had been convicted for an
enforced disappearance committed after 2006. Prosecutors and police routinely
fail to carry out basic investigative steps to identify those responsible for disap-
pearances, often blaming victims, and telling their families to investigate. Fami-
lies of the disappeared may lose access to basic social services that are tied to
the victim’s employment, such as child care. 
The government has pursued potentially promising initiatives to find people who
have gone missing, but they have produced limited results. In 2013, it created a
unit in the Federal Prosecutor’s Office to investigate disappearances, and locate
people who had gone missing. As of August 2014, the unit had found 87 people.
The implementation of a comprehensive database donated by the International
Committee of the Red Cross to cross-reference information on missing people
and unidentified bodies, remained pending at time of writing.
Military Abuses and Impunity
Mexico has relied heavily on the military to fight drug-related violence and or-
ganized crime, leading to widespread human rights violations. Since 2006, the
CNDH received approximately 9,000 complaints of abuse by the army, and is-
sued reports in over 100 cases in which it found that army personnel had com-
mitted serious human rights violations. 
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In April, Congress reformed the Code of Military Justice, stating that abuses com-
mitted by members of the military against civilians should be handled by the or-
dinary criminal justice system. Previously, these cases had been handled by the
military justice system, which had routinely failed to hold members of the mili-
tary accountable for abuses. Under the reform, abuses against soldiers remain
subject to the military justice system, which lacks independence and trans-
parency. 
In June, military personnel opened fire on a group of 22 civilians who were inside
an empty warehouse in Tlatlaya, state of Mexico, killing all of them. One soldier
was injured during the incident. 
Accounts from witnesses and a report by the CNDH said that at least 12 civilians
were extrajudicially executed. State prosecutors detained two of the three surviv-
ing witnesses, beat them, repeatedly asphyxiated them with a bag, and threat-
ened them with sexual abuse to force them to confess to having links to people
killed in the incidents, and to say that the military was not responsible for the
killings, according to the CNDH. They also threatened and mistreated a third wit-
ness, and forced the three witnesses to sign documents they were not allowed to
read. 
In September, the military justice system detained 24 soldiers and one lieu-
tenant who allegedly participated in the incidents, and accused 8 of them of
breaches of military discipline. Subsequently, the Attorney General’s Office
charged seven soldiers and the lieutenant with“undue exercise of public service.
Three of the soldiers were also charged with “abuse of authority, aggravated
homicide of eight people, and altering the crime scene.” The lieutenant was also
charged with cover-up. 
Torture
Torture is widely practiced in Mexico to obtain forced confessions and extract in-
formation. It is most frequently applied in the period between when victims are
arbitrarily detained and when they are handed to prosecutors, when they are
often held incommunicado at military bases or other illegal detention sites.
Common tactics include beatings, waterboarding, electric shocks, and sexual
torture. Many judges continue to accept confessions obtained through torture,




The criminal justice system routinely fails to provide justice to victims of violent
crimes and human rights violations. Causes of this failure include corruption, in-
adequate training and resources, and the complicity of prosecutors and public
defenders. 
In 2013, Mexico enacted a federal Victims Law intended to ensure justice, pro-
tection, and reparations for victims of crime. At time of writing, the executive had
yet to adopt implementing regulations that are necessary to provide reparations
to victims. As of March 2014, only six states had enacted legislation in compli-
ance with the Victims Law.
In 2008, Mexico passed a constitutional reform to transform its inquisitorial,
written justice system to an adversarial, oral one by 2016. As of November, only
3 states had fully implemented the reform, while 13 had partially transitioned to
the new system.
The reform also introduced the provision of arraigo, which allows prosecutors,
with judicial authorization, to hold organized crime suspects for up to 80 days
before they are charged with a crime. In February, the Supreme Court ruled the
provision should only be applied in cases of organized crime. A proposal to re-
duce the maximum time that such individuals can be held without charge to 35
days was pending before the Senate at time of writing. 
Self-Defense Groups
The failure of law enforcement has contributed to the emergence of armed citi-
zen self-defense groups in many parts of the country. 
Following concerns about some groups’ unregulated security actions, self-de-
fense groups in Michoacán state signed an agreement with the government in
April stipulating that their members would register their weapons and incorpo-
rate into local security forces. At time of writing, there had been no independent
assessment of the agreement’s implementation, nor its compliance with the vet-




Prisons are overpopulated, unhygienic, and fail to provide basic security for
most inmates. Prisoners who accuse guards or inmates of attacks or other
abuses, have no effective system to seek redress. In the majority of prisons, the
inmate population is controlled by organized crime, and corruption and violence
are rampant. 
Freedom of Media 
Journalists, particularly those who report on crime or criticize officials, face ha-
rassment and attacks. According to the Special Prosecutor’s Office for Crimes
against Freedom of Expression, between 2000 and May 2014, 102 journalists
were killed, and 24 were disappeared—including 2 who were killed in 2014. 
Authorities routinely fail to adequately investigate crimes against journalists,
often preemptively ruling out their profession as a motive. As of May, the Special
Prosecutor’s Office was conducting 555 investigations of crimes against journal-
ists or media outlets, and had presented charges in 61 cases. 
Journalists are often driven to self-censorship by attacks carried out both by gov-
ernment officials and by criminal groups, while the under-regulation of state ad-
vertising can also limit media freedom by giving the government
disproportionate financial influence over media outlets.
Women’s and Girls’ Rights
Mexican laws do not adequately protect women and girls against domestic and
sexual violence. Some provisions, including those that make the severity of pun-
ishments for some sexual offenses contingent upon the “chastity” of the victim,
contradict international standards. Women and girls who have suffered these
types of human rights violations generally do not report them to authorities,
while those who do generally face suspicion, apathy, and disrespect. 
In 2008, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of a Mexico City law
that legalized abortion in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. Since then, 17 states





In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that all states must provide emergency contra-
ception and access to abortion for rape victims. However, in practice many
women and girls face serious barriers to accessing abortions after sexual vio-
lence, including inaccurate information and intimidation by officials.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
In 2010, the Supreme Court recognized the right of same-sex couples in Mexico
City to adopt children and to marry. It ruled that all 31 Mexican states must rec-
ognize same-sex marriages that take place in Mexico City, but did not require
states to perform same-sex marriages in their respective jurisdictions. In January
2014, the Supreme Court also ruled that same-sex couples can claim the same
social security and health insurance benefits that heterosexual couples receive
from government entities. In September, Coahuila became the first state to legal-
ize same-sex marriage.
Palliative Care
The Mexican government took a number of important steps to implement legal
provisions granting people who are terminally ill access to palliative care. It en-
acted a new regulation in November 2013, announced an overhaul of drug con-
trol regulations to facilitate access to morphine and other opioid analgesics,
added partial coverage of palliative care to a government insurance scheme for
the poor, and announced an effort to develop a national palliative care strategy.
Tens of thousands of patients require end-of-life care in Mexico every year but
only a small minority can access it in practice. 
Migrants
Hundreds of thousands of undocumented migrants, including unaccompanied
children and families, pass through Mexico each year and many are subjected to
grave abuses en route at the hands of organized crime, migration authorities,
and security forces. A 2013 report by the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights (IACHR) found that “robberies, extortion, kidnappings and physical and
psychological assaults, sexual abuse, murders and disappearances to which
[migrants] fall victim … have taken a dramatic turn for the worse” in recent years. 
383
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
In April, approximately 300 Central American migrants and 3 rights defenders ac-
companying them were allegedly attacked and forcibly detained by immigration
and police officials in Tabasco, according to the IACHR. 
Authorities have not taken adequate steps to protect migrants, or to investigate
and prosecute those who abuse them. The government has also failed to imple-
ment protective measures granted by national and international human rights
bodies in favor of migrant shelters’ staff, who face threats and harassment from
criminal groups and officials. 
Labor Rights
The dominance of pro-management unions continues to obstruct legitimate
labor-organizing activity. Independent unions are often blocked from entering
negotiations with management, while workers who seek to form independent
unions risk losing their jobs. A 2012 labor law failed to address the lack of trans-
parency and democracy in the powerful pro-management unions, and failed to
protect workers’ right to form independent unions and carry out collective bar-
gaining. 
Human Rights Defenders
Human rights defenders and activists continue to suffer harassment and attacks,
often in the context of opposition to infrastructure, or resource extraction “mega-
projects.” In many cases, there is evidence that state agents are involved in ag-
gressions against them. 
In 2012, Mexico enacted a law to protect human rights defenders and journal-
ists. The protection mechanism created by the law, however, has not been effec-
tively implemented, with protective measures slow to arrive, insufficient, or
incomplete in some cases. 
Key International Actors
The United States has allocated over US$2 billion in aid to Mexico through the
Merida Initiative, an aid package agreed upon in 2007 without a year cap, to
help Mexico combat organized crime. Fifteen percent of select portions of the as-
sistance can be disbursed only after the US secretary of state reports that the
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Mexican government is meeting human rights requirements. However, the im-
pact of these requirements has been undermined by the fact that the US State
Department has repeatedly reported to the US Congress that they are being met,
despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, often citing vague and incom-
plete progress towards meeting the requirements, leading Congress to release
the funds. 
In April-May, the UN special rapporteur on torture visited Mexico and found that
torture is “generalized.” In August, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions reported that widespread abuses committed
with impunity by security forces during the “war on drugs” seriously threat-
ened the right to life. In September, the UN high commissioner for human rights
expressed “very serious concern” over attacks against journalists, and urged the
government to adopt measures to protect them. 
In Mexico, most people with disabilities live in poverty, leading to increased
barriers to education, employment, and health care. In its October 2014 review
of Mexico’s compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, the treaty’s monitoring body raised concerns about restrictions on
the legal capacity of persons with disabilities, violence faced by women and
children with disabilities (including involuntary sterilization), institutionaliza-
tion of children with disabilities and physical coercion, and isolation of people




Morocco’s 2011 constitution incorporated strong human rights provisions, but
these reforms have not led to improved practices, the passage of significant im-
plementing legislation, or the revision of repressive laws. In 2014, Moroccans ex-
ercised their right to peaceful protest in the streets, but police continued to
violently disperse them on occasion. Laws that criminalize acts deemed harmful
to the king, the monarchy, Islam, or Morocco’s claim over Western Sahara limited
the rights to peaceful expression, assembly, and association. Courts continued
to convict and imprison street protesters and dissidents in unfair trials. On a
more positive note, Morocco implemented reforms announced in 2013 to its poli-
cies on migrants, granting temporary legal status to hundreds of refugees and to
thousands of other foreigners, most of them sub-Saharan. 
Freedom of Expression
Independent print and online media continue to investigate and criticize govern-
ment officials and policies, but face prosecution and harassment if they step too
far. The press law mandates prison terms for “maliciously” spreading “false in-
formation” that authorities consider likely to disturb the public order, or for
speech that is ruled defamatory. 
Moroccan state television allows some space for debate and investigative re-
porting but little for direct criticism of the government or dissent on key issues.
Authorities pursued their investigation on terrorism charges of Ali Anouzla, di-
rector of the independent news site Lakome.com, because of an article describ-
ing, and providing an indirect link to, a jihadist recruitment video. In 2013,
Anouzla spent five weeks in detention after publishing the article. 
Rapper Mouad Belghouat (“El-Haqed”), whose songs denounce corruption and
police abuse, spent four months in prison after being convicted on charges of
assaulting police officers, in a trial where the judge refused to summon any de-
fense witnesses or purported victims. Authorities in February prevented a
Casablanca bookstore from hosting an event for El-Haqed’s new song album.
Seventeen-year-old rapper Othmane Atiq (“Mr. Crazy”) served a three-month
prison term for insulting the police and inciting drug use for his music videos de-
picting the lives of disaffected urban youth. 
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Abdessamad Haydour, a student, continued to serve a three -year prison term for
insulting the king by calling him a “dog,” “a murderer,” and “a dictator” in a
YouTube video. A court sentenced him in February 2012 under a penal code pro-
vision criminalizing “insults to the king.” 
Freedom of Assembly
Authorities tolerated numerous marches and rallies to demand political reform
and protest government actions, but they forcibly dispersed some gatherings,
assaulting protesters. In Western Sahara, authorities prohibited all public gath-
erings deemed hostile to Morocco’s contested rule over that territory, dispatch-
ing large numbers of police who blocked access to demonstration venues and
often forcibly dispersed Sahrawis seeking to assemble. 
On April 6, police arrested 11 young men at a pro-reform march in Casablanca
and accused them of hitting and insulting the police. A court of first instance on
May 22 sentenced nine of them to prison terms of up to one year and two to sus-
pended sentences using similarly worded “confessions” police said they had
made in pretrial detention, although the defendants repudiated them in court.
On June 17, the court provisionally freed the nine pending the outcome of their
appeals trial, which was continuing at time of writing. 
Freedom of Association
Officials continue to arbitrarily prevent or impede many associations from ob-
taining legal registration although the 2011 constitution guarantees the right to
form an association. In May, authorities refused to register Freedom Now, a new
free speech group and prohibited it from holding a conference at the bar associ-
ation in Rabat. Other associations denied legal registration included charitable,
cultural, and educational associations whose leadership includes members of
al-Adl wal-Ihsan (Justice and Spirituality), a nationwide movement that advo-
cates for an Islamic state and questions the king’s spiritual authority. 
In Western Sahara, authorities withheld recognition for all local human rights or-
ganizations whose leaders support independence for that territory, even those




Authorities also prohibited tens of public and non-public activities prepared by
legally recognized human rights associations, such as an international youth
camp that the national chapter of Amnesty International had organized every
summer; and numerous conferences, training sessions, and youth activities or-
ganized by the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH) and its
branches. 
Between April and October, Morocco expelled at least 40 foreign visitors from
Western Sahara. Most of those affected were either European supporters of
Sahrawi self-determination or freelance journalists or researchers who had not
coordinated their visit with authorities. These expulsions, along with heavy Mo-
roccan police surveillance of foreigners who did visit and met Sahrawi rights ac-
tivists, undermined Morocco’s efforts to showcase the Western Sahara as a
place open to international scrutiny. 
Police Conduct, Torture, and the Criminal Justice System
Legal reforms advanced slowly. A law promulgated in September empowers the
newly created Constitutional Court to block proposed legislation if it contravenes
the new constitution, including its human rights provisions. A proposed law that
would deny military courts jurisdiction over civilians was awaiting parliamentary
approval. 
Meanwhile, military courts continued to try civilians, including Mbarek Daoudi, a
Sahrawi activist held since September 2013, on weapons charges. Twenty-one
other Sahrawis remained in prison serving long sentences imposed by a military
court in 2013. The men had been charged in connection with violence that
erupted on November 8, 2010, when authorities dismantled the Gdeim Izik
protest camp in Western Sahara. Eleven members of the security forces were
killed in the violence. The military court failed to investigate defendants’ allega-
tions that police officers had tortured or coerced them into signing false state-
ments, and relied heavily on the statements to return its guilty verdict. 
Courts failed to uphold the right of defendants to receive fair trials in political
and security-related cases. Authorities continued to imprison hundreds of sus-
pected Islamist militants they arrested in the wake of the Casablanca bombings
of May 2003. Many were serving sentences imposed after unfair trials following
months of secret detention, ill-treatment and, in some cases, torture. Police
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have arrested hundreds more suspected militants since further terrorist attacks
in 2007 and 2011. Courts have convicted and imprisoned many of them on
charges of belonging to a “terrorist network” or preparing to join Islamist mili-
tants fighting in Iraq or elsewhere. Morocco’s 2003 counterterrorism law con-
tains a broad definition of “terrorism” and allows for up to 12 days of garde à vue
(pre-charge) detention. 
After visiting Morocco and Western Sahara in December 2013, the United Nations
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) concluded, “The Moroccan crimi-
nal judicial system relies heavily on confessions as the main evidence to support
conviction. Complaints received by the Working Group indicate the use of torture
by State officials to obtain evidence or confessions during initial questioning …
.Courts and prosecutors do not comply with their obligation to initiate an ex offi-
cio investigation whenever there are reasonable grounds to believe that a con-
fession has been obtained through the use of torture and ill-treatment.” The
WGAD said authorities had allowed it to visit the places of detention it had re-
quested, and to interview detainees of its choice in private. 
Moroccan courts continue to impose the death penalty, but authorities have not
carried out executions since the early 1990s.
Prison conditions are reportedly harsh, largely due to overcrowding, exacerbated
by the proclivity of investigating judges to order the pretrial detention of sus-
pects. The National Human Rights Council (CNDH), which urged the government
to expand alternative punishments, reported that the prison population had
reached 72,000 in 2013, 42 percent of them pretrial, with an average of 2 square
meters of space per inmate. The CNDH is a state-funded body that reports to the
king. 
A court on August 12 sentenced left-wing activist Wafae Charaf to serve one year
in prison and pay a fine, and damages for slander and “falsely” reporting an of-
fense, after she filed a complaint after unknown men abducted and tortured her
following a workers’ protest in April in Tangiers. An appeals court in that city on
October 20 doubled her prison term to two years. A Casablanca court sentenced
one local activist to three years in prison, a fine, and damages, on the same
charges, after he reported having been abducted and tortured by unknown men.
The sentences in these two cases could have a chilling effect on people wishing
to file complaints of abuse by the security forces. 
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Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
Moroccan courts continued to jail persons for homosexual behavior under article
489 of the penal code, which prohibits “lewd or unnatural acts with an individ-
ual of the same sex.” Two of six men arrested in Beni Mellal in April and charged
under this provision received prison terms for this and other offenses. 
On October 2, a court sentenced a British tourist and a Moroccan acquaintance
to four months in prison for homosexuality. After spending about three weeks in
jail, the two men were released pending appeal. 
Migrants and Refugees
Implementation continued of a 2013 plan to overhaul national policies toward
migrants. Morocco’s refugee agency granted one-year renewable residency per-
mits to more than 500 UNHCR-recognized refugees. At time of writing, Morocco
had not determined the status it would grant to more than 1,300 Syrians, whom
UNHCR recognizes as refugees. Morocco also granted one-year renewable resi-
dency permits to thousands of sub-Saharan migrants who were not asylum-seek-
ers but who met certain criteria. However, security forces continued to use
excessive force on migrants, especially the mostly sub-Saharan migrants who
were camping near, or attempting to scale, the fences separating Morocco from
the Spanish enclave of Melilla (see also Spain chapter). 
Women’s and Girls’ Rights
The 2011 constitution guarantees equality for women, “while respecting the pro-
visions of the Constitution, and the laws and permanent characteristics of the
Kingdom.” In January, Parliament removed from article 475 of the penal code a
clause that had, in effect, allowed some men to escape prosecution for raping a
minor if they agreed to marry her. The code retains other discriminatory provi-
sions, including article 490, which criminalizes consensual sex between unmar-
ried people and so places rape victims at risk of prosecution if the accused
rapist is acquitted. 
The Family Code discriminates against women with regard to inheritance and the
right of husbands to unilaterally divorce their wives. Reforms to the code in 2004





marriage from 15 to 18. However, judges routinely allow girls to marry below this
age. In September 2014, the Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed
concern that Morocco had not adopted a legislation criminalizing all forms of do-
mestic violence, including marital rape, although violence against women and
girls in the home is reported to be pervasive. 
Domestic Workers
Despite laws prohibiting the employment of children under the age of 15, thou-
sands of children under that age—predominantly girls—are believed to work as
domestic workers. According to the UN, nongovernmental organizations, and
government sources, the number of child domestic workers has declined in re-
cent years, but girls as young as 8 years old continue to work in private homes
for up to 12 hours a day for as little as US$11 per month. In some cases, employ-
ers beat and verbally abused the girls, denied them an education, and refused
them adequate food. In January 2014, an Agadir court sentenced an employer to
20 years in prison for violence leading to the death of a child domestic worker in
her employ. In September 2014, the Committee on the Rights of the Child ex-
pressed concern that the government had not taken effective measures to re-
move children from hazardous domestic labor. 
Morocco’s labor law excludes domestic workers from its protections, which in-
clude a minimum wage, limits to work hours, and a weekly rest day. In 2006, au-
thorities presented a draft law to regulate domestic work and reinforce existing
prohibitions on domestic workers under 15 years old. The draft had been modi-
fied but not adopted at time of writing. 
Key International Actors
France, a close ally and Morocco’s leading trading partner, refrained from pub-
licly criticizing human rights violations in the kingdom. Morocco suspended its
bilateral judicial cooperation agreements with France in February after a French
investigating judge served subpoenas on a visiting Moroccan police commander
based on a complaint of complicity in torture. The United States is also a close
ally of Morocco. Secretary of State John Kerry, in Rabat in April for the bilateral
“Strategic Dialogue,” avoided any public mention of human rights concerns. 
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The government in recent years has granted access to several UN human rights
mechanisms seeking to visit Morocco and Western Sahara, including the Work-
ing Group on Arbitrary Detention in December 2013 (see above). Then-UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, on an official visit on May 29, noted
Morocco’s “great strides towards the better promotion and protection of human
rights,” but cited several areas of concern, including torture, restraints on free-
dom of expression, and the need to implement laws guaranteeing rights set out
in the 2011 constitution. 
As in past years, the UN Security Council in April renewed the mandate of UN
peacekeeping forces in Western Sahara (MINURSO) without broadening it to in-






A coalition government led by Nepali Congress leader Sushil Koirala took power
in February 2014 after months of political stalemate but did not make much
progress on human rights. Pressing concerns include lack of accountability for
serious human rights violations and war crimes committed during the 1996-2006
civil war, migrant and refugee rights, and women’s and girls’ rights. 
In May, the assembly enacted a law establishing the Commission on Investiga-
tion of Disappeared Persons, Truth and Reconciliation to investigate serious
rights violations and abuses committed during the civil war, but the law largely
replicates a previous version that the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitu-
tional. 
Pressure from China has contributed to continuing restrictions on Tibetans in
Nepal, including those living in the country and those transiting to India. 
The government tried but was unable to press for greater protection of its mi-
grant workers despite reported deaths and injuries, particularly in Qatar. 
Accountability and Transitional Justice
Nepal has made little progress on justice for serious abuses committed by both
sides during its decade-long civil war, in which an estimated 13,000 people
died. Efforts to ensure prosecutions in civilian courts for serious human rights
and humanitarian law violations during the conflict remain stalled. 
In 2014, authorities in the United Kingdom continued to proceed with the prose-
cution of Nepali army Col. Kumar Lama, charged with committing torture during
the civil war, under English laws of universal jurisdiction for that crime. While
Nepal has delivered interim monetary and in-kind compensation to the families
of those who were “disappeared” or killed during the conflict, other victims,
such as victims of sexual violence or torture, have received no compensation
from the state. 
Truth and Reconciliation 
In January 2014, Nepal’s Supreme Court rejected the Truth and Reconciliation





to international legal standards. In May 2014, Nepal’s Constituent Assembly
passed a new TRC Act, but the law did not address the Supreme Court’s con-
cerns. A public interest litigation challenge to the new law has been filed with
the Supreme Court. 
In July, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights is-
sued a technical note pointing out that the TRC Act does not conform to Nepal’s
international legal obligations, including because it allows amnesties for serious
international crimes. Five experts at the UN Human Rights Council have voiced
similar concerns. 
Tibetan Refugees
Nepal imposes strict restrictions on peaceful protests by Tibetan refugees. Since
the 2008 uprising in Tibet, Chinese authorities have pressured Nepal to restrict
basic rights. Tibetans in Nepal are forbidden from participating in public celebra-
tions of the Dalai Lama’s birthday or the Tibetan new year. Buddhist religious
sites and monasteries are openly under government surveillance. 
A 2014 Human Rights Watch report documented limitations on the fundamental
freedoms of Tibetans in Nepal. Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissed the
findings, claiming that the report drew on unsubstantiated claims. The ministry
did not address Nepal’s de facto ban on political protests by Tibetans, its failure
to provide them with official identification documents, sharp restrictions on pub-
lic activities promoting Tibetan culture and religion, and routine abuses by
Nepali security forces including excessive use of force, arbitrary detention, and
ill-treatment. 
Migrant Workers
The Nepali economy depends heavily on remittances from Nepali migrant work-
ers abroad, but the government has done little to support and protect such workers. 
In 2014, there were reports that hundreds of Nepali and other migrant workers in
Qatar had died due to poor working conditions. Migrant workers often live in
cramped, unsanitary conditions, and many workers complain of excessive work-
ing hours and unpaid wages. The Nepal government took some steps by sus-
pending some unregulated recruiting agencies and calling upon the Qatar
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government to provide redress and end practices that facilitate trafficking and
forced labor, but was unable to ensure effective protection. 
Statelessness
Despite promises of reform, Nepal’s citizenship laws leave an estimated 2.1 mil-
lion people without official status and at risk of statelessness. As a result, many
people, particularly women, children born out of wedlock, or children of refugee
fathers, are unable to secure drivers’ licenses, passports, bank accounts, or vot-
ing rights. The flawed citizenship law makes it particularly difficult for women to
secure legal proof of citizenship, especially when male family members refuse to
assist them or are unavailable to do so, and it effectively denies citizenship to
children of non-Nepali fathers. 
Women’s and Girls’ Rights
Victims of rape and other sexual violence committed by both sides during
Nepal’s civil war are excluded from any compensation under the Interim Relief
Program. They also have been denied access to justice through regular courts for
a variety of reasons, including that Nepali criminal law has an inflexible 35-day
statute of limitations on reporting rape. Despite promises by the previous gov-
ernment, Nepal is yet to amend its laws against sexual assault. 
Protecting Disabled Children
In line with its international obligations under the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), the government has made a commitment to in-
clusive education, but has failed to effectively implement the policy due to lack
of funding, inadequate teacher training, and competing priorities. The enroll-
ment of children with disabilities in primary and secondary education continued
to decline in 2014 and an estimated 85 percent of all out-of-school children in
Nepal have disabilities. 
The government, however, has increased school scholarships for children with
disabilities, developed a special curriculum for children with intellectual disabil-





The international community was less vocal on human rights in Nepal in 2014. In
2013, European Union missions—including those of Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom—and the EU delegation, joined by Norway
and Switzerland, had issued a statement calling for credible and independent
mechanisms to address war-era violations, emphasizing that there should be no
amnesty for serious human rights abuses. 
However, in 2014 there were no public statements from the EU despite Nepal’s
announcement of a flawed commission. Instead, some countries suggested they
might fund some part of the commission, although they retreated from this posi-
tion after the OHCHR issued a technical note pointing out the shortcomings.
Donors have yet to publicly state that they will refrain from supporting any
process that violates Nepal’s international legal obligations. 
China has significant influence in Nepal. The two countries have several security
and intelligence sharing agreements and exchanged several official high-level
visits in 2014. Nepal pledged cooperation with China’s People’s Armed Police
and closely monitored the Tibetan community. China’s financial assistance to
Nepal has increased, with several proposed hydropower and transit agreements. 
The US continued to play the primary role in Tibetan refugee protection issues.
The US and other countries have also provided third country settlement to tens
of thousands of Bhutanese refugees from Nepal. 
During an official state visit, the newly elected prime minister of India, Narendra
Modi, committed to providing assistance for development projects and pressed
the government to complete drafting a new constitution, but made no mention






Intensified violence and atrocities by Boko Haram, Nigeria’s home-grown mili-
tant insurgent group, dominated the country’s human rights landscape in 2014.
The group indiscriminately killed civilians, abducted women and girls, forcefully
conscripted young men and boys, and destroyed villages, towns, and schools. In
April 2014, Boko Haram’s abduction of nearly 300 schoolgirls in the town of Chi-
bok focused unprecedented global attention on the group. 
In a shocking display of its military power, Boko Haram seized and controlled ter-
ritory in the beleaguered northeastern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. In
responding to the Islamist group, government security forces were also impli-
cated in grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in
the treatment of Boko Haram suspects. Violence persisted, despite the imposi-
tion of a state of emergency in 2013 that was renewed in May. The conflict re-
sulted in the death of over 2,500 civilians between January and August 2014,
and the displacement of over 650,000 residents within Nigeria as well as more
than 80,000 as refugees in neighboring countries. 
Elsewhere in Nigeria, communal violence, fueled by competition for power and
access to land between nomadic pastoralists and farming communities, killed
more than 1,200 people in the north-central states in 2014. Security forces, in-
cluding the police, engaged in human rights abuses including torture throughout
the country. 
Nigerian authorities made scant effort to investigate or prosecute those respon-
sible for the violence. International actors, notably the United Kingdom, United
States, and United Nations, frequently condemned the actions of Boko Haram,
but their criticism of the abusive conduct of the Nigerian security forces has not
resulted in meaningful change. 
Abuses by Boko Haram
Boko Haram attacked and in some cases held more than 130 villages and towns,
where it imposed its interpretation of Sharia law. Boko Haram combatants per-
petrated killings, and razed and looted homes, businesses, schools, churches,
markets, and health facilities in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states. 
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The violence extended to the cities of Kano, Jos, Kaduna, Gombe, Bauchi, Lagos,
and Abuja, the federal capital territory, where multiple bombings—for which the
insurgents claimed responsibility—killed over 410 people. Out of about 6,000
civilian deaths in Boko Haram attacks since 2009, more than 2,563 people were
killed in 2014 alone. 
Since 2009, Boko Haram has destroyed at least 211 schools in Borno alone, and
abducted more than 500 women and girls from the northeast, of which at least
over 100 either escaped, were rescued by security forces, or were released by in-
surgents. Some abductees suffered other abuses including sexual violence,
forced marriage, and forced conversion. 
In the largest abduction to date, the group captured 276 female students from a
government-run secondary school in Chibok, Borno State; 219 of the schoolgirls
remain in captivity. Male students were also targeted in Boko Haram’s attacks on
schools: insurgents killed over 100 male students at government-owned schools
in Buni Yadi and Potiskum, Yobe State, during attacks in February and November.
Insurgents have also abducted and forcibly conscripted hundreds of young men
and boys; those who resist conscription are executed. 
Conduct of Security Forces
Government security forces continued to respond to the Boko Haram violence in
a heavy-handed manner, leading to serious human rights violations. Suspects
are routinely abused, tortured, and held incommunicado in abusive detention
conditions without charge or trial. The Joint Investigation Team, which military
authorities commissioned in 2013, has recommended for trial 500 suspects out
of 1,400 detainees in the northeast. Fewer than 50 suspects have faced trial. 
During a Boko Haram attack in March on the Giwa military barrack and detention
facility in Maiduguri, Borno state, security forces allegedly killed more than 600
detainees who fled during the attack. No member of the security forces has been
brought to justice for these and previous violations of human rights, despite re-
peated pledges by the military to investigate them. 
Local vigilante groups assisting Nigerian security forces to apprehend the mili-
tants and repel attacks were allegedly implicated in the recruitment and use of
child soldiers, and ill-treatment and unlawful killing of Boko Haram suspects.
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Nigerian authorities were at time of writing investigating video footage that ap-
peared to show the execution of unarmed men by soldiers, including some in
uniform, and members of the vigilante groups who can be identified by uniforms
supplied by the Borno state government. 
Inter-Communal and Political Violence
Inter-communal violence, which has plagued the Middle Belt states of Plateau
and Kaduna for years, extended to other states in northern Nigeria, including
Benue, Nasarawa, Taraba, Katsina, and Zamfara. 
Recurring violence in these states since 2010 has resulted in the death of more
than 4,000 people and the displacement of more than 120,000 residents. The
failure of federal and state authorities to investigate and prosecute crimes com-
mitted by all sides, including ethnic and economic groups in these five states,
exacerbated the struggle for political power between ethnic groups and failed to
resolve contested access to grazing land by both sedentary farmers and nomadic
herdsmen. 
Political violence between supporters of two major political parties in the build-
up to the February 2015 general elections led to bloody clashes in Rivers State in
early 2014. In September, the president of the Nigerian Senate said that 2015
elections could be postponed because the nation “was at war with Boko
Haram.” The Independent National Electoral Commission, which supervises
elections, had also suggested that it might be difficult to hold elections in the
three states currently under emergency rule. 
Government Corruption
Endemic public sector corruption continued to undermine the enjoyment of so-
cial and economic rights in Nigeria. In February 2014, the government sus-
pended then-Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, on
allegations of financial impropriety. Sanusi had alleged large-scale corruption by




In May, President Goodluck Jonathan told journalists that allegations of corrup-
tion against members of his cabinet were politically motivated and that most
acts were no more than “common stealing.” 
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and its public sector counter-
part, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commis-
sion, failed to effectively tackle high-level corruption and financial crimes in the
country. Many of the arrests and prosecutions were against low-level officials,
while allegations against highly placed politicians and the elite were not investi-
gated. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
In southern states, under the criminal code, consensual homosexual conduct
can result in a 14-year prison term. In northern states, under Sharia law, punish-
ments include caning, imprisonment, or death by stoning. 
The Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Bill, which President Jonathan ratified in
January 2014, took things to what an observer described as “absurd levels” as
the new law criminalizes public displays of affection between same-sex couples
and penalizes organizations advocating for the rights of LGBT people. The law
could inhibit the right to health by criminalizing outreach to LGBT groups. The
vaguely worded law contradicts Nigeria’s Constitution, as well as its obligations
under regional and international human rights treaties. It has been roundly con-
demned by local and international human rights groups. 
Freedom of Expression, Media, and Association
The Nigerian media is independent, strong, and free. However, it is not immune
to intimidation and harassment for publishing materials that authorities deem to
be uncomplimentary. 
In June, security forces reacted to critical media reports about the military carry-
ing out a campaign against several media houses, destroying newspapers and
arresting at least two journalists. In July, a member of the federal House of Rep-
resentatives introduced a bill to parliament designed to regulate foreign funding
of civil society organizations. The bill mandates that voluntary organizations reg-
ister with the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Com-
WORLD REPORT 2015
404
mission and seek its approval within 60 days of accepting funds from interna-
tional organizations. If passed into law, the bill would violate the right to free-
dom of association and assembly, guaranteed by the Nigerian Constitution and
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
Key International Actors
Under both domestic and international pressure in the wake of the massive
media attention that followed the April Boko Haram abduction of hundreds of
teenage schoolgirls, the Nigerian government requested assistance to combat
the insurgency. The plea led to increased involvement by international actors
and created an opportunity to exert pressure on the Nigerian government over its
dismal human rights record. 
At the London ministerial meeting on security in Nigeria in June, the United King-
dom outlined a substantial package of defense and development support to
strengthen the capacity of the Nigerian military. The assistance includes provi-
sion of surveillance aircraft and the training of units to be deployed in counterin-
surgency operations in the northeast. 
At the August 2014 US-Africa Leaders’ Summit, US President Barak Obama an-
nounced the launch of the Security Governance Initiative, of which Nigeria will
be an inaugural recipient. This initiative is geared to help improve the trans-
parency, governance, and effectiveness of the security sector. 
In September, the US government also announced plans to launch a major bor-
der-security program for Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger under the Global
Security Contingency Fund launched by President Obama during the US-Africa
Leaders’ Summit. President Obama said that the US was committed to helping
Nigeria address Boko Haram and urged Nigeria’s government to adopt a compre-
hensive approach to protect its citizens. 
In November, the US government confirmed allegations by Nigeria authorities
that it denied the sale of military helicopters to Nigeria partly due to concerns
about the failure of the Nigerian military to protect civilians during military oper-
ations. 
In July, the European Parliament passed a resolution condemning Boko Haram
abuses and urging the Nigerian government to ensure that efforts to tackle the
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insurgent violence are carried out in accordance with its obligations under inter-
national law. The violence in the north generated considerable attention from
the United Nations: in May, the Security Council added Boko Haram to the UN’s
resolution 1267 [Al-Qaeda] sanctions list, which imposes an international asset
freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo against the group. In May, the secretary-
general’s report on children and armed conflict included Boko Haram for the first
time on its “list of shame” as a party to conflict that “kills and maims children,”
and “attacks schools and hospitals.” 
Navi Pillay, then-UN high commissioner for human rights, during a visit to Nigeria
in March, emphasized the importance of transparent investigations into alleged
violations by security forces in the northeast. 
The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) visited Nigeria in Febru-
ary, during which she reiterated her office’s findings that Boko Haram is an
armed group and the situation in northeast Nigeria is a non-international armed
conflict. The situation in Nigeria has been under preliminary examination by the
ICC since 2010. 
Foreign Policy
Nigeria plays an important role in African and international affairs, and showed
its commitment to the international human rights regime by ratifying all the
major international and regional human rights treaties. 
In Africa, which is the center of its foreign policy, Nigeria is a member of the
African Union Peace and Security Council. President Jonathan is a co-mediator of
the ECOWAS efforts to resolve the conflict in Mali, and the country currently con-
tributes troops to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in
Mali. 
Nigeria has engaged with the UN and its organs, especially in the maintenance
of international peace and security. It has regularly participated in UN and
African Union peacekeeping operations across the world. In February, Nigeria
was re-elected as chair of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Opera-
tions and currently holds the chair of the Security Council Committee concerning
Guinea-Bissau and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolu-
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tion in Africa. In October, Nigeria was elected to serve as a member of the UN
Human Rights Council from 2015-2017. 
Nigeria supports efforts to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light
weapons and currently serves as one of the three vice-chairs of the Security
Council’s 1540 Committee on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion. It is also one of the two vice-chairs of the Security Council Committee con-
cerning Sudan. 
The country has been at the forefront of demands for expanding the UN Security
Council and is a leading African contender for permanent membership in a re-




The human rights situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK
or North Korea) has remained dire under the control of Kim Jong-Un. The govern-
ment is controlled by a one-party monopoly and dynastic leadership that do not
tolerate pluralism and systematically denies basic freedoms. Tight controls on
North Korea’s border with China continued in 2014, further reducing the number
of North Koreans able to flee and seek refuge in third countries. 
A Commission of Inquiry (COI) established by the United Nations Human Rights
Council (HRC), chaired by retired Australian judge Michael Kirby, published a
devastating report in February 2014 that concluded that the North Korea govern-
ment has committed systematic human right abuses at a scale without parallel
in the contemporary world—including extermination, murder, enslavement, tor-
ture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions, and other sexual violence. 
On March 28, the HRC adopted a resolution supporting the COI’s findings and
calling for accountability. In October, heavy pressure on North Korea at the UN
General Assembly in New York and North Korea’s concern over the possibility of
a referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC) prompted a first-ever meeting
between North Korean diplomats and Marzuki Darusman, the HRC special rap-
porteur on human rights in North Korea. 
On November 18, the third committee of the UN General Assembly, rejecting an
amendment by Cuba that would have stripped accountability from the text,
adopted the resolution by a 111 to 19 vote, with 55 states abstaining. The resolu-
tion endorsed the COI’s conclusions and called on the UN Security Council to
consider referring North Korea’s leadership to the ICC for crimes against human-
ity committed against the people of North Korea. 
Surprisingly, North Korea has ratified four key international human rights treaties
and signed, but not yet ratified, another, and has a constitution that provides a
number of rights protections on paper. But in practice, the government is among
the most rights-repressing in the world. Political and civil rights are nonexistent
since the government quashes all forms of disfavored expression and opinion
and totally prohibits any organized political opposition, independent media, free




North Koreans who seek to assert their rights are perceived to show insufficient
reverence for supreme leader Kim Jong-Un or the ruling Korean Workers’ Party.
Those who act in ways viewed as contrary to state interests face arbitrary arrest,
torture, and ill-treatment, detention without trial, or trial by state-controlled
courts. North Koreans also face severe penalties for possessing unauthorized
videos of foreign TV programs and movies or communicating with persons out-
side the country. 
The government also practices collective punishment for supposed anti-state of-
fenses, effectively enslaving hundreds of thousands of citizens, including chil-
dren, in prison camps and other detention facilities where they face deplorable
conditions and forced labor. 
Torture and Inhumane Treatment
People arrested in North Korea are routinely tortured by officials in the course of
interrogations. Common forms of torture include kicking and slapping, beatings
with iron rods or sticks, being forced to remain in stress positions for hours,
sleep deprivation, and, for female detainees, sexual abuse and rape. For less se-
rious crimes, suspects endure abuse until they can pay bribes for better treat-
ment or release, while for more serious offenses, torture is used to extract
confessions. 
Executions
North Korea’s criminal code stipulates that the death penalty can be applied for
vaguely defined offenses such as “crimes against the state” and “crimes against
the people.” In 2007, North Korea amended its penal code to extend the death
penalty to additional crimes, including non-violent offenses such as fraud and
smuggling, as long as authorities determine the crime is “extremely serious.” 
Political Prisoner Camps
Persons accused of serious political offenses are usually sent to brutal forced
labor camps, known as kwan-li-so, operated by North Korea’s National Security
Agency. The government not only punishes the offender, but also the person’s
entire extended family. 
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These camps are characterized by systematic abuses and often deadly condi-
tions, including meager rations that lead to near-starvation, virtually no medical
care, lack of proper housing and clothes, regular mistreatment including sexual
assault and torture by guards, and executions. People held in the kwan-li-so face
backbreaking forced labor at logging, mining, agricultural, and other worksites.
These are characterized by exposure to harsh weather, rudimentary tools, and
lack of safety equipment, all of which create a significant risk of accident. Death
rates in these camps are reportedly extremely high. 
While a North Korean UN diplomat publicly acknowledged for the first time in Oc-
tober 2014 that “reform through labor” centers exist in North Korea where “peo-
ple are improved through their mentality and look on their wrongdoings,”
Pyongyang still refuses to admit that kwan-li-so camps operate in the country. 
United States and South Korean officials estimate that between 80,000 and
120,000 people are imprisoned in the four remaining kwan-li-so: camp No. 14 in
Kaechun, No. 15 in Yodok, No. 16 in Hwasung, and No. 25 in Chungjin. 
Freedom of Information
All media and publications are state-controlled, and unauthorized access to non-
state radio or TV broadcasts is punished. Internet and phone calls are limited
within the country and are heavily censored. North Koreans are punished if
found with mobile media such as computer flash drives or DVDs containing
unauthorized videos of foreign films or TV dramas. Authorities also actively
track, and seek to catch and punish, persons using Chinese mobile phones to
make unauthorized calls to people outside North Korea. 
Freedom of Movement, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers
The government uses threats of detention, forced labor, and public executions to
generate fearful obedience, and imposes harsh restrictions on freedom of infor-
mation and movement, both within the country and across its borders. 
North Korea criminalizes leaving the country without state permission, and in
some instances, state security services actively pursue North Koreans and seek
to detain and forcibly return those who have fled the country. The ascent to
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power of Kim Jong-Un saw significantly expanded efforts to stop irregular cross-
ings of North Koreans into China across the northern border. 
The government has increased rotations of North Korean border guards and
cracked down on guards who permit crossings in exchange for bribes. Increased
patrols, fences, and use of security cameras on the Chinese side of the border
have also made crossings more difficult. Consequently, fewer North Koreans
have been able to make the arduous journey from the North Korean border
through China to Laos and then into Thailand, from where most are sent to South
Korea. 
China continues to categorically label all North Koreans in China as “illegal” eco-
nomic migrants and routinely repatriates them, despite its obligation to offer
protection to refugees under the Refugee Convention of 1951 and its 1967 proto-
col, to which China is a state party. 
The certainty of harsh punishment upon repatriation has led many in the interna-
tional community to argue that all North Koreans fleeing into China should be
considered refugees sur place. Beijing regularly restricts access of staff of the UN
Refugee Agency (UNHCR) to North Koreans in China. 
Former North Korean security officials who have defected told Human Rights
Watch that North Koreans handed back by China face interrogation, torture, and
consignment to political prisoner or forced labor camps. The severity of punish-
ments depends on North Korean authorities’ assessments of what the returnee
did while in China. 
Those suspected of simple trading schemes involving non-controversial goods
are usually sent to work in forced labor brigades (known as ro-dong-dan-ryeon-
dae, literally labor training centers) or jip-kyul-so (collection centers), which are
criminal penitentiaries where forced labor is required. Harsh and dangerous
working conditions in those facilities purportedly result in significant numbers of
people being injured or killed. 
Those whom authorities suspect of religious or political activities abroad, or hav-
ing contact with South Koreans, are often given lengthier terms in detention fa-
cilities known as kyo-hwa-so (correctional, reeducation centers) where
detainees face forced labor, food and medicine shortages, and regular mistreat-
ment by guards. 
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North Korean women fleeing their country are frequently trafficked into forced de
facto marriages with Chinese men. Even if they have lived in China for years,
these women are not entitled to legal residence and face possible arrest and
repatriation. Many children of such unrecognized marriages lack legal identity or
access to elementary education. 
Labor Rights
North Korea is one of the few nations in the world that still refuses to join the In-
ternational Labor Organization. Workers are systematically denied freedom of
association and the right to organize and collectively bargain. The only author-
ized trade union organization, the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea,
is controlled by the government. 
In 2003, a special administrative industrial zone at the southern border, the Kae-
sung Industrial Complex (KIC), was developed in cooperation with South Korea.
According to data from June 2014, the KIC hosts 125 South Korean companies
employing 52,742 North Korean workers, supervised by 780 South Korean man-
agers. A joint North-South Korea committee oversees the KIC, but the law govern-
ing working conditions there falls far short of international standards. 
Key International Actors
Pyongyang’s record of cooperation with UN human rights mechanisms remains
among the worst in the world. 
In its report released in February, the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) found that
“systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations have been and are
being committed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, its institutions
and officials. In many instances, the violations of human rights found by the
commission constitute crimes against humanity. These are not mere excesses of
the State; they are essential components of a political system that has moved far
from the ideals on which it claims to be founded. The gravity, scale and nature of




The COI recommended that the international community pursue accountability
for those responsible, either through a UN Security Council referral of the situa-
tion to the ICC or UN establishment of an ad hoc tribunal. 
The COI visited South Korea, Japan, Thailand, the United States, and the United
Kingdom, but China declined to let the three COI commissioners visit to conduct
investigations. North Korea also declined to participate in the inquiry, but in
September released its own human rights report that declared that North Kore-
ans “feel proud of the world’s most advantageous human rights system” and
blamed the US, European Union, South Korea, and Japan for singling out North
Korea for international condemnation. 
In February 2014, the two Koreas organized reunions of more than 100 families
separated during the Korean War, the first such reunions since 2010. An October
2014 visit to Seoul by Hwang Pyong So, vice-marshal of the Korean People’s
Army, marked the highest-level talks between the two sides since 2007. Follow-
ing the release of the COI report, however, North Korea conducted a series of
missile launches and threatened to hold another nuclear test. 
Japan continues to demand the return of 12 Japanese citizens whom North Korea
abducted in the 1970s and 1980s. Some Japanese civil society groups insist the
number of abductees is much higher. South Korea’s government has also
stepped up its demands for the return of its abducted citizens, hundreds of




During 2014, the government of Oman continued to restrict rights to freedom of
expression, association, and assembly. Authorities detained and harassed crit-
ics and pro-reform activists, and withheld security clearance from some due to
their peaceful political activities preventing their employment in state services. 
On August 20, Oman became the eighth Arab state, and the 162nd country
worldwide, to ratify the international Mine Ban treaty. 
Freedom of Expression and Pro-Reform Activists
The authorities continued to target peaceful pro-reform activists using short term
arrests and detentions and other forms of harassment. Since mass protests in
2011, authorities have engaged in a cycle of prosecutions of activists and critics
on charges such as “insulting the Sultan” that criminalize free speech, leading
to prison sentences followed by release under pardons granted by Sultan Qa-
boos. According to local activists, the arrests and prosecutions have had a chill-
ing effect on free speech and the expression of dissent in Oman. 
Articles 29, 30, and 31 of Oman’s Basic Law protect freedom of expression and
the press, but other laws undercut these safeguards. Authorities in practice did
not respect these rights, continuing to restrict online criticism and other content
using the 2002 Telecommunications Act, article 26, which penalizes “any person
who sends, by means of telecommunications system, a message that violates
public order or public morals.” 
Authorities arrested pro-reform activists and held them without access to
lawyers and their families using a 2011 amendment; the criminal procedure code
that empowers security forces to hold detainees without charge for up to 30
days. Some detainees arrested since 2011 have allegedly reported that security
forces tortured or otherwise ill-treated them. 
Khalfan al-Badwawi, a pro-reform activist, left Oman in December 2013 soon
after police released him from several days of incommunicado detention for
comments criticizing the government. Authorities refused to disclose his where-
abouts to his family during his detention. 
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Authorities arrested Noah al-Saadi, a blogger and rights activist, on July 13,
2014, and detained him until August 7, before releasing him apparently without
charge. Officials had previously detained al-Saadi in September 2013 after he
used his blog to criticize the arrest by the authorities of Dr. Talib al-Maamari, a
Shura Council member involved in anti-pollution protests at Sohar port and the
2011 mass protests in Sohar by Omanis demanding jobs and an end to official
corruption. 
Police arrested Mohammed al-Fazari, a prominent blogger and government critic,
on August 30, 2014, when he obeyed a summons to appear at the Royal Oman
Police headquarters in Muscat concerning “a personal matter.” They detained
him incommunicado, allowing him only one phone call, until September 4, when
they released him without charge. 
On October 31, authorities prevented Saeed al-Jaddad, a human rights activist
and pro-reform blogger, from boarding a flight out of the country. They did not
provide al-Jaddad with a reason for the travel ban. In 2013, he was arrested and
held for eight days in solitary confinement on charges including calling for
demonstrations and heaping discredit on state officials before releasing him on
bail. In July of that year, the public prosecution summoned al-Jaddad on a new
charges: “Undermining the status and prestige of the state.” Authorities re-
leased him on bail but threatened that he may again be interrogated and
brought to trial on these charges. 
Freedom of Assembly and Association
All public gatherings require advance official approval and the authorities arrest
and prosecute participants in unapproved gatherings. Some private gatherings
are also prohibited under article 137 of the penal code, which prescribes a pun-
ishment of up to three years in prison and a fine for anyone who “participates in
a private gathering including at least ten individuals with a view to commit a riot
or a breach of public order.” Authorities sharply increased the penalties under
article 137 after the pro-reform demonstrations of 2011. 
On August 6, 2014, an appeal court in Muscat imposed a one year prison term
and a fine on Dr. Talib al-Maamari, a former Shura Council member from Liwa, on
a charge of “illegal gathering,” and a three-year prison term and a fine for calling
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for demonstrations against the authorities. The court also sentenced Saqr al-
Baloushi, a former Liwa municipal councilor. 
The case stemmed from an incident on August 22, 2013, when activists gathered
in Liwa to protest industrial pollution at the nearby port of Sohar, which they
consider a public health risk. Police used tear gas to disperse demonstrators
who had blocked the port’s entrance and, on August 24, arrested Dr. Talib al-
Maamari, a local Shura Council member who had attended the demonstration.
Authorities denied al-Maamari access to a lawyer for more than 17 days during
his detention until the public prosecution had charged him with inciting a crowd
and wrongful assembly at a public place. The lower court that tried al-Maamari
and al-Baloushi sentenced them to seven and four year prison terms respectively
and fines after convicting them of “illegal gathering” and “blocking traffic.” 
The authorities closed down the Elixir Cultural Saloon, run by a group of young
men and women in Sohar, in September 2014. Oman’s Law on Associations re-
stricts the formation of independent associations, makes official registration
mandatory, gives the Ministry of Social Development powers to deny registration
without stating reasons and bans political parties. 
Women’s Rights
Article 17 of the Basic Law states that all citizens are equal and bans gender-
based discrimination. In practice, however, women continue to face discrimina-
tion in law under the Personal Status Law that governs matters such as divorce,
inheritance, child custody, and legal guardianship, and in practice. 
Key International Actors
Oman ratified the international Mine Ban treaty—the Convention on the Prohibi-
tion of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines
and on their Destruction—on August 20. The treaty bans the use, production,
transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines and requires clearance of
mined areas within 10 years and assistance to landmine victims. The treaty takes
effects for Oman in February 2015, six months after ratification. 
During a visit to Oman in September the UN special rapporteur on the rights to
freedom of peaceful assembly and of association noted “a pervasive culture of
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silence and fear affecting anyone who wants to speak and work for reforms in
Oman,” and said some activists had “reported reprisals, before and during my
visit, following their attempts to contact or meet with me.” 
In late 2012, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), of which Oman is a member, re-
vised and re-signed its security cooperation agreement enabling each state party
to take legal action against its own or other GCC citizens when they are judged to
have interfered in the internal affairs of any GCC state. 
Both the United States and the United Kingdom provide significant economic
and military aid to the sultanate. Neither country publicly criticized Oman’s




Pakistan had a tumultuous year in 2014. Sectarian attacks continued with im-
punity, military operations in North Waziristan displaced more than one million
people, and massive floods wrought devastation in Sindh and Punjab provinces.
Political instability reached a crisis point in August and September, as prolonged
and violent opposition protests threatened to undermine gains achieved by the
country’s first civilian transfer of power following the May 2013 election of Nawaz
Sharif as prime minister. 
The protests in Islamabad—led by opposition politicians Imran Khan and Dr.
Tahir-ul-Qadri, who demanded Sharif’s resignation and the formation of a new
government—prompted violence by both protesters and the security forces that
resulted in at least three deaths and hundreds of injuries. The government re-
sponded to the protests by imposing a state of emergency in Islamabad and sus-
pending fundamental rights such as the right to petition the courts to enforce
constitutional guarantees. During the height of the crisis, the military intervened
at the government’s request, allowing it to dangerously reinsert itself into demo-
cratic political decision-making. 
Violent attacks on religious minorities, fostered in part by the institutionalized
discrimination of the “blasphemy laws,” continued. Ongoing rights concerns in
Balochistan province related to enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings,
and torture remained unaddressed. Lack of government response to continuing
abuses by the security forces in Balochistan fostered a long-standing culture of
impunity. 
In July, the government passed the Protection of Pakistan Act (PPA), an overly
broad counterterrorism legislation that violates international human rights stan-
dards and creates a legal pretext for abuses by the security forces without ac-
countability. The PPA violates the right to fair trial by shifting the onus of proof
on the accused in certain circumstances, and granting powers of arbitrary arrest
and preventive detention to the security forces. 
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Fighting in Waziristan 
Following a June 8 attack by militants at Jinnah International Airport in Karachi
that killed more than 18 people, the military on June 30 launched an offensive in
North Waziristan involving more than 30,000 troops. Severe military restrictions
on independent media access to the conflict zone made it difficult to assess
civilian casualty figures. 
The conflict has displaced an estimated one million people in squalid displace-
ment camps. The government has not adequately responded to their health
needs. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) Pakistan country representative in July, lack of potable water, sanitation
facilities, and health care in the main internally displaced persons camp in the
city of Bannu in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province has led to the spread of commu-
nicable disease outbreaks. 
The military offensive prompted the Punjabi faction of the Threek-i-Taliban Pak-
istan (TTP) in September to surrender and renounce terrorist attacks inside Pak-
istan. However, the TTP has said it will focus future violent attacks on military
and government targets in Afghanistan. 
Sectarian Violence
Sectarian violence, particularly attacks against the already beleaguered Shia
community, continued to claim a high toll in 2014. 
The militant group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) continued attacks on Shia Hazaras in
Balochistan. The government failed to successfully prosecute and imprison sus-
pects, in part due to sympathy for the group within the security forces. In June,
twin suicide attacks in Taftan near Pakistan’s border with Iran killed 24 Shia pil-
grims and injured 18. The Sunni militant group Jaish-ul-Islam claimed responsi-
bility, but authorities had not made any related arrests at time of writing. 
The port city of Karachi remains a hotbed of sectarian violence, with at least 750
sectarian targeted killings in Karachi from September 2013 to September 2014.
On September 6, 2014, unidentified gunmen killed Shia cleric Ali Abbas. Four
days later, unidentified gunmen killed Sunni cleric Maulana Masood in an appar-






Section 295-C of Pakistan’s penal code makes the death penalty mandatory for
blasphemy, although no one has yet been executed for the crime. The Pakistani
government failed to amend or repeal the blasphemy law provisions that provide
a pretext for impunity and violence against religious minorities. Since 1990, at
least 60 people have been murdered after being accused of blasphemy. At pres-
ent, 17 people convicted of blasphemy are on death row; 19 others are serving
life sentences. 
In March 2014, a Lahore court sentenced Sawan Masih to death for blasphemy
after he was accused of making derogatory statements regarding the Prophet
Muhammad. In April, those allegations prompted a 3,000-strong mob to attack a
Christian residential community in Lahore and torch hundreds of houses. Police
arrested Masih, but failed to otherwise intervene. 
On May 7, unidentified gunmen killed Rashid Rehman, a renowned human rights
lawyer, in apparent retaliation for representing people accused of blasphemy. At
the time of his murder, Rehman was representing Junaid Hafeez, a university lec-
turer accused of blasphemy, and had received death threats. Hafeez’s trial was
ongoing at time of writing. 
In April, a court in Toba Tek Singh sentenced to death a Christian couple, Shafqat
Emmanuel and Shagufta Kausar, for allegedly sending “blasphemous” text mes-
sages. In November, a mob beat to death a Christian couple after they allegedly
committed blasphemy by burning pages of a Quran. Their bodies were later
burned in the kiln of the factory in which they worked. 
In July, a mob in Gujranwala burned down houses of the Ahmadi community
killing three people and injuring eight others over alleged blasphemy. The provi-
sions of Pakistan’s penal code, which perpetuate discrimination against the Ah-
madis, remain unchanged: the code explicitly prohibits Ahmadis from “indirectly
or directly posing as a Muslim”; declaring or propagating their faith publicly;
building mosques or referring to them as such; or making public calls to prayer. 
Women’s and Girls’ Rights
In September, the government announced that police had arrested the attackers
of 17-year-old Malala Yousafzai, a student and outspoken advocate for children’s
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right to education, who was shot in an attack claimed by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pak-
istan on October 9, 2012. She subsequently recovered from her serious injuries
and, in October, became the youngest person to ever receive the Nobel Peace
Prize. 
Violence against women and girls—including rape, murder through so-called
honor killings, acid attacks, domestic violence, and forced marriage—remained
routine. Pakistani human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) esti-
mate that there are about 1,000 “honor killings” every year. 
In a notorious case, 25-year-old Farzana Parveen, who was three-months preg-
nant, was stoned to death in May in front of a Lahore courthouse by family mem-
bers angry that she had married without their permission. Perpetrators of these
killings often enjoy impunity because law enforcement officials routinely drop
the case if the victim’s family has offered “forgiveness.” Intimidation and threats
against women and girls who venture out in public places or take public roles
continued in 2014. 
Women who are members of religious minorities are particularly vulnerable. A re-
port by the Movement for Solidarity and Peace in Pakistan found that at least
1,000 girls belonging to Christian and Hindu communities are forced to marry
male Muslims every year. The coercion often originates from the prospective
bridegrooms’ families, and failure to comply can prompt serious violence
against the girls and their families. The government has failed to act to stop such
forced marriages. 
Balochistan
The human rights situation in Balochistan remained abysmal. Despite the May
2013 election of a civilian government, the military has retained all key decision-
making functions in the southwestern province and blocked efforts by civil soci-
ety organizations and media to cover ongoing violence there. 
Enforced disappearances linked to the security forces continued with impunity.
On March 18, plainclothes gunmen later identified as belonging to Pakistan’s
paramilitary Frontier Corps allegedly abducted Zahid Baloch, chairperson of the
Baloch Student Organization-Azad in the provincial capital, Quetta. Baloch’s
whereabouts and safety remained unknown at time of writing. Despite rulings
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from the Pakistan Supreme Court in 2013 demanding justice for victims of en-
forced disappearances, as well as recommendations from the UN Working Group
on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances in 2012, Pakistan’s government has
failed to meet its obligations under the constitution and international law pro-
hibiting enforced disappearances. 
Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement Abuses
Accountability of law enforcement agencies showed no signs of improving in
2014. In June, one of the most egregious incidents of excessive use of force
against political protesters occurred in Model Town, a Lahore suburb. Police fired
without warning on supporters of the Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT), an opposi-
tion political party, whose workers had tried to stop police demolition of security
barriers erected in front of PAT headquarters. Authorities confirmed the deaths of
at least eight PAT members. Another 80 PAT members were injured. 
In July, the government enacted new repressive counterterrorism legislation. The
Protection of Pakistan Act (PPA) is an extremely broad and ambiguously worded
document that grants the security forces broad powers to implement preventive
detention and carry out arrests without warrants. Such provisions can easily pro-
vide legal cover for abuses by law enforcement agencies and open the door for
the violation of fundamental rights to freedom of speech, privacy, peaceful as-
sembly, and a fair trial. 
Freedom of Expression 
Freedom of expression and media came under severe pressure from both state
and non-state actors in 2014. 
In April, unidentified gunmen attacked Hamid Mir, one of Pakistan’s most fa-
mous television presenters, in Karachi. Mir survived the attack and Jang/Geo—
his employer and the country’s largest media conglomerate— accused the
director general of the military’s powerful Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) of in-
volvement in the incident. The ISI denied the allegation and the central govern-
ment punished Jang/Geo for the accusation by suspending its broadcast license
and taking its channels off the air for 15 days. 
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Unidentified assailants also attacked the offices and employees of the media
group. Other attacks on journalists in 2014 included the March shooting by
unidentified gunmen of Raza Rumi, a prominent columnist and television anchor
in Lahore. Rumi was injured in the attack, which killed his driver. At time of writ-
ing the police had yet to arrest any of the gunmen, who are suspected of belong-
ing to the LeJ. 
In August, journalist Omar Quraishi and columnist Kamran Shafi both received
death threats from unidentified sources after the two men criticized the August
protests in Islamabad led by opposition politicians Imran Khan and Dr. Tahir-ul-
Qadri. 
Key International Actors
Relations with the United States, Pakistan’s largest donor of development and
military aid, showed signs of improvement after years of disagreement and mis-
trust. While Prime Minister Sharif’s US visit in October 2013 did not achieve any
notable short-term diplomatic objectives, it did serve as a confidence-building
measure between the two countries. 
Pakistan’s alleged persistent support for the Haqqani network, a militant group
that US officials accuse of targeting US troops in Afghanistan, continued to un-
dermine bilateral relations. Nonetheless, the US voiced public support for
Sharif’s government during the protests and sit-ins in Islamabad by issuing
statements in favor of the democratic process. 
Historically tense relations between Pakistan and India continued despite
Sharif’s visit to India in August to attend the inauguration of Indian Prime Minis-
ter Narendra Modi. Persistant tensions include security issues and longstanding
disputes over the distribution of water from rivers that run through both coun-
tries. 
Pakistan and China continued to deepen already extensive economic and politi-
cal ties, although the relationship suffered a setback when Chinese President Xi
Jinping postponed a scheduled visit in August due to the protests in Islamabad.
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Papua New Guinea 
Despite Papua New Guinea’s (PNG) current extractives-led economic boom, an
estimated 40 percent of the country lives in poverty. Pressing human rights is-
sues include gender inequality, violence, corruption, and excessive use of force
by police. Rates of family and sexual violence are among the highest in the world
and perpetrators are rarely prosecuted. 
In 2014, in a blow to rule of law and accountability, Prime Minister Peter O’Neill
sacked key officials and disbanded the country’s main anti-corruption body in
response to efforts to arrest him for his alleged involvement in a multi-million
dollar corruption case. 
Torture and Other Police Abuse
Physical and sexual abuse of detainees—including children—by police and para-
military police units continues to be widespread. In March, a videotape surfaced
of police officers surrounding and unleashing three dogs on a defenseless man.
Police officials later condemned the abuse and said the incident was being in-
vestigated. 
Members of PNG’s notorious paramilitary police units (Mobile Squads), deten-
tion center staff, and local residents were implicated in excessive use of force in
quelling protests in February 2014 at the Manus Island detention center, which
holds asylum seekers transferred by Australia for refugee status determination
and resettlement. During the incident, many detainees sustained injuries and
one detainee was beaten to death. Police allegedly entered firing their guns
when violence broke out inside the facility. One detainee was reportedly shot in
the buttocks. In May, then PNG Deputy Police Commissioner Simon Kauba de-
nied any involvement of PNG police in the violence. At time of writing, authori-
ties had arrested two local men working in the detention center in connection
with the murder. 
UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions Christof
Heyns visited PNG in March and expressed concerns about police use of exces-
sive force during arrest, interrogation, and pretrial detention, sometimes result-
ing in death. 
425
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
In October, Prime Minister O’Neill highlighted the problem of police brutality, ad-
mitting that the PNG police force lacks discipline and is not sufficiently serving
the interests of the people of PNG. O’Neill announced that a hotline will be es-
tablished for members of the public to report instances of police abuse. 
Violence and Discrimination against Women and Girls
PNG is one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a woman, with an es-
timated 70 percent of women experiencing rape or assault in their lifetime. While
such acts have long been criminalized and domestic violence was specifically
proscribed under the 2013 Family Protection Act, few perpetrators are brought to
justice. Lack of access to courts and police, as well as failure by many justice of-
ficials to take violence against women seriously, contribute to the extremely low
arrest and conviction rates. The 2013 law presents an important opportunity to
improve the situation, but the government must fully commit to its full enforce-
ment and allocate the resources necessary to do so. 
Reports of violent mobs attacking individuals accused of “sorcery,” the victims
mostly women and girls, continue to be reported. The instigators of such attacks
rarely face justice, with few witnesses coming forward. In April, six people, in-
cluding two children, were hacked to death when 500 men went on a sorcery
hunt in Madang Province. Police arrested at least 180 suspects but police say
they lack funds to complete investigations. 
Disability Rights
People with disabilities in PNG are often unable to participate in community life,
go to school, or work because of stigma and other barriers associated with dis-
ability. In many cases, people with disabilities are not able or allowed to leave
their homes. Access to mental health care is limited, and traditional healers are
the only option for many people with psychosocial disabilities. 
Children with disabilities in PNG face abuse, discrimination, exclusion, lack of




Following PNG’s 2013 expansion of the scope of crimes eligible for the death
penalty and signaling its intention to resume executions, 14 prisoners were on
death row at time of writing, but no executions had taken place. In March, UN ex-
pert Heyns urged PNG not to use the death penalty and pursue instead other
measures including more effective policing of violent crimes. 
Corruption
In April, PNG’s Taskforce Sweep, a government anti-corruption initiative, suc-
cessfully prosecuted prominent politician Paul Tiensten for misappropriating
US$3.6 million in public funds. Tiensten was sentenced to nine years in jail. 
In June, following investigations by Taskforce Sweep, the PNG police fraud squad
filed a warrant for the arrest of Prime Minister O’Neill for his alleged role in ap-
proving fraudulent payments from the PNG Finance Department to a Port
Moresby law firm. O’Neill then sacked the attorney general and deputy police
commissioner and ordered the disbandment of the taskforce. The Police Com-
missioner was arrested and convicted on contempt of court charges and subse-
quently retired. O’Neill’s lawyers won a stay of the warrant for his arrest and Sam
Koim, the head of Taskforce Sweep, obtained a National Court order preventing
the government from disbanding it. At time of writing, the Justice Ministry was
withholding Koim’s pay in an apparent attempt to induce him to resign. 
Extractive industries
Extractive industries are an important engine of PNG’s economic growth, but
continue to give rise to serious human rights problems and environmental harm.
Controversy raged around the alleged environmental impacts of the long-trou-
bled Ok Tedi mine in 2014, and violent clashes erupted around the controversial
Ramu Nickel project. 
In 2011, Human Rights Watch documented gang rape and other violent abuses
by private security personnel at PNG’s Porgera gold mine, operated by Canadian
company Barrick Gold. Along with other steps, Barrick responded by rolling out a
compensation scheme that paid out claims to more than 100 women in 2014.
Barrick’s efforts on this front have been dogged by controversy, but could mark
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an important global precedent, particularly if they result in lasting positive out-
comes for the women involved. 
The government deployed security forces to Porgera and other restive areas of
the highlands in 2014 as part of a state of emergency. This led to allegations of
violent abuses including the destruction of homes around Porgera—allegations
that mirror abuses linked to similar deployments in the past. 
PNG’s massive US$19 billion Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project, led by Exxon-
Mobil, began production in 2014. The project could ultimately double the size of
PNG’s economy. The project has transformative potential but there are serious
concerns as to whether ordinary citizens will derive any benefit from it. Key gov-
ernment institutions remain plagued by corruption and a questionable capacity
to deploy the additional resources effectively.
Key International Actors
Australia remains the country’s most important international partner, providing
an estimated US$460 million in development assistance for 2013-2014. Aus-
tralia provided an additional $556.7 million this financial year to support the
Manus Island detention center. 
Since 2013, Australia has transferred asylum seekers arriving irregularly by boat
in Australian waters to PNG for refugee status determination. Those recognized
as refugees are to be resettled in PNG or in a third country other than Australia.
At time of writing, 1,084 men were detained on Manus Island and PNG immigra-
tion officials had completed 104 interim refugee determinations, 56 of which
were positive. In November, PNG’s immigration minister announced the first 10
final positive refugee determinations. At this writing, the 10 refugees were to be
released on temporary visas issued initially for a period of 12 months. The PNG
government has yet to formulate a policy to permanently integrate refugees and
Australia has not yet found third countries willing to admit refugees transferred
from PNG. 
The facilities on Manus Island are overcrowded and dirty, and asylum claims are
not processed in a fair, transparent, or expedient manner, contributing to de-
tainee physical and mental health problems. Safety is also a concern. In Febru-
ary 2014, an Iranian asylum seeker, Reza Berati, was killed during a riot at the
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Manus Island facility. Two former detention center staff have been charged with
his murder, and in March 2014, an inquiry into the incident was referred to the
Australian Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee. 
In a senate inquiry submission in May, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) told the
senate committee that PNG and Australia are failing to provide safe and humane
conditions for asylum seekers in detention and that the lengthy delays in
refugee status determinations and lack of timeframes for durable resettlement
amount to punishment for affected asylum seekers. 
In March, UN expert Heyns expressed regret that representatives of the private
security firm G4S, which runs the detention center, were not available to meet
him, and that he was refused access to the center and was unable to meet with
asylum seekers. 
At time of writing, the Australian government had deployed 73 Australian federal
police officers to act as unarmed advisers to the Royal PNG Constabulary in Port




Public protests against large-scale mining projects and other private sector and
government initiatives in Peru often lead to confrontations between protesters
and police in which civilians are killed or wounded by police or army gunfire.
While these confrontations resulted in fewer fatalities in 2013 and 2014 than in
2012, there has been little progress in investigating deaths and injuries, and re-
cent legislation has further weakened police and army accountability. 
Judicial investigations into grave human rights abuses committed during Peru’s
armed conflict continue, but progress in trials has been slow and limited. 
Deaths in Protests
As of September 2014, 34 civilians had been killed during protests since Presi-
dent Ollanta Humala took office in July 2011. During the first nine months of
2014, four civilians died from gunshot wounds when police reportedly used live
ammunition against protesters in three separate incidents. In September 2014,
16-year-old Jhapet Huilca was shot by police during a protest against a gas
pipeline in Quillabamba, Cusco. The minister of the interior announced the sus-
pension of the police chief responsible for the operation pending an investiga-
tion. 
There has been little progress in determining the circumstances in which these
deaths occurred or holding to account police or military personnel who used
force unlawfully. In January 2014, a prosecutor closed without any charges an in-
vestigation into the alleged shooting by soldiers of four civilians during a protest
in Celendín, Cajamarca, in July 2012, even though he concluded that those re-
sponsible had committed intentional homicide. His report revealed that the fatal
shots were probably fired from army-issued Galil combat weapons, and that
there was no evidence that any of the victims had been armed. His report stated,
however, that the army had failed to provide a copy of the operational plan, the
names of the participating soldiers, or details of the firearms issued to them, de-




Shielding Security Forces from Accountability
In January 2014, Law 30151 entered into force, providing immunity from prosecu-
tion to “armed forces and police personnel who in fulfillment of their duty and
using their weapons or other means of defense, cause injury or death.” This
amendment to the criminal code eliminated language that made immunity con-
ditional on police using lethal force in compliance with regulations and departs
from international standards that require law enforcement officers use force in
accordance with the principles of necessity and proportionality, and that they be
held accountable for its misuse. 
The jurisdiction of military courts in human rights cases involving members of
the military remains an issue. Legislative Decree 1095, adopted in 2010 by the
administration of President Alan García, could allow military courts to try mem-
bers of the military accused of abuses against civilians in public security opera-
tions. International human rights bodies have consistently rejected the use of
military prosecutors and courts in cases involving human rights violations. As of
November 2014, the Constitutional Court had yet to rule on the decree’s consti-
tutionality, which Peruvian human rights advocates have challenged. 
Confronting Past Abuses
Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission has estimated that almost 70,000
people died or were subject to enforced disappearance during the country’s
armed conflict between 1980 and 2000. Many were victims of atrocities by the
Shining Path and other insurgent groups; others were victims of human rights vi-
olations by state agents. 
In a landmark trial, former President Alberto Fujimori was sentenced in 2009 to
25 years in prison for killings and “disappearances” in 1991 and 1992. His intelli-
gence advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos, three former army generals, and members
of the Colina group, a government death squad, are also serving sentences rang-
ing from 15 to 25 years for the assassination in 1991 of 15 people in the Lima dis-
trict of Barrios Altos, and for 6 “disappearances.” 
Courts have made much less progress in addressing violations that occurred
under the earlier administrations of Fernando Belaúnde (1980-1985) and Alan
García (1985-1990). In a report issued in August 2013 to mark the 10th anniver-
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sary of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s report, the human rights om-
budsman found that, despite initial efforts, Peru had failed to consolidate a spe-
cialized judicial system with sufficient staff and resources to bring most cases to
court. 
As of 2013, 48 percent of 2,880 cases of human rights violations during the
armed conflict reported to prosecutors had been dismissed, largely because
prosecutors were unable to identify perpetrators and the Ministry of Defense was
unwilling to provide documents to facilitate investigations. Only about 2 percent
of the cases had been brought to trial, according to Human Rights Trials in Peru,
a project based at George Mason University that monitors human rights prosecu-
tions. In 2014, court hearings continued in their fourth year in two emblematic
cases: torture and disappearances at the Los Cabitos military base in Ayacucho
in 1983 and a massacre at Accomarca in 1985 in which an army unit killed 62
peasants. 
In a recent trend, the Supreme Court has overturned an increasing number of
convictions on appeal. While the court has sometimes based its decisions on
contradictions in witness testimony, it ruled in a January 2014 verdict that the
disappearance in 1983 of 6 people whose bodies were found and identified
more than 20 years later was subject to a statute of limitations, contravening
Peru’s obligations to hold accountable those reponsible for enforced disappear-
ances. 
In June 2014, President Ollanta Humala appointed as minister of the interior a
former army intelligence officer who was facing charges for his alleged role in the
1988 murder of Hugo Bustíos, the Ayacucho correspondent for Caretas maga-
zine. Two soldiers were convicted in 2007 for Bustíos’ murder, one of whom tes-
tified that the minister, Daniel Urresti, had commanded the soldiers who
ambushed and shot Bustíos before blowing up his body with a grenade. 
Urresti’s appointment was highly questionable considering the gravity of the
charge and that his public position as minister could influence the judicial out-
come of his case and undercut the right to justice of Bustíos’ relatives. In addi-
tion, President Humala’s public statements in advance of the trial supporting





Congress took a significant step in 2014 to combat torture, which continues to
be a chronic problem in Peru. In June, it approved a bill mandating the human
rights ombudsman to implement the National Preventive Mechanism against
Torture (NPM), in fulfillment of Peru’s obligations under the Optional Protocol to
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment (OPCAT), which it ratified in 2006. The bill requires the ombudsman, inter
alia, to visit and monitor conditions in prisons and detention centers without
prior announcement, make proactive and preventive recommendations, and
publish an annual report, but it did not state how these additional activities
would be funded. As of November 2014, the bill was delayed in Congress pend-
ing clarification from the plenary on points that the president of the congres-
sional committee that debated the draft had raised. 
Freedom of Expression
Journalists investigating corruption by regional government officials, mayors,
and business people are frequent targets of physical attack, threats, and crimi-
nal defamation suits, and the number of criminal defamation prosecutions in-
creased in 2014. 
In March 2014, journalist César Quino was given a six-month suspended prison
sentence for defaming the then-governor of Ancash, César Alvarez, in an article
published in El Observador, a paper Quino edits that is critical of the regional
government. In recent years, Alvarez—now facing charges for the murder of a po-
litical opponent— has won several other defamation suits in efforts to silence
his press critics. 
In April 2014, a bomb exploded at the home of journalist Yofré López Sifuentes in
Barranca, a port city north of Lima. López, who edits a weekly newspaper and
presents a radio program called “Curfew” (Toque de Queda), was not hurt, but
his mother and stepfather were injured. According to press reports, he had been




Women and girls in Peru have the right to seek abortions only in cases of risk to
their health or life. In June 2014, the Ministry of Health published guidelines de-
tailing the administrative procedures hospitals must follow in assessing individ-
ual cases. Addressing a previous regulatory vacuum that had been criticized by
international human rights bodies, the rules allow health staff to perform abor-
tions under 10 medical conditions, and to consider the rights and needs of
women and girls not covered by those conditions on a case by case basis. Ac-
cess to services in situations that fall outside the prescribed conditions—such
as when a woman’s or girl’s mental health could be dangerously affected by an
unwanted pregnancy—is left to the discretion of facility staff, with a facility-
based appeals process. 
Key International Actors
In its concluding observations on Peru’s combined seventh and eighth periodic
reports, the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against
Women urged Peru to adopt a comprehensive law to combat violence against
women and implement a strategy to fight discriminatory gender-based stereo-
types. It also recommended that Peru extend the grounds of legalized abortion
to cases of rape and incest. 
In August 2014, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) recommended that Peru take measures to avoid the propagation of mate-
rial stigmatizing its indigenous and Afro-Peruvian population. The committee re-
ferred specifically to “The Peasant Jacinta” (La Paisana Jacinta), a popular
television comedy show featuring a male actor dressed up as a grossly carica-
tured indigenous peasant woman. Following CERD’s recommendations, Frecuen-
cia Latina, the television channel which has broadcast the show since 1999,
removed it from its prime-time slot. 
As a member of the UN Human Rights Council, Peru supported United Nations
action to put human rights violations in North Korea, Sri Lanka, Belarus, Iran, the




With less than two years left in office, the administration of President Benigno
Aquino III continues to send mixed signals about its commitment to improve
human rights in the Philippines. Although the number of cases of extrajudicial
killings, torture, and enforced disappearances by state security forces has de-
clined in the last four years, such abuses regularly occur. They are fueled by the
government’s lack of political will to end the longstanding impunity enjoyed by
the police and armed forces, a dysfunctional criminal justice system, and mili-
tary resistance to accountability. 
While human rights was a key agenda for Aquino when he took office in 2010, he
has failed to make good on many of his commitments, chiefly his expressed in-
tent to end killings of activists and journalists and bring those responsible to
justice. Aquino risked losing political capital by suggesting a term extension for
the president, and he found himself at odds with the Supreme Court by calling it
an impediment to his proposed reforms. 
There has been some progress in tackling certain human rights problems. On Au-
gust 12, the National Bureau of Investigation arrested retired army general, Jovito
Palparan, who is implicated in the alleged enforced disappearance and torture
of two activists and others in 2006. The Supreme Court has taken steps to im-
prove the rule of law in the Philippines, for instance launching its “Justice Zone”
program in which the investigation, prosecution, and trial of cases are expedited
through such electronic or digital methods as issuances of “e-warrants” and “e-
subpoenas.” 
The Philippine government and the rebel Moro Islamic Liberation Front signed a
peace agreement on March 27, 2014, which would extend autonomy to Muslims
in Mindanao and end the decades-long conflict there that has engendered seri-
ous human rights abuses by all sides. 
Arrest of Retired General 
The arrest of retired army general, Jovito Palparan, in August 2014 by a combined
unit of the civilian National Bureau of Investigation and naval intelligence could





ness to prosecute personnel for serious human rights abuses. Palparan is impli-
cated in extrajudicial killings, torture, and enforced disappearances by forces
under his command in several regions between 2001 and 2005. He has been
charged with the kidnapping and torture in 2006 of two women, Sherlyn Cada-
pan and Karen Empeno. Palparan has said that his actions during this period
were to implement the counterinsurgency program of then-President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. Under the Macapagal-Arroyo administration from 2001 to
2010, hundreds of leftist activists were tortured, “disappeared,” and killed. 
Palparan was put in the custody of the provincial police in Bulacan, north of
Manila, where the Cadapan-Empeno case is being tried. However, on September
15 the court allowed Palparan’s transfer to military custody, prompting protests
from families of victims and human rights advocates. 
Killings 
While killings appeared to decrease in 2014 compared to recent years, activists,
journalists, environmentalists, and tribal leaders continued to be targets of at-
tack. Among those killed was Fausto Orasan, a 64-year-old tribal group leader in
the southern Philippines, who was shot by unidentified gunmen on September
13, 2014, while riding his motorcycle in a village in Cagayan de Oro City. Authori-
ties said Orasan had been a leader of anti-mining efforts in the area. During one
week in August, three other tribal leaders were gunned down in different parts of
the country, according to the nongovernmental organization Karapatan. Human
Rights Watch has long documented attacks on tribal leaders who opposed min-
ing and other extractive business interests in their communities. 
On August 24, 2014, unidentified gunmen shot dead human rights lawyer
Rodolfo Felicio in Taytay, a city in Rizal province, east of Manila. Felicio was the
fifth member of the activist group National Union of People’s Lawyers to have
been killed in the past 10 years. 
Killings of journalists continued in late 2013 and early 2014: local media re-
ported at least 26 such killings since Aquino took office in 2010. The trial of the
Maguindanao Massacre case, in which 58 people—mostly journalists and media
workers—were killed in 2009 allegedly by the militia of the powerful Ampatuan
clan in the southern Philippines, was set back by the murder on November 18 of
Dennis Sakal, a potential witness for the prosecution. 
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Although the Aquino administration vowed in 2012 to expedite investigations
into killings of journalists by creating a “superbody,” little progress appears to
have been made. The superbody had only processed four cases at time of writ-
ing, resulting in the conviction of five people. However, the alleged masterminds
who planned and financed these killings remained at large. 
Urban Death Squads
A “death squad” in the southern city of Tagum that killed hundreds of suspected
criminals, including children, was the subject of a Human Rights Watch report in
May. The so-called Tagum Death Squad also branched out into contract killing,
targeting a range of victims for as little as US$110 per hit, including journalists,
village officials, business rivals, alleged drug dealers, tribal leaders, and a judge.
The death squad was allegedly formed and financed by then-mayor Rey Uy with
the cooperation of city hall officials and members of the local police force. 
Despite evidence directly implicating Uy in the death squad operation, the au-
thorities have not arrested him or others implicated in the Tagum City killings. 
Death squad killings have been reported in cities across the country, with
unidentified gunmen on motorcycles targeting people in public in broad daylight
in so-called “riding in tandem” killings. Official responses in 2014 to stem such
killings included police roadblocks specifically for motorcycles, banning motor-
cyclists from riding in pairs, and a proposed law that would ban the use of mo-
torcycle helmets, so cyclists could not hide their identities. 
Police Use of Torture
Rampant police corruption seriously undermines the country’s criminal justice
system and exacerbates the problem of impunity. 
In January, an investigation by the Commission on Human Rights implicated
members of the Laguna provincial police in the systematic torture of at least 22
inmates that began in February 2013. The police dealt out torture in a secret lo-
cation using a spinning wheel like in the “Wheel of Fortune” game show in the
United States. At time of writing, 10 police officers implicated in the torture had




A November report by the Department of Justice detailed allegations of torture by
members of the police in Zamboanga City against several suspects arrested in
connection with the September 2013 attack on the city by Islamist militants.
Human Rights Watch documented several instances of mistreatment of the de-
tainees, several of them children, as well as the militants’ use of civilians as
human shields. The government has not investigated the alleged abuses. 
Displaced People in Zamboanga
In September 2013, Islamist militants attacked Zamboanga, a predominantly
Christian city in the south. Ensuing fighting between the militants and govern-
ment armed forces, including the use of artillery and airstrikes, destroyed neigh-
borhoods, resulted in dozens of deaths and injuries to civilians, and caused
120,000 people—mostly Muslims—to be displaced from their homes. 
A year later, a third of the displaced residents remain in evacuation camps, and
more than 160 had died from illnesses mainly linked to poor sanitation. 
Key International Actors
President Aquino made trips to Europe and the US in 2014 in which Philippine
activists protested against the government’s human rights record, particularly
the lack of accountability for abuses. The United States and European Union gov-
ernments have sought to address the problem of impunity, such as by funding
programs to improve the performance of police, prosecutors, and the courts. 
The US government was more vocal in 2014 than in previous years in communi-
cating its concerns about impunity to the Aquino administration. The US had
conditioned a small part ($3 million) of its $20 million annual military aid to the
Philippines on improvement in the human rights situation. In 2014, the US in-
creased the military financial assistance to $50 million but most of it was allot-
ted for the Philippine Navy, which has a better human rights record than the
army. 
The EU-Philippines Justice Support Program, now in its second phase, aims to
improve the Philippine criminal justice system by, among other things, training




Qatar has experienced a low level of domestic dissent compared to its neigh-
bors, but since its successful bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup, it has become
a focus of international criticism of the mistreatment of low-paid migrant work-
ers. Despite this, Qatar has failed to enact meaningful reforms to its labor sys-
tem, which continues to facilitate the trafficking and forced labor of workers.
Qatar has enjoyed a reputation as a center for media freedom in the region, but a
new cybercrime law poses a serious threat to freedom of expression. 
Migrant Worker Rights
Qatar has a population of about 2 million, of whom only 10 percent are Qatari
nationals. Low-paid migrant workers, mostly from countries in Asia and to a
lesser extent Africa, continue to experience abuse and exploitation. Qatari au-
thorities announced labor reforms in May 2014, in response to widespread con-
demnation of human rights abuses of construction workers as the country builds
stadia and other facilities to host the 2022 World Cup. 
However, the announced reforms will not adequately protect migrant workers
from human trafficking, forced labor, and other rights violations. It is unclear
whether they will provide some protection for migrant domestic workers, mostly
women, who are especially vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. 
Qatar’s Law 14 of 2004, regulating labor in the private sector, limits workers’
hours, requires that foreign workers receive paid annual leave, sets require-
ments on health and safety, and requires on-time payment of wages each
month. In practice, employers continue to flout these requirements with im-
punity due to the failure of the authorities to enforce this and other laws in-
tended to protect workers’ rights. 
Workers typically pay exorbitant recruitment fees and employers regularly take
control of their passports when they arrive in Qatar. Many migrant workers com-
plain that their employers fail to pay their wages on time, if at all. Migrant work-
ers are prohibited from unionizing or engaging in strikes, although they make up
99 percent of the private sector workforce. Many migrant workers are obliged to
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live in cramped, unsanitary conditions, especially those working without docu-
mentation. 
The kafala (sponsorship) system ties a migrant worker’s legal residence to his or
her employer or sponsor. In Qatar, it is codified into law under the terms of Law
No. 4 of 2009, which regulates the sponsorship, employment, and residence of
expatriate workers. The law provides for the transfer of workers to other spon-
sors under certain conditions, but in practice workers are rarely able to secure
the No Objection Certificates that they require from their existing sponsor to
transfer legally to another sponsor. It also requires that foreign workers obtain
exit permits from their sponsors when they wish to leave Qatar; in practice, this
enables employers to arbitrarily prevent their employees from leaving Qatar and
returning to their home country. Workers can become undocumented when em-
ployers report them to the authorities as having absconded, or when they fail to
pay to renew workers’ annual ID cards. A lack of proper documentation leaves
workers at risk of arrest and detention or deportation. It also leaves them at risk
of further labor exploitation. 
The exit visa requirement and the authorities’ use of arbitrary travel bans means
that Qatari employers can prevent their foreign employees from leaving Qatar in-
definitely, a power they may use unfairly to secure concessions from foreign em-
ployees with whom they are in dispute. Formerly highly-paid expatriates trapped
in Qatar in 2014 include former employees of the Al Jazeera Children’s Channel. 
In May 2014, Qatar announced a series of labor reforms via a Ministry of Interior
press release. It announced that “the current kafala system will be replaced by a
system based on employment contracts” but the details it provided indicated
that workers would still be bound to their employers. The statement announced
that workers would be able to secure No Objection Certificates, but only after 5
years of employment with one employer, and that an automated e-government
system would issue exit visas after a 72-hour grace period prior to a foreign
worker’s departure. 
The press release also said that Qatar would increase the number of labor in-
spectors, introduce an electronic wage payment system, increase the penalty for
passport confiscation, and build suitable housing for 200,000 workers. The
statement gave no details on how or when the government would implement the
reforms. Nor did the authorities respond to a Human Rights Watch letter ques-
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tioning the validity of the government’s assertion that the changes amount to re-
placement of the kafala system. On June 5, the minister of labor added to the
confusion when he announced that the model contract being developed by his
ministry will determine whether or not a worker will require an exit visa to leave
Qatar and whether or not they will receive a No Objection Certificate at the end of
their contract. 
In July 2014, the Qatar Foundation, a quasi-governmental organization heavily
engaged in property development, issued a report on recruitment practices.
Among its recommendations were that the government of Qatar should seek to
ensure standardized ethical recruitment practices in labor-sending countries by
developing bilateral agreements on recruitment, and that it should consider set-
ting up its own recruitment agencies in major labor sending countries. 
It is not clear how the proposed reforms will affect migrant domestic workers, a
predominately female subset of the migrant worker population, who are espe-
cially vulnerable. In addition to the problems the general migrant worker popula-
tion face, domestic workers suffer verbal, physical, and in some cases, sexual
abuse at their places of work. Some are not allowed by their employers to speak
to strangers or are locked into the homes in which they are employed. Many are
required to work without receiving a day off. 
Qatari labor law affords no protection to migrant domestic workers, and does not
require employers to allow them rest days or rest periods when at work, or to
limit their working hours. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), of which Qatar is a
member, is discussing a unified regional contract for domestic workers. How-
ever, the contract fails to provide key protections such as a limit on hours of
work, and has weak enforcement mechanisms. It also falls short of the minimum
standards outlined in the recently adopted International Labour Organization’s
Domestic Workers’ Convention, which Qatar has yet to ratify. Even a strong con-
tract, however, would be no substitute for labor law reforms. 
Freedom of Expression
In September, Qatar issued a law “on the suppression of electronic crimes,”
which poses a clear threat to freedom of expression. Vaguely worded provisions
provide for the prosecution of individuals who publish “false news with the in-
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tent of endangering the public order” and information that “infringes social prin-
ciples or values.” 
Qatar’s emir has not yet given final approval to a draft media law that would ex-
pose journalists in Qatar to prohibitive financial sanctions if they publish infor-
mation that damages relations with other Arab states.
Qatar’s penal code contains provisions that are inconsistent with free speech
standards under international law. Article 134, for example, prescribes a penalty
of up to five years’ imprisonment for anyone who is convicted of criticizing the
emir or vice-emir. 
In August 2014, authorities detained two British citizens who were in Qatar to re-
search and document living and working conditions for migrant workers, and
held them in incommunicado detention for 11 days before releasing them with-
out charge. 
Women’s Rights
Provisions of Law No. 22 of 2006, Qatar’s first codified law to address issues of
family and personal status, discriminates against women. Under Article 36, a
marriage contract is valid when a woman’s male guardian concludes the contract
and two male witnesses are present. Article 57 forbids husbands from hurting
their wives physically or morally, but article 58 states that it is a wife’s responsi-
bility to look after the household and to obey her husband. Marital rape is not a
crime. 
Key International Actors
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates withdrew their ambassa-
dors from Qatar in March, in response to its support for Islamist groups, notably
the Muslim Brotherhood. Normal diplomatic relations resumed in November.





The Kremlin took another leap backward in 2014 by intensifying its crackdown
on civil society, media, and the Internet, as it sought to control the narrative
about developments in Ukraine, including Russia’s occupation of Crimea and its
support to insurgents in eastern Ukraine. 
Parliament adopted laws, and authorities engaged in practices, that increasingly
isolated the country and inflamed a level of anti-Western hysteria unseen since
the Soviet era. 
Freedom of Association
In June, parliament amended Russia’s 2012 “Foreign Agent” law, which demo-
nizes advocacy groups that accept foreign funding, by authorizing the Justice
Ministry to register groups as foreign agents without their consent. By November,
the ministry had forcibly registered 17 independent groups as such. 
On December 17, the Supreme Court was due to review a Justice Ministry com-
plaint against the Memorial umbrella organization requesting its closure under
the pretext of technical breach of Russia’s nongovernmental organization (NGO)
legislation. 
In September, a court vacated a previous ruling against Golos, an election moni-
toring group, for failing to register as a “foreign agent” due to lack of evidence
that the group accepted foreign funding. However, at time of writing Golos re-
mained on the “foreign agents” registry. 
Freedom of Expression 
Russian authorities blocked several independent media websites, adopted new
laws, and proposed yet more measures that would further stifle freedom of ex-
pression. 
In January 2014, TV Rain, one of Russia’s few independent television stations,
lost access to cable and satellite television after it posted a viewers’ poll about






In March, the state agency for media oversight blocked three independent web-
sites and an opposition leader’s blog under a new law authorizing the prosecu-
tor general to request that the agency block websites without a court order. Also
in March, the editor and executive director of Lenta.ru, an independent current
affairs portal, were dismissed and replaced by pro-Kremlin media executives. 
In April, the founder and CEO of VKontakte, the most popular Russian-language
social network, announced he had left Russia because of persistent demands by
the Federal Security Service to block opposition users and communities. In Sep-
tember, an Internet company controlled by an oligarch close to the Kremlin took
full control of VKontakte by acquiring its remaining shares. 
As the crisis in Ukraine escalated, Russian policymakers adopted laws imposing
further, severe restrictions on media and independent groups. In May, President
Vladimir Putin signed a law requiring bloggers with more than 3,000 daily visi-
tors to register as mass media. In June, Putin signed a law imposing custodial
terms for extremist calls on the Internet, including re-posts on social media. In
July, a new law banned commercial advertising on cable and satellite television
channels, effectively stripping hundreds of privately owned channels of a crucial
income. Also in July, the president signed laws criminalizing “separatist” calls
and prohibiting storing Russian Internet users’ personal data on foreign servers.
The latter will enter into force in 2016. A law adopted in October severely re-
stricts foreign ownership of Russian media. 
Several outspoken academics and public figures who work for government-
funded cultural institutions were either fired or “rotated out” of their positionsfor
example, historian Andrei Zubov, who lost his job after he publicy criticized Rus-
sia’s occupation of Crimea in a newspaper commentary. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Russian authorities fined four people during the year for violating the 2013 law
banning distribution among children of positive information about “non-tradi-
tional sexual relationships,” which are known to signify lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender (LGBT) relationships. 
WORLD REPORT 2015
446
Anti-LGBT vigilante groups continued attacking gay people across Russia. The
authorities have conducted a few isolated investigations but largely failed to
prosecute homophobic and transphobic violence. 
Attacks on LGBT activists also persist. In April, a group of nationalists interrupted
a Moscow screening of a documentary about LGBT discrimination. In September,
groups of nationalists disrupted the opening night of an annual LGBT event in
Saint Petersburg, QueerFest, throwing smoke bombs. Other QueerFest events
were canceled due to threats and to venue operators breaking rental agree-
ments. 
Smear campaigns have targeted LGBT people working in the public education
system. In at least six cases, employers did not renew their contracts, pressured
them to resign, or simply fired them. Some LGBT people decided to leave Russia
due to homophobia and fear of violations of their rights because of their sexual
orientation. 
Freedom of Assembly
Police interference in peaceful public gatherings continued in 2014. Authorities
detained hundreds of peaceful protesters during the 2014 Winter Olympic
Games and after the occupation of Crimea, in most cases arbitrarily and in some
cases with unnecessary force. Between February 21 and March 4, police de-
tained at least 1,300 peaceful protesters in Moscow alone. In March and Sep-
tember, two peaceful marches protesting Russia’s interference in Ukraine took
place without incident in Moscow. 
The government toughened penalties for unauthorized public gatherings. A new
law increased to up to 15 years prison terms for “mass rioting,” the offense used
to prosecute dozens of people who had protested at Moscow’s Bolotnaya
Square on the eve of Putin’s 2012 inauguration.The law also introduced a new
offense—“mass riots training”— punishable by up to 10 years in prison. New
amendments significantly increased fines for unauthorized public gatherings




Human Rights Defenders and Political Opponents
In a March speech, Putin called independent groups and government critics “na-
tional traitors” and a “fifth column” working to destabilize the country. 
Russia’s biggest political trial, against the Bolotnaya Square protestors, contin-
ued. In December 2013, four of the accused were released under a federal
amnesty. Between February and August 2014, 13 were sentenced to up to four-
and-a-half years in prison for, variously, mass rioting, violence against police,
and organizing mass riots. 
In June, a court released Mikhail Kosenko, a Bolotnaya protester sentenced in
2013 to forced psychiatric treatment. 
In February, unknown perpetrators attempted to set fire to the home of Igor
Sazhin, a prominent human rights defender in the Komi region. Authorities
failed to investigate. Also in February, police in Voronezh arrested Roman
Khabarov, a former police officer and human rights defender, on trumped-up
charges of membership in an organized criminal group that operated a network
of unlawful gambling spots in the region. His trial was set to begin in late 2014. 
On April 2, a Krasnodar court convicted Mikhail Savva, a civic activist and aca-
demic, of fraud and gave him a suspended prison sentence and a fine of 70,000
rubles (US$1,945). Savva had spent over seven months in pretrial custody.
On June 9, five men were sentenced for participating in the killing of one of Rus-
sia’s most outspoken investigative journalists, Anna Politkovskaya, in 2006. Two
received a life sentence; the others received prison terms ranging from 12 to 20
years. Others believed to have ordered the killing remained unpunished. The
perpetrators of the 2009 killing of leading Chechen human rights defender Na-
talia Estemirova had still not been brought to justice at time of writing. 
North Caucasus
The confrontation between the Islamist insurgency and law enforcement agen-
cies continued in Russia’s North Caucasus, particularly in Dagestan. According
to Caucasian Knot, an independent online media portal, in the first nine months
of 2014, 239 people were killed in the North Caucasus region, including 31 civil-
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ians, and 117 people were wounded, including 15 civilians. More than two-thirds
of these casualties occurred in Dagestan. 
Security forces raided Salafi mosques across Dagestan detaining, interrogating,
photographing, and finger-printing hundreds of people. Police also subjected
many Salafis to forced DNA testing. Abusive special operations in the mountain
villages of Gimry and Vremennyi went on for months and involved destruction of
property and enforced disappearances. 
Abduction-style detentions, torture, and enforced disappearances persisted in
the North Caucasus, as did attacks against government critics. In August, Timur
Kuashev, a freelance journalist and rights activist, was found dead near Nalchik,
in Kabardino-Balkaria. The official investigation had not yielded tangible results
at time of writing. Several Dagestani activists and lawyers told Human Rights
Watch that they frequently received threats aimed at silencing them. In July, a
court in Chechnya convicted Ruslan Kutaev, a prominent local activist, on
trumped-up drug charges and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment. The
court disregarded torture allegations he made during his trial. On October 31, an
appeals court decreased Kutaev’s prison sentence by three months. Two days
before his arrest, Kutaev publicly criticized an order handed down by Chechnya’s
leader, Ramzan Kadyrov. 
Chechen authorities require women to wear headscarves in public places. In
September, Kadyrov made a televised statement warning that as part of their
fight against “non-traditional Islam,” authorities would detain women who wear
“Wahabi”-style headscarves, covering the forehead and the chin. 
Abuses Linked to Preparations for the 2014 Olympic Games
Authorities harassed and intimidated organizations, individuals, and journalists
in Sochi in advance of the 2014 Winter Olympic Games. In February, an appeals
court upheld a politically motivated prison sentence for Evgenii Vitishko, an en-
vironmental activist and critic of Russia’s Olympic preparations. 
In January, the authorities announced that an inspection of more than 500 com-
panies involved in Olympic construction exposed 277 million rubles (US$8.34
million) in unpaid wages to workers. However local activists report hundreds of





The authorities failed to resettle or fairly compensate some families evicted for
Olympic development or whose homes or property suffered damage from it. 
Palliative Care 
2014 saw several positive developments in palliative care, including the intro-
duction of clinical guidelines on pain treatment for children. The lack of access
to quality pain treatment and palliative care remains a systemic problem. Access
to morphine remains overly restricted for the vast majority of patients. 
A doctor in Krasnoyarsk and another woman who had helped a man in final
stages of cancer access pain medication were finally acquitted during a re-trial in
October after they had initially been convicted and fined on charges of illegal
drug trafficking of controlled substances. 
Disability Rights
Adults and children living with various disabilities face many barriers to partici-
pating in their communities. These include physical barriers, such as the lack of
ramps and elevators and inadequate accommodations in transportation sys-
tems; policy barriers, such as lack of inclusive education; and social barriers,
such as employers’ unwillingness to hire people with disabilities. 
In positive steps in 2014, the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection introduced
amendments to legislation to expand mandatory accommodations for people
with sensory and physical disabilities and to prohibit disability-based discrimi-
nation. Russia successfully hosted the Sochi 2014 Winter Paralympic Games.
However, Sochi residents and tourists with disabilities continued to face barriers
to using public services and facilities due to lack of accessibility. 
Hundreds of thousands of adults and children with disabilities currently live in
closed institutions. Approximately 45 percent of children in orphanages have
disabilities. Many children with disabilities in orphanages face physical and psy-
chological violence and neglect and are denied adequate healthcare, education,
and play. Russia has committed to addressing the high rates of children in state




Moscow has made clear its political support for armed insurgents in eastern
Ukraine and clearly exerts influence over them. There is also evidence that they
provide material support to the insurgents in terms of weapons and training.
Mounting evidence, including images of military manouvers and the capture of
Russian soldiers in Ukraine, showed that Russian forces are taking part in hostil-
ities there. Yet Russia has taken no public steps to rein in abuses by insurgents
(see Ukraine chapter). 
Key International Actors
Russia’s interference in Ukraine largely contributed to the drastic deterioration
of relations between Russia and its international partners, including the Euro-
pean Union and the United States, both of which imposed sanctions over Rus-
sia’s actions in Ukraine. Although the conflict in Ukraine eclipsed concerns
about the crackdown in Russia, various actors sharpened their public criticism of
Russia’s domestic record, decrying new, restrictive legislation and the hostile cli-
mate for civil society activists and human rights defenders. 
In February 2014, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) pressed Russian
authorities to investigate arrears wages owed to migrant workers involved in the
preparations for the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, but it failed to condemn the
2013 anti-LGBT law, despite the Olympic Charter’s prohibition of discrimination. 
In May, the Council of Europe’s human rights commissioner noted that pressure
on independent journalists in Russia had increased. 
On June 3, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe rapporteur on
human rights defenders expressed regret over the continued repression of civil
society and human rights defenders and the fact that Russia had not met its
promises to revise the “foreign agents” law. 
The International Criminal Court prosecutor continued to monitor Russian and
Georgian investigations into crimes committed during the 2008 Georgia-Russian




The 20th anniversary of the 1994 genocide was commemorated in ceremonies
and other events across Rwanda, and in many other countries. 
Progress in economic and social development remain impressive, but the gov-
ernment continues to impose severe restrictions on freedom of expression and
association and does not tolerate dissent. Political space is extremely limited
and independent civil society and media remain weak. Real or suspected oppo-
nents inside and outside the country continue to be targeted.  
Detainees were held unlawfully for several weeks or months in police or military
custody, in unrecognized detention centers. Dozens of people were reported dis-
appeared. Some reappeared in prison after prolonged incommunicado deten-
tion, but others remain unaccounted for.
Political Opposition
The ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) dominates all aspects of political and
public life. Opposition parties cannot operate in a meaningful way.
In December 2013, the Supreme Court increased from eight to fifteen years the
prison sentence of Victoire Ingabire, president of the FDU-Inkingi opposition
party, who had been convicted of conspiracy to undermine the government and
genocide denial in 2012. Several other FDU-Inkingi members, including the
party’s secretary general, Sylvain Sibomana, also remained in prison.   
Bernard Ntaganda, leader of the PS-Imberakuri opposition party, was released in
June after serving a four-year sentence for endangering national security and di-
visionism. 
The Democratic Green Party of Rwanda, which was granted registration in 2013,
joined the National Consultative Forum of Political Organizations in April. There
were no arrests in connection with the murder of the party’s Vice President André





Attacks on Opponents Abroad
On January 1, Patrick Karegeya, former head of Rwanda’s external intelligence
services and a prominent government opponent exiled in South Africa, was
found murdered in a hotel room in Johannesburg. South African authorities
launched an investigation, which was ongoing at time of writing. Karegeya was a
leading member of the Rwanda National Congress (RNC), an opposition group in
exile. Other RNC members have also been attacked and threatened outside
Rwanda. The Rwandan government denied any involvement in these attacks, but
President Paul Kagame came close to publicly condoning Karegeya’s murder on
January 12, 2014, when he said, among other things, “whoever betrays the coun-
try will pay the price.”
In August, a South African court convicted two Rwandans and two Tanzanians of
the attempted murder of General Kayumba Nyamwasa—a former senior military
official and leading RNC member—in South Africa in 2010, and sentenced them
in September to eight years’ imprisonment. It acquitted two other Rwandan de-
fendants. The judge stated that the attack was politically motivated and em-
anated from a group of people in Rwanda. 
Civil Society Organizations
Independent civil society organizations remain extremely weak as a result of
years of state intimidation and infiltration. The only remaining effective Rwandan
human rights group, the Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defence of
Human Rights (LIPRODHOR), took legal action in protest at a takeover of its lead-
ership by members sympathetic to the government in 2013. The Rwanda Gover-
nance Board, the state body with oversight of national nongovernmental
organizations, recognized the new leadership in 2013. After numerous adjourn-
ments, a court in Kigali ruled on procedural grounds in August 2014 that the case
was unfounded. The ousted LIPRODHOR leaders have filed an appeal. 
In September, two police officers were arrested in connection with the murder of
anti-corruption activist Gustave Makonene. After initially denying the murder
charges, both suspects pleaded guilty in pretrial hearings in October. The trial
had not started at time of writing. Makonene, coordinator of Transparency Inter-
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national Rwanda’s Advice and Legal Advice Center in Rubavu, was found dead in
July 2013.  
In June the pro-government New Times newspaper published an “assessment”
of Human Rights Watch’s work in Rwanda by the Ministry of Justice, which
grossly misrepresented the organization’s work. Among other allegations, it ac-
cused Human Rights Watch of supporting the Democratic Forces for the Libera-
tion of Rwanda (FDLR), a predominantly Rwandan armed group operating in
eastern Congo, some of whose leaders participated in the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda. 
Freedom of Media
Media remained heavily dominated by pro- government views. Most journalists
were unable or unwilling to engage in reporting on sensitive issues due to
threats, intimidation, and prosecution in previous years. However, some radio
stations occasionally broadcast call-in programs in which listeners can raise a
broader range of issues and put questions to political leaders.   
Agnès Uwimana, editor of Umurabyo newspaper, was released in June after serv-
ing four years in prison for endangering national security and defamation, in
connection with articles published in the newspaper. 
On October 24, the Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority (RURA) suspended the
British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) Kinyarwanda service's broadcasts in
Rwanda. RURA said it had received complaints of incitement, hatred, division-
ism, genocide denial and revision from members of the public after the October
1 BBC television documentary, “Rwanda’s Untold Story” was broadcast. On No-
vember 19 a commission of inquiry, established by RURA and headed by former
Prosecutor General Martin Ngoga, began investigations into these allegations
against the BBC. It was expected to produce its report in three months. 
Unlawful Detention and Enforced Disappearances
Dozens of people were held unlawfully, incommunicado in the military Camp
Kami and other detention centers, some for several weeks or months. Some
were tortured and pressured to confess to alleged crimes or to incriminate oth-
ers. Some of these detainees were later tried on security-related charges.
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From March to time of writing, at least 30 people were reported missing, many in
northwestern Rwanda. Some were arrested by state agents and taken to un-
known destinations. After several weeks, some of the disappeared reappeared
in police detention and were transferred to civilian prisons. Some were among a
group of 16 people who appeared before a court in Rubavu in June, accused of
endangering state security and collaborating with the FDLR. Government authori-
ties did not acknowledge their unlawful detention or account for their where-
abouts during the preceding period, failings which render their detentions
enforced disappearances. In a speech on June 5, President Kagame said authori-
ties would continue to arrest suspects and, if necessary, shoot in broad daylight
those intending to destabilize the country.
Throughout the year, hundreds of men, women, and children—many of them
street children, commercial sex workers, or street hawkers—were detained un-
lawfully, without charge or trial, in very poor conditions in an unrecognized de-
tention center commonly known as Kwa Kabuga, in the Gikondo area of Kigali.
Many were beaten by police, or by other detainees in the presence of police.
Security-Related Trials
The trial of Joel Mutabazi, a former presidential bodyguard forcibly returned from
Uganda to Rwanda in October 2013, and 15 co-accused began before a military
court in Kigali in January. The defendants were charged with terrorism, murder,
forming an armed group, and other offenses, linked to alleged collaboration with
the RNC and the FDLR. Mutabazi and several co-defendants stated in court that
they had been tortured and forced to sign statements. Mutabazi was found guilty
of all charges and sentenced in October to life in prison. Thirteen defendants re-
ceived sentences ranging from 3 months to 25 years. Two were acquitted. 
Well-known singer Kizito Mihigo, journalist Cassien Ntamuhanga, and co-defen-
dants Agnès Niyibizi and Jean-Paul Dukuzumuremyi were arrested in April and
charged, among other things, with offenses against the state and complicity in
terrorist acts for allegedly collaborating with the RNC and FDLR. Mihigo’s where-
abouts were unknown for several days before he appeared in police custody. In
November, he confessed to all the charges. Two of his co-defendants, Nta-
muhanga and Dukuzumuremyi, pleaded not guilty. The trial was ongoing at time
of writing and Niyibizi had not entered a plea. 
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In August, two senior military officers, retired Brig. Gen. Frank Rusagara and
Col.Tom Byabagamba, were arrested and charged with, among other offenses,
inciting insurrection and public disorder, and tarnishing the country’s image.
The accusations are believed to be related to their alleged contacts with the
RNC. They appeared in a military court alongside a third co-defendant, demobi-
lized Sgt. François Kabayiza. They were awaiting trial at time of writing.
Justice for the Genocide
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was expected to conclude all pro-
ceedings by the end of 2014, with the exception of one appeal due to conclude
in 2015. Nine suspects wanted by the ICTR continue to evade justice. The ICTR
and the United Nations mechanism for international criminal tribunals launched
a new initiative in July to track and arrest these remaining fugitives.
Genocide trials took place in the domestic courts of several countries under the
principle of universal jurisdiction, and further cases were pending. In the first
such prosecution in France, conducted by a newly established war crimes unit, a
court in Paris tried former intelligence chief, Pascal Simbikangwa, and sentenced
him in March to 25 years in prison for genocide and complicity in crimes against
humanity. In February, a court in Germany sentenced former Rwandan mayor,
Onesphore Rwabukombe, to 14 years in prison for aiding and abetting genocide.
Key International Actors
The UN special rapporteur on freedom of association and assembly, Maina Kiai,
visited Rwanda in January and expressed concern about restrictions on non-
governmental organizations and political parties, among other issues. In his re-
port to the UN Human Rights Council in June, he raised a number of concerns,
including the prevailing opposition to vigorous debate and free expression of
opinions, the government’s hostility toward peaceful initiatives by its critics and
the existence of a legal framework that silences dissent. The Rwandan govern-
ment refuted several of his findings.
In January, the United States Department of State publicly condemned the mur-
der of Patrick Karegeya. It expressed concern about what appeared to be politi-
cally motivated murders of prominent Rwandan exiles and President Kagame’s
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statements about the “consequences” for those who betrayed Rwanda. In June,
a US government press statement expressed concern about the arrest and disap-





Saudi Arabia continued in 2014 to try, convict, and imprison political dissidents
and human rights activists solely on account of their peaceful activities. System-
atic discrimination against women and religious minorities continued. Authori-
ties failed to enact systematic measures to protect the rights of 9 million foreign
workers. As in past years, authorities subjected hundreds of people to unfair tri-
als and arbitrary detention. New anti-terrorism regulations that took effect in
2014 can be used to criminalize almost any form of peaceful criticism of the au-
thorities as terrorism. 
Freedom of Expression, Association, and Belief
The Specialized Criminal Court, Saudi Arabia’s terrorism tribunal, sentenced
prominent Eastern Province activist Fadhil al-Manasif to 15 years in prison, a 15-
year ban on travel abroad, and a large fine on April 17 after it convicted him on
charges that included “breaking allegiance with the ruler,” “contact with foreign
news organizations to exaggerate the news,” and “circulating his phone number
to [foreign] news agencies to allow them to call him.” The charges arose from al-
Manasif’s assistance to international media covering the 2011 protests in East-
ern Province. 
A Specialized Criminal Court judge ordered the detention of prominent human
rights lawyer Waleed Abu al-Khair on April 15. In July, the court convicted him on
vague charges arising solely from his peaceful activism, sentencing him to 15
years in prison, a 15-year travel ban, and a fine of 200,000 Saudi Riyals
(US$53,000). On August 11, the day after Abu al-Khair refused to cooperate in his
transfer to another prison, Jeddah prison authorities beat him and dragged him
from the prison with chains, injuring his ankles, then dispatched him to another
prison almost 1,000 kilometers away from his family home. 
Authorities continued to persecute activists associated with the Saudi Civil and
Political Rights Association (ACPRA). In June, a court sentenced Fowzan al-Harbi
to seven years in prison but suspended six years of the sentence on condition
that he does not return to his activism. Issa al-Hamid, the brother of imprisoned
activist Abdullah al-Hamid, was on trial in September on charges that included
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“inciting [people] to violate public order and spreading discord” and “insulting
the judiciary.” Others were under investigation.
An appeals tribunal inside the Specialized Criminal Court in July upheld a sen-
tence of five years in prison and a 10-year travel ban for human rights advocate
Mikhlif al-Shammari, based on his writings and exposure of human rights
abuses. 
Saudi officials continue to refuse to register political or human rights groups,
leaving members subject to prosecution for “setting up an unregistered organi-
zation.” Saudi officials did not pass a long-awaited associations law in 2014,
leaving Saudi citizens with no legal avenue to set up non-charity nongovernmen-
tal organizations. 
Saudi Arabia does not tolerate public worship by adherents of religions other
than Islam and systematically discriminates against Muslim religious minorities,
notably Twelver Shia and Ismailis.
In May, a Jeddah court convicted activist Raif Badawi and sentenced him to 10
years in prison and 1,000 lashes for “insulting Islam” by founding a critical lib-
eral website, and for his comments during television interviews. An appeals
court upheld the sentence in September. 
Criminal Justice
Detainees, including children, commonly face systematic violations of due
process and fair trial rights, including arbitrary arrest and torture and ill-treat-
ment in detention. Saudi judges routinely sentence defendants to floggings of
hundreds of lashes. 
Judges can order arrest and detention, including of children, at their discretion.
Children can be tried for capital crimes and sentenced as adults if physical signs
of puberty exist.
Saudi Arabia applies Sharia (Islamic law) as the law of the land. Judges decide
many matters relating to criminal offenses pursuant to Sharia in accordance with
established rules of jurisprudence and precedent. 
While there is no formal penal code, the government has passed some laws and
regulations that subject certain broadly-defined offenses to criminal penalties.
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In the absence of a written penal code or narrowly-worded regulations, however,
judges and prosecutors can criminalize a wide range of offenses under broad,
catch-all charges such as “breaking allegiance with the ruler” or “trying to distort
the reputation of the kingdom.” 
Authorities do not always inform suspects of the crime with which they are
charged, or allow them access to supporting evidence, even after trial sessions
have begun in some cases. Authorities generally do not allow lawyers to assist
suspects during interrogation and often impede them from examining witnesses
and presenting evidence at trial. 
Authorities continued to arrest and hold suspects for months and sometimes
years without judicial review or prosecution. On May 15, an Interior Ministry
database showed that criminal justice officials were holding 293 individuals
whose pretrial detention exceeded six months without having referred their
cases to the judiciary. At least 31 people had been detained “under investiga-
tion” for more than six months. 
Saudi Arabia permitted representatives of certain foreign diplomatic missions to
monitor trials of Saudi dissidents and activists in 2014 for the first time. 
Saudi authorities promulgated a new anti-terrorism law on January 31 that con-
tains serious flaws. Its vague and overly broad provisions allow authorities to
criminalize free expression and it gives the authorities excessive police powers
that are not subject to judicial oversight. On March 7, the Interior Ministry issued
further regulations designating a list of groups the government considers terror-
ist organizations, as well as other provisions that proscribe acts such as “calling
for atheist thought,” throw[ing] away loyalty to the country’s rulers,” “contact or
correspondence with any groups, currents [of thought], or individuals hostile to
the kingdom,” and participating in or calling for protests or demonstrations. 
In June, the Ministry of Justice announced that prosecutors had filed 191 cases of
alleged sorcery—a crime punishable by death—between November 2013 and
May 2014, including some against foreign domestic workers. 
According to media reports, Saudi Arabia executed at least 68 persons between
January and mid-November 2014, mostly for murder, drug offenses, and armed
robbery, including 31 between August 4 and September 4. Thirty-one of those ex-
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ecuted were convicted for non-violent crimes, including one man sentenced for
sorcery. 
On October 15, Specialized Criminal Court sentenced prominent Shia cleric Nimr
al-Nimr to death on a host of vague charges, based largely on his peaceful criti-
cism of Saudi officials. 
Women’s and Girls’ Rights
Saudi Arabia’s discriminatory male guardianship system remains intact despite
government pledges to abolish it. Under this system, ministerial policies and
practices forbid women from obtaining a passport, marrying, traveling, or ac-
cessing higher education without the approval of a male guardian, usually a hus-
band, father, brother, or son. 
Authorities also fail to prevent some employers from requiring male guardians to
approve the hiring of adult female relatives or some hospitals from requiring
male guardian approval for certain medical procedures for women. In February, a
member of the Senior Council of Scholars, the highest state body for the inter-
pretation of Islamic law, issued a fatwa stating that women are not allowed to
visit a male doctor without their male guardians. They are not allowed to expose
parts of the body with the exception of a medical emergency. All women remain
banned from driving in Saudi Arabia. 
Likewise, under un-codified rules on personal status, women are not allowed to
marry without the permission of their guardian; unlike men, they do not have a
unilateral right to divorce and often face discrimination in relation to child cus-
tody. In September, the Supreme Judicial Council issued a decision to allow
women granted custody of their children to handle all affairs related to their chil-
dren including obtaining official documents. To travel outside the country with
theirchildren, however, women still require the permission of the children’s fa-
ther . 
In a welcome move in April, the Shura Council, Saudi Arabia’s highest consulta-
tive body, directed the Education Ministry to study the possibility of introducing
physical education for girls in Saudi public schools, which, if enacted, would




Over 9 million migrant workers fill manual, clerical, and service jobs, constitut-
ing more than half the workforce. Many suffer abuses and exploitation, some-
times amounting to conditions of forced labor. 
The kafala (sponsorship) system ties migrant workers’ residency permits to
“sponsoring” employers, whose written consent is required for workers to
change employers or exit the country under normal circumstances. Some em-
ployers illegally confiscate passports, withhold wages, and force migrants to
work against their will. 
Saudi officials, wary that the domestic unemployment rate of 12 percent may
grow as the domestic population increases, have issued a set of labor reforms
since 2011 that create a tiered quota system for the employment of Saudi citi-
zens in the private labor sector that differs according to the nature of the busi-
ness. As part of these reforms, Saudi labor authorities in 2014 began allowing
foreigners working in firms that do not employ the required percentage of Saudis
to change jobs without employer approval. 
Police and labor authorities in 2014 continued a vigorous campaign to arrest and
deport foreign workers found in violation of existing labor laws, targeting work-
ers who did not have valid residency or work permits, or those found working for
an employer other than his or her legal sponsor. According to the International
Organization on Migration (IOM), Saudi Arabia deported 163,018 Ethiopians be-
tween November 2013 and March 2014, and 458,911 Yemenis between June 2013
and June 2014. There were reports that prior to deportation some deportees were
placed inovercrowded detention conditions, denied adequate food and water,
and physically abused by guards. Between December and March 2014, Saudi
Arabia deported 38,164 Somalis to Mogadishu, including hundreds of women
and children, without allowing any to make refugee claims. 
Domestic workers, most of them women, frequently endure a range of abuses in-
cluding overwork, forced confinement, non-payment of wages, food deprivation,
and psychological, physical, and sexual abuse without the authorities holding
their employers to account. Workers who attempted to report employer abuses




During a visit to Saudi Arabia in March, US President Barack Obama did not dis-
cuss human rights issues with Saudi officials. State Department spokespeople
stated that the US was “troubled” over the conviction of Waleed Abu al-Khair and
“concerned” over Raif Badawi’s harsh sentence. Otherwise the United States did
not criticize Saudi human rights violations beyond Congressionally-mandated
annual reports. In 2014, Saudi Arabia was classified as a Country of Particular
Concern under the US International Religious Freedom Act for having engaged in
or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. 
On December 27, 2013, a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) joint security agree-
ment came into force. The agreement’s 20 provisions include a vaguely worded
article that would suppress “interference in the domestic affairs” of other GCC
countries, which could be used to criminalize criticism of Gulf countries or rulers.
Another provision provides for sharing citizens’ and residents’ personal data at




There was limited progress in human rights protection in Serbia in 2014. War
crimes prosecutions are slow and lack political support. The Roma minority con-
tinue to face attacks and harassment. The situation for journalists remains pre-
carious, including attacks, threats, and lawsuits for reporting on sensitive
issues. Hostility towards members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) community continued and included threats and attacks. 
Accountability for War Crimes 
War crimes prosecutions progressed slowly in 2014 due to a lack of political sup-
port, resources, and staff at the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor. Few high-
ranking former military and civilian personnel have been prosecuted for war
crimes. During the year, the War Crimes Chamber reached judgments in six
cases, including two appeals. The Office of War Crimes Prosecutor indicted five
people for crimes against civilians, including former Yugoslav Army General Dra-
gan Zivanovic for war crimes in Kosovo in 1999. At time of writing, 6 trials were
ongoing, indictments had been issues in 16 cases awaiting trial, and 20 cases
were under investigation. 
In February, the chamber sentenced nine former members of the Yugoslav Army
to a total of 106 years of imprisonment for the killing of over 120 Albanian civil-
ians in Kosovo in 1999. Also in February, the chamber sentenced Djuro Tadic to
10 years for participating in the killings by Bosnian Serb forces of 18 people, in-
cluding a 13-year-old girl, in northwestern Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in Sep-
tember 1992. Two co-defendants were sentenced to 11 and 10 years respectively. 
At time of writing, the February 2013 war crimes protocol signed between BiH,
Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro that details information sharing and coopera-
tion, had not led to new prosecutions or convictions derived from case transfers. 
In February 2014, a first instance court in Belgrade dismissed 12 Croatian ex-pris-
oners’ civil lawsuits against Serbia for torture in detention in 1991 on the
grounds the claim was time-barred and there were no criminal convictions for
the alleged abuse on which to base the civil claims. 
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In January, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
appeals chamber upheld the crimes against humanity conviction of former Ser-
bian Assistant Minister of Interior Vlastimir Djordjevic for the murder, persecu-
tion, and forced deportation of Kosovo Albanians in 1999, but reduced his
sentence from 27 to 18 years. 
Also in January, the ICTY appeals chamber upheld its guilty verdict against for-
mer Yugoslav Deputy Minister Nikola Sainovic, former Yugoslav Army Generals
Nebojsa Pavkovic and Vladimir Lazarevic, and former Serbian Police General
Sreten Lukic for murder, deportation, and inhumane treatment of Kosovo Albani-
ans in 1999. In doing so, a majority of the judges rejected the reasoning in the
2014 ICTY appeals chamber judgment in the Perisic case that an accused must
have “specifically directed” assistance to commit crimes to be guilty of aiding
and abetting. 
Freedom of Media
Journalists continued to face threats, harassment, intimidation, and political
and other interference. Between January and August, the International Journalist
Association in Serbia reported five assaults on journalists, three direct threats,
and 12 cases of political and other pressure. 
In early July, FoNet News Agency Editor Davor Pasalic was severely beaten by
three unknown assailants who demanded money and called him a Croatian fas-
cist. Police were investigating at time of writing. 
In May, online news sites Druga Strana and Teleprompter suffered cyber-attacks
that temporarily shut down their websites, which had reported on the misman-
agement and inefficiency of Serbian state institutions during severe flooding
that the country experienced earlier the same month. The perpetrators of the
cyber-attacks remain unknown. Srdjan Skoro, a former editor at the daily Ve-
cernje Novosti, was dismissed from his post in May after speaking critically
about the government’s handling of the floods in a Radio Television Serbia
broadcast. 
The government commission established in 2013 to investigate the murders of
three prominent journalists more than a decade earlier made progress in only
one case, resulting in four people being charged. The seven-member commis-
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sion is tasked with analyzing all prior investigations, ascertaining why they
failed, and gathering evidence to assist future criminal investigations. 
Treatment of Minorities
Attacks and harassment against the Roma minority continued. 
In February, a group of non-Roma attacked members of a Romani nongovern-
mental organization (NGO) in Novi Sad, northern Serbia. The Roma managed to
escape into their office and called police for help, who refused to assist, accord-
ing to the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC). In March, four members of the
NGO were brutally beaten by two non-Roma carrying sticks. One Roma man re-
ceived serious head injuries and two others suffered lighter head injuries. Police
were investigating at time of writing. 
In April, around 15 men threw Molotov cocktails at a Romani Protestant church in
the village of Bosnajce in southern Serbia, setting fire to the room where church
ceremonies are held. Nobody was injured. According to the ERRC, three people
were convicted in April in connection with the attack and sentenced to 30 days in
prison. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
LGBT people continue to face intolerance, harassment, and in at least one case,
physical violence. 
In September, a 27-year-old German LGBT activist was brutally beaten by a group
of men and suffered serious injuries that required hospitalization. Police ar-
rested three suspects. In April, the Gay-Straight Alliance received repeated
emails calling for the murder of LGBT people and cleansing of LGBT organizations
in Serbia. Three weeks prior, Gay-Straight Alliance members received death
threats over the phone. A local LGBT group reported that the police had failed to
identify the perpetrators. 
In February, the Commissioner for Equality Nevena Petrusic issued an opinion
that held that the Belgrade Bosko Buha theatre discriminated against a gay mag-




The May Belgrade Pride March, which had been cancelled for three consecutive
years due to alleged security reasons, was held in late September amid heavy
police security and was attended by 1,000-1,500 people, including three Serbian
ministers, the European Union representative in Serbia, and several foreign
diplomats. No violence against LGBT supporters was reported. 
Asylum Seekers and Displaced Persons
In the first eight months of 2014, Serbia registered 6,974 asylum seekers, a sig-
nificant increase from 2,567 during the same period in 2013. Syrians comprised
the largest national group (3,696 people). 
In 2014, three new reception centers opened in Serbia, adding to the existing
two. For the first time since it assumed responsibility for the asylum procedure in
2008, the Asylum Office granted refugee status to one asylum seeker and sub-
sidiary protection to three others. But its asylum procedures remain inadequate
with thousands of pending claims. 
By September, there were 96 unaccompanied migrant children registered in Ser-
bia. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
there are no formal age assessment procedures for unaccompanied migrant chil-
dren, putting them at risk of being treated as adults and not receiving special
protection. Guardians appointed to represent the interest of unaccompanied
children are not sufficiently trained to accommodate their needs and rarely visit
them after first contact. 
Serbian authorities made little progress towards finding a durable solution for
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the Balkan wars living in
Serbia. According to data from UNHCR, as of July there were 44,251 refugees in
Serbia, most from Croatia, and as of September 204,049 IDPs, a majority of
whom are from Kosovo. 
Key International Actors
In April, Catherine Ashton, EU high representative for foreign and security policy,
commended the new Serbian government’s commitment to fight corruption and




EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fule in May praised Serbia’s progress to-
wards EU membership and emphasized the need to strengthen rule of law, but
did not mention Serbia’s human rights record. 
The European Commission’s October progress report on Serbia stressed the
need to enhance the constitutional and legal framework to ensure an effective
independent judiciary, and expressed concerns about freedom of expression, in-
cluding continued threats and violence against journalists. The report also noted
the limited number of war crimes investigations by Serbian authorities against
high-level officers in domestic war crimes and lenient sentences handed down
by Serbian courts in such cases. 
The United States State Department 2013 human rights report on Serbia high-
lighted discrimination and attacks against minorities, especially Roma, and ha-
rassment of journalists as the most serious human rights issues during the year. 
In May, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) representa-
tive on media freedom, Dunja Mijatovic, expressed concern about online censor-
ship in Serbia, citing cyber attacks on websites that report critically on the




The European Union and Kosovo government reached a landmark agreement in
2014 to establish a special court outside Kosovo to try crimes committed by for-
mer members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during and after the 1998-
1999 Kosovo war. 
The continued failure to form a government after April elections and the crisis
over the role of the Constitutional Court further weakened human rights protec-
tion. The justice system continued to be overburdened and international judges
in Kosovo claimed widespread corruption among judges and prosecutors. Jour-
nalists and members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual (LGBT) com-
munity continued to face threats and harassment. Inter-ethnic tensions flared
mid-year and Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian communities remained vulnerable to
discrimination and social exclusion. Parliament changed an existing law to offer
support to wartime rape victims. 
Impunity, Accountability, Access to Justice
In April, the Kosovo parliament approved the establishment of a special court lo-
cated outside Kosovo and presided over by international judges to adjudicate
criminal prosecutions arising from the work of the European Union Special Task
Force established in 2011 to investigate serious abuses during and after the
Kosovo war. The Special Task Force based its work on findings of a 2010 Council
of Europe report. The court will be based in the Netherlands and is expected to
become operational once the Kosovo Assembly adopts necessary legislative
changes. 
Based on the decisions of European Union member states, the EU Rule of Law
Mission (EULEX) mandate, although extended in April until June 2016, was signif-
icantly scaled back in June as a result of the transfer of some responsibilities to
the local judiciary and prosecutorial branch. International EULEX judges, in a
January letter to the head of the EULEX Executive Division, outlined their con-
cerns with the downsizing of the mission, stating that the local judiciary was not
fully equipped to handle sensitive and complex cases and that EULEX prosecu-




Despite progress in recent years, the justice system in Kosovo remains weak,
with inadequate security for judges, court staff, prosecutors, plaintiffs, and wit-
nesses. This results in few prosecutions for serious crimes, such as organized
crime and corruption. 
In July, the EU Special Task Force published its findings and stated former senior
KLA officials will face charges for crimes against humanity and other abuses
committed after the 1998-1999 war. 
As a result of an EULEX appeal to the 2013 November acquittal, the Kosovo Ap-
peal’s Court in September reopened the case against former KLA commander,
Fatmir Limaj, and nine co-defendants suspected of abusing prisoners at the
Klecka detention center in 1998-1999. Two EULEX judges and one Kosovar judge
will oversee the proceedings. The case illustrates weakness in Kosovo’s witness
protection program: in the initial proceedings in 2012, testimony by the key wit-
ness, who was found dead in a park in Germany in December 2012 in what police
called a suicide, was first ruled inadmissible, and on retrial, contradictory and
unreliable. 
In May, a first instance court in Mitrovica acquitted former KLA Commander Sylej-
man Selimi and three co-defendants of war crimes committed during the 1998-
1999 conflict in a case concerning repeated assaults of two ethnic Albanian
women held at the KLA detention center in Likovac. The court said the evidence
was too weak and too much time had elapsed since the alleged abuse took
place. 
The trial of Kosovo Serb politician Oliver Ivanovic and other former Serb paramili-
ataries officials started in August. Ivanovic is suspected of war crimes by order-
ing the murder of four ethnic Albanians in Mitrovica in 1999 during the NATO
bombing. He and three co-defendants are further charged with inciting others to
commit murder during the February 2000 violence in Mitrovica where 10 ethnic
Albanians were killed, 25 wounded, and more than 11,000 forced from their
homes after being attacked by ethnic Serbs several months after the end of the
war. 
Between January and August, EULEX reported that two war crimes judgments
had been issued by mixed panels of judges, one at the Basic Court and one at
the Court of Appeals. A panel of EULEX judges also issued one judgment during
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2014. At time of writing, there were 160 pending war crimes cases, of which 128
cases are with EULEX Special Prosecution Office prosecutors and 32 with Kosovo
Special Prosecution Office prosecutors. 
In November, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy Federica Mogherini appointed an independent expert to re-
view a EULEX internal investigation into alleged corruption in the mission. A
EULEX prosecutor has alleged the mission failed to investigate her complaints
about the matter and instead targeted her. The same month, EU Ombudsman
Emily O’Reilly opened an inquiry into the EU’s handling of the corruption allega-
tions. 
The Human Rights Review Panel, an independent body set up in 2009 to review
allegations of human rights violations by EULEX staff, handed down three deci-
sions between January and September, including that EULEX had violated a com-
plainant’s right to effective remedy in a case where a EULEX police officer
attacked the complainant, who then could not work for several months. 
The Human Rights Advisory Panel, an independent body set up in 2006 to exam-
ine complaints committed by or attributable to the United Nations Interim Ad-
ministration in Kosovo (UNMIK), found violations in 59 out of 60 cases
addressed between January and August. 
In March, the Kosovo Assembly adopted legislation that recognized survivors of
conflict-related sexual violence and abuse as veterans. 
Treatment of Minorities 
Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian communities continued to face problems obtaining
personal documents, which hamper their access to health care, social assis-
tance, and education.
The continued failure to implement the 2010 Strategy and Action Plan for the In-
tegration of Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian communities stems from a lack of polit-
ical will, funds, and cooperation between central and municipal authorities and
between government and civil society. 
A new strategy for reintegrating repatriated persons—including Roma, Ashkali
and Egyptians—for 2014-2018 replaced the old 2010 strategy, improving the situ-
ation slightly for returnees in 2014. 
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Municipal Committees for Return were established dealing with assistance to re-
turnees, mainly food and accommodation. Repatriated persons still face difficul-
ties accessing employment, education, and health services and, as a result,
more than 1,200 Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians left Kosovo in 2014, according to
Balkan Sunflowers, a local nongovernmental organization. 
Inter-ethnic tensions in the north flared up in June, when a protest organized by
Albanians from south Mitrovica sparked violence. Protesters clashed with
Kosovo police and several people were injured and vehicles burned. In January,
the Serb municipal councilor for north Mitrovica, Dimitrije Janicijevic, was shot
dead outside his home. Police were investigating his murder at time of writing. 
Between January and August, Kosovo Police Services reported three inter-ethnic
incidents, without specifying their nature. 
Asylum Seekers and Displaced Persons
During the first 10 months of the year, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) registered 440 voluntary returns, including people from out-
side Kosovo and internally displaced persons, compared to 465 during the same
period in 2013. 
Deportations from Western Europe to Kosovo continued, with improved but lim-
ited assistance upon return. Between January and August, the Ministry of Interior
registered 2,109 forced returns to Kosovo, including 261 Roma, 95 Ashkali, and
19 Egyptians. Most were returned were from Germany (341) and Switzerland
(258). 
Freedom of Media
Journalists continued to face attacks and threats during 2014, particularly those
reporting on radical Muslim groups. In September, Visar Duriqi, a journalist at
the GazetaExpress newspaper who had reported on political Islam, received
death threats, including of beheading, when a radical Islamist group accused
him of apostasy. Artan Haraqija, a journalist at Indeksonline news site, who
worked on a joint report with Duriqi about radical Muslim groups operating in
Kosovo, received death threats after he appeared on the KTV show “Rubikon” in
September. Police were investigating both incidents at time of writing. 
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In September, the ombudsperson condemned threats against journalists and
called on media, prosecutors, and police to act within the full scope of their
mandates and not use methods that violate people’s privacy and dignity. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
According to QESh, the only public LGBT organization in Kosovo, the LGBT com-
munity faced physical attacks and threats during the year, particularly via social
and online media and on radio. According to QESh, in August, three men as-
saulted a gay man in Prizren. In June, a transsexual 17 year old in Pristina was
verbally abused and threatened by three other boys his age, and in April, an 18-
year-old gay man was verbally abused by his school teacher. 
Key International Actors
In January, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
called on Kosovo authorities to establish exactly how many forcibly returned asy-
lum seekers were still in Kosovo and, in particular, identify members of commu-
nities UNHCR considers to be “at risk” and in need of international protection,
including Serbs, Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian communities. 
EU High Representative Catherine Ashton in April welcomed the extension of
EULEX’s mandate and the establishment of a specialist court to adjudicate
abuses during and after the 1998-1999 Kosovo war. 
The EU progress report on Kosovo highlighted shortcomings with rule of law, in-
cluding judicial independence, stressed that witness intimidation remains a se-
rious concern, and noted limited results in the fight against corruption and
organized crime. The report called for the strengthening of the ombudsperson’s
institution, the adoption of anti-discrimination legislation, and for human rights
issues to be put higher on the political agenda, such as the implementation of
the action plan for integrating Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian communities. 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in a May report stated that strengthening rule
of law institutions remains a long-term challenge and called on authorities to im-
prove their performance in this area. 
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In September, OSCE Representative on Freedom of Media Dunja Mijatovic con-
demned death threats and attacks against journalists in Kosovo and called on
authorities to bring perpetrators to justice. 
The Council of Europe Venice Commission in March published its opinion on an
amendment of the Law on Freedom of Religion in Kosovo, outlining the need for
a number of improvements, including expanding the list of religious communi-
ties that “constitute the historical, cultural and social heritage of the country”




Singapore’s government limits political and civil rights—especially freedom of
expression, peaceful assembly, and association—using overly broad legal provi-
sions on security, public order, morality, and racial and religious harmony. Since
the 2011 parliamentary election, however, in which the opposition made gains,
Singaporean citizens have been increasingly asserting their rights through social
media and rallies in designated areas. 
Freedom of Expression, Peaceful Assembly, and Association 
On September 10, Singapore’s Media Development Authority (MDA) banned the
film “To Singapore, With Love ” on grounds that it undermined national security.
The film features interviews with activists who fled Singapore rather than face
political persecution and possible detention under the country’s abusive Inter-
nal Security Act (ISA). Film director Tan Pin Pin filed an appeal, stating that peo-
ple should be able to air “differing views about our past, even views that the
government disapproves.” On November 12, the Film Appeals Committee re-
jected her appeal by a 9-3 vote. 
The MDA also continues to compel online news websites discussing domestic
political issues to register under the Broadcasting Act. Registration requires
posting a monetary bond, paying fees, undergoing annual registration, and, on
notification, immediately removing anything the MDA deems to be against “pub-
lic interest, public order or national harmony” or to offend “good taste or de-
cency.” Registered websites are also prohibited from receiving any foreign
funding. In late March, the MDA ordered the news website Mothership.sg to reg-
ister and, in late September, made the same demand of The Online Citizen
(TOC). 
The Newspaper and Printing Presses Act requires local newspapers to renew
their registration every year and empowers the government to limit circulation of
foreign newspapers. 
The government maintains restrictions on freedom of assembly through provi-
sions of the 2009 Public Order Act, which require a police permit for any cause-
related assembly in a public place or to which members of the general public are
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invited. Grounds for denial are broad. On November 5, 2013, police arrested 10
people for planning a march without a permit in Singapore as part of a global
“Million Mask March.” A court convicted Jacob Lau Jian Ron of organizing the
event and fined him S$1000 (US$800). 
Protests and rallies conducted at the Speakers’ Corner in Hong Lim Park do not
need a police permit so long as the topic does not touch on religious or racial is-
sues and the organizer and speakers are Singaporean citizens. Foreigners who
are not permanent residents are not permitted to participate without a police
permit. Despite these restrictions, there has been an increase in the size of
crowds and the number of applications submitted to use the Speakers’ Corner. 
On September 25, 2014, the police notified activists Han Hui Hui and Roy Ngerng
Yi Ling that permission had been withdrawn for their planned September 27
event at Speakers’ Corner featuring speeches and a demonstration related to
management of Singapore’s Central Provident Fund (CPF), the state pension
fund. 
Hui and Ngerng refused to comply, and the demonstration went ahead. Police in-
vestigated at least 15 persons connected with the protest before charging
Ngerng and Hui with unlawful assembly for demonstrating without a permit, and
with causing a public nuisance. Four others (Janet Low Wai Choo, Chua Siew
Leng, Goh Aik Huat, and Ivan Koh Yew Beng) were charged only with causing a
public nuisance. The cases against the six were ongoing at time of writing. 
Associations of more than 10 individuals are required to register with the govern-
ment, and the Registrar of Societies has broad authority to deny registration if
the registrar determines that the group could be “prejudicial to public peace,
welfare or good order.” The registrar approved a new political party, Singapore-
ans First, in May 2014.  
Government officials continue to use criminal and civil defamation as a means to
silence critics. In May 2014, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong filed a lawsuit in his
personal capacity against activist and blogger Roy Ngerng Yi Ling who, Lee al-
leged, defamed him when he compared Lee’s actions in managing the CPF to a
criminal case involving misappropriation of funds. Ngerng agreed to apologize,
removed the posts, and made an offer of compensation—but Lee refused and
sought summary judgment in the case. In June, soon after being sued by Lee, the
WORLD REPORT 2015
478
private hospital employing Ngerng fired him, an action that the Ministry of
Health publicly applauded. As widely expected, on November 7, the Singapore
High Court ruled in favor of Lee and determined that damages would be as-
sessed at a later date. 
Criminal Justice System
Singapore continues to use the Internal Security Act (ISA) and Criminal Law (Tem-
porary Provisions) to arrest and administratively detain persons for virtually un-
limited periods without charge or judicial review. Government authorities
publicly maintain that such laws are necessary to protect Singapore from inter-
national terrorist threats. Authorities did not report any new arrests under the
ISA in 2014. 
While Singapore retains the death penalty, which is mandated for many drug of-
fenses and certain other crimes, judges in 2014 continued to apply legal provi-
sions that give them discretion to bypass the mandatory penalty and sentence
low-level offenders to life in prison and caning where prosecutors attest that of-
fenders have been cooperative. In July, convicted drug traffickers Tang Hai Liang
and Foong Chee Peng declined consideration for re-sentencing and opted to be
executed rather than to spend life in prison. In accepting the men’s preferences,
Singapore ended a de facto moratorium on executions in place since July 2011. 
Use of corporal punishment is common in Singapore. For medically fit males
ages 16 to 50, caning is mandatory as an additional punishment for a range of
crimes, including drug trafficking, violent crimes (like armed robbery), and even
immigration offenses. Sentencing officials may also order caning for some 30
additional violent and non-violent crimes. 
Yong Vui Kong, who had his death sentence for drug-running commuted to life
imprisonment and now faces a 15-stroke caning, has mounted a constitutional
challenge to caning, asserting it violates Singapore’s constitution and customary
international law that prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment. The challenge was pending before the Supreme Court
at time of writing. 
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Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
In 2014, top government leaders reiterated that Singapore society is not yet
ready to accept LGBT rights. In October, the Supreme Court rejected a claim that
the ban on gay sex is unconstitutional. The court said the legislature, not the ju-
diciary, needs to address this issue. A constitutional challenge that would have
prohibited employment discrimination against LGBT individuals also failed. 
In July, the National Library Board removed three children’s books with alleged
LGBT themes from library shelves, including “And Tango Makes Three,” a true
story of two male penguins in New York City’s Central Park Zoo who raised a pen-
guin chick. One book (“Who’s in Our Family?”) was pulped, but after pushback
from civil society groups, the board’s decision to destroy “And Tango Makes
Three” and “The White Swan Express: A Story About Adoption” was overruled,
and the books were shifted to the adult section of the library. Comic books, in-
cluding Archie and X-Men, also ran afoul of authorities when they included LGBT
content . 
The pro-LGBT Pink Dot festival was held for the sixth consecutive year, with an
estimated 26,000 people attending in June 2014. For the first time, there was a
protest mounted against the event. In August, police forced the cancellation of a
running event connected to the 10th annual Indignation LGBT Pride celebration
by refusing a permit in the “interest of public order.” 
Human Rights Defenders
M. Ravi, a lawyer who has played a central role in key human rights cases in Sin-
gapore, faced increasing government pressure in 2014. Ravi has mounted consti-
tutional challenges to the death penalty, caning, and several laws that
discriminate against LGBT individuals; has defended the right to counsel; and
represents blogger Roy Ngerng Yi Ling. 
In March, Singapore’s attorney general issued a complaint against Ravi for re-
leasing court documents to media before they were fully reviewed by govern-
ment prosecutors. Ravi immediately apologized. Ravi also has been subject to
several investigations by the Law Society of Singapore and faced disciplinary ac-
tion related to his public campaign on behalf of death row inmate Cheong Chun
Yin, whose case was subsequently accepted for re-sentencing. 
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Migrant Workers and Labor Exploitation
Migrant workers rioted in December 2013 in the Little India area, torching stores,
houses, and vehicles after a migrant was hit and killed by a bus. The violence
was the worst Singapore had faced in decades. Twenty-five Indians were charged
in connection with the riots. Fifty-two were deported, others were fined, and at
least eight were jailed. 
Foreign migrant workers are subject to labor abuse and exploitation through
debts owed to recruitment agents, non-payment of wages, restrictions on move-
ment, confiscation of passports, and sometimes physical and sexual abuse. For-
eign domestic workers are still excluded from the Employment Act and many key
labor protections, such as limits on daily work hours. Labor laws also discrimi-
nate against foreign workers by barring them from organizing and registering a
union or serving as union leaders without explicit government permission. 
Key International Actors
Singapore maintains good relations with both the United States and China, and
plays an important role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It
is an important military ally of the US, as the latter implements its security
“pivot” to Asia; serves as a regional hub for international business; and main-
tains close trade relations with China, its largest trading partner. 
In part because of these geopolitical and economic considerations, there has







The warring parties in Somalia’s long-running armed conflict continue to dis-
place, kill, and wound civilians. Restrictions on humanitarian access exacerbate
the human rights and humanitarian crises. 
The Islamist armed group Al-Shabaab abandoned several towns after a joint mili-
tary offensive by the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali
National Armed Forces in 2014. However, Al-Shabaab maintains control of large
areas of south-central Somalia, where it administers public executions and beat-
ings and restricts basic rights. Al-Shabaab carried out deadly attacks in govern-
ment-controlled areas such as Mogadishu, targeting civilians, including
lawmakers and other officials. 
Somali government security forces, African Union (AU) troops, and allied militias
were responsible for indiscriminate attacks, sexual violence, and arbitrary ar-
rests and detention. 
The Somali government largely failed to provide security and protect rights in
areas under its control. Ongoing insecurity in government-controlled areas, in-
cluding Mogadishu, and political infighting and reshuffles detracted from
progress on justice and security sector reform. Political efforts to establish fed-
eral states fuelled inter-clan fighting in some areas. 
Abuses by Government Forces 
Civilians have been caught up in fighting between government forces and Al-
Shabaab, skirmishes between government forces over control of checkpoints,
and in inter-clan fighting over land and over the haphazard and politicized cre-
ation of federal states. They have become casualties of indiscriminate attacks by
government forces in their heavy-handed responses to public protests and rebel
attacks. On December 13, 2013, government soldiers shot dead Duduble clan
elder Suldan Abdinaser Hussein Hassan at a checkpoint in Lower Shabelle; the
country’s military court issued warrants for the soldiers, but they were never ap-
prehended, reportedly due to their commanders’ protection. 
Somalia’s national intelligence agency, NISA, routinely carried out mass security
sweeps, despite having no legal mandate to arrest and detain suspects. NISA
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has occassionally held detainees for prolonged periods without judicial review
and mistreated suspects during interrogations. 
Government forces and clan militia regularly clashed, causing civilian deaths, in-
juries, and destruction of property. In December 2013, government forces at-
tacked KM-50 village, where they fought a local militia, beat residents, and
looted and burned homes and shops. Several civilians were reportedly killed and
many civilians fled the area. 
The Somali government continued to rely on its military court to administer jus-
tice for a broad range of crimes not within its jurisdiction in proceedings that fall
short of international fair trial standards. The court in 2014 sentenced to death
and executed 15 people, 13 of whom were not members of the Somali armed
forces. 
Abuses by Al-Shabaab 
Credible reports indicate that Al-Shabaab continues to carry out targeted
killings, including beheadings and civilian executions. On June 2, the group pub-
licly executed three men accused of spying for the federal government and for-
eign governments in the port-town of Barawe. Al-Shabaab also administers
arbitrary justice and severely restricts basic rights. 
Al-Shabaab regularly targeted for attack civilians and civilian objects, particu-
larly in Mogadishu with a significant increase during the Ramadan holiday. On
February 13, a suicide car bomb attack on a United Nations convoy near Mo-
gadishu International Airport killed at least six civilian bystanders. Al-Shabaab
claimed responsibility for the killings of three lawmakers in July and August. 
Sexual Violence 
While the full scope of sexual violence in Somalia remains unknown due to un-
derreporting and absence of data, it is clear that internally displaced women and
girls are particularly vulnerable to rape by armed men, including Somali govern-
ment soldiers and militia members. Government forces and allied militia have
also taken advantage of insecurity in newly recovered towns to rape local women
and girls. The government endorsed an action plan to address sexual violence,







Some soldiers from Uganda and Burundi deployed as part of the African Union
Mission in Somalia sexually exploited and assaulted women and girls on their
bases in Mogadishu. In some cases women and girls were offered humanitarian
assistance, medicine, and food in exchange for sex. Few women filed complaints
due to a fear of reprisals and an absence of effective and safe complaints mech-
anisms. At time of writing, the AU and troop contributing countries were investi-
gating allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation by AMISOM forces. Thus far,
accountability for these abuses has been limited despite AMISOM commitments. 
Recruitment of Children and Other Abuses
Al-Shabaab in particular targets children for recruitment and forced marriage,
and attacks schools. The UN documented recruitment and use of children by
government forces and allied militia. 
In August, the UN expert on children in armed conflict raised concerns about the
unlawful detention of 55 children, reportedly formerly associated with armed
groups, in the Serendi rehabilitation camp in Mogadishu. 
Government authorities committed to implement action plans signed in 2012 to
end the use of child soldiers, as well as the killing and maiming of children, but
progress has been slow. 
Access to Humanitarian Assistance 
According to the UN, over 1 million people, many of them displaced persons,
face acute food insecurity and 120,000 Somalis have been newly displaced
since the beginning of 2014, as a result of ongoing military operations. 
Tens of thousands of displaced people remain in dire conditions in Mogadishu
and are subjected to evictions, sexual violence, and clan-based discrimination
at the hands of government forces, allied militia, and private individuals includ-
ing camp managers. Government plans to relocate displaced communities to the
outskirts of Mogadishu stalled, but forced evictions by private individuals and
the authorities increased in July and August. 
Ongoing attacks on humanitarian workers, insecurity, local power struggles, and
restrictions imposed by the warring parties posed challenges for humanitarian
agencies trying to address basic needs. For example, on December 18, 2013,
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unidentified gunmen killed three Syrian doctors and one Somali doctor while
traveling to a health post outside Mogadishu. 
Al-Shabaab used its control of supply routes to impose blockades around Hudur,
Bulo-Burte, Elbur and Qoryoley and other towns taken over by AMISOM and So-
mali government forces, severely restricting the movement of goods, assistance,
and people—including by attacking civilian vehicles. 
Attacks on Media 
Somalia remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world to be a jour-
nalist; three media professionals, including two journalists, were killed in 2014.
On June 21, Yusuf Ahmed Abukar—a reporter working with Mustaqbal, a privately
owned radio station, and Ergo radio, which covers humanitarian affairs—was
killed when a bomb exploded in his car. Impunity for these types of killings pre-
vails. 
Government harassment and intimidation of journalists in Mogadishu, particu-
larly by NISA, and threats against media outlets increased. On February 11, NISA
detained Mohamed Haji Bare from Radio Danan and Ibrahim Mohamed from
Radio Haatuf, for three days, beating them severely and threatening them, re-
portedly for taking photos of a deputy governor previously injured in a car bomb. 
On August 15, following two controversial broadcasts, including one criticizing
the president’s claims of widespread support for Al-Shabaab in the independent
media, NISA raided Radio Shabelle and Sky FM and arrested 19 journalists and
media workers. Sixteen were subsequently released, but the stations’ leader-
ship were reportedly charged with inciting violence. Several journalists com-
plained of mistreatment during interrogations. 
In Somaliland, the authorities harassed popular newspapers. On June 25, a re-
gional court in Hargeisa charged and sentenced Yusuf Abdi Gabobe, chairman of
the Haatuf Media Network, and Ahmed Ali, chief editor of the network, to three
years and fours years in prison respectively for libel, false publication, and anti-
state propaganda. They were later released following a presidential pardon. The
Hatuuf license was revoked reportedly as a result of a series of reports on cor-
ruption in the Ministry of Energy. 
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Key International and Regional Actors 
Foreign and regional partners prioritized financial assistance to AMISOM for the
military offensives against Al-Shabaab and to mentor and train the Somali armed
forces. On January 22, 4,395 Ethiopian troops formally merged with AMISOM,
joining troops from Burundi, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Djibouti, and Kenya to bring
the force’s strength to 22,126 troops. Support to the Somali government has fo-
cused on building the security apparatus, resulting in a proliferation of new se-
curity entities, and integration of militias. 
In January, the United States said it had deployed a number of military advisors
to assist AMISOM and Somali security forces. The US Defense Department
claimed responsibility for a September 1 airstrike that killed Al-Shabaab’s
leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane. 
Much of the international and regional community focus, including that of the
UN and European Union, has centered on the implementation of a federalist
form of government. At time of writing, international support for the country’s
development agenda was strained by infighting between the Somali president
and prime minister. 
In addition to their large military presence in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia
trained and provided military support to government-affiliated militia. Both fo-
cused on the status of border areas and have been involved in negotiations over
the creation of new federal states in these areas. 
Host countries of Somali refugees, including Kenya and several European coun-
tries, used alleged improvements in security in Mogadishu as grounds for return-
ing Somalis, including asylum seekers and refugees, to Somalia, despite
volatility on the ground and continued risk of persecution and serious harm from
generalized violence. 
Between April and mid-May, Kenya deported 359 Somalis, including registered
refugees, to Mogadishu without access to the UN refugee agency, in violation of
its international obligations. Saudi Arabia also deported 33,605 Somalis be-





The government’s inability to address critical socio-economic and political rights
issues such as unemployment, corruption, and threats to freedom of expression
remains a concern for many South Africans. In May 2014, President Jacob Zuma
and the African National Congress (ANC) won a second term in office, but the
majority victory was marred by the report of the public protector, Thuli Madon-
sela, accusing the president of misusing state funds for a security upgrade to his
private residence in Nkandla, Kwa Zulu Natal. 
South Africa also largely failed to utilize its membership at the United Nations
Human Rights Council to support resolutions that would have helped the promo-
tion and protection of human rights in various countries, most notably in North
Korea, Syria, Sri Lanka, and Iran. 
Police Conduct
Serious concerns remain about the conduct and capacity of the South African
Police Services (SAPS), both in terms of the use of force in general, as well as the
ability to deal with riots in a rights-respecting manner. The police lack proper
equipment and training to quell riots which often leads to the use of excessive
and disproportionate force. 
In 2014, incidents of police violence were reported in Mothutlung in Brits, North
West province, Relela in Kgapane, Limpopo province and Bekkersdal in Gauteng
province. In January 2014, police killed three people during a protest over lack of
water in Mothutlung. 
In March 2014, the Independent Police Investigation Department launched an in-
vestigation into a video that showed an incident of police officers assaulting,
stripping, and humiliating a man before dragging him on the sidewalk into a po-
lice van during an apparent arrest in Kensington, Cape Town. The officers were
later arrested and charged with assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. 
Inquiry into Killing of Marikana Miners
Hearings by the Farlam Commission into the deaths of 44 people, including the
police killing of 34 miners between August 11 and 16, 2012, continued through-
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out the year. Those called to testify before the commission included Deputy
President Cyril Ramaphosa and the National Police Commissioner Riah Phiyega.
The commission has faced significant delays due to loss of vital documents (in-
cluding video evidence), the death of witnesses, and a legal battle over state
funding for lawyers representing the families of the miners killed, injured, and
arrested. In September, the president extended the term of the commission to
March 2015. 
Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Migrants
In August 2014, the Department of Home Affairs announced the creation of the
new Zimbabwean Special Dispensation Permit of 2014 (ZSP), to replace the 2009
Dispensation of Zimbabweans Project. In a move that grants further protection to
Zimbabwean nationals who received permits under the previous dispensation,
the ZSP will allow permit-holders to live, work, conduct business and study in
South Africa, for the duration of the permit, which is valid until December 31,
2017. 
However, concerns remain about the treatment of migrants, refugees, and asy-
lum seekers by government officials from various departments. The right to ac-
cess health care services is constitutionally guaranteed for everyone living in
South Africa, and by the National Health Care Act and the Refugee Act. But local
nongovernmental organizations expressed concern that many asylum seekers
were denied access to health care services as officials were not aware that asy-
lum seekers were entitled to health care. 
On June 19, 2014 security officials and police used excessive force to control a
crowd of foreign nationals who were attempting to renew their permits at
Marabastad reception office in Pretoria. Security officials and police attacked the
unarmed crowd with whips and pepper spray. 
On August 28 2014, the Gauteng High Court ruled in favor of the the South
African Human Rights Commission, People Against Suffering, Suppression, Op-
pression and Poverty (PASSOP), and 39 individuals who were detained in Lindela
Repatriation Centre. The court found that the actions of the Department of Home
Affairs and the minister in detaining migrants for over 120 days at Lindela were
unlawful and unconstitutional. The High Court declared that individuals detained
there had been inhumanely treated, and that officials had failed to follow fair
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and legal procedure by detaining individuals for longer than 30 days without the
necessary warrant of a magistrate permitting extended detention. 
In September 2014, the South African Human Rights Commission found that the
government had violated the right to health of detainees at the Lindela Repatria-
tion Centre. The commission’s investigation found that there was a lack of provi-
sion for tuberculosis testing and isolation of infected persons, and psychological
care; lack of tetanus vaccines; and overcrowding in rooms, among other con-
cerns, in violation of South Africa’s Regulations to the Immigration Act and the
right to health care under the South African constitution. 
Xenophobic Attacks on Foreign Nationals
Continued incidents of violence against foreign nationals and looting of foreign-
owned shops in 2014 highlighted the government’s inability to address the root
causes of xenophobia. In June 2014, bands of local youths attacked Somali
shopkeepers in Mamelodi East, Pretoria. Two Somalis were killed and around
100 men, women, and children fled their shops and homes. No one was held ac-
countable for the attacks. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
South Africa continues to play an important but inconsistent role in advancing
the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people inter-
nationally. For example, South Africa was reluctant to publicly condemn the in-
troduction of anti-LGBT laws in Uganda, Nigeria, and the Gambia. At the June
2014 session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, South Africa inexpli-
cably supported a regressive resolution called “Protection of the Family” that
brought into question its commitment to gender equality and the rights of les-
bian, gay, bisexual and transgender people. Not only did South Africa vote in
favor, but it also supported an aggressive move by Russia to shut down discus-
sion of more inclusive “family” language. 
Despite taking the initiative at the UN Human Rights Council in 2011 by tabling a
precedent-setting resolution on human rights, sexual orientation, and gender
identity, South Africa stalled in supporting a follow up resolution that called for
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bi-annual reporting on human rights abuses against LGBT people. South Africa
eventually voted in favor of the resolution in September 2014. 
On the domestic front, South Africa has taken positive steps in responding to
widespread violence (including rape and murder) against lesbians and transgen-
der men in the country. In an important move in April 2014, the Department of
Justice and Constitutional Development launched a public campaign which in-
cludes a national intervention strategy to address anti-LGBT violence and
strengthen institutional responses to LGBT hate crimes, violence, and discrimi-
nation. 
Foreign Policy
South Africa’s inconsistent foreign policy once again came to the fore in 2014.
While the country regularly supports and mediates an end to conflicts on the
continent, it has proved reluctant to protect the rights of victims at the UN
Human Rights Council, and at times has taken decisions that contradict its
human rights principles. 
In February 2014, Zuma appointed Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa as special
envoy to South Sudan in a bid to help resolve the conflict in the country.
Ramaphosa was also appointed special envoy to Sri Lanka. South Africa was
also quick to try and mediate the political crisis in Lesotho following an aborted
coup there. In August, at the annual summit of heads of state of the Southern
African Development Community, South Africa was appointed to sit on the Organ
on Politics, Defense and Security, a crucial role in ensuring stability in the re-
gion. 
In an example of its contradictory stance, in September 2014, the South African
government denied the Dalai Lama a visa to the country for the third time in five
years and presented no valid reasons for doing so. The Dalai Lama had beendue
to attend the 14th World Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates in Cape Town. 
At the UN Human Rights Council, South Africa is a strong supporter of the coun-
cil’s engagement on issues like racism and the council’s action on the Occupied
Palestinian Territories. It has also participated actively in the Universal Periodic
Review process, a review of the rights records of all UN member states. However,
its voting record on country specific situations and some rights issues has been
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considerably disappointing. For example, at the March 2014 session, South
Africa sought to weaken a resolution on the right to peacefully protest jointly
with Russia, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and China. It also took negative
stances on other rights issues. 
Contrary to its stance in repeatedly supporting resolutions on Palestine, it ab-
stained on the votes of all other country situations, including on North Korea,
Syria, Sri Lanka, and Iran. Despite country resolutions playing a key role in shed-
ding light on abuses and giving a stronger voice to victims, South Africa has jus-
tified its actions by arguing that it does not support the council’s work on
country-specific situations because such measures and resolutions are per-
ceived as highly politicized and divisive. 
South Africa has firmly supported the establishment of the International Criminal
Court and has been a key supporter of international justice. But in recent years it
has often failed to use its influence to stand against impunity for human rights
violations. In June 2014, South Africa supported an amendment to a protocol cre-
ating an African Court that provides for immunity from prosecution for serving
heads of state and senior government officials, including war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide. 
In a landmark judgement, judges of the South African Constitutional Court unani-
mously ruled that the South African Police Service must investigate crimes
against humanity perpetrated in Zimbabwe in 2007. The case was brought by the
Southern Africa Litigation Centre and the Zimbabwean Exiles Forum to compel
South Africa to abide by its domestic and international legal obligations to in-





Horrific attacks on civilians began within 24 hours of the start of South Sudan’s
new war in mid-December 2013. Thousands of civilians have been killed and
large parts of key towns, including civilian infrastructure such as clinics, hospi-
tals, and schools, have been looted, destroyed, and abandoned. An estimated
1.5 million people were forced to flee their homes; 100,000 people still shelter in
United Nations compounds, too afraid to return home. Three years after South
Sudan’s independence famine looms on the horizon, and the conflict continues,
despite peace negotiations in Ethiopia. 
The conflict, triggered by fighting in Juba, the capital city, between soldiers loyal
to President Salva Kiir, a Dinka, and those loyal to his former deputy, Riek
Machar, a Nuer, followed growing political tensions. Kiir maintains the violence
was a coup attempt by Machar, a charge the now-leader of the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/Army-in Opposition forces has denied. 
Lack of accountability for decades of violence during Sudan’s long civil war
helped fuel the conflict. Military and political leaders have failed to make any se-
rious attempt to reduce abuses committed by their forces, or to hold them to ac-
count. 
Attacks on Civilians and Civilian Property
In the period between mid-December and mid-April, armed forces on both sides
targeted and killed hundreds of civilians, often because of their ethnicity, and
pillaged and destroyed civilian property. These crimes amount to war crimes and
in some cases may be crimes against humanity. 
Following fighting between government and defecting Nuer soldiers in Juba on
December 15, government forces conducted a brutal crackdown on Juba’s Nuer
population that included targeted killings, house-to-house searches, mass ar-
rests, unlawful detention of hundreds of men in poor conditions, ill-treatment,
and torture. Human Rights Watch documented more than 60 separate cases of
targeted, extrajudicial killings of one or more individuals. In one of the worst in-





night of December 15 and the following day, detained them in a building in the
Gudele neighborhood and then massacred all but 13. 
The conflict quickly spread to Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity states. The largely
ethnic Dinka town of Bor, Jonglei state, changed hands four times during the first
two months of the war. Widespread targeting and killing of civilians took place in
Bor in the first two weeks of January by opposition forces under the control of
Gen. Peter Gadet. In one incident 14 women were killed by opposition fighters in
a church compound. 
Malakal, Upper Nile state, changed hands six times between December and
April. Forces on both sides conducted house-to-house searches, arbitrary ar-
rests, and killed many civilians, often based on their ethnicity. In a brutal attack
in February, opposition forces killed civilians inside the Malakal hospital and at-
tacked churches. In Bentiu, Unity state, government forces killed civilians during
their recapture of the town in January, and in April, opposition forces attacking
Bentiu slaughtered hundreds of civilians, including in appalling attacks on a
mosque and hospital. 
Civilians have also been attacked and killed while sheltering in bases of the
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). On December 19, 2013, in
Akobo town, Jonglei state, a group of armed Nuer civilians and security forces at-
tacked the UN base and killed more than 20 Dinka men, as well as two peace-
keepers. On April 17, a large group of Dinka youth and armed men, including
some in government police and military uniforms, attacked the UN base in Bor
town, killing at least 53 people, mostly Nuer, and injuring scores of others. The
government has failed to investigate these killings or stop other harassment and
attacks on Nuer civilians sheltering in UN bases. 
Forces from both sides were responsible for widespread destruction of civilian
property and mass looting. In Juba, during the first days of the conflict, govern-
ment forces looted many neighborhoods, especially Nuer homes. Opposition
forces in Bor looted and then destroyed the town’s market in January, as well as
numerous homes and other buildings, including clinics. Both government and
opposition forces pillaged offices of aid agencies, markets and banks in Bentiu
and Malakal, leaving behind emptied, destitute towns. In Unity state, govern-
ment forces, together with the Sudanese rebel group, the Justice and Equality





offensive in January and February, contributing to severe food insecurity there.
By the end of February, some 4,700 tons of World Food Programme food had
been pillaged, hampering relief efforts. 
Attacks on numerous health facilities further reduced already very limited access
to services for survivors of sexual violence and services for people with psy-
chosocial disabilities, many of whom languish in prisons. 
Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers
Both government and opposition forces have used child soldiers in the conflict.
Children were forcibly recruited by opposition forces in Bentiu in January and in
other parts of Unity state later in the year. The latest UN secretary-general’s re-
port on children and armed conflict stated that thousands of children were re-
portedly mobilized by Nuer efighters alligned with the opposition, known as
“White Army.”
The government also deployed children on the front lines to defend Bentiu dur-
ing an August opposition attack. The government and opposition have made lit-
tle progress beyond signing agreements with the UN to end this abusive
practice. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA), armed forces were occupying more than 35 schools in South Sudan at
time of writing. 
Freedom of Expression 
Abusive practices by South Sudan’s government authorities, especially the Na-
tional Security Service (NSS), have eroded freedom of expression since South
Sudan’s independence, but these intensified withthe conflict. Security forces
have harassed, intimidated, and arbitrarily detained journalists; shut down one
newspaper; taken a radio station off the air; and seized or held entire print runs
of newspapers several times. South Sudan’s Information Minister Michael
Makuei has repeatedly verbally banned journalists from interviewing opposition




In September, President Kiir signed the Convention against Torture and the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights after they were passed by South
Sudan’s Legislative Assembly (SSLA). South Sudan also ratified the Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Con-
vention of the Rights of the Child, although at time of writing they had yet to de-
posit all the instruments of ratification to finalize the process of South Sudan
being a party to these human rights treaties. Kiir also signed into law three
media bills, including a right to information law, after they languished for years
in the SLA. 
A bill to define and limit NSS powers, passed by the SSLA amid controversy in
October but not signed into law by the president at time of writing, gives NSS of-
ficers the same powers to arrest and detain as police, but does not specify per-
missible detention sites or guarantee basic due process rights, such as the right
to counsel or to be tried within a reasonable period of time. It grants NSS officers
powers to surveille and to search and seize property without clear judicial over-
sight. A pending bill to oversee nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) would
restrict such groups to a government-approved list of activities. 
Accountability and Justice
South Sudan’s government has not provided accountability for abuses commit-
ted by its forces, nor demonstrated the will to hold them to account. The opposi-
tion has not, to Human Rights Watch’s knowledge, investigated or punished any
abusive forces. A presidential committee formed in January to investigate
killings and abuses has made no public update on its findings. Many victims are
reluctant to provide information to the committee because of its lack of inde-
pendence, and because there are no clear mechanisms for victim and witness
protection. 
South Sudan’s army and police investigated some killings by security forces in
Juba in December 2013 but reports, which according to officials include names
of alleged perpetrators, have not been made public. At least 11 alleged perpetra-
tors were arrested but escaped from military detention in March during a gun
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battle. A military tribunal in Juba heard some looting cases, but no cases of
killings were prosecuted. 
The South Sudan Human Rights Commission released an interim report in March
that described some abuses and called on the government to speed up investi-
gations into alleged perpetrators. 
Key International Actors 
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) took on the role of
peacemaker in December 2013, establishing envoys to mediate talks in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia. In January, the parties to the conflict signed a cessation of hos-
tilities agreement prohibiting attacks on civilians or civilian property, which was
quickly violated. IGAD has deployed teams to monitor compliance with the
agreement. 
Uganda, an IGAD member, sent forces to shore up the government in December
2013, putting IGAD’s impartiality in question. Evidence of fresh cluster bombs
used either by the government or Ugandan forces, was found near Bor town in
February. 
The United States, United Kingdom, Norway, China, and the European Union,
have sent delegates or helped fund the peace process. In May, the US imposed
sanctions on opposition commander Peter Gadet and the head of the govern-
ment’s presidential guard, Marial Chanuong, and have since sanctioned two
other commanders. On July 10 the European Union imposed travel bans and
asset freezes on on Gadet and a government SPLA commander, Santino Deng.
The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council said in December 2013 it in-
tended “to take appropriate measures including targeted sanctions” against
South Sudanese leaders who commit human rights abuses or incite violence. 
UNMISS opened its gates to civilians fleeing the fighting and has sheltered over
100,000 civilians in its bases. The UN peacekeepers have not, however, been
able to prevent many of attacks on civilians around their bases. A swifter military
response by peacekeepers during an attack on their base in Bor in April may
have prevented some casualties. 
A report by the AU Commission of Inquiry in South Sudan (AUCISS)—headed by
former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and mandated to investigate seri-
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ous crimes committed in violation of law and make recommendations on ac-
countability— anticipated issuing its report before the end of 2014. The UN sec-
retary-general also stressed the need to exclude amnesty for serious crimes in
any peace agreement at a September high-level ministerial event on South
Sudan. 
On December 24, 2013, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of
5,500 more peacekeeping forces, bringing the total authorized to 12,500. In May,
it changed the mission’s mandate, prioritizing protection of civilians, human
rights monitoring, investigations and public and regular reporting. By October
2014, there were close to 10,500 soldiers under UNMISS in South Sudan. 
The UNMISS Human Rights Division released a May report concluding that there
are “reasonable grounds” to believe crimes against humanity had occurred. The
report recommended that any national justice process “be complemented by in-
ternational assistance through a special or hybrid court” to ensure accountabil-




The Sri Lankan government has made little progress in providing accountability
for wartime abuses. The government’s failure to comply with a March 2013
United Nations Human Rights Council resolution led to a new resolution in 2014.
The resolution calls on the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) to investigate serious violations of international human rights and hu-
manitarian law and related crimes by both sides during Sri Lanka’s civil war,
which ended in 2009. 
The government has also continued its crackdown on critics. In March 2014, it
detained two prominent human rights defenders who were looking into the ar-
rest of an ethnic Tamil activist. Although the two were subsequently freed, the
government arrested scores of other Tamils under the draconian Prevention of
Terrorism Act. It also labelled 16 overseas Tamil organizations as financers of ter-
rorism without providing evidence of unlawful activity by the groups. 
A rally by the ultra-nationalist Buddhist Bodhu Bala Sena (BBS) escalated into vi-
olence in June, resulting in the death of four Muslims, injuries to at least 80 peo-
ple, and the destruction of numerous Muslim homes and businesses. 
The government’s treatment of Tamils forcibly returned to Sri Lanka after being
denied asylum overseas continues to be a significant concern. In 2014, the gov-
ernment also started forcibly returning foreign nationals seeking asylum in Sri
Lanka, many of them from communities at risk in Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
The government is continuing its rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in the
war-affected northern areas. In 2014, a long-promised victim and witness protec-
tion bill was enacted into law. 
Accountability and International Investigations
The Mahinda Rajapaksa government resisted taking meaningful steps to investi-
gate and prosecute alleged war crimes by government forces and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), as recommended by Human Rights Council resolu-
tions in 2012 and 2013. Instead, the government continued its longtime practice
of refusing to investigate or prosecute credible allegations of torture, including
sexual violence, against suspected LTTE members or supporters in custody. 
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As a result, the Human Rights Council approved a stronger resolution in March
2014, calling on the OHCHR to undertake a “comprehensive investigation into al-
leged serious violations and abuses of human rights and related crimes.” The re-
port is due in March 2015. 
The resolution also calls upon OHCHR to investigate ongoing violations by the
government, including the targeting of activists and attacks on Muslims. It reiter-
ates past calls to the government to deliver justice and accountability in parallel
with the OHCHR investigation. 
In response, the Sri Lankan government has publicly stated that it will not coop-
erate with the international investigation and will deny visas to members of the
investigative team seeking to enter the country. Members of the government
also warned that Sri Lankan nationals who provide information to the UN investi-
gation will be regarded as traitors. One cabinet member threatened that the gov-
ernment would “take appropriate action based on the evidence the detractors
give.” 
In July, the government announced the appointment of an international expert
team to assist its own “disappearances” commission, and authorized the com-
mission to investigate allegations of laws-of-war violations and enforced disap-
pearances. 
Crackdown on Civil Society and Critics
Arbitrary arrests of Sri Lankan activists who advocate for accountability contin-
ued in 2014. The government also widened its crackdown against independent
media and human rights defenders. 
In March, prominent human rights activists Ruki Fernando, of the Colombo-
based INFORM, and Father Praveen Mahesan, a Catholic priest, were detained
for three days and questioned. They had been seeking to ensure the welfare of
13-year-old Balendran Vithushaini, who had been ordered into probationary care
following the arrest of her mother, Balendran Jeyakumari, an activist working on
behalf of the forcibly disappeared. Human rights lawyers Namal Rajapakshe,
Manjula Pathiraja, and Lakshan Dais received threats from unidentified men. 
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Media, particularly in the northern Tamil-majority areas, continue to face restric-
tions on reporting. In 2014, security forces forcibly shut workshops organized in
the south to train journalists from the north, and ordered participants home. 
While various development, resettlement, and reconstruction projects have
been undertaken in former war zones in the north and east, government pledges
to address the rights concerns of the ethnic Tamil population remain largely un-
fulfilled. The government has blocked simple gestures, such as allowing Tamil
communities to hold commemorative services for their dead or sing the national
anthem in Tamil. 
The government passed an order freezing the assets and financial resources of
entities ranging from the LTTE to nonviolent Tamil organizations around the
world. The government provided no factual evidentiary basis for this order. The
chief military spokesman said that legal action would be taken against anyone
with links with the listed groups, potentially placing local activists and alleged
group members visiting the country at risk of arbitrary detention. 
Attacks on Religious Minorities
Previous altercations in Aluthgama, about 60 kilometers south of Colombo,
reached a violent apex in June. The incident was sparked by a minor traffic inci-
dent between Muslim youths and the driver of a van carrying a Buddhist monk.
The BBS held a protest rally led by leader Galagodaaththe Gnanasara Thera the
next day, purportedly to express concerns for the safety of Buddhists in the area.
Soon after, mobs carrying poles and other objects went on a rampage, attacking
Muslims. Even after the government ordered a curfew, Muslim homes and prop-
erties were targeted in nearby areas leaving at least four Muslims dead, 80 in-
jured, and numerous homes and businesses destroyed in the town and
surrounding areas. 
Senior government officials, including President Rajapaksa, made public state-
ments denouncing the violence. The government announced some arrests but




Serious concerns remain about the forced return of Sri Lankans who seek asylum
abroad. Many of the forced returns took place in the midst of intensified govern-
ment security operations since March 2014, which saw scores of arrests and sev-
eral deaths due to hazardous conditions at sea. Human Rights Watch and others
have documented the authorities’ use of torture against people suspected of
links to the LTTE, including those returned as failed asylum seekers from the
United Kingdom and other countries. 
In recent years and particularly since early 2014, the government also began
forcibly returning individuals from other countries seeking asylum in Sri Lanka,
including some persons registered with the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR). Most of those forcibly returned are members of minority
religions persecuted back home in Pakistan and Afghanistan. UNHCR has not
been allowed access to detained asylum seekers prior to their deportation,
some of whom it has previously recognized as refugees. 
Migrant Workers
More than 1 million Sri Lankans are employed overseas, and many remain at risk
of abuse at every stage of the migration cycle from recruitment and transit to em-
ployment, repatriation, and reintegration. Recruiters and unregulated subagents
charge exorbitant fees leaving migrants indebted and often with inaccurate infor-
mation about their promised employment overseas. 
Over 90 percent of Sri Lanka migrants now work in the Middle East where they
are subject to the restrictive kafala system that ties their visa to their employer.
More than a third of Sri Lanka’s migrants are domestic workers, almost exclu-
sively female. The government has taken some steps to protect their rights
abroad, but many continue to face long working hours with little rest, delayed or
unpaid wages, confinement in the workplace, and verbal, physical, and sexual
abuse. 
Key International Actors
The UN Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted the recommendation of then-UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay to create an independent inter-
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national inquiry into war crimes and other serious abuses committed during Sri
Lanka’s civil war. 
The United States and the United Kingdom called upon Sri Lanka to ensure ac-
countability for war crimes. 
India, an important regional partner, continued to press for reconciliation and
protection of Tamils, but it abstained from the HRC vote. Japan, a key donor, also
abstained and in other public statements commended Sri Lanka on post-
wartime developments. The Chinese premiere visited Sri Lanka in an ongoing
show of financial and political support for the government absent any human
rights concerns. 
Australia and Sri Lanka colluded to ensure that asylum seekers leaving Sri Lanka
were either returned or else not allowed onto Australian territory. Australia sent
back many asylum seekers to Sri Lanka after cursory interviews at sea; those
found to have legitimate claims were processed in other countries. In an appar-
ent bid to secure Sri Lanka’s assistance in stopping migrants and asylum seek-
ers, Australia failed to call for better human rights protections and advocated




Sudan saw no progress in its abysmal rights record in 2014. Instead, new
episodes of conflict in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile states resulted in
large numbers of civilian deaths and displaced; security forces repeatedly sup-
pressed protesters demonstrating against government policies; and authorities
continued to stifle civil society and independent media. 
The ruling National Congress Party and opposition parties, two of which signed
an alliance in August, remained deadlocked over a national dialogue process
that was to pave the way for elections and a new constitution. Sudan has yet to
adopt a constitution after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement’s six-year in-
terim period ended in 2011 and South Sudan became independent. 
Conflict and Abuses in Darfur
Fighting between government forces and rebel groups, and between other armed
groups, often using government equipment and weapons, continues in several
parts of Darfur. Conflict between the Rizeigat and Ma’aliya groups in South Dar-
fur killed hundreds. More than 450,000 people have fled violence in Darfur since
the beginning of 2014, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordina-
tion of Humanitarian Affairs. 
Starting in February, the Rapid Support Forces, a Sudanese government force
consisting largely of former militias, moved into Darfur from the Kordofan region,
where they had been deployed to fight rebels in Southern Kordofan. The forces,
led by the Darfuri former militia leader, Brig. Gen. Mohammed Hamdan Dagolo
(“Hemmeti”) carried out massive ground attacks on dozens of villages in South
and North Darfur, targeting areas where they accused the population of sympa-
thizing with rebels. They burned homes and shops, looted livestock, killed and
robbed civilians, and forced tens of thousands of residents to flee to towns and
camps for displaced people. 
Government forces carried out raids in camps for internally displaced people, re-
sulting in four deaths of residents at Kalma camp. The raids were ostensibly to
search for weapons, alcohol, and other contraband as part of the governor’s
emergency response to rising criminality. 
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Starting in October 31, large numbers of Sudanese forces entered the North Dar-
fur town of Tabit, beating men and raping women and girls over a two-day pe-
riod. Sudan initially refused to allow the African Union (AU)/United Nations
Hybrid Operations in Dafur (UNAMID) to access the town. When the peacekeep-
ers did gain access, Sudanese security forces were present during their visit, un-
dermining the credibility of their investigation 
In its sixth year, UNAMID has been largely ineffective in protecting civilians from
violence and has all but ceased public reporting on human rights issues. Su-
danese government restrictions have seriously hampered access to conflict
areas, including the rebel stronghold, Jebel Mara. Chronic security threats have
also undermined its effectiveness: attacks on the peacekeepers have killed at
least 207 since 2008. 
Conflict and Abuses in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile
In April 2014, the government intensified ground and aerial attacks in rebel-held
areas of the Nuba Mountains, Southern Kordofan, deploying the Rapid Support
Forces and other security forces to several areas. In May and June, government
bombing damaged schools, mosques, churches, water sources and health cen-
ters, including a Médecins sans Frontières clinic. Dozens of civilians were killed
or injured. 
The attacks, which continued throughout the year, forced tens of thousands of
people, some already displaced, to abandon their homes and fields. In govern-
ment-controlled areas, government forces detained dozens of displaced civilians
for their perceived political views. 
Ground attacks and government bombing also persisted in Blue Nile, though
many people have fled to refugee camps in South Sudan. In September, govern-
ment forces attacked villages, carrying out numerous cases of sexual violence in
Bau locality. 
In August, the conflict in South Sudan spilled into the refugee camps when a
local militia group, following clashes between government soldiers and ethnic
Nuer opposition forces, targeted ethnic Nuer aid workers, killing five in the area
of Bunj town. More than 220,000 refugees from Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile





Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, Association, Expression
Sudanese law enforcement officers continued to violently disperse protests and
to arbitrarily arrest and detain protesters and activists. In September 2013, gov-
ernment forces used excessive force, including live ammunition, to disperse a
wave of protests over austerity measures. The forces were implicated in over 170
deaths, and hundreds of injuries and arrests. Many people were held for weeks
or months without charge or access to family or lawyers, and were beaten, ver-
bally abused, deprived of sleep, and held for long periods in solitary confine-
ment. 
The government has failed to investigate or prosecute those responsible for the
2013 killings and related abuses. In September 2014, the UN’s independent ex-
pert on sudan reported to the Human Rights Council (HRC) that the government
had not conducted thorough and independent investigations. Of scores of com-
plaints lodged, only one proceeded to trial, unsuccessfully. 
On March 11, government security forces and pro-government student militia
used live ammunition again to disperse a student demonstration protesting the
escalating violence in South Darfur. The violence led to the death of a Darfuri
student, Ali Abakar Musa Idris. 
In September, government forces broke up memorial services for the one-year
anniversary of the killing of protesters, and arrested more than 80 political oppo-
sition members, activists, and their family members. 
In June, authorities shut down the Salmmah Women’s Resource Center, a
women’s rights organization in Khartoum. The closure was the latest of several
in recent years, provoking renewed fears the government would clamp down fur-
ther on civil society and specifically women’s rights activists. In August, security
forces carried out searches of another civil society organization in Khartoum, but
did not shut it down. 
Authorities continued to censor media and blacklist journalists. Although the Su-
danese Constitutional Court in March voided an order to suspend a newspaper,
al-Tayyar, post-publication censorship continued. Security agents seized print
runs of newspapers on dozens of occasions. In June, September and October,
NISS detained at least three  journalists for unknown reasons. 
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Arbitrary Detentions, Ill-treatment, and Torture
Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) and other security
forces arrested opposition party members and activists throughout the year, de-
spite promises by President Omar al-Bashir to release all “political detainees.” 
On May 12, NISS officials arrested Mohammed Salah, 25, Taj Elsir Jaafar, 26, and
Moammer Musa Mohammed, 27, near the University of Khartoum. Authorities de-
tained them without charge at a NISS facility in the suburb of Bahri. The activists,
who participated in campaigns protesting the killing of a Darfuri student, Ali
Abaker Musa Idris, by government security forces at Khartoum University on March
11, were subjected to ill-treatment and possibly torture; they were released in July. 
Sadiq al-Mahdi, head of the National Umma Party, was arrested on May 17 after
publicly criticizing the Rapid Support Forces’ abuses in Darfur. He was released
after a month in detention. Ibrahim al-Sheikh, head of the Sudan Congress Party,
was arrested in al-Nuhood, North Kordofan, and detained from June 8 until mid-
September without access to family or lawyers, or needed medical care, along
with several other party members. 
Sudanese military courts exercised their new power to try civilians, contrary to
international standards. The courts acquitted one journalist but convicted at
least eight Darfuri civilians whom they accused of being members of opposition
forces. In July 2013, Sudan’s parliament amended the Sudan Armed Forces Act of
2007 to allow military courts to exercise jurisdiction over civilians for a range of
broadly defined offences such as undermining the constitution and publication
of “false news.” 
Law Reform
The National Security Act of 2010, which gives security forces broad powers of ar-
rest and detention, and many other laws contravene basic human rights norms.
The government has also failed to implement various criminal justice reforms,
including law reforms recommended by the AU’s mediation body, the High-Level
Panel on Darfur, in 2009. 
Authorities continued to apply Shari’a law sanctions that violate international
prohibitions on cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. The penalties are ap-
plied disproportionately to women and girls, typically for “crimes” that include
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private beliefs and decisions about marriage, sexuality, or dress code. 
In May, a judge in Khartoum sentenced a pregnant 27 year old, Mariam Yahya
Ibrahim, to death for the crime of “apostasy,” and to 100 lashings for “adultery.”
Ibrahim, detained for months, was initially accused of adultery because she is
married to a non-Muslim of South Sudanese origin—a marriage the court did not
recognize. The court added the apostasy charge after Mariam said she is Chris-
tian. Following intense international pressure, Ibrahim was released in June. 
Key International Actors
Relations with South Sudan deteriorated with the outbreak of war there in De-
cember 2013 and renewed accusations of Sudan’s support to armed opposition
in South Sudan. The two governments made no progress on other outstanding
issues, such as border demarcation, security, and status of the contested area of
Abyei, as required in the 2012 cooperation agreement. 
The AU’s High-level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan, headed
by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, continued to mediate peace
talks for the Two Areas, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, and began simultane-
ous mediation on Darfur, as well as talks on a National Dialog process. 
In August, the UN Security Council extended UNAMID’s mandate for 10 months,
at which time it is expected to alter the mandate. The Security Council also ex-
tended the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei to February 2015, and in Septem-
ber, the HRC extended the mandate of the independent expert for one year. The
HRC resolution condemned violations of international humanitarian law in Dar-
fur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile; criticized Sudan for the shooting of protest-
ers; and called for an independent public inquiry into the killing of protesters
and release of political prisoners. However, the HRC postponed the appointment
of a new independent expert for several months. 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has charges pending against five individu-
als, including Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir, for war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide in connection with atrocities in Darfur. Khartoum re-
fuses to cooperate with the ICC and has obstructed its work. In September, the
ICC issued an arrest warrant and vacated the November trial start for Abdallah






In 2014, Syria’s armed conflict grew increasingly bloody with government and
pro-government militias intensifying their attacks on civilian areas and continu-
ing use of indiscriminate weapons. Government forces also continued to arbi-
trarily arrest, disappear, and torture detainees, many of whom died in detention.
Non-state armed groups opposing the government also carried out serious
abuses including deliberate and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, use of child
soldiers, kidnapping, and torture in detention. 
The extremist group Islamic State, also known as ISIS, and al-Qaeda’s affiliate in
Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, were responsible for systematic and widespread viola-
tions including targeting civilians, kidnappings, and executions. 
According to then-United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pil-
lay, as of August 2014, the death toll in the conflict reached more than 191,000
people. The spread and intensification of fighting have led to a dire humanitar-
ian crisis with millions internally displaced or seeking refuge in neighboring
countries. 
Government Attacks on Civilians, Indiscriminate Use 
of Weapons
Following the August 2013 chemical weapons attack on Ghouta, near Damascus,
international pressure resulted in Syria acceding to the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention and agreeing to eliminate its declared chemical weapons. All of the de-
clared chemical weapons were removed from Syria for destruction in 2014. But,
justice remains elusive for the victims of the attack and evidence strongly sug-
gests that Syrian government helicopters dropped barrel bombs embedded with
cylinders of chlorine gas on three towns in Northern Syria in mid-April. These at-
tacks used a common industrial chemical as a weapon, an act banned by the
Chemical Weapons Convention. 
The Syrian government’s extensive use of cluster munitions has caused numer-
ous casualties and left a deadly legacy of explosive remnants of war. Human
Rights Watch has identified at least 249 attacks in 10 of Syria’s 14 governates
where cluster munitions were used between July 2012 and July 2014. At least
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seven types of cluster munitions were used, including air-dropped bombs, dis-
pensers fixed to aircraft, and ground-launched rockets, and at least ten types of
explosive submunitions. Evidence indicates that government forces used a pow-
erful type of cluster munition rocket not seen before in the conflict in attacks on
Keferzita, a town in northern Syria, in February. Cluster munitions appear to have
been used again on August 21 by Syrian government forces in the town of Manbij
in Aleppo governorate, reportedly killing at least six civilians and wounding an-
other 40. 
The government also persisted in dropping large numbers of high explosive bar-
rel bombs on civilians in defiance of UN Security Council resolution 2139 passed
on February 22. These unguided high explosive bombs are cheaply made, locally
produced, and typically constructed from large oil drums, gas cylinders, and
water tanks, filled with high explosives and scrap metal to enhance fragmenta-
tion, and then dropped from helicopters. Between February and July, there were
over 650 new major impact strikes in Aleppo neighborhoods held by armed op-
position groups. Most of the strikes had damage consistent with barrel bomb
detonations. One local group estimated that aerial attacks had killed 3,557 civil-
ians in Aleppo governorate in 2014. 
The Syrian government also continues to impose sieges, which are estimated to
affect over 200,000 civilians. The sieges are in violation of Security Council reso-
lution 2139, which demands that all parties “immediately lift the sieges of popu-
lated areas,” including in Homs, Moadamiya and Daraya in Western Ghouta,
Eastern Ghouta, and the Palestinian refugee camp in Yarmouk in south Damas-
cus. The government has used siege strategies to effectively starve civilian popu-
lations into submission and force negotiations that would allow the government
to retake territory. 
Arbitrary Arrests, Enforced Disappearances, Torture, and
Deaths in Custody
Syrian security forces continue to detain people arbitrarily, regularly subjecting
them to ill-treatment and torture, and often disappearing them using an exten-
sive network of detention facilities throughout Syria. Many detainees were young
men in their 20s or 30s; but children, women, and elderly people were also de-
tained. In some instances, individuals reported that security forces detained
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their family members, including children, to pressure them to turn themselves
in. On August 30, the Syrian Network for Human Rights, a local monitoring group,
estimated that 85,000 people were currently being held by the government in
conditions that amount to enforced disappearance. 
Despite a general amnesty declared by the government in June, scores of civil so-
ciety activists, human rights defenders, media, and humanitarian workers re-
main in arbitrary detention, some of whom are on trial, including before military
and Anti-Terrorism courts, for exercising their rights. Some of the activists who
remain in detention include freedom of expression advocate Bassil Khartabil,
and human rights defender Mazen Darwish and his colleagues Hani Al-Zitani and
Hussein Ghareer, from the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression.
Some activists, like the lawyer and human rights defender Khalil Maatouk,
whom former detainees report to have seen in government detention, continue
to be held in conditions amounting to enforced disappearance. 
Security Council resolution 2139 demands an end to the practices of arbitrary de-
tention, disappearance, and abductions, and the release of everyone who has
been arbitrarily detained. 
Released detainees consistently report ill-treatment and torture in detention fa-
cilities and prison conditions that lead to many cases of deaths in custody. Four
former detainees released from the Sednaya military prison in 2014 described
deaths in custody and harsh prison conditions that closely match the allegations
of mass deaths in custody by a military defector made in January, who pho-
tographed thousands of dead bodies in military hospitals in Damascus. At least
2,197 detainees died in custody in 2014, according to local activists. 
Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS Abuses
Extremist Islamist groups Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS committed systematic rights
abuses, including the intentional targeting and abduction of civilians, such as
the abduction by ISIS forces in May of 153 Kurdish children. The children were
later released. 
Based on reports of local Kurdish officials and photographic evidence, ISIS
forces used cluster munitions on July 12 and August 14 during fighting between





town of `Ayn al-`Arab, also known by its Kurdish name of Kobani, in Aleppo gov-
ernorate near Syria’s northern border with Turkey. 
On May 29, according to local accounts, ISIS forces executed at least 15 civilians,
including seven children, after they entered the village of al-Taliliya near Ras al-
`Ayn in northern Syria. After it took over the town of Bukamal in Deir al-Zour gov-
ernorate in July, a resident reported that ISIS forces summarily executed an
Alawite and Christian resident in the main square during the month of Ramadan.
Summary executions of residents by ISIS forces were also reported in Raqqa and
Tabka cities in Raqqa governorate in 2014. ISIS forces have also summarily exe-
cuted some of its hostages including American journalists James Foley and
Steven Sotloff in August and September, British aid workers David Haines and
Alan Henning in September and October, and American aid worker Peter Kassig
in November. 
Jabhat al-Nusra has made repeated claims of responsibility for lethal car bomb-
ing attacks that have targeted civilians in Syria. 
ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra have imposed strict and discriminatory rules on women
and girls and they have both actively recruited child soldiers. In Bukamal, during
Ramadan 2014, ISIS forces also reportedly whipped anyone that was eating or
drinking in public and during and after Ramadan whipped anyone seen walking
in the streets during prayer times. Using the Internet, listening to music, and
smoking were also forcibly banned. 
Abuses by Other Non-State Armed Groups 
Non-state armed groups have launched indiscriminate mortar and other artillery
strikes from areas under their control that killed civilians in neighborhoods
under government control. These attacks repeatedly hit known civilian objec-
tives, including schools, mosques, and markets. 
On April 29, two mortar shells struck the Badr el-Din Hussaini educational com-
plex in the al-Shaghour neighborhood of Damascus, an area under government
control, reportedly killing 17 children, at least two parents who came to pick up
their children from the school, and injured approximately 50 people. The mortars





Non-state armed groups including the Free Syrian Army and the Islamic Front are
also using children for combat and other military purposes. They have also put
students at risk by using schools as military bases, barracks, detention centers,
and sniper posts. 
Non-state armed groups have also been responsible for abductions. At least 54
Alawite women and children that were taken hostage during a military offensive
in Latakia countryside in August 2013 continue to be held by “the Mujahadeen
room in Latakia countryside.” 
The prominent human rights defender, Razan Zeitouneh, and three of her col-
leagues, Wael Hamada, Samira Khalil, and Nazem Hammadi were abducted on
December 9, 2013, in Douma, a city outside Damascus under the control of a
number of armed opposition groups, including the Army of Islam. They continue
to be held. 
Despite the systematic nature of abuses by ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra many other
non-state armed groups in Syria have not ceased coordination and cooperation
with these groups. 
Areas under Kurdish Rule 
In January 2014, the Democratic Union Party and allied parties established a
transitional administration in the three northern regions: `Afrin, `Ain al-`Arab,
and Jazira. They have formed councils akin to ministries and introduced a new
constitutional law. Authorities there have committed arbitrary arrests, due
process violations, and failed to address unsolved killings and disappearances.
The local police and military forces, the YPG also used child soldiers, although
they made commitments in June to demobilize and stop the use of child sol-
diers. 
Displacement Crisis 
The UN estimates that 7.6 million Syrians are internally displaced and that 12.2
million need humanitarian assistance. In 2014, humanitarian aid agencies expe-
rienced significant challenges in getting assistance to the displaced civilian pop-
ulation and others badly affected by the conflict because of sieges imposed by
both government and non-state armed groups, the government’s continuing re-
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fusal to allow assistance to come in across the border, and a general failure to
guarantee security for humanitarian workers. 
In July, a Security Council Resolution authorized deliveries of cross border hu-
manitarian aid even without government permission. 
As of September 3, 2014, over 3 million Syrians had registered or were pending
registration as refugees with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) in Lebanon, Jor-
dan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt. In 2014, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon all imple-
mented measures to restrict the numbers of refugees entering their countries. 
All four neighboring countries accepting Syrian refugees have denied Syrians se-
cure legal status. 
Palestinians from Syria have faced additional obstacles. They have been refused
entry or forcibly deported from Jordan and some Palestinian-Jordanians who had
been living in Syria had their Jordanian citizenship withdrawn. Palestinian
refugees coming from Syria have also faced additional restrictions in Lebanon
following new regulations by the Minister of Interior in May that limited Palestini-
ans ability to enter the country or renew their residencies if they already were in
the country. 
In 2014, the number of refugees from Syria attempting to reach Europe, including
through dangerous smuggling routes, has increased. While some European
Union countries offer them safety, others such as Bulgaria and Greece have
pushed back asylum seekers, sometimes violently, at their borders or from their
territorial waters without allowing them to lodge asylum claims. Countries that
do not neighbor Syria, including in the west have continued to only accept for re-
settlement small numbers of refugees. 
At time of writing, only 51 percent of UNHCR’s appeal for the regional refugee re-
sponse was funded, leaving a budget shortfall of more than US$1.8 billion. As a
result, UNHCR, the World Food Program, and others have cut assistance to
refugees, including the provision of basic goods and health care subsidies. 
Key International Actors
While parties to the conflict and their international backers met in Switzerland
for a second round of political negotiations known as Geneva II in January, the
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meetings did not result in any tangible outcomes and negotiations have not
since resumed. 
International efforts to ensure credible justice for serious crimes under interna-
tional law on all sides in Syria have also proved elusive. On May 22, Russia and
China blocked a Security Council resolution that would have referred the situa-
tion in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Over 100 nongovernmental
organizations urged the Council to approve the resolution, more than 60 coun-
tries co-sponsored it, and 13 of the Council’s 15 members voted for it. 
More than 140 nations have condemned Syria’s cluster munition use in state-
ments and resolutions, including dozens of states not party to the Convention
on Cluster Munitions. The UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 68/182 on
18 December 2013, expressing “outrage” at the “continued widespread and sys-
tematic gross violations of human rights” in Syria “including those involving the
use of … cluster munitions.” 
The Security Council did however pass a resolution on February 22 demanding
safe and unhindered humanitarian access—including across conflict lines and
across borders; that all parties cease “indiscriminate employment of weapons in
populated areas, including shelling and aerial bombardment, such as the use of
barrel bombs;” and an end to the practices of arbitrary detention, disappear-
ance, and abductions, and the release of everyone who has been arbitrarily de-
tained. 
In light of the Syrian government’s continued non-compliance with the resolu-
tion, on July 14, the council passed a second resolution directly authorizing UN
agencies and their implementing partners to deliver aid across Syria’s borders
and conflict lines. No such follow up resolutions have been passed on detainees
or indiscriminate attacks despite continued non-compliance with the resolution
by all-parties to the conflict. 
In addition to persistently blocking Security Council action to curb violations by
the Syrian government, Russia, along with the Iranian government, continued to
provide the Syrian government with military assistance in 2014, according to
media reports . 
On August 15, the Security Council passed resolution 2170 calling on all member
states to take national measures to stop the flow of foreign fighters, financing,
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and arms to ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and any other individual or group associate
with al-Qaeda, and placed six individuals from these groups on the Al-Qaeda
Sanctions List. 
The Human Rights Council renewed the mandate of its independent International
Commission of Inquiry on Syria in March 2014 for one year. 
Countries neighboring Syria, and principally the Turkish government, have
stepped up their border control policies to limit the flow of material and fighters
to these groups but these measures were implemented after significant delay.
Western states who fear their nationals are attempting to enter Syria to fight
have also stepped up screening and other measures in an attempt to stem the
flow of foreign fighters. 
On September 24, the Security Council adopted resolution 2178, urging states to
take a number of steps to counter terrorism including, that states should estab-
lish screening measures, effective border controls, and other measures to pre-
vent the recruitment, organization, and movement of terrorists including those
affiliated with ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates. The resolution also urged that they
improve cooperation, pursue prosecutions, improve assistance in pursuing pros-
ecutions, and help build the capacity of other states to fight terror. 
Individuals from Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have
also financed and supported military operations led by ISIS or Jabhat al-Nusra.
At the beginning of August, Kuwait announced new measures to curb funding for
extremists. This included banning all fundraising in mosques, requiring greater
transparency from charities regarding the source and destination of their dona-
tions, and obtainment of official receipts. Saudi Arabia has also taken new
measures in the past year, announcing a royal decree to imprison Saudi nation-
als who fight abroad with terrorist groups in February, warning against donations
to unauthorized groups in April, and pledging $100 million to establish a UN




Tajikistan’s human rights record deteriorated in 2014, as authorities continued
to crack down on freedom of expression, imprisoned opposition leaders, pres-
sured a leading independent news agency, and arrested an academic researcher
on trumped up espionage charges. Authorities’ use of torture to obtain confes-
sions remained a serious concern. The government blocked various websites,
considered introducing a new law that would require NGOs to register all sources
of funding from foreign sources, subjected human rights groups to harassment,
restricted media freedoms, and continued to enforce serious restrictions on reli-
gious practice, as it had in previous years. 
In May, at least three people, including a police officer, were killed and at least
seven, including three police officers, were injured during three-day clashes in
Khorog, the capital of the autonomous republic of Gorno-Badakhshan in south-
eastern Tajikistan. The fatal clashes occurred during a police operation against
suspected drug traffickers and protests by local residents upset with the police
action. Some protesters used violence, attacking a security forces’ building in
Khorog using a grenade and firearms. 
In a positive development, representatives of several nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGOs) and Tajikistan’s human rights ombudsman created a detention
monitoring group to investigate human rights issues, including the prevention
and documention of torture and conditions in prisons and detention facilities. It
was too early at time of writing to evaluate whether the group, which includes
government representatives, will be a genuinely independent body. 
Crackdown on Political Opposition 
In December 2013, a Dushanbe court sentenced businessman and former Minis-
ter of Industry Zaid Saidov to 26 years in prison on charges including embezzle-
ment, corruption, polygamy, and rape, following a flawed investigation and trial
during which Saidov was held incommunicado and denied access to counsel.
Authorities arrested Saidov in April 2013, weeks after he announced plans to run
for president and the creation of an opposition political party, New Tajikistan, to





rassed and threatened Saidov’s relatives, fellow party members, his legal team,
and their families with prosecution. 
In March, Tajikistan’s Agency for State Financial Control and Combating Corrup-
tion arrested one of Saidov’s lawyers, Fahriddin Zokirov, on fraud charges. Au-
thorities released Zokirov under an amnesty on November 3. 
In July, authorities arrested Shuhrat Kudratov, a well-known human rights lawyer
also working on Saidov’s case, for bribery. Kudratov had previously represented
prominent public figures and the popular independent news agency “Asia Plus.”
On July 15, days before his arrest, Kudratov sent an appeal to NGOs, the news
media, and diplomatic missions in Tajikistan highlighting what he called the on-
going persecution of Zaid Saidov’s legal team. In a joint statement, 18 Tajik civil
society groups called Kudratov’s and Zokirov’s arrests politically motivated. 
In October, authorities responded to plans by the opposition party “Group 24”
for a public demonstration in Dushanbe by blocking Internet and cell phone
service throughout the country in the days leading up to the event. Authorities
also denied visas to a number of representatives of international organizations
throughout the end of the year, raising concerns that the government was seek-
ing to block access to the country for independent observers. 
In November, the Justice Ministry introduced a bill that, if adopted, would re-
quire NGOs to register grants from foreign donors in a state registry prior to
being able to access them. The move raised concerns in Tajik civil society that
the government planned to adopt measures to restrict the activities of independ-
ent NGOs similar to the “Foreign Agents” law adopted in Russia and currently
under consideration in Kyrgyzstan. 
Social and Economic Rights of Rogun Dam Resettlers
Tajikistan’s Rogun Dam and Hydropower Plant stand to displace over 42,000
people before they become operational. Since 2009, the government has reset-
tled 1,500 families to other regions around Tajikistan. Despite government com-
mitments to comply with international standards on resettlement that protect
the rights of those displaced, it has not provided the necessary compensation to
displaced families to replace their homes or restore their livelihoods. Many fami-
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lies have suffered serious disruptions in access to housing, food, water, and ed-
ucation. 
Criminal Justice and Torture
Torture is often used to coerce confessions and police and investigators rou-
tinely deny detainees access to counsel in pretrial custody. 
On January 19, 34-year-old Umedjon Tojiev, a member of the opposition Islamic
Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, died in a prison hospital in Khujand in northern
Tajikistan. His death followed serious injuries he sustained on November 2,
2013, after allegedly jumping from the third floor window of a police station in
the northern city of Isfara. According to his lawyer and relatives, Tojiev only leapt
as he had been subject to three days of torture by police, including electric
shock, asphyxiation with a plastic bag, severe beatings, and sleep deprivation.
Authorities had arrested him on suspicion of belonging to a banned Islamist or-
ganization. 
The authorities opened an investigation following calls by Tajikistan’s NGO Coali-
tion against Torture, but had yet to present any findings at time of writing. The
coalition reported that authorities have undertaken investigations regarding at
least three out of seven cases of suspicious deaths in custody over the past four
years, but that none have produced meaningful results. 
Freedom of Expression
Authorities’ attempts to restrict media freedoms and access to critical or inde-
pendent information, including on the Internet, and the intimidation or deten-
tion of journalists, NGO representatives, and academics in 2014 harmed
freedom of expression. 
Authorities periodically blocked access to independent websites. According to
Internet service providers, the state telecommunications agency continued peri-
odically to order that several websites be blocked, including Gmail, Facebook,
and Radio Ozodi, the Radio Free Europe Tajik service. 
In February, a court decision against Tajikistan’s leading independent news out-
let, Asia Plus, hampered freedom of expression in the country. On May 30, 2013,
the site’s editor Olga Tutubalina published an article, “Unintelligent about the
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Intelligentsia.” The piece criticized Tajikistan’s intellectuals, and voiced skepti-
cism over public praise for President Emomali Rahmon by Bozor Sobir, a poet
and former government critic, including his call to Tajikistan’s artists and intel-
lectuals to “unite” around the president. 
Three Tajik intellectuals not named in the article and five state-funded bodies
sued Tutubalina, accusing her of attacking their “honor, dignity and reputation.”
A Dushanbe court ordered Asia Plus and Tutubalina to publish a retraction and
pay the plaintiffs approximately US$6,100 (30,000 somoni), a decision upheld
on appeal in April. The average monthly salary in Tajikistan is approximately
$200. 
In June, State Committee for National Security officers arrested scholar and well-
known blogger Alexander Sodiqov in Khorog during an interview he was con-
ducting with a leader of the May anti-government protests. For several days,
authorities refused to confirm he was in their custody. They later confirmed that
they were holding him in a Dushanbe detention facility where he was detained
for two months without charge on suspicion of espionage. Following a robust in-
ternational campaign that included public statements by numerous academic
associations in support of academic freedom, Tajik authorities allowed Sodiqov
and his family to leave the country and resume his PhD studies abroad. Human
Rights Watch received credible reports that Tajikistan’s security services inti-
mated or harassed other foreign and Tajik scholars during 2014. 
Despite 2012 amendments removing libel as an offense from the criminal code,
Tajikistan retains criminal sanctions for “insulting the president” or any govern-
ment officials, creating a chilling effect on freedom of speech. 
Freedom of Religion
Tajik authorities maintained tight restrictions on religious freedoms, including
on religious education and worship. Authorities suppress unregistered Muslim
education throughout the country, bring administrative charges against religious
instructors, control the content of sermons, and have closed many unregistered
mosques. Regulations also restrict religious dress; headscarves are banned in
educational institutions and beards are prohibited in public buildings. 
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Rights groups, religious communities, and international bodies continued to crit-
icize the highly controversial Parental Responsibility law, passed in 2011, which
stipulates that parents must prevent their children from participating in religious
activity, except for state-sanctioned religious education, until they turn 18. 
Under the pretext of combating extremism, Tajikistan continues to ban several
peaceful minority Muslim groups. Some Christian minority denominations, such
as Jehovah’s Witnesses, are similarly banned. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender-Based Abuses
Although Tajikistan decriminalized same-sex sexual activity in 1998, LGBT (les-
bian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) people are subjected to wide-ranging dis-
crimination and homophobia. In 2014, the State Committee for Religious Affairs
instructed imams across the country to preach against “nontraditional sexual re-
lations.” Tajik NGOs continued to document cases of police violence against
LGBT people. LGBT people are especially vulnerable to extortion, fearing that
their sexual orientation could be revealed to their family or employers. 
After long-time advocacy by local and international women’s rights groups or
NGOs, Tajikistan took the positive step of enacting a domestic violence law in
March 2013. However, local women’s rights activists indicate that little has been
done to implement or enforce the law and that victims of domestic violence con-
tinue to suffer inadequate protection.
Key International Actors
After a follow-up visit in February to assess implementation of his 2012 recom-
mendations, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Juan Méndez stated that the pun-
ishment for torture needs to be increased in accordance with the severity of the
crime, and that amnesty for torture should be prohibited. Mendez also ex-
pressed concern that there had been only four prosecutions involving cases of
torture since 2012, despite persistent allegations that it takes place in prison
and other places of detention. 
In June, the European Union held its annual human rights dialogue with Tajik au-
thorities , in which it highlighted its concerns shortcomings in the 2013 presi-
dential elections and restrictions in press freedom, including the blocking of
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websites.The EU delegation in Tajikistan also publicly criticized Alexander
Sodiqov’s detention.
The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom recom-
mended that Tajikistan be designated a “country of particular concern” for “sys-
tematic, ongoing, [and] egregious violations of religious freedom,” but the
administration elected not to do so. 
In June, while stating it has no plans to finance the Rogun Dam, the World Bank
released an assessment, including about the impact of the project on those who
have been or could be resettled as a result, but did not consider relevant inter-






The military staged a coup on May 22, 2014, establishing the National Council
for Peace and Order (NCPO) junta and sending Thailand’s human rights situation
into free fall. The NCPO has severely repressed the rights to freedom of expres-
sion, association and peaceful assembly, detained hundreds mostly without
charge, and tried civilians in military courts with no right to appeal. 
Political Upheavals and Coup
Attempts in November 2013 by then-Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s gov-
ernment to pass a blanket amnesty for all those responsible for political violence
and corruption since 2004 sparked mass protests in Bangkok and other
provinces. Suthep Thaugsuban, former secretary-general of the Democrat Party,
mobilized the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) to occupy major
government buildings and business districts in Bangkok for months. 
PDRC and its allies obstructed the general election in February, occasionally with
violence, leading to political impasse. Street battles between PDRC’s support-
ers, pro-government groups, and the police, as well as militia attacks on PDRC’s
protest sites, resulted in at least 28 dead and more than 800 wounded. 
On May 20, army chief Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha announced that the Martial Law
Act of 1914 would be enforced throughout Thailand to prevent imminent riots
arising from what he claimed were increasingly violent political confrontations.
On May 22, General Prayuth staged a coup and arrested representatives of op-
posing political factions attending military-brokered negotiations at the Army
Club in Bangkok after the caretaker government of Niwatthamrong Bunsong-
paisal refused to resign. 
On August 21, the junta-appointed National Legislative Assembly approved Gen-
eral Prayuth as Thailand’s 29th prime minister while permitting him to retain his
chairmanship of the NCPO. 
Under a junta-promulgated interim constitution, the NCPO has broad authority to




Freedom of Expression and Association
Prior to the coup, PDRC supporters targeted journalists considered to back the
Yingluck government. On May 7, PDRC security guards assaulted Nick Nostitz, a
German freelance photojournalist. Two days later, thousands of people protest-
ing the Yingluck government aligned with the PDRC to besiege major TV stations
in Bangkok, harass reporters and prominent news presenters, and demand that
the stations cease broadcasting information from government sources. 
Using broad martial law powers, the NCPO forced satellite TV channels and com-
munity radio stations from all political factions off the air. Some were later al-
lowed to resume broadcasting provided they excluded political issues. 
The NCPO ordered print media not to publicize commentaries critical of the mili-
tary. TV and radio programs were instructed not to invite guests who might com-
ment negatively on the situation in Thailand. On July 26, the NCPO threatened to
prosecute the weekly magazine Phu Jad Karn Sud Sapda if it continued to pub-
lish stories alleging military cronyism and corruption. 
The junta has blocked more than 200 websites—including the Thailand page on
the Human Rights Watch website—as threats to national security. 
The NCPO has banned public gatherings of more than five people and prohibits
alleged anti-coup activities. Protesters who have expressed disagreement with
the junta through public acts of defiance—such as by showing a three-finger
salute used in the movie “The Hunger Games,” putting duct tape over their
mouths, reading George Orwell’s novel 1984 in public, or playing the French na-
tional anthem, “La Marseillaise”—have been arrested and sent to military
courts, where they could face up to two years in prison. 
The junta also perceives political discussions and debates to be a threat to sta-
bility and national security. On September 18, the NCPO ordered shut down a
“Democracy Classroom” seminar at Thammasat University, and police detained
the speakers for several hours. On September 2, the NCPO ordered the cancella-
tion of a discussion on human rights at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thai-
land. 
Criticizing the monarchy is a serious criminal offense in Thailand. Persons
charged with lese majeste (insulting the monarchy) are routinely denied bail and
held in prison for many months awaiting trial. In most cases, convictions result
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in harsh sentences. In September 2014, Prime Minister Prayuth publicly stated
that a top NCPO priority is to prosecute critics of the monarchy. Since the coup,
at least 14 new lese majeste cases have been brought to the Bangkok Military
Court and criminal courts around Thailand. 
On July 31, the Ubon Ratchathani Court sentenced a 27-year-old man to 15 years
in prison for posting messages on Facebook deemed insulting to members of the
royal family. On September 19, the Appeals Court upheld the Bangkok Criminal
Court’s sentence against Somyot Prueksakasemsuk of 11 years in prison for pub-
lishing two articles in his magazine that made negative references to the monar-
chy. 
Arbitrary and Secret Detention
Since the coup, the junta has detained more than 300 politicians, activists, jour-
nalists, and people that it accused of supporting the deposed government, dis-
respecting the monarchy, or being involved in anti-coup protests and activities. 
The NCPO held people in incommunicado lockup in military camps. Some have
been held longer than the seven-day limit for administrative detention provided
for under martial law. Kritsuda Khunasen, a United Front for Democracy against
Dictatorship (UDD) activist, was arrested by soldiers on May 27, in Chonburi
province and held incommunicado until June 24. 
Kritsuda alleged that soldiers beat her during interrogation and suffocated her
with a plastic bag until she lost consciousness. Thai authorities quickly blocked
access to an interview she gave on YouTube and to an English language online
article about her case. There has been no official inquiry into Kritsuda’s allega-
tions or other reports of mistreatment in military custody.
The NCPO has refused to provide details about the release of detainees, many
who were held without charge, and continues to arrest and detain others. Per-
sons released from military detention are forced to sign an agreement that they
will not make political comments, become involved in political activities, or
travel overseas without the junta’s permission. Failure to comply could result in
a new detention, a sentence of two years in prison, or a fine of 40,000 baht
(US$1,250). The junta canceled passports of at least 10 dissidents—including
535
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Japan-based academic Pavin Chachavalpongpun—and issued arrest warrants
after they failed to report to the NCPO when summoned. 
Accountability for 2010 Political Violence
At least 90 people died and more than 2,000 were injured in the 2010 political
violence. The large majority of casualties resulted from unnecessary or excessive
use of lethal force by soldiers. Elements of the UDD, popularly known as the Red
Shirts, were also responsible for deadly armed attacks against soldiers, police,
and civilians. 
Court inquests found that soldiers fatally shot 15 of the victims. The soldiers
were acting under orders of then-Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and Deputy
Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban. On August 28, 2014, the Bangkok Criminal
Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to try Abhisit and Suthep for premeditated
murder on the basis of command responsibility because they were political of-
ficeholders at the time. No military personnel have been charged for the killings. 
The NCPO has expedited the investigations into 2010 violence by the UDD-linked
“Black Shirt” militants, leading to many arrests. However, despite clear photo-
graphic and other evidence, only a handful of violent crimes committed by sup-
porters of the PDRC and its allies in 2013 and 2014 have been investigated. At
time of writing, the April 23, 2014 murder of Kamol Duangphasuk, a prominent
poet and Red Shirt political activist, remained unresolved. 
The NCPO halted payment of financial reparations—initiated by the Yingluck gov-
ernment as part of political reconciliation measures—to all those harmed by the
2010 violence. 
Violence and Abuses in Southern Border Provinces
Since January 2004, more than 6,000 ethnic Thai Buddhists and ethnic Malay
Muslims have been killed in the armed conflict between separatist groups and
the government in Thailand’s southern border provinces. In the past year, the
peace dialogue between the Thai government and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional
(BRN) movement made no headway. 
Thai security forces have not been prosecuted for illegal killings and other
abuses against ethnic Malay Muslims, leading to further radicalization of sepa-
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ratists and their supporters. The Fatoni Fighters (also known as Pejuang Ke-
merdekaan Fatoni), insurgents in the loose BRN network, regularly targeted civil-
ians in bomb attacks, roadside ambushes, drive-by shootings, and
assassinations. Separatists have killed at least 175 teachers during 10 years of
insurgency. 
Enforced Disappearances 
Prominent ethnic Karen activist Por Cha Lee Rakchongcharoen, known as “Billy,”
was forcibly disappeared after officials at Kaengkrachan National Park arrested
him on April 17, 2014 in Petchaburi province. At time of writing, there was no
progress in police investigation to locate Billy and bring those responsible for
his disappearance to justice. 
Thailand signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance in January 2012, but has taken no steps to ratify
the treaty. The penal code does not recognize enforced disappearance as a crim-
inal offense. Thai authorities have failed to make a priority of solving any of the
64 known cases of enforced disappearance, including that of prominent human
rights lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit, who was disappeared 10 years ago. 
Human Rights Defenders
The Thai military and private companies used defamation lawsuits to try to si-
lence human rights defenders and make it more difficult for victims to voice their
complaints. 
On August 8, 2014, the army’s 41st Task Force in Yala province filed defamation
suits against the Cross Cultural Foundation and its head, Pornpen Khongka-
chonkiet, for allegedly damaging the army’s reputation by publishing in May
2014 an open letter exposing torture of an ethnic Malay Muslim man by a para-
military unit. 
Chutima Sidasathian and Alan Morison, journalists from the online newspaper
Phuketwan, were put on trial on May 26 for defamation and breach of the Com-
puter Crimes Act for publishing a paragraph from a Reuters special report on Ro-





because the article contained a passage implicating navy personnel in human
trafficking. 
On October 29, 2014, the Prakhanong Court in Bangkok dismissed criminal
defamation charges filed by Natural Fruit Co. Ltd., one of Thailand’s biggest
pineapple processors, against labor activist Andy Hall regarding a report he co-
wrote alleging serious labor rights abuses at one of its factories. Hall still faces
more serious charges under the Computer Crime Act, which carries prison terms
of up to seven years on each count. 
Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Migrant Workers
Prime Minister Prayuth announced in July 2014 that the 140,000 Burmese
refugees living in camps in Thailand near the Burmese border would not be
forced to return home against their will. However, Thai authorities imposed
tighter restrictions on all camp residents and intensified scrutiny on unregis-
tered camp residents, who comprise around 40 percent of the population and
whom successive Thai governments have effectively blocked from being consid-
ered for refugee status, sparking fears in the camps of possible mass expul-
sions. 
Thailand is not a party to the Refugee Convention and has no law that recognizes
refugee status. Asylum seekers, including ethnic Rohingya from Burma and eth-
nic Uighurs from China, who are arrested often face long periods of detention
until they are accepted for resettlement or agree to be repatriated at their own
expense. Child migrants, asylum seekers, and other migrants are regularly held
indefinitely in squalid immigration facilities and police lock-ups. 
In June, several hundred thousand migrant workers from Cambodia, Burma, and
Laos fled Thailand, fearing a crackdown by the junta. Thailand’s labor laws pro-
vide little protection to migrant workers. A migrant worker registration scheme
failed to effectively counter the impunity with which employers violate workers’
rights. Migrant workers remain extremely vulnerable to exploitation, with female
migrants enduring sexual violence and trafficking, and male migrants facing ex-




The NCPO has shown no interest in launching criminal investigations of extraju-
dicial killings related to anti-drug operations, especially the more than 2,800
killings that accompanied then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s 2003 “war
on drugs.” 
Drug users are sent to “rehabilitation” centers, mostly run by the military and the
Interior Ministry, where “treatment” consists mainly of military-style physical ex-
ercise, but little or no medical assistance for drug withdrawal symptoms. 
Key International Actors
The May coup drew condemnation from the United Nations and Thailand’s major
allies, including the United States, Europea Union, and Australia, which down-
graded their relationship with Thailand in 2014. 
Following the coup, the US blocked US$4.7 million in military aid and in June un-
invited Thailand from participating in its largest international maritime military
exercise that took place in Hawaii. In October, the US announced plans to scale
back its annual “Cobra Gold” military exercise in 2015 but did not cancel it. In
contrast, China did not criticize the coup, earning it public praise from the NCPO,
which also benefited from Beijing’s continued unconditional political, military,
and economic support. 
In June, the US State Department downgraded Thailand to a Tier 3 ranking on its
2014 Trafficking in Persons Report for failing to combat human trafficking. 
Thailand lost its bid for election to a seat on the United Nations Human Rights
Council for 2015-2017. 
The UN Thailand country team has yet to establish a monitoring and reporting
mechanism for grave violations against children, as is the norm in conflict situa-





Tunisia achieved significant progress in strengthening human rights protections
following the adoption of a new constitution on January 26, 2014, three years
after the uprising that toppled President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali. The first na-
tional parliamentary elections since the 2011 uprising, held in October, resulted
in victory for the modernist party Nidaa Tounes, with 86 out of the 217 seats of
the Assembly of the Peoples’ Representatives. The new authorities will need to
undertake a thorough overhaul of existing laws, reform public institutions, and
implement constitutional guarantees to address deficiencies in the current pro-
tection of human rights. 
The year 2014 saw important reforms, including the adoption of new laws to
combat torture and the establishment of a truth commission into past human
rights abuses. In contrast, the lenient sentences that the military appeals court
passed on former officials and police responsible for killings of protesters during
Tunisia’s 2011 uprising sent the wrong message about accountability. 
New Constitution
The 2014 constitution guarantees key civil and political, as well as social, eco-
nomic, and cultural rights. These include the rights to citizenship; to freedom of
expression and association, including the right to form political parties; to free-
dom of assembly and movement; and to bodily integrity and fair trial and free-
dom from arbitrary detention and torture. The right to political asylum is also
guaranteed, as are rights to health, education, and work. The Tunisian authori-
ties still need to amend existing laws or adopt new ones and institute other re-
forms to realize these rights. 
The new constitution contains several weaknesses and ambiguities that could
be used to suppress rights. For example, it contains a provision prohibiting “at-
tacks on the sacred,” which could be used to prosecute statements that the au-
thorities consider “defamatory” of religion or religious beliefs, contrary to the
freedom of expression guarantee contained in article 31. 
The constitution fails to abolish the death penalty, although Tunisia has main-
tained a moratorium on executions since the early 1990s. 
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Several provisions of the penal code and the code of criminal procedure appear
to contradict rights guarantees contained in the new constitution, such as that
affording detainees the right, following arrest, to have access to legal represen-
tation. The code of criminal procedure continues to permit a detainee to have
legal representation only when they are taken before an investigative judge. 
Freedom of Expression
In 2014, there were fewer incidents of prosecutions for alleged defamation or
“insult” of state officials and on charges of “harming public order” or “public
morals.” 
In July, the head of government temporarily suspended two radio stations, ac-
cusing them of having links to terrorism and propagating hate speech, the day
after an attack by armed men on July 16 killed 15 Tunisian soldiers near the bor-
der with Algeria. The government’s action ignored the 2011 decree-law 116 on
audiovisual media, which gives the High Independent Authority for Audiovisual
Communications sole authority to suspend or otherwise sanction a media outlet. 
Women’s Rights
The new constitution provides improved protection for women’s rights and obli-
gates Tunisia to work towards achieving gender parity in elected assemblies. 
In April, the government withdrew the reservations that Tunisia entered when it
ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW). These reservations had enabled Tunisia to opt out of certain
CEDAW provisions, including provisions on women’s rights within the family,
even though it had ratified the treaty.
Tunisia maintained, however, a general declaration that it had made in relation
to CEDAW, indicating that it would not take “any organizational or legislative de-
cision in conformity with the requirements” of the convention if that should con-
flict with chapter 1 of the Tunisian Constitution, which declares Islam the state
religion of Tunisia. 
Tunisia has a personal status code that gives women greater rights within the
family than those allowed by other states in the region, but the code retains
some discriminatory provisions. These deny women an equal share with men of
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any inheritance and prohibit a mother who has remarried, unlike remarried fa-
thers, from having her children reside with her. 
Accountability 
Since 2011, Tunisian authorities have taken some steps to prosecute perpetra-
tors of human rights violations, notably those committed during the uprising
that began on December 17, 2010, and ended in February 2011. An official inves-
tigation concluded that the authorities’ attempt to crush the uprising using ex-
cessive force caused the deaths of 132 protesters and injuries to hundreds more.
The trials of those accused of responsibility for these killings began in late 2011
before military courts, which have sole jurisdiction over cases involving mem-
bers of the military and security forces. First instance military courts that began
investigations in July 2011 determined that the accused should stand trial in
groups, organized geographically, and trials opened in the military tribunals of
Tunis and Le Kef in November and December 2011. 
Defendants included the former president, charged in absentia, two former inte-
rior ministers, five general directors of the Interior Ministry, and several high-
level and mid-level security force commanders. When the tribunals delivered
their verdicts in June and July 2012, they convicted President Ben Ali, his interior
minister at the time, and five directors of the Interior Ministry and imposed
prison sentences ranging from 15 years to life. On April 12, 2014, the military
court of appeals confirmed the life imprisonment sentence in absentia of former
president Ben Ali but significantly reduced the sentences of all other former sen-
ior officials.
After reviewing the trials and the proceedings of the military court of appeals,
Human Rights Watch concluded that the military courts had largely respected the
rights of the defendants but had faced serious obstacles that prevented their en-
suring full accountability for unlawful killings and other serious rights abuses
committed during the 2011 uprising. 
These included the failure of prosecuting authorities to obtain sufficient evi-
dence to identify the individual perpetrators of unlawful killings and other
crimes, and the lack of a provision in the penal code or other legislation making
senior officers liable for crimes committed by forces under their command. The
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government’s failure to press effectively for Ben Ali’s extradition from Saudi Ara-
bia to stand trial in Tunisia also undermined accountability. 
On December 24, 2013, the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) adopted the
Law on Establishing and Organizing Transitional Justice. The law sets out a com-
prehensive approach to addressing past human rights abuses. It provides crimi-
nal accountability via the creation of specialized chambers within the civil court
system to adjudicate cases arising from past human rights violations, including
abuses committed by military and security forces. 
The law also provides for the establishment of a Truth and Dignity Commission
tasked with uncovering the truth about abuses committed in the period since
Tunisia’s independence in July 1955 through to 2013. The NCA elected 15 of the
commission’s members on May 15, 2014. The December 2013 law also estab-
lishes mechanisms for victim reparation, institutional reform, vetting of civil ser-
vants, and national reconciliation. 
Counterterrorism and Security
On June 24, Minister of Interior Lotfi Ben Jeddou told a press conference that a
total of at least 2400 Tunisian armed militants had joined the conflict in Syria,
mostly as fighters for the Al Nusra Front and the extremist group Islamic State,
also known as ISIS. He made the announcement following the publication on
Facebook of a video and photographs in which a man who identified himself as
Tunisian appeared to participate in the summary killing of five captured Iraqi
border guards. 
In July, the government ordered 157 associations to suspend their operations,
accusing them of having links to terrorism following an attack by armed men that
killed 15 Tunisian soldiers near the country’s border with Algeria. The govern-
ment’s action breached decree-law 2011-88, which the transitional government
had adopted in September 2011 to replace a restrictive law that criminalized par-
ticipation in officially unrecognized associations, bringing Tunisia’s national law
into conformity with its international law obligation to uphold freedom of associ-
ation. 
Decree-law 2011-88 gives the judiciary sole authority to order the suspension or
dissolution of an association under a three-stage process of warning, then initial
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suspension for 30 days, followed by dissolution if the association fails to take
corrective action. The government’s suspension of 157 organizations in July 2014
ignored this process and took the form of a unilateral administrative decision.
The associations appealed the government decision before the administrative
tribunal. 
Judicial Independence
The constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary. It makes judges
accountable solely to the constitution and to the law in the performance of their
duties. Article 109 of the constitution prohibits outside interference in the judici-
ary.
In practice, the judiciary lacks independence from the executive branch and still
labors under the legacy of the Ben Ali era, when the authorities used the judicial
system as an instrument to suppress dissent. The new authorities have yet to re-
form law 67-29 of July 14, 1967, which places judges under the effective control of
the minister of justice, who used his powers in 2012 to summarily dismiss 75
judges for alleged corruption or links to the Ben Ali regime. The Ministry of Jus-
tice has since rejected an administrative tribunal order to reinstate the dis-
missed judges. 
Torture and Ill-Treatment
Torture and other ill-treatment reportedly remained common in detention facili-
ties and prisons, despite the NCA’s adoption on October 9, 2013, of a law to cre-
ate a National Authority for the Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. A year later, however, the NCA had yet to
vote on the appointment of the National Authority’s members. 
Following his second visit to Tunisia since the revolution, in June the special rap-
porteur on torture, Juan Mendez, said that the eradication of torture in Tunisia re-
quired both political will and institutional, legal, and cultural reforms to
strengthen safeguards against torture and to rebuild citizens’ trust in the judicial
and security apparatus. 
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Key International Actors 
Since the January 2011 revolution, several United Nations agencies and foreign
governments have committed to support Tunisia’s transition, focusing on techni-
cal and financial assistance to Tunisia’s economy and private sector, security
sector support, and support for civil society and democratic practices. In 2014,
the United States approved a sovereign loan guarantee to Tunisia of US$500 mil-
lion. The International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN Development Pro-
gram, and the European Union provided support in 2014 for security sector and




The Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—elected
president in August 2014—are undermining the gains of the past decade with
steps that erode human rights and the rule of law in Turkey. In the wake of the
mass protests in the summer of 2013 that began in Istanbul and spread to other
cities, the government continued a policy of controlling media and the Internet
and clamping down on critics. 
Corruption allegations in December 2013 implicating the government, with Istan-
bul prosecutors ordering scores of arrests in December, were followed by circula-
tion on social media of politically damaging leaked telephone calls supporting
the allegations. In response, the government intensified its interference in the
criminal justice system, reassigning judges, prosecutors, and police, attempted
to exert greater executive control over Turkey’s already politicized judiciary, and
clamped down on Internet freedom. 
The corruption allegations emerged in the context of a political contest between
Erdoğan’s circle within the AKP and their former long-term ally, the Gülen (or
Hizmet) movement, led by the US-based cleric Fethullah Gülen, which the gov-
ernment accuses of exerting an undue influence in state institutions, the police,
and the judiciary, and of attempting a “coup” against it. 
More positively, negotiations with imprisoned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
leader Abdullah Öcalan to end the decades-long armed conflict with the PKK an-
nounced at the beginning of 2013 continued in 2014. Bolder steps to address the
rights deficit for Turkey’s Kurds could address the root causes of the conflict and
help further human rights for all ethnic and religious minority groups in Turkey.
While the military and the PKK broadly maintained a ceasefire through 2014,
around 50 civilians died in violent protests in early October in cities throughout
the southeast. The circumstances of most of these deaths had not been fully in-
vestigated at time of writing, but the protests themselves followed the Kurdish
political movement’s strong criticism of the Turkish government’s approach to
the siege of the Syrian Kurdish city of Kobani (Ayn al-Arab) by the extremist group





Freedom of Expression, Association, and Assembly
The government’s erosion of media freedom continued. Readiness to limit free-
dom of expression, restrictive approach to freedom of assembly, and readiness
to prosecute demonstrators while tolerating police violence against them, were
among features most damaging to Turkey’s democratic credentials and interna-
tional reputation during the year. 
The government responded to the use of social media to disseminate leaked
phone calls implicating ministers and family members in corruption by tighten-
ing the already restrictive Internet law and blocking Twitter and YouTube in
Turkey for several weeks, prompting a joint statement in March from three United
Nations special rapporteurs. Both sites were reopened in April and May respec-
tively after the Constitutional Court ruled against the blocking orders. 
The clampdown included a rise in broadcasting watchdog disciplinary fines ap-
plied selectively to anti-government media, criminal defamation cases against
journalists, the firing of some prominent journalists, and blocking orders on par-
ticular accounts and content on social media. Through these measures, the gov-
ernment is impeding the ability or likelihood of media to hold government
authorities to account or to scrutinize their activities. 
In the year after the Taksim Gezi Park protests in Istanbul and anti-government
protests in other cities across Turkey, thousands of demonstrators faced legal
proceedings. In some cases the courts acquitted defendants at the first hearing,
but other trials continued at time of writing. Some defendants charged with ter-
rorism offenses and still on trial spent up to 10 months in pretrial detention be-
fore being bailed. 
In June, the trial began of five organizers of Taksim Solidarity, a platform of 128
nongovernmental organizations supporting the Gezi Park campaign and sit-in.
They were charged with forming a criminal gang, inciting and participating in un-
lawful demonstrations, and refusing orders to disperse. Their trial with 21 code-
fendants continued at time of writing. In September, an Istanbul prosecutor
indicted 35 people associated with the Beşiktaş football club fan group Çarşı for
their participation in the Gezi protests on a range of charges including an al-
leged coup attempt against the government. 
549
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Trials continued of Kurdish political activists, journalists, students, and lawyers
on widely used terrorism charges such as “membership of an armed organiza-
tion.” The evidence against them in most cases concerned nonviolent political
association and protest. 
However, in March the government took the welcome steps of abolishing the
Special Heavy Penal courts whose remit was terrorism offenses, and cutting the
maximum period for pretrial detention to 5 years (from 10), resulting in the re-
lease on bail of many defendants. Among those bailed were hundreds of defen-
dants tried for alleged links to the outlawed Union of Kurdistan Communities
(KCK), including human rights defender Muharrem Erbey, bailed in April after
spending over four years in pretrial detention on terrorism charges. The abusive
application of terrorism charges remains a serious problem. 
Judicial Independence 
Turkey has long-standing defects in its justice sytem including concerns over ju-
dicial independence, inadequate investigations into abuses by state actors, ex-
cessive length of proceedings, and politically motivated prosecutions. 
Developments in 2014 highlighted the politicization of Turkey’s judiciary. In re-
sponding to the corruption investigations, the government asserted that follow-
ers of the Gülen movement were strongly represented in the judiciary and police. 
In the name of reducing the alleged influence of the Gülen movement in the jus-
tice system, the government took steps to bring the police, prosecutors, and
judges under greater executive control. The government oversaw the mass reas-
signment or demotion of judges, prosecutors, and police, including all those in-
volved in the corruption investigations. It adopted a law in February to
restructure the Higher Board of Judges and Prosecutors (Hâkimler ve Savcılar
Yüksek Kurulu, HSYK) responsible for the administration of the judiciary, to tie it
closer to the executive, and created in July a new category of criminal judges of
the peace responsible for key decisions at the criminal investigation stage. 
In April, the Constitutional Court partially quashed key provisions of the HSYK
law concerning enhanced powers for the Minister of Justice on the grounds that
they violated the separation of powers in important respects, threatened judicial
independence, and opened the way to political pressure on the judiciary. 
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In June, 237 military personnel serving sentences after convictions for coup-plot-
ting in the Sledgehammer case were released from prison after the the Constitu-
tional Court ruled that they had not had a fair trial and ordered retrials.
Defendants in the Ergenekon trial whose convictions were under appeal were
bailed in March when pretrial detention was cut from 10 to 5 years. 
Combating Impunity
Great obstacles remain in securing justice for victims of abuses by police, mili-
tary, and state officials. In April 2014, the government introduced a law giving
immunity from prosecution to personnel of the National Intelligence Agency
(Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MİT), unless the agency itself expressly authorizes
prosecution. This measure, which is incompatible with Turkey’s human rights ob-
ligations, creates a risk that intelligence personnel might be immune from ac-
countability for serious human rights violations committed during their duties,
including torture. At time of writing, the law was under appeal before the Consti-
tutional Court. 
Despite thousands of killings and disappearances of Kurds by state officials in
the 1990s, only a handful of trials of officials have taken place. The 20-year
statute of limitations on the prosecution of unlawful killings remains a major ob-
stacle to justice and many cases risk being timed out without urgent action to
address it. Stronger efforts to combat impunity are vital to support the Kurdish
peace process. 
In June, a military court upheld a decision of non-prosecution in the case of the
attack by the Turkish Air Force in December 2011 that killed 34 Kurdish villagers
near the village of Roboski (Ortasu) close to the Iraqi Kurdistan border. An ap-
peal by the families of the victims to the Constitutional Court was pending at
time of writing. 
Few investigations were concluded into police violence and disproportionate use
of force against demonstrators during the May-June 2013 Gezi protests around
the country. In a July 2014 communication to the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe on the right to freedom of assembly (regarding the Oya Atman
group of cases), the Turkish government claimed that after the countrywide Gezi
protests, 329 criminal investigations into the police had been launched in 13
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provinces, of which 59 had resulted in decisions of nonprosecution, 6 in prose-
cutions, and the remainder were still pending. 
A police officer who shot dead Ethem Sarısülük in June 2013 during an Ankara
protest received an eight-year sentence for “probable intent to kill.” There were
delays in the trials of police and civilians charged with killing demonstrators Ali
İsmail Korkmaz and Abdullah Cömert. Decisions in these cases to transfer the tri-
als to locations at significant distance from the place of the crime disadvantages
the families of the victims and their lawyers. At time of writing there was an on-
going investigation into police for the shooting with a tear gas canister of 14-
year-old Berkin Elvan who died in March after nine months in a coma. 
The retrial of a group of young men for the January 2007 murder of journalist
Hrant Dink continued. In July, the Constitutional Court ruled that the murder in-
vestigation had not been conducted in an effective manner. 
Refugees
As of October 2014, according to official estimates, Turkey was hosting 1.6 mil-
lion refugees from Syria, 220,000 in camps and the remainder in urban areas, as
well as around 80,000 mostly Afghan asylum seekers and refugees from other
nationalities. 
A new asylum law, which went into effect in April 2014, maintains Turkey’s geo-
graphical limitation to its accession to the Refugee Convention but, for the first
time, enshrines asylum and subsidiary protection as a matter of law, including
provisions for legal aid, on unaccompanied children and on nonrefoulement. It
limits administrative detention of migrants pending deportation to six months
(extended for another six months for noncooperation) with the stipulation that
detention ordinarily should not be used for asylum seekers. 
Key International Actors
The European Union, EU member states, and the United States expressed con-
cerns about Turkey’s record on Internet freedom, judicial independence, and
moves to undermine the rule of law, while commending Turkey for hosting over
one million refugees from the war in Syria. 
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The European Commission in its annual progress report released in October
commended the Turkish government’s moves to put the Kurdish peace process
on a legal footing, advised that full revision of the 1982 constitution constitutes
“the most credible avenue for advancing further democratization of Turkey,” and
raised “serious concerns” about government interference in the judiciary follow-
ing corruption allegations and blanket bans on Twitter and YouTube. 
There was no progress in the EU accession process. An EU readmission agree-
ment with Turkey came into force in October, allowing EU governments to return
Turkish citizens residing in the EU without authorization to Turkey, and after a
three-year transition period permitting the EU to return irregular migrants from
other countries to Turkey in cases where it is established that they entered the
EU via Turkey. 
Among the European Court of Human Rights rulings against Turkey in 2014, a
September decision on religious education classes (Mansur Yalçın and Others v.
Turkey) found that when it comes to compulsory religious instruction, the Turkish
education system is still inadequately equipped to ensure respect for parents’
convictions because of the overwhelming emphasis on Sunni Islam. The court
ruled that, without delay, Turkish authorities had to permit pupils the right to be
exempt from religion and ethics classes without requiring a reason. 
In September, the Turkish government announced that it would sign two Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO) conventions (nos. 167 and 176) on safety and
health in mining and construction. The May 13 mining accident at the Soma mine
in western Turkey in which 301 miners died highlighted that Turkey has one of
the world’s worst records on fatal accidents in the mining and construction in-
dustries, lacks effective oversight and inspection to ensure safety and work con-
ditions, and has a poor record of holding companies accountable for accidents. 
Foreign Policy
The conflicts in Syria and Iraq had a growing impact on Turkey, particularly in the
wake of the June 2014 consolidation of power by ISIS when it occupied large
swathes of Syria and Iraq and took hostage Turkey’s Mosul consul general and
48 consular staff and their family members. Turkey managed to secure their re-
lease in September. The Turkish parliament voted in October to grant the Turkish
government wide-ranging powers to intervene militarily in Syria and Iraq. 
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Turkey’s approach to Syria primarily advocated the overthrow of the Assad gov-
ernment, viewing the US coalition focus on combating ISIS as inseparable from
that aim.
As prime minister, and now president, Erdoğan has consistently and publicly
criticized the Egyptian government of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi since it deposed Presi-
dent Mohamed Morsy in 2013. Turkey’s stance on Egypt has reduced its ability to
influence powers in the Middle East supportive of the Sisi government. 
Turkey was a strong critic of Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip in July-
August and diplomatic relations between the two countries remain limited. There





The Turkmen government’s abysmal human rights record saw no real improve-
ments in 2014. The president, his relatives, and their associates maintain unlim-
ited control over all aspects of public life. The government thoroughly denies
freedoms of association, expression, and religion, and the country is closed to
independent scrutiny. Relatives of dozens of people imprisoned during the mas-
sive waves of arrests in the late 1990s and early 2000s have had no official infor-
mation about their fate. Proposed “reform” of the constitution promises no
actual expansion of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Cult of Personality, No Pluralism 
According to the Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights (TIHR), a Vienna-based
group, several books written by and about President Gurbanguly Berdy-
mukhamedov, who uses the title “Arkadag” (Protector), were added to the sec-
ondary school curriculum in January, replacing the study of writings by former
President Saparmurat Niyazov. 
TIHR also reported that in May, parents of schoolchildren in Ashgabat were
obliged to sign a pledge to raise their children in accordance with Turkmen tradi-
tions. In one school, the pledge obliged students to “become faithful sons and
daughters” of the president. 
In August, a commission led by Berdymukhamedov convened to discuss consti-
tutional reform and the creation of a human rights ombudsman to bring legisla-
tion in line with international standards. It was unclear at time of writing which
articles and laws would be considered for amendment. 
Civil Society
Repressive government policies make it extremely difficult for independent non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to operate. Civil society activists and jour-
nalists, including those living in exile and their families in Turkmenistan, face
constant threat of government reprisal. 
In May, Berdymukhamedov signed a new Law on Public Associations. The law
states that only a court, not the Ministry of Justice, can cancel registration or sus-
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pend the activities of an NGO. However, the Ministry of Justice reserves a long
list of reasons to deny registration to new NGOs, and unregistered NGOs are
deemed unlawful. Non-state funding is subjected to extensive government con-
trols. 
Housing and Property Rights
In January 2014, a new housing law entered into force allowing citizens who have
resided in public housing under rental agreements for more than 10 years to pri-
vatize their rented properties. It was unclear at time of writing whether the new
law will be fully implemented. 
In June, during peak high temperatures of over 100 degrees Farenheit (around 40
degrees Celsius), some residents in Ashgabat clashed with authorities after local
officials prohibited air conditioning units in multi-story apartment buildings be-
cause of their alleged unsightly appearance. Following the protests, officials re-
lented. 
Arbitrary evictions continue in Ashgabat, where house demolitions make way for
monuments, hotels, and office buildings. Residents, many of whom own their
properties, are often not given adequate notice of imminent demolitions and
must accept compensation from authorities of government-subsidized apart-
ments of lesser value on the outskirts of the city. In April, the minister of con-
struction and architecture was dismissed, though this has not resulted in any
evident improvements. 
Freedom of Media and Information 
The total absence of media freedom in Turkmenistan remains unchanged. The
state controls virtually all print and electronic media; Internet access remains
limited and heavily state-controlled; and social media and many websites are
blocked, including those of foreign news organizations. The government is
known to monitor electronic and telephone communications. 
According to TIHR, in June, secret service officials mobilized efforts to cover up
news of a Turkmen air force plane that crashed in a residential area near Mary,
killing the pilot and a trainee. Residents of neighboring houses were reportedly
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obliged to sign statements acknowledging their liability for “disclosure of state
secrets.” 
The Russian mobile operator MTS, the only competitor to the state-run Altyn Asyr
operator, has faced licensing problems launching a 3GB network that would offer
better Internet access to users. In October, MTS was able to launch the network,
but at time of writing it was unclear how reliable the network would be due to
limited channel capacity. 
Freedom of Movement
Turkmenistan’s government continues to restrict the right of its citizens to travel
freely outside the country by means of an informal and arbitrary system of travel
bans commonly imposed on civil society activists and relatives of exiled dissi-
dents. 
For example, in April, Turkmen authorities barred Ruslan Tukhbatullin from flying
to Istanbul to visit his brother, Farid, the head of TIHR. Border police informed
him that he is on a list of people banned from foreign travel. In November,
Tukhbatullin received official notification from the Federal Migration Service that
he was no longer on the list. 
Geldy Kyarizov, former director of the state-run organization “Turkmen Atlary”
(Turkmen Horses) who was imprisoned in 2002 for alleged abuse of office and
later granted a presidential pardon in 2007, is subject to constant surveillance by
authorities.He has been denied permission to travel abroad for medical treat-
ment. 
A new law granting citizenship to stateless persons, many of whom hold expired
USSR passports from former republics, entered into force in June. Since October
2013, stateless persons had faced problems leaving the country after the author-
ities stopped issuing them passports. 
In June 2013, the migration service announced it would issue new biometric
passports to all Turkmen citizens, including those who also have had Russian
passports since June 2003. However, according to TIHR, in April 2014 the Turk-
men State Migration office suspended issuing biometric passports to dual citi-
zens, though some were reportedly able to get new passports by paying bribes.
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Since July 2013, travel outside of the country is prohibited without a biometric
passport. 
According to Radio Azatlyk, in recent years Turkmen authorities have restricted
travel to Turkey, Iran, and Russia for medical treatment by requiring complicated
paperwork to obtain exit visas. 
Forced Labor
Amendments to the Law on Guarantees of the Rights of the Child introduced in
May 2014 prohibit child labor in the agricultural and other sectors in cases where
children have to be taken out of school. However, an in situ RFE/RL report found
that the past year saw record numbers of children, some under the legal working
age of 16, supervised by teachers and local officials being taken into the fields to
harvest cotton, and a report by Alternative News of Turkmenistan, a Netherlands-
based group, also found forced labor in the cotton and other sectors. 
Freedom of Religion
Unregistered religious groups or communities are forbidden to operate by law,
and several religious communities have been unable to register for years. In
2014, a new administrative offenses code entered into force, which establishes
harsher fines for involvement in unregistered religious activity. 
According to Forum 18, an independent international religious freedom group, in
August, Jehovah’s Witness Bibi Rahmanova was sentenced to four years’ impris-
onment for allegedly resisting police. Police had detained her a month earlier
when she was picking up religious literature from Ashgabat that had been sent
to her. In September, her sentence was suspended on appeal, and she was serv-
ing her conditional four-year sentence under house arrest at time of writing. Ac-
cording to Forum 18, she allegedly suffered “severe physical abuse” while in
detention. 
In January, Murat Sapargeldyyev, a conscientious objector to Turkmenistan’s
compulsory military service, was charged with refusal to serve in the armed
forces during peacetime and given a suspended sentence of two years’ correc-
tive labor. In February, another conscientious objector and Jehovah’s Witness,
Pavel Paymov, was sentenced to one year in prison. In October, Paymov, along
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with five other conscientious objectors and two other Jevovah’s Witnesses, all
imprisioned in the Seydi Labor Colony, were released under presidential
amnesty. 
Ruslan Narkuliev, sentenced to two years’ imprisonment in September, also for
refusal to serve in the armed forces during peacetime, remained imprisoned at
the Seydi Labor Colony. 
Muslims who want to take the haj pilgrimage to Mecca must do so through a
state-organized trip. In one region, Muslims have to wait up to 11 years to make
the annual pilgrimage. 
Political Prisoners, Enforced Disappearances, and Torture 
More than a decade after their arrest and show trials during several waves of re-
pression under former President Niyazov, several dozen people remain victims of
enforced disappearances. They include former Foreign Minister Boris Shikhmu-
radov, his brother Konstantin, and Turkmenistan’s former ambassador to the Or-
ganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Batyr Berdiev. In
2014, Human Rights Watch received unverified information that several of the
disappeared had died in custody. 
The government continues to use imprisonment as a tool for political retaliation.
It is impossible to determine the actual number of those jailed on political
grounds because the justice system lacks transparency and there is no inde-
pendent monitoring of these cases. Dissident Gulgeldy Annaniazov and former
troop commander Tirkish Tyrmyev both remained in prison on politically moti-
vated charges. 
In May, Mansur Mingelov, who is serving a 22-year sentence on several bogus
charges, began a three-week hunger strike to demand a retrial. Mingelov had
been arrested in 2012 after sending video evidence of police torture against
Turkmenistan’s Baloch ethnic community to diplomats and the Prosecutor’s Of-
fice. 
Torture remains a grave problem. A 2014 report by a coalition of independent
human rights groups, Prove They Are Alive!, described the torture of inmates in
the Ovadan Tepe prison, a facility shrouded in secrecy that houses many people
believed to have been sentenced on politically motivated charges. The govern-
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ment has persistently denied access to independent human rights monitors, in-
cluding the Red Cross and 10 United Nations special procedures. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Consensual sex between men is criminalized with a maximum prison sentence
of two years. Turkmenistan rejected recommendations made during the April
2013 UN Universal Periodic Review to decriminalize consensual sex between
adults of the same sex. 
Key International Actors
At time of writing, the World Bank Group was in the process of developing a new
short-term strategy with the government of Turkmenistan, building on its 2013
re-engagement with the government. 
In May, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) adopted
a new country strategy for Turkmenistan, reaffirming its prior stance of linking its
level of investment to the government’s progress in meeting benchmarks on plu-
ralism and accountability, media freedoms, and improving the country’s overall
human rights record. Because of the govermnent’s lack of progress in these
areas, the EBRD’s engagement in Turkmenistan remains limited.
In July, the United States State Department designated Turkmenistan as a “coun-
try of particular concern for religious freedom” following the US Commission for
International Religious Freedom’s recommendation. 
Also in July, the OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly adopted a declaration express-
ing concern about the disappeared and their families in Turkmenistan and ask-
ing the government to provide information about them, including Boris
Shikhmurdov and Batyr Berdiev. US Ambassador to the OSCE Daniel Baer raised
specific cases of the forcibly disappeared in his February 2014 meeting with
Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov. 
In September, the European Union held its annual human rights dialogue with
Turkmenistan, raising concerns about torture and ill-treatment, enforced disap-
pearances, and restrictions on the rights of expression, association, and reli-




President Yoweri Museveni, in power for 28 years, and his ruling National Resist-
ance Movement party continue to curtail freedom of expression, assembly, and
association, among other basic rights. In February and July respectively, Musev-
eni signed the Anti-Homosexuality Act and the HIV Prevention and Control Act
into law, after five years of parliamentary debates. Although the Anti-Homosexu-
ality Act was overturned by a constitutional challenge in August, the government
continues to voice outspoken support for its discriminatory provisions. In some
parts of the country, police prevented opposition members from holding public
meetings, relying on the sweeping police powers under the 2013 Public Order
Management Act. Impunity for abuses by the security forces, particularly during
protests, remains a serious problem. 
Donors reduced or redirected some assistance in the wake of the Anti-Homosex-
uality Act, but aid has largely continued to flow despite large-scale corruption
scandals in recent years. 
Freedom of Assembly and Expression 
The Public Order Management Law, passed in August 2013, grants police wide
discretionary powers to permit or disallow public meetings. It has generally been
implemented to undermine or obstruct Ugandans’ assembly rights when protest-
ing against government. 
In March, police in eastern Uganda blocked two demonstrations organized by
the opposition pushing for electoral reforms. Police claimed the politicians had
not sought permission from the inspector general of police, as required under
the new law. Eventually the rallies were permitted, but those seeking to protest
against the current electoral laws often face unclear procedures and prolonged
delays when seeking permissions. 
In June, two men were arrested for smuggling two pigs into parliament as a
protest against high youth unemployment rates. The two were charged with crim-
inal trespass and conspiracy, and were awaiting trial at time of writing. In Au-
gust, police arrested 20 members of the Uganda National Students Association





unlawful assembly. The same month, police arrested seven young men in Kam-
pala who were peacefully demonstrating against unemployment. 
Media and Civil Society
The closure of two newspapers and a radio station in 2013 and new ad-hoc poli-
cies introduced by the minister of information negatively impacted media’s oper-
ating environment. Station managers and journalists report fear of reprisals if
programs are highly critical of the government. In June, the government regula-
tory body, the Uganda Communications Commission, informed all radio stations
that they are required to reserve one hour of prime time air to promote govern-
ment programs. 
In March, a regional police commander stormed the studios of Guide Radio in
Kasese, western Uganda, and stopped a program in which the leader of the op-
position Forum for Democratic Change was participating. The police commander
claimed to be under orders to stop the program because it was “inciting vio-
lence.” In August, the executive director of the Uganda Communications Com-
mission wrote to a radio manger in Fort Portal warning him of running programs
that “cause disharmony” in the community and requested recordings of all pro-
grams. 
The minister of internal affairs proposed amending the current nongovernmental
organization (NGO) law to further constrict civil society operating space. The gov-
ernment has accused organizations of engaging in “political activism,” and in
one case suspended an NGO working on sexual rights, arguing that it was “pro-
moting homosexuality.” Four NGO offices in Kampala were burgled and comput-
ers and servers stolen, raising concerns among civil society that the incidents
were an orchestrated attempt to curtail NGO operations. The incidents were re-
ported to the police, though only limited investigations occurred, no one was ar-
rested and no stolen items were recovered. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
In December 2013, parliament passed the Anti-Homosexuality Act, increasing
prison sentences for same-sex conduct and criminalizing “promotion of homo-
sexuality.” President Museveni signed the bill into law on February 24 and a di-
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verse group of individuals and NGOs subsequently challenged the law’s consti-
tutionality. 
On August 1, the Constitutional Court declared the Anti-Homosexuality Act null
and void on procedural grounds because of lack of parliamentary quorum during
the vote. The court did not take the opportunity to affirm the rights to freedom of
expression, association, and privacy. There are signals that the government may
appeal the ruling, and a new draft legislation entitled the Prohibition of Promo-
tion of Unnatural Sexual Practices Bill was pending with an ad-hoc committee of
parliamentarians, but had yet to be formally introduced to parliament at time of
writing. The new draft bill retains the criminalization of “promotion,” which
would effectively criminalize the activities of groups that advocate for the rights
of LGBT people and render it illegal for such organizations to receive funds or ad-
vertise their work and activities in any form. Same-sex conduct remains a crime
under Uganda’s colonial-era sodomy law. 
On April 3, police raided a US-funded health clinic and medical research facility,
the Makerere University Walter Reed Project, accusing the clinic of conducting
“unethical research” and “recruiting homosexuals.” On July 9, the Ugandan High
Court upheld the government’s forced closure of a 2012 LGBT rights workshop,
ruling that its participants were “promoting” or “inciting” same-sex acts. 
With the passage of the Anti-Homosexuality Act, some LGBT people reported in-
creased arbitrary arrests, police abuse and extortion, loss of employment, and
evictions. 
Health and HIV/AIDS
In August, President Museveni signed the HIV Prevention and Control Act into
law. The law allows medical providers to require mandatory HIV testing for preg-
nant women and their partners, and to disclose a patient’s HIV status to others,
violating human rights related to consent, privacy, and bodily autonomy. Con-
trary to international guidelines, the new law criminalizes intentional HIV trans-
mission, attempted transmission, and behavior that might result in transmission
by those who know their HIV status. The act has been widely condemned by
health care providers as counterproductive to national HIV goals, discouraging




Major corruption scandals have surfaced repeatedly in the last few years, but no
high-ranking officials have served prison sentences for corruption-related of-
fences. Scandals have rocked health services, particularly regarding the misuse
of funds intended for the provision of immunizations and essential medicines to
fight HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria. 
Uganda’s government promotes private investment in mining in northeastern
Karamoja, which could provide jobs and improve security, access to water,
roads, and other basic infrastructure. But the extent to which local populations
will benefit, if at all, remains unclear. As companies have begun to explore and
mine the area, communities have voiced serious fears of land grabs, environ-
mental damage, and lack of information as to how and when they may prevent,
or receive compensation for, encroachment on their land. 
Lack of Accountability
The government failed to credibly investigate violence in which at least 100 peo-
ple were killed in the western Rwenzori region. Numerous reports suggest that
after a July 5 attack on a military barracks and some police posts, civilians were
mutilated, tortured, and killed, some buried in mass and unmarked graves, and
that government forces may have been involved in reprisals against members of
the ethnic group believed to be responsible for the initial attacks. 
Despite numerous promises to investigate, no police or military personnel have
been held accountable and there have been no credible investigations into
killings during protests in 2009 and 2011. In December 2011, police disbanded
the Rapid Response Unit but there have been no investigations into the killings
or torture by the unit, and one case involving a suspect tortured to death during
an interrogation did not advance in the courts. Similarly, no inquiries have been
made into cases of people who were tortured or died in the custody of the Joint
Anti-Terrorism Task Force. 
The government has also failed to protect street children and investigate abuses
against them. Despite a strong legal child protection framework, homeless chil-
dren face violence, beatings, unlawful detention, and forced labor at the hands





ficials and police also carry out targeted mass roundups of homeless children.
On the streets, homeless adults and older children harass, beat, sexually abuse,
force drugs upon, and exploit street children, often with impunity as police neg-
lect to investigate crimes against them. 
The Lord’s Resistance Army
The Ugandan rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) remains active across
Central African Republic, South Sudan, and northern Democratic Republic of
Congo, with ongoing allegations of killings and abductions, though on a much
lesser scale than in previous years. 
Warrants issued in 2005 by the International Criminal Court for LRA leaders re-
main outstanding. Former LRA fighter Thomas Kwoyelo, charged before Uganda’s
International Crimes Division with willful killing, taking hostages, and extensive
destruction of property, has been imprisoned since March 2009 but his trial had
yet to begin at time of writing. The Supreme Court has not yet heard the state’s
2012 appeal of the High Court order that Kwoyelo be granted amnesty and re-
leased.
Key International Actors
In a significant departure from the past, several key donors moved beyond con-
demnatory statements when President Museveni signed the Anti-Homosexuality
Bill into law. This pressure may have contributed to the Constitutional Court’s
swift hearing of the challenge to the law. The World Bank delayed a US$90 mil-
lion loan to cover a funding shortfall for the renovation of health care facilities,
according to bank President Jim Kim, because the bank could not be sure that
the “loan would not lead to discrimination or endangerment of the LGBT commu-
nity.” It remained unclear at time of writing if the loan would be released. 
The United States and Dutch governments, among others, cut or diverted assis-
tance, including to the police and justice sector. The US issued visa sanctions
against individual human rights abusers, including those who violate the rights
of LGBTI people. US support to Uganda’s army for the counter-LRA mission and
the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia continued, though a military




The “Maidan” uprising in Kiev led to the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovich in
February and a complete overhaul of Ukraine’s political system. The uprising that
began in November 2013 was marked by clashes between police, street fighters,
and protesters, which killed over 100 people. 
Yanukovich’s overthrow, and a law that would have disfavored the Russian lan-
guage, which the interim president vetoed, prompted violent clashes in south-
eastern Ukraine between pro and anti-Kiev protesters. May clashes in Odessa
alone left 46 people dead. After Russia’s occupation of Crimea in March, Russia-
backed armed insurgents seized control of many cities and towns in the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions, resulting in armed conflict with Ukrainian forces. Both
sides violated laws of war in the conflict that by October had claimed the lives of
over 4,000 combatants and civilians and wounded over 9,000. 
Mounting evidence, including the capture of Russian soldiers in Ukraine, ex-
posed Russian forces’ direct involvement in military operations, constituting an
international armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine. 
Between April and October, hostilities resulted in over 450,000 displaced per-
sons, including 16,000 from Crimea, having to flee their homes to other parts of
Ukraine. 
Russian officials and state media grossly distorted, manipulated, and at times
invented information about the conflict. In response, the Ukraine government
imposed excessive restrictions on freedom of media, including by banning Russ-
ian channels and barring foreign journalists from entering the country. 
Following a September cease-fire agreement between the Kiev government and
pro-Russian rebels, parliament passed a law granting three years of semi-auton-
omy to rebel-controlled areas and amnesty to rebels who have not committed
grave abuses. In November, after insurgents organized elections in the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions, which Kiev deemed illegal, President Petro Poroshenko re-
quested that parliament repeal the law. Also in November, Poroshenko issued
decrees shutting down all governmental institutions and banking services, as
well as cutting all state funding to rebel-held areas. 
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In September, the Ukrainian government stated the need for a new defense doc-
trine defining Russia as an “aggressor state” and to move towards joining the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and introduced into parliament a draft
law abolishing Ukraine’s non-bloc status. 
Maidan Violence
On November 30 and December 1, 2013, riot police violently dispersed and se-
verely beat numerous peaceful demonstrators in Kiev protesting Yanukovich’s re-
jection of a political and trade agreement with the European Union. Police
detained some of the protesters and beat them in custody. 
Violent clashes between police and street fighters, who intermingled with pro-
testers, killed over 100 people between January 19-21 and February 18-20, in-
cluding some police, and injured many more. Police used rubber bullets, tear
gas, and live munitions against protesters and street fighters armed with bats,
firearms, and improvised explosives. At least 98 people were killed between
February 18-20, including dozens by sniper fire presumably from Ukrainian secu-
rity forces, although several former officials later claimed that Maidan organizers
orchestrated the shooting. An investigation was pending at time of writing. 
Riot police trying to disperse street fighters and protesters assaulted dozens of
journalists. Police beat journalists who were covering the protests and some-
times deliberately shot them with rubber bullets or injured them with stun
grenades. 
Ukraine is not party to the treaty of the International Criminal Court (ICC), but in
April 2014, the acting government lodged a declaration accepting the court’s ju-
risdiction over alleged crimes committed in the country between November 17,
2013, and February 22, 2014. The ICC prosecutor’s examination into whether cri-
teria for opening a full investigation, as set out in the ICC’s treaty, are met was
ongoing at time of writing. 
Crimea 
In February, extra-legal, so-called self-defense units, aided by Russian security
forces, seized administrative buildings and military bases across Crimea and in-





Crimea’s status, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Crimea’s leadership
signed agreements claiming to make Crimea and the city of Sevastopol part of
the Russian Federation. Ukraine’s authorities and most international actors de-
clared the referendum unlawful, and there was no lawful transfer of sovereignty
to Russia. At time of writing, Russia remains an occupying power of Crimea under
international law.
Between February and April, “self-defense” units committed serious abuses, in-
cluding abductions, attacks, torture and harassment of activists, journalists, and
others they suspected of being pro-Kiev. 
Crimean Tatars, the predominantly Muslim ethnic minority of the Crimean penin-
sula, faced increased harassment and persecution. Since March, local authori-
ties issued several warnings to Mejlis, the Crimean Tatar highest representative
body, for “extremist” activities and threatened it with closure. 
In April and July, respectively, authorities banned Tatar elders Mustafa Jemilev
and Refat Chubarov from entering Crimea for five years. In September, they
seized all property and bank accounts of the charitable fund that administered
Mejlis, claiming it violated the law by having Jemilev, a Ukrainian citizen banned
from Russia, on the board of directors. 
Police searched the homes of dozens of Crimean Tatars, as well as Islamic
schools and mosques, for “prohibited literature.” In May, the authorities banned
all mass gatherings before the 70th anniversary of the community’s deportation. 
Over 16,000 people have fled Crimea since March, primarily for mainland
Ukraine. 
Abuses in Eastern Ukraine
Between May and September, mortar, rocket, and artillery attacks killed hun-
dreds of civilians in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Both armed insurgents
and government forces violated laws of war by using weaponry indiscriminately,
including unguided rockets in civilian areas. Both sides fired salvos of Grad rock-
ets into heavily populated civilian areas. 
The use of ground-launched Smerch and Uragan cluster munition rockets with
explosive submunitions was recorded in several parts of eastern Ukraine after
June. While evidence suggests all parties may have used cluster munitions, it
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was not possible to determine which forces were responsible for each attack, al-
though the evidence indicates Ukrainian government forces were responsible for
some attacks on Donetsk in October. Neither Ukraine nor Russia are parties to
the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions that comprehensively bans the
weapons. 
Between April and September, intense fighting led to the complete collapse of
law and order in several rebel-controlled areas. Rebels attacked, beat, and
threatened hundreds of people whom they suspected of supporting Kiev, includ-
ing journalists, local officials, and political and religious activists, and carried
out several summary executions. They also subjected detainees to forced labor
and kidnapped civilians for ransom, using them as hostages. In May, militants
kidnapped eight military observers with the Organization for Security and Co-op-
eration in Europe (OSCE) and held them for several weeks. 
Also in May, Ukrainian authorities captured the “defense minister” of the self-
proclaimed Donetsk Republic. The next day, the leader of Ukraine’s Radical Party
posted on his social media page photos of the detained man, naked, scratched,
and with hands bound, stating that he planned to exchange him for the ousted
President Yanukovich. Ukrainian authorities held the man in custody until Sep-
tember, when he was released in exchange for a Ukrainian serviceman during
prisoner exchanges between insurgents and government forces. 
As counterinsurgency operations continued, Ukrainian security services and pro-
Kiev volunteer battalions detained over 1,000 persons suspected of involvement
in the insurgency, sometimes holding them for over 14 days and subjecting them
to ill-treatment. In September, Kiev authorities opened a criminal investigation
into alleged crimes by the pro-Kiev Aydar battalion, which have reportedly in-
cluded arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, and torture. 
Armed militants obstructed work of journalists covering the conflict. In some
cases, rebels physically assaulted journalists they accused of “biased” report-
ing. In July, insurgent leaders prohibited journalists from filming in combat zones
and public places, threatening them with prosecution before a military tribunal if
they did so. Rebels harassed, threatened, beat, and abducted domestic and in-
ternational journalists. At time of writing, most abducted journalists had been
released, although the whereabouts of at least three remained unknown. 
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Kiev’s forces disappeared and arbitrarily detained 13 journalists, often accusing
them of assisting insurgents. For example, in May, security services detained two
Russian reporters and held them for a week in incommunicado detention for sus-
pected assistance to insurgents. The reporters later alleged they were beaten
and threatened with execution. 
At least seven media workers have been killed since the fighting began. 
Internally Displaced Persons 
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), at
least 450,000 people have been displaced from the armed conflict in Ukraine
and Crimea; approximately 814,000 went to Russia, according to the Russian
government. Ukrainian authorities have struggled to provide adequate protec-
tion and assistance for internally displaced people, and the bodies that the gov-
ernment tasked with coordinating efforts in various regions to provide housing
and social assistance to IDPs lacked resources to carry out those tasks. 
In October, parliament passed a law extending a specific set of rights to IDPs, in-
cluding protection against discrimination and forcible return, and simplifying ac-
cess to social and economic services, including residence registration and
unemployment benefits. 
Freedom of Media
Throughout the year, as political rhetoric grew more heated and polarized, cen-
tral authorities imposed excessive restrictions on freedom of media. By Septem-
ber, the authorities, seeking to control slanted reporting and to counter Russian
propaganda, banned 15 Russian channels from broadcasting in Ukraine, arbitrar-
ily denied entry to at least 20, and barred 35 Russian journalists from entering
Ukraine for between three and five years. During the year, authorities expelled at
least nine Russian journalists covering the armed conflict. 
In March, members of a Ukrainian nationalist party stormed the office of a major
Ukrainian television station and attacked its acting president, hitting him sev-
eral times and forcing him to resign over its Crimea coverage. Authorities opened
a criminal investigation into the incident but closed the case in September due
to “lack of evidence.” The same month, security services raided the Kiev office of
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a major news outlet that is considered to be pro-Russian, claiming authorities
suspected it of attempting to “undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity.” 
After Russia’s occupation of Crimea, local media outlets in Crimea identified as
pro-Ukrainian increasingly came under threat. Authorities issued warnings to
critical journalists and bloggers, searched their homes, and detained several of
them. 
In July, Russian security services questioned the editor of a major Crimean Tatar
newspaper in connection with the newspaper’s suspected “extremist” publica-
tions. In September, security services raided the newspaper’s office, seized
some recent publications, and threatened it with closure. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Unlike last year, the Kiev 2014 March for Equality was canceled because authori-
ties in the city were afraid they could not protect lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) participants and their allies. 
Russia’s state-sanctioned intolerance of the LGBT community crept into Ukraine.
There was an attempt to pass Ukrainian legislation mimicking Russia’s so-called
“anti-gay propaganda bill,” which aims to outlaw “pro-homosexual propa-
ganda,” any “positive depiction” of gay people, gay pride marches, or the
screening of films with an LGBT theme, like Milk.
Key International Actors
Throughout the year, the European Union, United States, NATO, and other key ac-
tors showed overwhelming support for the Ukrainian government without ade-
quately pressing human rights issues. The actors condemned Russia’s
occupation of Crimea and it’s backing of the armed insurgency in the east. 
In June, President Petro Poroshenko stated that Russia and Ukraine were at war,
and in August accused Russia of invading Ukrainian territory. More than a dozen
nations have condemned the reported use of cluster munitions in Ukraine. 
In March, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution, supported
by 100 members states but with 58 abstentions, on the territorial integrity of
Ukraine, which underscored that the referendum held in Crimea in March had
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“no validity” and could not “form the basis for any alteration of the status of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea or of the city of Sevastopol.” 
Since the beginning of the conflict in the east, the UN Office of the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights and the OSCE have set up on-the-ground monitoring
missions and deployed teams of human rights monitors to Ukraine, providing
regular reports and updates on human rights abuses. In June, the UN Human
Rights Council adopted a resolution on cooperation and assistance to Ukraine in
the field of human rights, calling upon the government of Ukraine to investigate
all allegations of rights violations and upon all concerned parties to provide ac-
cess to human rights monitors in Ukraine, including Crimea. 
Throughout the year, the OSCE’s representative on media freedom issued nu-
merous statements expressing concern over deteriorating media freedom in
Ukraine. In September, the representative called for an immediate stop to “hos-
tile behavior” against media in Crimea, citing in particular the fate of the weekly
newspaper of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, which had faced intimida-
tion by the de facto authorities since early September. 
In April, the secretary general of the Council of Europe (CoE) set up an interna-
tional advisory panel to oversee investigations into violence during the Maidan
protests and in Odessa in May. The Council’s Parliamentary Assembly held three
urgent debates on the situation in Ukraine, suspending the Russian delegation’s
voting rights in April. 
The CoE commissioner for human rights visited Ukraine three times. Following
his trip to Crimea in September, he called for an effective investigation into
abuses by the “self-defense” units in March. In February, the Committee for the
Prevention of Torture visited Kiev to look into treatment of people held during the
Maidan protests. 
In September, the European Parliament and Ukrainian authorities ratified the As-
sociation Agreement on deeper political association and free trade between the
EU and Ukraine. In response to Russia’s threat to impose harsher trade condi-
tions on Ukraine if the agreement went into effect immediately, Ukraine and the




United Arab Emirates 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) continued in 2014 to arbitrarily detain individu-
als it perceives as posing a threat to national security, and its security forces
continued to face allegations that they torture detainees in pretrial detention.
UAE courts invoked repressive laws to prosecute government critics, and a new
counterterrorism law poses a further threat to government critics and rights ac-
tivists. Migrant construction workers on one of the country’s most high-profile
projects continued to face serious exploitation, and female domestic workers
were still excluded from regulations that apply to workers in other sectors. 
Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Fair Trial
In January 2014, 20 Egyptians and 10 Emiratis received five-year jail sentences
on charges that they set up a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the country.
They alleged that UAE authorities subjected them to torture in detention and de-
nied them access to legal assistance for many months. 
In August, authorities detained 10 Libyan businessmen, at least 2 of whom
forcibly disappeared. In September, UAE authorities detained six Emiratis with
suspected links to local Islamist groups. At time of writing, authorities have not
charged any of the men, and their whereabouts remain unknown.
Two British nationals alleged that they endured torture in pretrial detention. Has-
nan Ali, whom a court acquitted of drug charges in April 2014, alleged that police
in Dubai beat and threatened to shoot and sexually assault him. Ahmed Zeidan,
who received a nine-year sentence for drug possession in May 2014, alleged that
police in Dubai held him in solitary confinement for eight days and threatened
him with sexual assault. Both men claim they signed legal statements in Arabic,
a language neither can read. 
In February 2014, the UN special rapporteur on the independence of judges and
lawyers criticized the lack of judicial independence in the UAE, arguing that the
executive branch exerts de facto control over the judiciary. She also expressed
concern over reports of the use of secret detention facilities and the ill-treatment
and torture of individuals held in incommunicado detention. 
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Freedom of Expression, Association, and Assembly
In August, the UAE issued a counter-terrorism law that will give UAE authorities
the power to prosecute peaceful critics, political dissidents and human rights ac-
tivists as terrorists. The law classifies a broad range of peaceful and legitimate
conduct as terrorism offenses and provides for the death penalty for, among
other things, undermining national unity. 
The UAE continued to use a repressive 2012 cybercrime law to prosecute critics
of the government. On March 10, 2014, a court found Emirati nationals Khalifa
Rabia and Othman al-Shehhi guilty of criticizing state security on Twitter, sen-
tencing them to five years in prison and fining them 500,000 AED (US$98,378).
The day after Rabia’s arrest, the government-linked Emirati television channel
24.ae aired a piece analyzing in detail his Twitter account, accusing him of “affil-
iation with secret cells,” and referring to his use of Twitter hashtags such as
#UAE_freemen as evidence. 
On November 25, the Federal Supreme Court sentenced Osama al-Najer to three
years in jail for charges that included “damaging the reputation of UAE institu-
tions” and “communicating with external organisations to provide misleading in-
formation.” Al-Najer had criticized the June 2013 conviction of 69 Emiratis with
ties to an Islamist group and was quoted in a Human Rights Watch press release
that contained credible allegations that the detainees had been tortured during
interrogations. 
In January 2014, authorities denied entry to a Human Rights Watch staff member
and placed two others on the blacklist as they left the country in the immediate
aftermath of the release of Human Rights Watch’s 2014 World Report. According
to UAE immigration law, the blacklist includes the names of individuals prohib-
ited to enter the country “for being dangerous to public security.” 
Migrant Workers
Foreigners account for more than 88.5 percent of UAE residents, according to
2011 government statistics, but despite labour reforms, low-paid migrant work-
ers continue to be subjected to abuses that amount to forced labor. Domestic
workers are particularly vulnerable to abuse, since they do not enjoy even the





which operates in all Gulf Cooperation Council states, ties migrant workers to in-
dividual employers who act as their visa sponsors. In practice, the system se-
verely restricts workers’ ability to change employers. The system gives employers
inordinate power over workers by entitling them to revoke migrant workers’
sponsorship at will, thereby removing their right to remain in the UAE and mak-
ing them liable to deportation. 
Under new regulations from 2010, workers covered under the labor law can
switch employers in certain cases. However, domestic workers—who are ex-
cluded from this reach—cannot transfer employers before their contract ends or
they receive their employer’s consent. 
Nearly five years after Human Rights Watch first revealed systematic human
rights violations of migrant workers on Abu Dhabi’s Saadiyat Island, a develop-
ment project which will host branches of the Louvre and Guggenheim museums
and New York University, some employers continued to withhold wages and ben-
efits from workers, failed to reimburse recruiting fees, confiscated worker pass-
ports, and housed workers in substandard accommodation. The government
summarily deported Saadiyat workers who went on strike to protest low pay after
their employers contacted the police. Despite significant and laudable labor law
reforms and policies implemented by the development companies involved in
the project, the lack of rigorous investigation, enforcement and sanction re-
sulted in ongoing abuses of workers. 
Domestic workers, a predominately female subset of the migrant worker popula-
tion, continued to experience a range of abuses. Some accused their employers
of having physically abused them, confined them to the homes in which they
worked, and confiscated their passports. Many said their employers failed to pay
the full wages due to them; forced them to work excessively long hours without
breaks or days off; or denied them adequate food, living conditions or medical
treatment. Some workers continued to be employed in circumstances that
amount to forced labor, slavery, or trafficking. 
Domestic workers are excluded from Ministry of Labor regulations that apply to
other migrant labor sectors, such as one that imposes fines on employers who
make the workers they contract pay recruitment fees. In March 2014, the Federal
National Council passed a motion to curb the increasingly high recruitment
agency fees for domestic workers. In June 2014, the authorities issued a revised
579
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
standard contract for domestic workers that now provides them with weekly days
off and 8 hours of rest in any 24-hour period. The contract, however, is no substi-
tute for labor law protections. 
Women’s Rights
Federal law No. 28 of 2005 regulates matters of personal status in the UAE and
some of its provisions discriminate against women. For example, it requires that
a male guardian conclude a woman’s marriage contract; likewise,talaq (unilat-
eral divorce) occurs when the husband makes a declaration before a judge. 
Domestic violence is permitted under UAE law. Article 53 of the UAE’s penal code
allows the imposition of “chastisement by a husband to his wife and the chas-
tisement of minor children” so long as the assault does not exceed the limits
prescribed by Sharia, or Islamic law. Article 56 of the UAE’s personal status code
obligates women to “obey” their husbands. In 2010, the UAE’s Federal Supreme
Court issued a ruling—citing the UAE penal code—that sanctions beating and
other forms of punishment or coercion by husbands on their wives, provided
they do not leave physical marks. 
Key International Actors
The UAE participated in United States-led airstrikes on militant Islamist forces in
Iraq and Syria during the year, and along with Egypt bombed Islamist militia
forces in Libya. 
The European Union holds human rights working group sessions with the UAE,
where it discusses women’s rights and migrant worker issues, but more con-




The United States has a vibrant civil society and strong constitutional protec-
tions for many basic rights. Yet, particularly in the areas of criminal justice, immi-
gration, and national security, US laws and practices routinely violate rights.
Often, those least able to defend their rights in court or through the political
process—racial and ethnic minorities, immigrants, children, the poor, and pris-
oners—are the people most likely to suffer abuses. 
The August 2014 police killing of an unarmed teenager, Michael Brown, in Fergu-
son, Missouri, and the subsequent police crackdown on protesters, underscored
the gulf between respect for equal rights and law enforcement’s treatment of
racial minorities. The repressive US response to a surge in unauthorized mi-
grants crossing the border from Mexico and Central America highlights the ur-
gent need for US immigration policy reform. 
US national security policies, including mass surveillance programs, are eroding
freedoms of the press, expression, and association. Discriminatory and unfair in-
vestigations and prosecutions of American Muslims are alienating the communi-
ties the US claims it wants as partners in combatting terrorism. 
A redacted summary of an extensive Senate report on CIA torture released in De-
cember is a first step toward addressing serious abuses committed in the years
after the attacks of September 11, 2001, but the Obama administration has failed
to bring those responsible for torture to justice. 
Harsh Sentencing
Reversing 3 years of slightly declining prison populations, at the end of 2013, the
state and federal prison population had grown by 0.3 percent to an estimated
1,574,700 people. At mid-2013, there were also 731,200 people in jails, resulting
in a total estimated 2.3 million people behind bars, the largest reported incarcer-
ated population in the world. 
Although crime continues to decline, punitive sentencing policies continue to
propel high rates of incarceration. Among state prisoners, over 46 percent were
incarcerated for nonviolent drug, property, and public order offenses. In the fed-





Between 90 and 95 percent of all state and federal criminal cases are resolved
by plea bargains. Prosecutors threaten defendants with far higher sentences if
they do not plead and instead choose to assert their right to a trial. Among fed-
eral drug defendants, for example, those who refuse to plead receive sentences
that are on average three times higher than those received by people who plead
guilty. Not surprisingly, only three percent of federal drug defendants risk going
to trial. 
The US Sentencing Commission took a step towards fairer drug sentencing when
it amended its guidelines to reduce sentences for most federal drug offenders,
including over 46,000 federal prisoners currently serving unnecessarily long
sentences who now will be eligible to seek a reduction. 
For the first time in 3 years, no states changed their laws to abolish the death
penalty; 18 states and the District of Columbia do not impose death sentences.
Washington State Governor Jay Inslee announced in February that he would grant
reprieves to any death penalty case that came before him, instituting, in effect, a
moratorium. 
At time of writing, 33 people had been executed in the US in 2014, by lethal in-
jection. Due to European drug manufacturers’ ban on the use of their products
for executions, many US states are using experimental drug combinations, while
refusing to disclose their composition. At least four of the men executed in 2014
showed visible signs of distress before they died. 
Racial Disparities in Criminal Justice
Racial disparities have long plagued the US criminal justice system. African
American men are incarcerated at six times the rate of white men, and three per-
cent of all black males are currently incarcerated in a state or federal prison.
There are many causes of racial disparities in incarceration, including drug law
enforcement practices. For example, whites and African Americans engage in
drug offenses at comparable rates, but are arrested, prosecuted, and incarcer-
ated for drug offenses at vastly different rates. 
Although African Americans are only 13 percent of the US population, they repre-





eral prisoners serving time for drug offenses. African Americans are nearly four
times more likely than whites to be arrested for marijuana possession. 
Racial disparities in criminal justice contributed to the outrage that erupted in
Ferguson, Missouri, following the August police killing of Michael Brown, an un-
armed 18-year-old African American. While Ferguson protests began in response
to that shooting, they revealed longstanding problems between the predomi-
nantly black Ferguson community and the almost entirely white police force. In
response to the protests, law enforcement agencies in a number of instances
used teargas, rubber bullets, and other intimidating tactics in apparent violation
of the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression, and engaged in
possible excessive use of force. 
Drug Policy Reform
Since the 1980s, the US has spent hundreds of billions of dollars to arrest and
incarcerate drug offenders in the US. Its heavy reliance on criminal laws for drug
control has had serious human rights costs, including infringement of the auton-
omy and privacy rights of those who simply possess or use drugs. 
In 2014, voters in Oregon and Alaska approved measures to legalize the produc-
tion, sale, distribution, and use of marijuana for recreational purposes, joining
Colorado and Washington State. The District of Columbia also decriminalized
possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal use. New York, Maryland,
and Minnesota joined 20 states and the District of Columbia in legalizing mari-
juana for medical purposes. 
Prison Conditions
Pressed by litigation and public advocacy, some US states and local govern-
ments are reconsidering their solitary confinement policies. Ohio agreed to
lessen and eventually end the use of solitary confinement in its juvenile facili-
ties. New York corrections officials agreed to develop strict new guidelines, limit-
ing the use of solitary as a punishment except for the most severe infractions
and eliminating the use of solitary confinement for inmates younger than 18. In
California, a federal court ordered prisons to change policies on the use of soli-
tary as punishment for prisoners with mental illness. Nonetheless, many prison-
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ers and jail inmates—including children—are still held in harsh conditions of
nearly round-the-clock isolation and idleness, often for months or even years on
end. 
Poverty and Criminal Justice
Many poor defendants across the country languish in pretrial detention in large
part because they cannot afford to post rising bail costs. Extremely high court
and monitoring fees are also increasingly common, as cash-strapped counties
and municipalities often expect their courts to pay for themselves or even tap
them as sources of public revenue. The impact on poor defendants is particularly
harsh. 
In 2014, Human Rights Watch reported on widespread abuses linked to the pri-
vatization of misdemeanor probation services in several US states. Operating
under an “offender-funded” model, probation companies charge offenders di-
rectly for their services and may secure the arrest of those who fail to pay. Fees
are structured in ways that penalize the poor, and there is a general lack of
proper government oversight or accountability. 
In April, Georgia Governor Nathan Deal vetoed a bill that would have helped
shield probation companies from public scrutiny. Georgia’s legislature is likely
to take the issue up again in 2015, and will have an opportunity to introduce
badly-needed oversight and accountability mechanisms that could be a model
for other states. 
Youth in the Criminal Justice System
Every US jurisdiction allows children under the age of 18 to be prosecuted as
adults and sentenced to adult prison terms in certain circumstances. At the end
of 2013, 1,200 children were being held in adult state prison facilities. Florida
held a greater number of children in adult facilities than any other state, partly
as a result of its policy of granting prosecutors sole discretion over the prosecu-
tion of children in adult court. Fourteen other states also permit prosecutors to








States continue to grapple with a US Supreme Court decision banning manda-
tory life without parole sentences for youth offenders convicted of homicides.
While a majority of US states have found the Supreme Court ruling to be retroac-
tive, in July, the Michigan Supreme Court found that the decision did not apply to
youth already serving mandatory life without parole sentences.
Rights of Non-Citizens 
From October 2013 through September 2014, US Customs and Border Protection
apprehended 68,541 unaccompanied children from Central America and Mexico
and 68,445 non-citizens in family units near the US-Mexico border. These figures
represent 77 percent and 361 percent increases from the previous year, respec-
tively. In response, the Obama administration dramatically expanded detention
of unauthorized families and expedited deportations. In October, Human Rights
Watch documented how Central American migrants who had fled to the US fear-
ing for their lives were deported without sufficient opportunity to seek protec-
tion. 
In June, the administration opened the first of three new family detention centers
dedicated primarily to holding and facilitating the deportation of mothers and
children from Central America. Many detained families are seeking asylum; yet,
even when the US finds them to have a credible fear of returning to their coun-
tries, it denies them release on bond, categorically arguing that they are “na-
tional security” threats without conducting individualized risk assessments. 
Legislative efforts toward legal status for millions of unauthorized migrants in
the US foundered in 2014. In November, the Obama administration announced
executive branch policy changes to provide temporary legal status to over four
million unauthorized immigrants without certain criminal convictions who have
lived in the United States for five years or more and have US citizen or legal per-
manent resident children. These policies will likely protect millions of families
from the threat of arbitrary separation. However, they do not alter border policies
that result in the summary deportation and criminal punishment of people with
deep ties to the US.
In 2014, over 166 local jurisdictions instructed police not to fulfill some requests
from federal authorities to further detain apprehended non-citizens for immigra-





Barack Obama’s November executive action limited such federal-local collabora-
tion on immigration matters, recognizing it had exacerbated mistrust of law en-
forcement. 
Labor Rights
Hundreds of thousands of children work on US farms. The 1938 Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act exempts child farmworkers from the minimum age and maximum hour
requirements that protect other working children. Child farmworkers often work
10 or more hours a day and risk pesticide exposure, heat illness, and injuries. 
Child labor is common on tobacco farms in the US, the world’s fourth largest to-
bacco producer. Child tobacco workers suffer vomiting, headaches, and other
symptoms consistent with acute nicotine poisoning. 
Congress has not closed a legal loophole allowing children to do hazardous work
in agriculture at 16; hazardous work is prohibited in all other jobs until 18. US
laws and regulations include no special provisions to protect child tobacco work-
ers from nicotine exposure. 
Health Policy
US military veterans face systemic barriers in accessing health care, including
long delays in obtaining adequate care at Department of Veteran Affairs (VA)
health centers. 
Tens of thousands of veterans are unable to get effective help to prevent over-
dose, treat opioid dependence, and end chronic homelessness. The US Con-
gress passed the Veterans’ Access to Care through Choice, Accountability and
Transparency Act of 2014 in August, to improve and expand veterans’ access to
medical services. 
Thirty-four states have criminal laws that punish HIV-positive people for expos-
ing others to the virus. In June, Iowa became the first to amend (but not fully re-





Women’s and Girls’ Rights
In June, the US Supreme Court ruled in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. that
certain for-profit corporations can refuse to cover contraception in employee
health insurance plans based on the corporate owner’s religious views that life
begins at conception. Over two-thirds of employed US adults under 65 get their
health insurance through an employer. 
While state legislatures enacted fewer regulations targeting abortion providers
in 2014, the impact of the surge in restrictions from 2011 to 2013 became more
visible. In Texas, the number of abortion clinics has declined by almost half
since 2011, with more closures possible depending on the outcome of litigation
over onerous abortion provider and facility requirements passed in 2013.  
One in five women is sexually assaulted in college, according to a 2010 report by
the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. In January, the Obama admin-
istration established the White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual
Assault, which published its first set of recommendations in April. Meanwhile,
survivors from colleges across the country continued to expose how schools and
local police mishandled their cases. 
Police in Memphis, Detroit, and Cleveland analyzed forensic exams (rape kits)
that had been left in storage for years. The test results led to the discovery of
dozens of serial rapists and scores of indictments. The backlogs underscored a
broader problem of police not properly investigating sexual assaults. 
Following Human Rights Watch’s exposure of the Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment’s mishandling of sexual assault cases, the District of Columbia Council
passed a law establishing independent oversight of police and allowing victims
to have an advocate present during police interviews. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
At time of writing, same-sex couples can marry in 35 states, the District of Colum-
bia, and the city of St. Louis. The US Supreme Court decided in October 2014 to
let stand three federal appeals court rulings that overturned same-sex marriage





President Obama signed an executive order in June 2014 that prohibits work-
place discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity by com-
panies awarded federal contracts and outlaws discrimination based on gender
identity for federal employees. In August 2014, in response to a 2012 Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission decision, the US Department of Labor an-
nounced plans to issue new guidance making clear that discrimination on the
basis of transgender status is prohibited under the existing definition of discrim-
ination based on sex in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
However, the US Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of religious exemption in
the Hobby Lobby case could set a precedent undermining protections for les-
bian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people on religious grounds. 
Twelve US states retain sodomy laws. Since April 2013, legislatures in Montana
and Virginia have repealed their states’ sodomy laws. Louisiana’s legislature
voted to uphold the state’s law in April 2014. 
National Security 
For the 13th year, the US detained men at Guantanamo Bay without charge or
trial; at time of writing, 143 detainees remained at the facility. The Obama ad-
ministration resumed transfers from Guantanamo in August 2013 after a long
lull, sending 11 detainees to their home or third countries by the end of that year.
In late 2013, Congress added new provisions to the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act (NDAA) that gave the administration more flexibility to make transfers.
Yet, since the change, the pace of transfers out of Guantanamo has not changed
significantly; at time of writing, only 12 detainees had been transferred out of
Guantanamo in 2014. 
The Defense Department continued to force-feed Guantanamo detainees on
hunger strike using methods that remain classified and has stopped reporting
on the number of ongoing hunger strikes. The few details disclosed raise serious
concerns that the forced-feedings violate medical ethics and care standards, and
amount to ill-treatment under international law. A federal court ordered the re-
lease of videos of the forced-feeding of one detainee but refused to issue an in-
junction to change the forced-feeding procedures. The US, at time of writing, was
considering appealing the decision regarding the release of the videos. 
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The Obama administration continued to pursue cases before the military com-
missions at Guantanamo Bay. This system fails to protect attorney-client commu-
nications, allows the introduction of coerced evidence, and uses rules that block
defense counsel from access to information essential to the case—such as their
clients’ treatment while in secret CIA custody. 
The US brought one new case in the commissions against a detainee accused of
crimes connected to attacks on US troops in Afghanistan, among other allega-
tions. Two other pending cases, including the one against five men accused of
plotting the September 11, 2001 attacks, languished in pretrial hearings, with a
trial date likely years away. 
In July, Human Rights Watch released a report documenting abusive counterter-
rorism investigations against often vulnerable American Muslims, including indi-
gent people or those with intellectual and mental disabilities, who were unlikely
to ever have been involved in terrorist activities were it not for the government’s
involvement. The government also makes use of overly broad material support
charges, prosecutorial tactics that may violate fair trial rights, and harsh condi-
tions of confinement. 
The US continued to conduct targeted killing operations in Afghanistan, Pak-
istan, Yemen, and Somalia, purporting to follow administration policy guidelines
announced in 2013 that the targets of strikes pose a continuing, imminent threat
to the US and that there be near certainty that no civilians will be harmed. 
A Human Rights Watch investigation of a December 2013 strike on a wedding
procession in Yemen that killed 12 people and wounded at least 15 more found
that many, if not all, of those killed were civilians, contrary to the policy guide-
lines and in apparent violation of the laws of war. The Yemeni government re-
portedly paid more than US$1 million in total to the families of those killed or
injured in the strike. Payments were also reportedly made to the relatives of an
anti-Al-Qaeda cleric killed in a US drone strike in 2013. 
US policy and practice of targeted killings remained shrouded in secrecy. In re-
sponse to a court case, the administration was forced to disclose a Justice De-
partment memo, substantially redacted, providing the legal rationale for a strike
that killed a US citizen in Yemen in 2011. However, the administration has not
provided the legal memoranda justifying targeted killings in other contexts. 
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The US Senate Intelligence Committee released in December a 499-page
redacted executive summary of a 6,700-page report on the Central Intelligence
Agency ’s (CIA) detention and interrogation program. The report shows that the
interrogation techniques used by the CIA were far more brutal and widespread
than previously reported, including previously unreported forms of torture and
sexual assault such as “rectal rehydration.” The report also found that the inter-
rogation techniques used by the CIA were ineffective at gathering useful or valu-
able intelligence, and that the CIA repeatedly lied about the program and for
years sought to cover up its crimes. The US has failed to prosecute the US offi-
cials responsible for authorizing and carrying out torture and other ill-treatment
of detainees in US custody since 9/11.
Documents leaked to journalists by former National Security Agency (NSA) con-
tractor Edward Snowden continued to reveal new details about US surveillance
programs. In the last year, reports based on the Snowden documents show that
the US may be collecting millions of text messages worldwide each day and in-
tercepting all phone calls and metadata in the Bahamas and Afghanistan, and
gathering all phone metadata in Mexico, Kenya, and the Philippines. A July news
story said several prominent American Muslim leaders, including the head of a
Muslim civil liberties group, were targeted with electronic surveillance. 
On January 17, 2014, President Obama announced additional measures to re-
strict the use, retention, and dissemination of personal data gathered by intelli-
gence services in Presidential Policy Directive 28. However, these measures fell
short of ensuring that interference with privacy was limited to what was neces-
sary and proportionate, and they left open the possibility of large-scale collec-
tion. Also, while the measures purported to bring rules on surveillance of non-US
persons (foreigners abroad) closer to those governing data collected on US per-
sons, the rules are vague and create no justiciable rights. 
In March, the UN Human Rights Committee called on the US to ensure that its
surveillance activities respect privacy rights under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, regardless of the nationality or location of individuals
being monitored. It also expressed concern over the lack of transparency in US
laws and court rulings governing surveillance. 
In July, Human Rights Watch released a report documenting how large-scale US
surveillance is hampering journalists and lawyers in their work, making it more
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difficult to protect sources, and leading journalists to go to extreme lengths to
avoid detection: from using encryption to burner phones, to ceasing all elec-
tronic communication. As a result, far less information about matters of public
concern may be seeing the light of day. 
Also in July, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced a new version of the USA Freedom
Act that would have limited some forms of domestic surveillance, while doing al-
most nothing to safeguard the privacy of foreigners abroad. However, it failed to
move forward in the Senate. 
Foreign Policy
In August, the US launched air strikes against the extremist group Islamic State
(also known as ISIS) forces in Iraq as part of a US-led coalition that includes five
Arab countries; in September, the US expanded the air strikes to Syria against
ISIS and another extremist group, Jabhat al-Nusra. President Obama also an-
nounced he was deploying additional US military personnel to Iraq and was in-
creasing military assistance to armed groups opposed to the Assad government
in Syria. 
Following the disputed presidential election results in Afghanistan in April and
August, US Secretary of State John Kerry helped broker a power-sharing agree-
ment in Afghanistan. US troops prepared to withdraw from Afghanistan by the
end of the year, leaving about 10,000 to train, advise, and assist Afghan security
forces. The US signed a Bilateral Security Agreement with the new Afghan gov-
ernment in October. 
Following the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich in February and
ensuing violence, the US placed sanctions on Russia’s financial, energy, and de-
fense sectors.
In June and September, the Obama administration announced a US ban on the
production and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines as well as on their use
outside of the Korean peninsula, measures that bring it in closer alignment with
the Mine Ban Treaty. 
In August, the US hosted 45 African heads of state at the first US-Africa Summit,




Uzbekistan’s atrocious rights record did not discernibly improve in 2014. Author-
itarian President Islam Karimov, who entered his 25th year in power, continued
to employ a widespread security apparatus to monitor and crack down on activi-
ties of real and perceived opponents.
Authorities repress all forms of freedom of expression and do not allow any or-
ganized political opposition, independent media, free trade unions, independ-
ent civil society organizations, or religious freedom. Those who attempt to assert
rights, or act in ways deemed contrary to state interests, face arbitrary detention,
lack of due process, and torture. Forced labor of adults and children continues. 
A much-publicized feud between Gulnara Karimova, the president’s daughter,
and her sister and mother, as well as with the country’s repressive National Se-
curity Services (SNB) that unfolded on Twitter and in the press revealed a level of
infighting within the political elite in unprecedented fashion. Karimova’s accusa-
tions about corruption within the political elite and SNB officials’ use of torture
brought to the fore many politically sensitive topics. But there were no signs that
the feud led to more space for free expression inside the country. 
Imprisonment and Harassment of Critics
The Uzbek government has imprisoned thousands of people on politically moti-
vated charges to enforce its repressive rule, targeting human rights and opposi-
tion activists, journalists, religious believers, artists, and other perceived critics. 
Among those imprisoned for no other reason than peacefully exercising their
right to freedom of expression were 14 human rights activists: Azam Farmonov,
Mehriniso Hamdamova, Zulhumor Hamdamova, Isroiljon Kholdorov, Gaybullo
Jalilov, Nuriddin Jumaniyazov, Matluba Kamilova, Ganikhon Mamatkhanov,
Chuyan Mamatkulov, Zafarjon Rahimov, Yuldash Rasulov, Bobomurod Razzokov,
Fahriddin Tillaev, and Akzam Turgunov. Five more are journalists: Solijon Abdu-
rakhmanov, Muhammad Bekjanov, Gayrat Mikhliboev, Yusuf Ruzimuradov, and
Dilmurod Saidov. Four others are opposition activists: Murod Juraev, Samandar
Kukanov, Kudratbek Rasulov, and Rustam Usmanov. Three are independent reli-





Seven others are perceived to be government critics or witnesses to the May 13,
2005 Andijan massacre, when Uzbek government forces shot and killed hun-
dreds of mainly peaceful protesters. Those imprisoned include Dilorom Ab-
dukodirova, Botirbek Eshkuziev, Bahrom Ibragimov, Davron Kabilov, Erkin
Musaev, Davron Tojiev, and Ravshanbek Vafoev. Many were in serious ill-health,
had been tortured, and had their sentences arbitrarily extended in prison. 
In January, police detained and fined independent photographer Umida Akhme-
dova, her son, and five others for holding a peaceful demonstration near the
Ukrainian embassy in Tashkent in support of Ukraine’s “Euromaidan,” a pro-
democracy movement. Akhmedova and her son were released one day later; at
least 3 others were sentenced to 15 days’ administrative detention. 
In March, after investigations that lacked due process, a Tashkent court sen-
tenced Fahriddin Tillaev and Nuriddin Jumaniyazov, labor rights advocates, to
more than eight years in prison on fabricated human trafficking charges. 
The same month, authorities arbitrarily extended for an unspecified number of
years the sentence of imprisoned rights activist Ganikhon Mamatkhanov, who
had been serving a five-year sentence on politically motivated fraud charges. 
In June, rights activist Abdurasul Khudoynazarov died just 26 days after his re-
lease from prison, having served more than eight years of a nine-year sentence
on trumped up charges. Officials released him the same day that prison doctors
diagnosed him with advanced liver cancer. He told rights groups that officials
had consistently denied his requests for medical treatment since his imprison-
ment in 2006. 
Also in June, a Tashkent court convicted journalist Said Abdurakhimov, who
writes under the pseudonym “Sid Yanyshev” for FerganaNews, a site banned in
Uzbekistan, on charges of “threaten[ing] public security,” among others. The
court fined Abdurakhimov 100 times the minimum wage (approximately
US$3,200) and confiscated his video camera. 
In September, authorities introduced amendments that imposed new restric-
tions on bloggers, including a ban on “untrue posts and re-posts.” Dunja Mija-
tovic, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
representative on freedom of the media, warned the measures would further un-
dermine free expression in Uzbekistan. 
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Also in September, airport authorities prevented Feruza Khurramova, wife of ex-
iled opposition activist Bahodir Choriev, and her son, both Uzbek citizens, from
entering the country after they flew to Tashkent from the United States, where
they reside. After being detained for several hours, authorities notified Khur-
ramova that she and her son had been “stripped of their citizenship” and de-
ported them to Turkey. Uzbek officials later informed other relatives of Choriev
living outside Uzbekistan that they had also been stripped of their citizenship,
citing an order of President Karimov. 
Criminal Justice and Torture
In November 2013, the United Nations Committee against Torture stated that tor-
ture is “systematic,” “unpunished,” and “encouraged” by law enforcement offi-
cers in Uzbekistan’s police stations, prisons, and detention facilities run by the
SNB. Methods include beating with batons and plastic bottles, hanging by wrists
and ankles, rape, and sexual humiliation. 
Although authorities introduced habeas corpus in 2008, there has been no per-
ceptible reduction in the use of torture in pretrial custody or enhanced due
process for detainees. Authorities routinely deny detainees and prisoners access
to counsel, and the state-controlled bar association has disbarred lawyers that
take on politically sensitive cases. 
A lawyer for imprisoned activists Nuriddin Jumaniyazov and Fahriddin Tillaev told
Human Rights Watch that, in January 2014, authorities stuck needles between
Tillaev’s fingers and toes during an interrogation to force a false confession re-
lated to trumped-up charges. 
In July, the wife of imprisoned rights activist Chuyan Mamatkulov told Human
Rights Watch that on April 20, a prison captain named Sherali had repeatedly
struck Mamatkulov on the head with a rubber truncheon in his office after Ma-
matkulov had asked to see a dentist. He was then put in solitary confinement for
24 hours. 
The Andijan Massacre
For nearly a decade, the Uzbek government has refused an independent investi-
gation into the 2005 government massacre in Andijan. Authorities persecute
WORLD REPORT 2015
602
anyone suspected of having witnessed the atrocities or who attempts to speak
about them publicly. 
In 2014, Human Rights Watch confirmed that authorities in 2012 arbitrarily ex-
tended by 8 years the 10-year prison sentence of Dilorom Abdukodirova, an eye-
witness to the massacre. After fleeing to Kyrgyzstan in 2005, she settled in
Australia. She was immediately arrested and imprisoned on her return in 2010,
despite assurances she would not face prosecution.
Forced Sterilization
In 2014, Human Rights Watch interviewed gynecologists from Uzbekistan who re-
ported that the Ministry of Health orders some doctors to perform a certain num-
ber of forced sterilizations each month. Some women who have given birth to
two or more children have been targeted for involuntary sterilization, especially
in rural areas. Gynecologists confirmed that surgical sterilizations are performed
without women’s informed consent and in unsafe medical facilities. 
Freedom of Religion
Authorities imprison religious believers who practice their faith outside state
controls. In July, the Initiative Group of Independent Human Rights Defenders
(IGIHRD) estimated that more than 12,000 persons are currently imprisoned on
vague charges related to “extremism” or “anti-constitutional” activity, with sev-
eral hundred convicted in the past 12 months. Authorities also harass and fine
Christians who conduct religious activities for administrative offenses, such as
illegal religious teaching. 
In October, Forum 18 reported the death in custody at a women’s prison outside
Tashkent of Nilufar Rahimjonova. Rahimjonova, 37, had been serving a 10-year
sentence on “terrorism” charges—apparent retaliation for her links to her father,
theologian Domullo Istaravshani and husband, both based in Iran and critics of
the Uzbek government. After her arrest in 2011, Rahimjonova was forced to give
an incriminating TV interview against her family and was sentenced following a
flawed trial and allegations of ill-treatment. She was not known to have suffered
any chronic illnesses prior to her death on September 13, 2014, the cause of
which remains unknown. Authorities ordered her brother to bury her body
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quickly without an autopsy. Human rights activists fear Rahimjonova may have
died of torture. 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Consensual sexual relations between men are criminalized with a maximum
prison sentence of three years. Activists report that police use blackmail and ex-
tortion against gay men due to their sexual orientation, threatening to out or im-
prison them. LGBT community members face deep-rooted homophobia and
discrimination. 
Forced Labor
State-organized forced labor of children and adults in the cotton sector remains
widespread. Authorities force over two million adults and schoolchildren, mainly
ages 15-17 but some even younger, to harvest cotton for up to two months each
autumn. 
Following international pressure, the government reduced the numbers of young
children sent to harvest cotton in 2014, as it had done in 2013, but increased the
use of older children and adults. The forced labor of adults disrupts the delivery
of essential services nationwide, as authorities mobilize public sector workers—
including doctors, nurses, and teachers—to fill quotas. 
In February, the International Labour Organization (ILO) reported the findings of
its mission to monitor child labor during the 2013 cotton harvest. While finding
that the practice was not “systematic,” the report noted the use of child labor,
and emphasized concerns about the use of forced labor, which it recommended
the government take steps to eliminate. Uzbek civil society reported that the ILO
mission did not undertake a comprehensive assessment of the harvest since it
did not include forced adult labor or ensure Uzbek civil society’s participation,
and was not independent because monitoring teams included Uzbek govern-
ment representatives. 
Key International Actors
Uzbekistan’s record of cooperation with UN human rights mechanisms is ar-
guably among the worst in the world. For the past 12 years, it has ignored re-
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quests for access by all 11 UN human rights experts, and has rejected virtually all
recommendations that international bodies have made for human rights im-
provements. 
The United States government resisted imposing any serious policy conse-
quences for Uzbekistan’s dismal rights record, viewing Tashkent as a key ally
along the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) that it is using to withdraw sup-
plies from the war in Afghanistan. 
In 2014, for the second year in a row, the State Department’s human trafficking
report placed Uzbekistan in the lowest category—“Tier III”—based on Tashkent’s
systematic use of forced labor. For the sixth consecutive year, the State Depart-
ment also designated Uzbekistan as a “country of particular concern” due to its
serial violations of religious freedom, but the White House waived the sanctions
envisaged under both statutes citing national security grounds. 
The European Union did not publicly express concern about Uzbekistan’s deteri-
orating record, nor did it follow through with any known consequences for
Tashkent’s failure to meet the reform expectations that EU foreign ministers set
out in 2010. President Karimov was invited for state visits to European capitals,
including Riga and Prague, although the latter was canceled in February after an
outcry by rights groups. 
In 2014, the Asian Development Bank and World Bank approved investments in
Uzbekistan’s irrigation sector, despite concerns raised by civil society activists
that doing so before the Uzbek government has acted meaningfully to end forced
labor and allow monitoring by independent civil society could support ongoing




In 2014, security forces used excessive force against largely peaceful demonstra-
tors, many of whom were arbitrarily arrested, subject to severe beatings and
other abuses during their detention, and denied basic due process rights. These
human rights violations, which occurred over a period of several weeks in differ-
ent locations, were practiced systematically by Venezuelan security forces. 
Under the leadership of President Hugo Chávez and now President Nicolás
Maduro, the accumulation of power in the executive branch and the erosion of
human rights guarantees have enabled the government to intimidate, censor,
and prosecute its critics. While some Venezuelans continue to criticize the gov-
ernment, the prospect of reprisals—in the form of arbitrary or abusive state ac-
tion—has undercut judicial independence, and forced journalists and rights
defenders to weigh the consequences of publicizing information and opinions
that are critical of the government. 
Police abuse, poor prison conditions, and impunity for abuses by security forces
remain serious problems. 
Excessive Use of Force against Unarmed Protesters 
Beginning in February 2014, state security forces—including the Bolivarian Na-
tional Guard, the Bolivarian National Police, and state police forces—routinely
used unlawful force against unarmed protesters and bystanders. The violations
included severe beatings; the indiscriminate firing of live ammunition, rubber
bullets, and teargas into crowds; and, in some cases, the deliberate firing of pel-
lets at point blank range at unarmed individuals already in custody. Security
forces also tolerated and sometimes collaborated directly with armed pro-gov-
ernment gangs that attacked protesters with impunity. According to the Attorney
General’s Office, 3,306 people, including 400 adolescents, were detained during
the demonstrations. 
Detainees were often held incommunicado on military bases for 48 hours or
more before being presented to a judge. During their detention, they suffered a





being forced to squat or kneel, without moving, for hours at a time. In some
cases, the ill-treatment constituted torture. 
Judicial Independence
Since former President Chávez and his supporters in the National Assembly con-
ducted a political takeover of the Supreme Court in 2004, the judiciary has
largely ceased to function as an independent branch of government. Members of
the Supreme Court have openly rejected the principle of separation of powers,
publicly pledged their commitment to advancing the government’s political
agenda, and repeatedly ruled in favor of the government, validating the govern-
ment’s disregard for human rights. 
Judge María Lourdes Afiuni remains under criminal prosecution as a result of a
2009 ruling in which she authorized the conditional release of a government
critic. Although Afiuni’s ruling complied with a recommendation by international
human rights monitors—and was consistent with Venezuelan law— a provisional
judge who had publicly pledged his loyalty to Chávez ordered her to stand trial
on charges of corruption, abuse of authority, and “favoring the evasion of jus-
tice.” She continues to be forbidden from making any public statements about
her case. 
During the 2014 protests, justice officials failed to fulfil their role as a safeguard
against abuse of power and instead were party to serious due process viola-
tions. Scores of victims were denied access to a lawyer until minutes before judi-
cial hearings, which were often scheduled in the middle of the night.
Prosecutors and judges routinely turned a blind eye to evidence suggesting that
detainees had been physically abused, or that security forces had planted evi-
dence against them. 
Justice officials also acted on the government’s unsupported claim that its politi-
cal opponents were responsible for the violence that erupted during the demon-
strations. The government accused Leopoldo López, an opposition leader, of
being the “intellectual author” of the protest-related deaths and attacks against
public offices and vehicles on February 12. The Attorney General’s Office
promptly sought his arrest for several alleged crimes. López has been in deten-
tion in a military prison since he turned himself in on February 18. During his
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trial, which began in July, the presiding judge has not allowed his lawyers to
present evidence in his defense. 
In April, the Supreme Court summarily tried and sentenced two opposition may-
ors to 10 and 12 months in prison, respectively, in proceedings that violated
basic due process guarantees, including their right to appeal their convictions. 
Freedom of Expression
Over the past decade, the government has expanded and abused its powers to
regulate media. While criticism of the government is available in some newspa-
pers and radio stations, fear of government reprisals has made self-censorship a
serious problem.
In 2010, the National Assembly amended the telecommunications law to grant
the government power to suspend or revoke concessions to private outlets if it is
“convenient for the interests of the nation.” It also expanded the scope of a re-
strictive broadcasting statute to cover the Internet, allowing the arbitrary sus-
pension of websites for the vaguely defined offense of “incitement.” Previous
amendments to the criminal code had expanded the scope and severity
of defamation laws that criminalize disrespect of high government officials. 
The government has taken aggressive steps to reduce the availability of media
outlets that engage in critical programming. Venezuela’s oldest private televi-
sion channel, RCTV, which was arbitrarily removed from public airwaves in 2007,
was driven off cable TV in 2010. In 2013, Globovisión, which was for years the
only major channel that remained critical of Chávez, was sold to government
supporters because, according to its owner, it had become politically, economi-
cally, and legally unviable. Since then, Globovisión has significantly reduced its
critical programming. 
In January, the president of the National Assembly, Diosdado Cabello, filed a
criminal defamation suit against a citizen who published an opinion piece in the
newspaper Tal Cual, and four directors of the company that owns the paper, in-
cluding its editor. The article cited unofficial sources for the number of people
killed in Venezuela in 2013, and quoted Cabello saying: “If you don’t like insecu-
rity, leave.” Cabello argued that he had never said that, and that the article un-
dermined his reputation. A criminal court admitted the case in March, ordered
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the five men to present themselves before the courts once a week, and forbade
them from leaving the country without prior judicial authorization. 
During the 2014 protests, the government blocked transmission of NTN 24, a
cable news channel, and threatened to prosecute news outlets over their cover-
age of the violence. In many instances, victims of security force abuses were pro-
fessional journalists and people who had been taking photos or filming security
force confrontations with protesters. 
Human Rights Defenders
The Venezuelan government has sought to marginalize the country’s human
rights defenders through repeated unsubstantiated allegations that they are
seeking to undermine Venezuelan democracy with the support of the US govern-
ment. In March, President Maduro stated that Rocío San Miguel, director of a
nongovernmental organization (NGO) that promotes accountability of security
forces, was “fully involved in an attempted coup” in Venezuela. In May, the min-
ister of justice said that Humberto Prado, director of an NGO that monitors
prison conditions in Venezuela, was involved in a conspiracy plot to undermine
the Venezuelan government. In November, the president of the National Assem-
bly, Diosdado Cabello, citing information provided by “patriotic informants,”
said that 12 NGOs that submitted reports on torture during the United Nations
Committee Against Torture’s review of Venezuela had “dark interests.” 
In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that individuals or organizations that receive
foreign funding could be prosecuted for “treason.” In addition, the National As-
sembly enacted legislation blocking organizations that “defend political rights”
or “monitor the performance of public bodies” from receiving international as-
sistance. 
Impunity of Abuses of Security Forces
As of November, prosecutors had received 242 complaints of alleged human
rights violations committed during the 2014 protests, including only two cases of
torture. According to the Attorney General’s Office, prosecutors had concluded
125 investigations, bringing charges against 15 members of public security
forces. Official sources reported that two police officials were convicted for
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“events occurred in Anzoátegui” but provided no additional information on the
case nor the convictions. 
Killings by security forces are a chronic problem in Venezuela. In October, mem-
bers of the Scientific, Penal, and Criminal Investigative Police killed five civilians
during a search in the building of a pro-government group in Caracas. The Attor-
ney General’s Office issued arrest warrants against seven officers, who, accord-
ing to official news accounts, remained at large at time of writing. 
According to the most recent official statistics, law enforcement agents allegedly
killed 7,998 people between January 2000 and March 2009. Impunity for these
crimes remains the norm. 
Prison Conditions
Venezuelan prisons are among the most violent in Latin America. Weak security,
deteriorating infrastructure, overcrowding, insufficient and poorly trained
guards, and corruption allow armed gangs to effectively control prisons. Children
deprived of liberty are routinely held with adults, particularly during pretrial de-
tention. According to the Venezuelan Observatory of Prisons, as of August there
were approximately 55,000 inmates—most of them in pretrial detention—in pris-
ons with a capacity for 19,000. Since the Ministry of Penitentiary Matters was
created in June 2011, at least 1,463 people have died in prisons, including at
least 150 in 2014, according to unofficial sources. 
Labor Rights
Labor legislation adopted in April 2012 includes provisions that limit the free-
dom of unions to draft their statutes and elect their representatives. In practice,
the National Electoral Council (CNE), a public authority, continues to play a role
in union elections, violating international standards. 
In July, President Maduro denounced protesting workers at the state-owned steel
corporation Sidor, accusing them of being “mafias” that had “kidnapped” the
company. Clashes between workers and members of the National Guard dispers-
ing the demonstrations left some injured protesters, according to press reports.
In August, the communications minister tweeted that the government had
reached an agreement with the “true workers” of Sidor. Protests and strikes by
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workers who argued that the agreement was not signed by competent union rep-
resentatives continued during that month. 
Key International Actors
Several international human rights monitors have expressed concern regarding
abuses during the 2014 protests. In February, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights urged Venezuela to investigate unlawful actions and guarantee
public security. In March, six UN rapporteurs called on the Venezuelan govern-
ment to ensure “prompt clarification of allegations of arbitrary detention, exces-
sive use of force and violence against protesters, journalists and media workers
during protests.” 
In September, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary detention stated that Leopoldo
López and one of the mayors convicted in April had been arbitrarily detained. In
October, the UN high commissioner for human rights urged Venezuela to release
arbitrarily detained protestors and politicians. For years, Venezuela’s govern-
ment has refused to authorize these human rights experts to conduct fact-find-
ing visits in the country. 
The regional organization Unasur engaged with the government of Venezuela
and opposition leaders in early 2014 to promote dialogue. The Unasur represen-
tatives, however, failed to call on Venezuela to address abuses, even though
Unasur’s constitutive treaty states that “fully effective democratic institutions
and the unrestricted respect for human rights are essential conditions for build-
ing a common future of peace, economic and social prosperity and for the devel-
opment of integration processes among the Member States.” The dialogue was
stalled at time of writing. 
In July, the US Department of State revoked the visas of 24 Venezuelan officials
in response to allegations of excessive use of force and arbitrary detentions
against protesters. 
Since 2013, as a consequence of the government’s decision to withdraw from
the American Convention on Human Rights, Venezuelan citizens and residents
are unable to request the intervention of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights when local remedies for abuses are ineffective or unavailable for any
abuses committed since that date. The Inter-American Commission has contin-
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ued to monitor the situation in Venezuela applying the American Declaration of
Rights and Duties of Man. 
The Venezuelan government continued to support a campaign by Ecuador to un-
dermine the independence of the commission and limit the funding and effec-
tiveness of its special rapporteurship on freedom of expression. 
In light of local groups’ claims that patients with cancer, HIV/AIDS, and hemo-
philia, among other illnesses, had limited access to medicines and basic med-
ical supplies, the UN special rapporteur on the right to health urged the
Venezuelan government in April 2014 to “adopt all the necessary measures to
guarantee the protection and full enjoyment of the highest attainable standard
of physical and mental health for all the population.”
As a member of the UN Human Rights Council, Venezuela regularly voted to pre-
vent scrutiny of serious human rights situations around the world. Venezuela
voted down resolutions spotlighting abuses in North Korea, Syria, Iran, Sri
Lanka, Belarus, and Ukraine. In October, Venezuela was elected to a two-year




The human rights situation in Vietnam remained critical in 2014. The Communist
Party of Vietnam (CPV) continued its one-party rule, in place since 1975. Main-
taining its monopoly on state power, it faced growing public discontent with the
lack of basic freedoms. While fewer bloggers and activists were arrested than in
2013, the security forces increased various forms of harassment and intimidation
of critics. 
Denial of rights and endemic official corruption are widely seen as stifling Viet-
nam’s political and economic progress. The growth of critical discourse on blogs,
Facebook, and other forms of social media has challenged the government’s
ability to dominate public opinion. Anti-China sentiment has continued to grow
as the maritime dispute between Vietnam and China has intensified. In May
2014, violent protests against China erupted in Binh Duong and Ha Tinh
provinces, causing the death of four Chinese nationals and the destruction of fa-
cilities of many foreign-owned companies, including Chinese, Taiwanese, South
Korean, and Japanese businesses. 
Vietnam accepted 182 of the 227 recommendations made by the United Nations
Human Rights Council (HRC) at its June 2014 periodic review of Vietnam’s human
rights record, but rejected crucial recommendations such as release of political
prisoners and people detained without charge or trial, legal reform to end politi-
cally motivated imprisonment of people for their peaceful exercise of fundamen-
tal human rights, the creation of an independent national human rights
institution, and other steps to promote public political participation. In Novem-
ber, the National Assembly ratified the UN Convention against Torture and the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). 
Political Prisoners and Misuse of the Criminal Justice System
Vietnamese courts lack independence and continue to be used as political tools
of the CPV against critics. Trials are often marred by procedural and other irregu-
larities to achieve a politically pre-determined outcome. For example, during the
September 2014 trial of land rights activists from Duong Noi ward (Hanoi)
charged with “fighting against those on public duty,” the court refused to sum-
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mon witnesses who might have provided statements in favor of the accused and
prevented defense lawyer Tran Thu Nam from presenting his defense. 
Authorities use penal code provisions on “undermining national unity” and
“abusing the rights to democracy and freedom to infringe upon the interests of
the state” to crack down on dissent, though other laws such as disrupting public
order are also used. 
Independent writers, bloggers, and rights activists face police intimidation, ha-
rassment, arbitrary arrest, and prolonged detention without access to legal
counsel or family visits. 
In February 2014, activists Bui Thi Minh Hang, Nguyen Thi Thuy Quynh, and
Nguyen Van Minh were arrested on their way to visit fellow activist Nguyen Bac
Truyen on trumped up charges of causing traffic jams. The three were convicted
in August 2014 for causing public disorder under article 245 of the penal code
and received sentences of between two and three years in prison. 
The continued persecution of bloggers was highlighted in 2014 by the March tri-
als of Truong Duy Nhat and Pham Viet Dao for allegedly “abusing rights to
democracy and freedom” under article 258 of the penal code. Truong Duy Nhat
was sentenced to two years and Pham Viet Dao to 15 months. 
In May, the authorities arrested prominent blogger Nguyen Huu Vinh (often
known as Anh Ba Sam) and his colleague Nguyen Thi Minh Thuy, also for al-
legedly violating article 258. In total, at least 10 people were convicted under ar-
ticle 258 in 2014. 
Physical assaults against rights campaigners are common. In February 2014,
anonymous thugs assaulted and beat Huynh Ngoc Tuan and his son, Huynh
Trong Hieu, both of whom write blogs, in Quang Nam province. Two months ear-
lier, Huynh Ngoc Tuan had suffered broken bones in another assault that oc-
curred while he was campaigning for former political prisoners. 
In May thugs assaulted rights activist Tran Thi Thuy Nga, breaking her leg and
arm. In August, blogger Nguyen Bac Truyen was hit by a motorbike driven by two
anonymous men who had been keeping intrusive surveillance on him and his
family for months prior to the accident. In November, thugs assaulted and in-
jured former political prisoner and blogger Truong Minh Duc. Other bloggers and





Phuong Anh, Nguyen Van Thanh, Trinh Anh Tuan, Truong Van Dung, Tran Ngoc
Anh, Bui Tuan Lam, Pham Ba Hai, and Le Van Soc. No one was charged in any of
these cases. 
Freedom of Assembly, Association, and Movement
Vietnam bans all independent political parties, labor unions, and human rights
organizations. Authorities require official approval for public gatherings and re-
fuse to grant permission for meetings, marches, or protests they deem politically
or otherwise unacceptable. 
In April 2014, the police of Nha Trang city forcibly dispersed a human rights
meeting organized by prominent blogger Nguyen Ngoc Nhu Quynh (also known
as Mother Mushroom) and other activists. In July 2014, the Independent Journal-
ists Association of Vietnam (IJAVN) was established. In August and September,
police summoned members of the IJAVN— including founder Pham Chi Dung and
freelance journalist Nguyen Thien Nhan—for questioning about their writing. 
Domestic restriction of movement is used to prevent bloggers and activists from
participating in public events, such as anti-China protests, human rights discus-
sions, or attending trials of fellow activists. For example, writer Pham Dinh Trong
was detained briefly twice in 2014 so he could not participate in an anti-China
protest in Ho Chi Minh City in May or attend blogger Bui Thi Minh Hang’s trial in
August. 
The government has also prevented many critics from making trips outside Viet-
nam, citing “national security.” In February 2014, freelance journalist Pham Chi
Dung was prohibited from leaving Vietnam to attend Vietnam’s Universal Peri-
odic Review session in Geneva. Other bloggers and activists who have been
stopped from leaving Vietnam include Nguyen Thi Huyen Trang and Nguyen
Thanh Thuy (in April), and Pham Dac Dat (in July). 
Freedom of Religion
The government monitors, harasses, and sometimes violently cracks down on re-
ligious groups that operate outside official, government-registered, and govern-
ment-controlled religious institutions. Targets in 2014 included unrecognized
branches of the Cao Dai church, the Hoa Hao Buddhist church, independent
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Protestant and Catholic house churches in the central highlands and elsewhere,
Khmer Krom Buddhist temples, and the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam. At
least 20 people were convicted in the first nine months of 2014 for participating
in independent religious groups not approved by the government. 
In July, while Professor Heiner Bielefeldt, UN special rapporteur on freedom of re-
ligion or belief, was visiting Vietnam on an official mission, police intimidated
and put many dissidents and religious activists under house arrest so they could
not meet him. Fearing for the safety of activists, Bielefeldt cut short his planned
visits to An Giang, Gia Lai, and Kon Tum provinces. 
Abuses in Detention and Prison
Police brutality, including deaths in police custody, are an increasing source of
public concern in Vietnam. In 2014, even the heavily controlled state media fre-
quently published reports about police abuse. In many cases, those killed in po-
lice custody were being held for minor infractions. Police frequently engaged in
cover-ups, including by alleging the detainee’s suicide. Many detainees said
they were beaten to extract confessions, sometimes for crimes they say they did
not commit. Others said they were beaten for criticizing police officers or trying
to reason with them. Victims of beatings included children. 
In July, the Ministry of Public Security issued Circular 28 in attempt to curb police
abuse and misconduct during investigations. In September, the National Assem-
bly Judicial Committee held its first public hearing on forced confessions, tor-
ture, and other misconduct by police during investigations. 
Abuses in Drug Detention Centers
People dependent on drugs, including children, continue to be held in govern-
ment detention centers where they are forced to perform menial work in the
name of “labor therapy.” Violations of center rules and failure to meet work quo-
tas are punished by beatings and confinement to disciplinary rooms where de-
tainees claim they are deprived of food and water. In 2014, the government
developed a plan to “reform” the system that would not do away with forced
labor and, despite promises to close some centers and reduce the overall num-
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ber of detainees, would still leave more than 10,000 detainees in the system in
2020. 
Key International Actors
Vietnam’s most important foreign relations are with China and the United States,
but ties to Japan, the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions, and Australia are also significant. 
Vietnam’s relationship with China was complicated in 2014 by maritime territo-
rial disputes, which led to large street protests and violent riots in Vietnam. 
In the context of its “Asia pivot” aimed at containing China, the US pursued im-
proved military and economic relations with Vietnam while making efforts to
press Vietnam to improve its human rights record, delivering mixed messages.
Japan, the EU, and Australia, focusing on commercial relations, made inade-
quate efforts to support detained activists or otherwise advocate for improved




The fragile transition government that succeeded President Ali Abdullah Saleh in
2012 following mass protests failed to address multiple human rights challenges
in 2014. Violations in the context of several different armed conflicts, legally
sanctioned discrimination against women, child offenders facing the death
penalty, child marriage, child soldiers, attacks against journalists, unlawful de-
tention, human trafficking of migrants, and lack of accountability for the previ-
ous government’s human rights violations all persisted. 
All sides committed laws of war violations in fighting that broke out repeatedly in
different parts of the country in 2014, involving multiple actors including the
Yemeni armed forces, Houthi rebels, Islamist fighters, and the Islamist armed
group Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 
In September, following instances of security forces using excessive force
against Houthi protesters, a four-day armed conflict rocked Sanaa as Houthi
armed forces took the capital. The fighting in Sanaa ended on September 21 with
the signing of a peace agreement, the resignation of the prime minister, and the
formation of a new government in November. 
By September 2014, 334,512 people across Yemen were officially registered as
internally displaced due to fighting. 
Accountability
Yemen’s parliament voted in January 2012 to give former President Ali Abdullah
Saleh and his aides immunity from prosecution. In September 2012, however,
Saleh’s successor, President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi, decreed the creation of
an independent commission of inquiry to investigate alleged rights abuses com-
mitted during the 2011 uprising, and recommend measures to hold perpetrators
accountable and afford redress to victims. By November 2014, Hadi had still to
nominate the inquiry’s commissioners and no progress had been achieved. 
The government failed to implement human rights reforms recommended at the
10-month-long national dialogue conference (NDC) that concluded in January
2014. The NDC made hundreds of human rights and other recommendations for
legal reforms and relating to the drafting of a new constitution. However, the
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government took no significant steps to address the issue of accountability for
past human rights crimes by establishing a national human rights institution or
passing a transitional justice law, as the NDC had recommended. 
In response to NDC recommendations, in June the minister of social affairs and
labor and the minister of legal affairs jointly submitted a draft transitional justice
law for cabinet review. In November, both it and another bill on looted funds had
yet to be transmitted to parliament by the cabinet. 
Attacks on Health Workers
According to media reports, AQAP militants seized a hospital and two medical
centers in Shabwa governorate in southern Yemen on April 20, following a series
of government airstrikes that targeted AQAP training camps in the region. After
forcibly evacuating the hospital’s medical staff, AQAP militants reportedly
brought in a number of their own doctors to treat their wounded. In addition, ac-
cording to Yemeni media, suspected AQAP militants opened fire on a minibus
carrying staff members from a military hospital in Aden, southern Yemen, on
June 15, killing at least six people and wounding at least nine others. Human
Rights Watch was not able to independently verify these reports. 
Women’s and Girls’ Rights
Women in Yemen face severe discrimination in law and in practice. Women can-
not marry without the permission of their male guardian; they do not have equal
rights to divorce, inheritance, or child custody; and a lack of legal protection
leaves them exposed to domestic and sexual violence. The NDC produced many
recommendations to bolster women’s and girls’ rights. 
In response, in April, the minister of social affairs and labor, and the minister of
legal affairs, submitted a draft Child Rights Law to the cabinet. The draft law sets
the minimum age for marriage at 18, and provides criminal penalties of between
two months and one year in prison and a fine of up to 400,000 Yemeni Riyal
(US$1,860) for any authorized person who draws up a marriage contract know-
ing that at least one party is under 18. Any witnesses or signatories to the mar-





one party is under 18 face a prison sentence of between one and three months
and a fine of between 100,000 YER ($460) and 250,000 YER ($1,160).
The draft law also addresses other important rights for girls and women, includ-
ing criminalizing the practice of female genital mutilation, with penalties of be-
tween one and three years in prison and a fine of up to 1,000,000 YER ($4,644)
for those who carry out the cutting. The law remained pending in the cabinet at
time of writing. 
Children and Armed Conflict
The Child Rights Bill also addresses the recruitment of child soldiers and child
labor. Articles 162 and 250(b) prohibit the use or recruitment of child soldiers,
imposing a fine of up to 300,000 YER ($1,393). 
In May, Yemen signed an action plan with the United Nations to end and prevent
the recruitment of children by the armed forces. The plan includes reforming na-
tional laws, issuing military orders prohibiting the recruitment and use of chil-
dren, investigating allegations of recruitment, and providing for the reintegration
of child soldiers into their communities. According to the United Nations Chil-
dren’s Fund, UNICEF, the government has already taken concrete steps to imple-
ment the plan. 
According to the Ministry of Education and Teaching, armed conflicts in Amran,
Sanaa, and Shabwa led to the damage or destruction of at least 41 schools and
the occupation by armed forces of at least 6 schools in 2014. In addition, 31
schools were being used to house internally displaced persons. In November
alone, fighting in Ibb pushed authorities to temporarily close 169 schools serv-
ing 92,000 students, reopening them a week later. In Al Bayda, 11 schools in
Rada’ remained closed as of October 31, leaving 6,000 students without classes
to attend. 
US Drone Strikes
The United States continued its drone campaign against alleged AQAP members.
Independent research groups reported 23 US drone strikes in Yemen from Janu-
ary through November. The US remained unwilling to publish basic information
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on the attacks, including how many people the strikes killed or wounded, how
many of those were civilians, and which, if any, strikes it found to be unlawful. 
Previously, a US drone strike in December 2013 struck a wedding procession,
killing 12 people and wounding at least 15 others. A Human Rights Watch investi-
gation concluded that some, if not all, of the dead were civilians. In August 2014,
evidence surfaced that the families of those killed in the wedding strike alto-
gether received more than $1 million in compensation from the Yemeni govern-
ment. Previously, compensation has only been provided by the Yemeni
government when those killed were civilians.
Unlawful Use of Landmines
In November 2013, the government admitted, in response to reports by Human
Rights Watch and others, that a “violation” of the Mine Ban Treaty had occurred
in 2011 during the uprising that eventually ousted the Saleh government. Repub-
lican Guard forces loyal to the Saleh government laid thousands of antiperson-
nel mines in 2011 at Bani Jarmooz, northeast of Sanaa, causing numerous
civilian casualties. 
As a party to the Mine Ban Treaty, Yemen has committed to never use antiperson-
nel mines under any circumstances, and to prevent and suppress any prohibited
activities. At least 15 governments expressed concern at the use of landmines in
Yemen. In June at the Treaty’s Third Review Conference, Yemen stated that the
Military Prosecutor’s Office had begun an investigation to identify those respon-
sible. 
In March 2014, Yemen provided the Mine Ban Treaty‘s president with an interim
report that outlined plans for clearance, marking, risk education, and victim as-
sistance in relation to the Bani Jarmooz mines. In October, Human Rights Watch
was informed by locals that soldiers carried out mine clearance in one of the
contaminated areas. The soldiers also erected warning signs in the area. How-
ever, in a neighboring contaminated area there has been no mine clearance or
marking. Locals said that they had not received any risk education or victim as-
sistance. 
Since April 2013, Human Rights Watch has recorded at least seven new incidents
of civilian casualties cause by landmines, including one death. Since late 2011,
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landmines in the area have killed at least two civilians and wounded twenty oth-
ers. 
In September 2014, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs re-
ported that the Yemeni Mine Action Center suspended 30 percent of its high-pri-
ority survey and mine clearance activities due to a lack of funds. 
Human Trafficking
Since 2006, and particularly since a weakening of government control in some
areas following the 2011 uprising, human trafficking has thrived in Yemen. Traf-
fickers hold African migrants in detention camps, torturing them to extort pay-
ment from their families, often with the complicity of local officials. Following the
release of a report by Human Rights Watch documenting the trafficking industry,
the government stated that it embarked on a number of raids against the smug-
glers. 
It also requested the assistance of international organizations in addressing the
rescued migrants’ immediate needs, and to facilitate the voluntary return of
those wishing to return home. According to residents in the area where traffick-
ers operate their detention camps, by July 2014, government forces had ceased
their raids and the camps continued to function and held large numbers of
refugees from Syria as well as African migrants. 
Attacks on Journalists
In the first half of 2014, the Freedom Foundation, a Yemeni organization that
monitors press freedom, recorded 148 attacks affecting members of the media,
ranging from verbal harassment and threats, confiscations, looting, destruction
of property, and politicized prosecutions, to unlawful detention, and one killing.
In 47 percent of the cases reported, the abuses were attributed to the govern-
ment and its agents. In most other cases, the government had not condemned
the attacks, investigated them, or held those responsible to account. Nor did the






Yemen retains the death penalty for murder and a range of other crimes but the
authorities 
do not publish data on its use or publicize executions, which are normally car-
ried out by firing squad. In the past, Yemen has executed juvenile offenders—
those sentenced for crimes committed when they were under age 18—but
following international pressure, no juvenile offenders were sentenced to death
or executed in 2014, as far as Human Rights Watch is aware. 
Key International Actors
At their seventh ministerial level meeting in February, the 39 countries and 8 in-
ternational organizations that comprise the Friends of Yemen agreed a new
structure to realign support for Yemen with the priorities established by the NDC.
This saw the creation of working groups to support economic, political, and se-
curity reforms needed to complete Yemen’s democratic transition and agreement
on the allocation of most of approximately $7.9 billion previously pledged fund-
ing assistance. 
The US, the largest non-Arab donor, allocated $142.6 million in bilateral aid to
Yemen for 2014. 
Since May 2012, US President Barack Obama has in place an executive order al-
lowing the Treasury Department to freeze the US-based assets of anyone who
“obstructs” implementation of Yemen’s political transition. The implementation
of this executive order was scheduled to end with Yemeni presidential elections
in 2014. 
In October 2014, for the sixth consecutive year, Obama issued a full waiver al-
lowing Yemen to receive military assistance, despite documented use of child
soldiers by various forces, including government troops and progovernment mili-
tias. 
On February 26, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2140, which estab-
lished a sanctions regime that includes asset freezes and travel bans for those
undermining the political transition, impeding the implementation of the final
report of the NDC through violence or attacks on essential infrastructure, or hav-
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ing responsibility for international humanitarian law violations, and interna-
tional human rights law violations or abuses in Yemen. In November, the Yemen
Sanctions Committee imposed sanctions on former president Saleh and two
Houthi commanders that include a global travel ban and asset freezes. 
In September, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on Yemen that
highlighted the need for investigations into past abuses, the passage of a transi-
tional justice law, and the creation of an independent national human rights in-
stitution. In its report presented to the Human Rights Council and released in
August 2014, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights encouraged
the international community to establish an independent, international mecha-




The government of President Robert Mugabe continued to violate human rights
in 2014 without regard to protections in the country’s new constitution. An ex-
pected legislative framework and new or amended laws to improve human rights
in line with the constitution never materialized. 
Some 20,000 people, displaced by flooding from the Tokwe-Mukorsi dam in
Masvingo province in February, were evicted and resettled with little government
protection. They have not received adequate compensation, including land for
resettlement, and were pressured to relocate to land with disputed titles. When
displaced people protested in August, over 200 anti-riot police used excessive
force and beat and arrested about 300 people; 29 were charged with public vio-
lence. At time of writing, the case was still being heard in court. 
In the capital, Harare, many people have little access to potable water and sani-
tation. Police violated basic rights, such as freedom of expression and assem-
bly,using old laws that are inconsistent with the new constitution. Activists and
human rights defenders, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) people, faced police harassment. There has been no progress toward se-
curing justice for human rights abuses and past political violence, including vio-
lence after the 2008 election. 
New Constitution
The new constitution, which parliament approved in May 2013, enshrines re-
spect for the rule of law, and commits the government to fully implement and re-
alize the right to freedom of association, assembly, expression, and information. 
In a landmark ruling on July 22, 2014, the Constitutional Court declared criminal
defamation laws unconstitutional based on an interpretation of the old constitu-
tion. However, the government has yet to repeal or amend as appropriate other
laws, including the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA)
and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the provisions of which severely
restrict basic rights. Failure to amend or repeal these laws, and to address the
partisan conduct of police, severely limits the rights to freedom of expression,
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association, and assembly guaranteed in the new constitution and international
law. 
The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC), which was established as an
independent body under the constitution, is not fully operational due to lack of
adequate financial and human resources. The government has failed to
strengthen this institution. Its mandate remains narrow and limited to investigat-
ing alleged human rights abuses since February 2009. This prevents the com-
mission from investigating previous serious crimes, including election-related
violence in 2002, 2005, and 2008; the massacre of an estimated 20,000 people
in the Matebeleland and Midlands provinces in the 1980s; and mass demoli-
tions of homes and the evictions of 2005. 
Internally Displaced Persons
In February, the government removed an estimated 20,000 people from the
flooding of Tokwe-Mukorsi dam in Masvingo province, through a process fraught
with human rights problems. Many activists believe that the displacement could
have been done in a manner that minimized suffering, as those displaced lost
much moveable property for which they had not been compensated at time of
writing. 
The government failed to respect and protect the basic rights of those displaced
under domestic laws and the African Union Convention for the Protection and
Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, which Zimbabwe has rati-
fied. Instead of receiving fair compensation for the land they lost and allowed
freedom of movement, families were given the choice of tiny plots and becoming
farmworkers on a sugar cane plantation, or losing the inadequate aid offered by
the government. Should they accept the government’s deal, it is unclear whether
they could derive a sustainable living from, or steady tenure over, the plots,
whose titles appear to be in dispute. 
LGBT Rights
The government of Zimbabwe continues to violate rights of LGBT people guaran-
teed in the new constitution and international law, including the rights to non-
discrimination; liberty and security of the person and privacy; freedom of
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expression and thought; association; and peaceful assembly. For instance, it
was only after a lengthy court trial that the Harare Magistrates Court in February
cleared Martha Tholanah, chairperson of the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe
(GALZ), a nongovernmental organization (NGO). She was charged with running
an “unregistered” organization in contravention of article 6 of the Private Volun-
tary Organization (PVO) Act, which requires that all private voluntary organiza-
tions register with the PVO board. 
In March, police arrested two GALZ officials on charges of organizing a media
training workshop without police clearance, in violation of POSA. These attacks
on LGBT people, arbitrary arrests of LGBT activists by police, and the harassment
by state agents of GALZ in previous years, continue to drive many LGBT people
underground. 
Economic and Social Rights 
Presenting the 2014 National Budget in December 2013, Finance and Economic
Development Minister Patrick Chinamasa noted that Zimbabwe faced severe
socio-economic challenges, which he partly attributed to lack of transparency
and accountability in the exploitation of mineral resources, including diamonds. 
According to figures released by the International Monetary Fund in June, Zim-
babwe’s external debt obligations at the end of 2013 were estimated be US$10.6
billion (over 80 percent of the country’s gross domestic product). The govern-
ment is failing to achieve greater transparency in diamond production and rev-
enue collection, affecting its ability to invest in desperately needed public
services, including essential services such as water, education, health, and san-
itation. 
Public sector corruption and the deteriorating economy have severely impacted
the enjoyment of social and economic rights. By not addressing corruption and
other misuse of resources, the government has violated basic rights, such as the
right to water and sanitation, of millions of people in Harare, adversely impact-
ing their right to health. 
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Accountability for Past Abuses 
Lack of accountability for past abuses remains a serious problem in Zimbabwe.
The government has failed to ensure justice for victims more than five years after
the 2008 politically motivated violence in which the ruling Zimbabwe African Na-
tional Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), backed by state security forces, commit-
ted widespread and systematic abuses that led to the killing of up to 200
people, the beating and torture of 5,000 more, and the displacement of about
36,000 people. 
Human Rights Defenders and Opposition Political Parties
Police frequently misused provisions of POSA to ban lawful public meetings and
gatherings. Opposition and civil society activists were wrongly prosecuted and
charged under these laws. For instance, when hundreds of Women of Zimbabwe
(WOZA) members marched to petition parliament over the national economic sit-
uation on February 13, police violently broke up the march and dispersed the
demonstrators. 
In January, police arrested five activists from four NGOs—Chitungwiza Residents
Trust, Combined Harare Residents Association, Centre for Community Develop-
ment in Zimbabwe Trust, and Zimbabwe Human Rights Association—for partici-
pating in a demonstration in Chitungwiza. They were later released without
charge. Also in January, police arrested 12 leaders of the Zimbabwe National Stu-
dents Union. The students, who were beaten in police custody, were arrested
during a demonstration against poor education standards at Harare Polytechnic
College. 
On June 28, police in Victoria Falls arrested and detained for two days four mem-
bers of the Bulawayo Agenda organization on charges of contravening POSA by
allegedly failing to notify police of their public meeting. The court acquitted the
four. 
In July, authorities in Nyanga and Gweru separately charged the leader of the op-
position political party Transform Zimbabwe, Jacob Chengedzeni Satiya
Ngarivhume, with violating POSA for allegedly holding political meetings without




In August, Zimbabwe took over the leadership of the Southern Africa Develop-
ment Community (SADC), the 15-nation regional economic institution, for a year.
Zimbabwe’s poor human rights record could weaken the regional body’s ability
to press for human rights improvements across southern Africa. 
The European Union and other international donors in 2014 continued their pol-
icy of re-engagement with the government of Zimbabwe. This policy may have
contributed to the failure of donors to publicly confront the government over its
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